In close collaboration with the late Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp pioneered the theory and practice of 'the community of philosophical inquiry' (CPI) as a way of practicing 'Philosophy for Children' and prepared thousands of philosophers and teachers throughout the world in this practice. In Community of Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp represents a long-awaited and much-needed anthology of Sharp's insightful and influential scholarship, bringing her enduring legacy to new generations of academics, postgraduate students and (...) researchers in the fields of education, philosophy, philosophy of education, Philosophy for Children and philosophy of childhood. Sharp developed a unique perspective on the interdependence of education, philosophy, personhood and community that remains influential in many parts of the world. This perspective was shaped not only by Sharp's work in philosophy and education, but also by her avid studies in literature, feminism, aesthetic theory and ecumenical spirituality. Containing valuable contributions from senior figures in the fields in which Sharp produced her most focused scholarship, the chapters in this book present a critical overview of how Sharp's ideas relate to education, philosophy of education, and the Philosophy for Children movement as a whole. The historical and philosophical nature of this collection means that it will be a vital resource for philosophers and educators. It should also be of great interest to teacher educators and those involved in the study of pragmatism and feminism, as well as the history of education across the globe, particularly in the United States of America. (shrink)

When we speak about the aim of doing philosophy on the elementary school level with children as transforming classrooms into 'communities of inquiry', we make certain assumptions about nature and personhood and the relationship between the two. We also make certain assumptions about dialogue, truth and knowledge. Further, we make assumptions regarding the ability of children to form such communities that will engender care for one another as persons with rights, a tolerance for each other's views, feelings, imaginings, creations as (...) well as a care for one another's happiness equal to the concern one has for one's own happiness. Lastly, we make assumptions about children's ability to commit themselves to objectivity, impartiality, consistency and reasonableness. The latter has social, moral and political implications. This paper is an attempt to identify and clarify some of these assumptions. (shrink)

Life comes from physical or biological survival. But the good life comes from what we care about, what we value, what we think truly important, as distinguished from what we think merely trivial. What we care about is the source of the criteria we use to evaluate ideas, ideals, persons, events, things, and their importance in our lives. And it is these criteria that determine the judgments we make in our everyday lives. In the second edition of Thinking in Education, (...) Matthew Lipman has indicated the importance of fostering critical, creative and caring thinking in children, if one is to prepare them to make better judgments and live qualitatively better lives. He tells us that caring thinking is appreciative thinking, active thinking, normative thinking, affective thinking and empathetic thinking and then goes on to list a number of mental acts under each of these categories. Maybe it is because ‘caring thinking’ is not as common a term as ‘critical thinking’ and ‘creative thinking’ in everyday educational language that we stop for pause when we hear it. However when we read what Lipman says about caring thinking, we find ourselves nodding and saying to ourselves, ‘Yes, that makes sense. To think caringly means to think ethically, affectively, normatively, appreciatively and to actively participate in society with a concern for the common good’. In a real sense what we care about is manifest in how we perform, participate, build, contribute and how we relate to others. It is thinking that reveals our ideals as well as what we think is valuable, what we are willing to fight and suffer for. (shrink)

In this first part, Matthew Lipman offers the reader a glimpse at the thought processes that resulted in Philosophy for Children and, in so doing, ...

The overall purpose of this paper is to explore three related themes: feminist philosophy and philosophy for children have much in common including pegagogy, an inclusive orientation and fallibilist but critical epistemology, both feminism and philosophy for children benefit from a close reading of Peirce, but only philosophy for children draws explicitly on Peirce, and because of this common bond feminist philosophy and philosophy for children provide place to stand against the postmodern retreat to texts.e.

As I was thinking about what I would say to you tonight, I remembered myself in my freshman year at a Catholic girls high school. It was Spring and the nuns had told us that we would have a five-day retreat. Speakers would come to speak to us in the mornings and the afternoons would be reserved for reflection and reading. Of course, it was to be a silent retreat. No talking for five days.

Philosophy for Children engages students in philosophical deliberation characterized by dialogue, inquiry, reasoning and self-reflection. Philosophy for Children assumes a pluralistic conception of philosophy which, when practiced in a community of inquiry with children, is a necessary tool for the liberation from oppression. It is on this basis that an analogous relationship with feminist philosophy is established. Students of Philosophy for Children commit themselves, either consciously or unconsciously, to such principles as egalitarianism, respect for persons, fallibilism, pluralism, open-mindedness, tolerance, and (...) the procedures of democracy. Some procedures for philosophizing with children are enumerated. The author concludes that Philosophy for Children is not just a discipline to be added to the curriculum, but represents an alternative model of education in which thinking, questioning, self-correction, judgment making, collaboration, dialogue, and inquiry are central. (shrink)

Every child has a doll. I do. Do you have a doll? Is it a boy or a girl doll? If you have a doll, why don't you bring it along with you next time. Then we can all talk together. And there will be twice as many people in the group.

I finall am getting around to writing my short story. My name is Gabriel. Three years ago, I had a real problem. I was failing language arts. I liked the short stories and the novels that we read in class and at home, but I just couldn't write any stories of my own. And you had to write short stories, if you were going to pass language arts.

Geraldo is a philosophical novel, targeted at 9-10 year olds. The novel speaks directly to children who are learning to read, as well as children learning English as a second language. The work attempts to focus on reasoning skills embedded in language as well as on philosophical themes that arise when a child is learning to read a second language.

"Have you ever wondered how words began?" Monica asked. "I have," Stefan responded. "Did you come up with any theories?" "I'm afraid not," Stefan said. "The most I could think of was that perhaps words are what we make up to gather up the silence. That's not much of a theory." "I have a theory, Monica," I said. "Do you want to hear it?" The class settled down as if they were expecting a story.

The classroom community of inquiry aims at helping children make better judgments. If we can show that emotions are judgments or appraisals, it follows that they are educable. Such education of the emotions optimally should take place within the environment of communal inquiry with its focus on respect for persons, dialogue, concept formation, critical, creative and caring thinking. Children need help learning to identify their emotions, detecting assumptions upon which they lie and justifying these emotions to themselves and to others. (...) Such work involves helping children to be sensitive to the salient aspects of individual situations, developing a consciousness of criteria and the ideals from which these criteria ensue, and fostering a disposition to be willing to self correct when we discover through inquiry that our emotions are based on unwarranted beliefs. (shrink)

Historically, philosophy has not played a significant role in the preparation of elementary and middle school teachers in the twentieth century. However, if philosophy could be organized and sequenced, that is reconstructed, in such a way that it could be taught to prospective teachers in the same way that they could present it to children, both teachers and students could come to cultivate: reasoning skills, logical skills, inquiry skills, concept formation skills, translation skills, social and interpersonal skills.

By now, I would guess that thousands of teachers and children have read chapter one of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery by Matthew Lipman. It is the chapter in which Harry discovers, among other things, the Aristotelian notion of conversation. The students and the teahers have probably talked about truth, conversation, discovery, invention, mind, resentment, daydreaming, and perhaps even the role of Lisa as the one who supplies the counter-example to Harry's theory about language and how it works.

Sometimes I wonder how I ever got here. Other times I wonder what I'm doing here. Then I remember what happened and say to myself, "You don't come from here. You know you come from somewhere else. And soon you will be leaving here for good.".

Reasoning, reading and language arts program designed to help children develop cognitive skills in a sequenced yet cumulative manner.

Kantian Ethics aims to develop a defensible theory of ethics on the basis of Kantian principles. Its primary focus is Kantian ethics, not Kant scholarship or interpretation. The book fulfills a promise of Wood’s earlier book, Kant’s Ethical Thought , by developing a Kantian conception of virtue and theory of moral duties in greater detail, and it goes beyond Wood’s previous work on Kant’s ethics in offering extended treatments of substantive moral issues, such as social justice, sexual morality, punishment, lying, (...) consequentialism, personhood, and the status of non-rational animals.Acknowledging that his reading of Kant is now even further from traditional interpretations than it previously was, Wood contends that it is nevertheless “closer to the truth” . He aims to correct what he takes to be some serious misinterpretations of Kant’s views and, in setting the record straight, to provide for us “a better understanding of Kant’s own thoughts” . Some familiar points that Wood rejects are the ideas that Kant’s moral psychology involves a sharp dualism between nature and freedom, and that he was unconcerned with the empirical nature of human beings and human history, regarding such issues as entirely irrelevant to morality. (shrink)

Focusing on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, historical and contemporary critics of Kant's rationalist ethical theory accuse him of holding an impoverished moral psychology and an inadequate account of character and virtue. Kant's sharp contrast between duty and inclination and his claim that only action from duty possesses moral worth appear to imply that pro-moral inclination is unnecessary for, if perhaps compatible with, a good will. On traditional accounts of virtue, however, having a good will and (...) possessing virtue require pro-moral emotions and inclinations. Thus, Kant's moral psychology seems at odds with the common view that emotions and appetites are constituent elements within virtue. Kant's defenders have argued that an adequate assessment of these charges must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in The Doctrine of Virtue, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and the Lectures on Ethics. Yet the prospect for reconstructing a plausible Kantian account of virtue from these tests may appear bleak when we see that Kant conceives of virtue as moral strength of will over recalcitrant inclinations, and characterizes virtue in terms of the autocracy of pure practical reason. For autocracy may seem to require the extirpation or suppression of feelings and inclinations. Indeed, it might seem difficult to distinguish the autocratic agent from the agent who, in Aristotle's terms, is merely continent, or who, in Schiller's terms, possesses dignity, but not grace. But these objections misunderstand autocracy. In the thesis, I argue that the self-mastery constitutive of Kantian virtue involves the cultivation of sensibility according to reason and that emotions and appetites modified and regulated by a proper conception of the moral law play a constructive role within Kantian virtue. (shrink)

Anne Margaret Baxley offers a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of virtue, whose most distinctive features have not been properly understood. She explores the rich moral psychology in Kant's later and less widely read works on ethics, and argues that the key to understanding his account of virtue is the concept of autocracy, a form of moral self-government in which reason rules over sensibility. Although certain aspects of Kant's theory bear comparison to more familiar Aristotelian claims about virtue, Baxley (...) contends that its most important aspects combine to produce something different - a distinctively modern, egalitarian conception of virtue which is an important and overlooked alternative to the more traditional Greek views which have dominated contemporary virtue ethics. (shrink)