In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...) the body. Therefore, Udbhatabhatta seems to de-scribe the cognizing faculty according to a double ontology: it is both a principle and a characteristic, both inde-pendent and dependent. Two philosophical contexts—Vaisesika and Nyāya schools—are here taken into account as possible anti-Cārvāka fault-finding points of view that spured Udbhatabhatta to reconsider the Cārvāka per-spective. Although we do not have so much textual material on this particular aspect of the ancient and medieval philosophical debate in India, it nonetheless can be supposed that Udbhatabhatta’s reformulation of the concept of cognition was a tentative response to the Vaisesika idea that cognition is not an attribute of the body, rather of the mind (which is here supposed to be eternal), and to the Naiyāyika perspective according to which cognition would be an attribute of an everlasting self. In the case of the Nyāya school, fortunately we have at our disposal the criticism put forward by Vātsyāyana against the materialistic conception of cognition during this time. By examining some Vātsyāyana’s objections, it will emerge that Udbhatabhatta’s idea of cognition really seems to have the aspect of a consistent answer to them, from a renewed materialistic point of view. (shrink)

The article discusses Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpavṛtti and Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā commentaries on the “not without a cause” (nāpy ahetutaḥ) alternative of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1ab, from which it emerges that at least two distinct theories of causality can be attributed to the Lokāyata school. The first one is a physicalist theory that confines all causal relations within the sphere of material elements and is assimilated to accidentalism. The second one is a naturalist theory that attributes causal power to inner nature (svabhāva). The paper (...) discusses the theoretical differences between these two approaches, considers Bhāviveka’s and Avalokitavrata’s counter-arguments and concludes that some of the conjectures that modern scholars have put forward on the relation between svabhāvavāda, accidentalism and Lokāyata should be revised. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to provide a case study of textual hermeneutics in the context of Vedic literature. It will be shown how some interpretative pitfalls, into which contemporary translators have fallen, can be avoided if we broaden the perspective beyond the semantics of words and apply a principle of plausibility. The case study concerns the analysis of Ṛgveda 10.28, with special reference to the wildlife episodes depicted in verses 10cd-11ab. A few modern translations in Western languages (...) of 10cd are here considered. Some of them show that a principle of plausibility has been actually taken into account by their authors while approaching the text, albeit the result does not seem always entirely satisfactory. Some other translations seem not to carefully consider the broader context, therefore failing to convincingly make sense of the original text. After an introduction on the general subject of the hymn as it emerges from verses 1-9, i.e., the Vedic sacrifice and the subsequent consumption of the sacrificial offerings, arguments and textual evidence are provided in order to show how the reading of 10cd acquires a cogent and very plausible meaning if regarded in light of verse 11ab. (shrink)

Krishna Del Toso offre una penetrante analisi della cultura indiana sotto la particolare prospettiva della pratica marziale e della dimensione agonistica, riconducendole alla grande matrice di senso che è l’azione sacrificale sullo sfondo del grande testo classico Ṛgveda.

Introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione annotata del Madhyamakārthasamgraha attribuito a Bhāviveka.

In the Dunhuang manuscript IOL Tib J 709, which is a collection of writings concerning meditation, we come across a short text attributed to a Tibetan master called Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ (allegedly eighth-ninth centuries CE). In his work, Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ exposes a method of meditation that seems to be strongly indebted to Indian Mahāyāna scriptural sources. Besides, also a Chinese Chan influence is here detectable. Therefore, the method of meditation taught by Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ seems to represent a commingling of different elements from different contexts. (...) After a general introduction to the manuscript IOL Tib J 709, this study focuses on Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ’s text, discussing and analysing the following topics: its author and date, the Indian Mahāyāna possible sources, Chinese Chan elements, the meditational path described. An annotated translation of the text, along with its transliteration and the reproduction of the fac-simile of the corresponding portion of the manuscript, concludes the study. (shrink)

Abstract: This article shows how in the Pāli Nikāyas, after having defined Eternalism and Nihilism as two opposed positions, Gotama makes a dialectical use of Eternalism as means to eliminate Nihilism, upheld to be the worst point of view because of its denial of kammic maturation in terms of puñña and pāpa. Assuming, from an Eternalist perspective, that actions have effects also beyond the present life, Gotama underlines the necessity of betting on the validity of moral kammic retribution. Having thus (...) demonstrated the central ethical error of Nihilism, he subtly introduces peculiar Buddhist moral concepts (kusala/akusala) to purify the Eternalist vision from the doctrine of a real existing self (attāvāda) and from the puñña/pāpa dichotomy. We can summarize this dialectical course as follows: Nihilism is pāpa/akusala because it denies kamman, Eternalism is puñña/not-akusala because it upholds kamman from a non-Buddhist perspective, Buddhism is kusala because it admits the law of kamman not centred on a theory of a real existing self (anattāvāda). (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to shed light on why the citation taken from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti and occurring in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 7, opens the door to some fundamental reflections concerning the authority and the “nature” of this latter text. On the basis of a historical and doctrinal analysis, here a new interpretation is put forward, according to which the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa should be considered a tenth century CE handbook, written by some unknown Buddhist teacher perhaps as a manual (...) for his lessons. The primary purpose of this teacher seems to have been the discussion—in the light of textual sources compiled up to this time—of the doctrinal and philosophical perspectives contained in the sixth century CE Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa could have been composed on the basis of notes written down for the benefit of this teacher’s students. Moreover, the analysis of the general style and quotes or references of the text, on the one hand, compared with the passage containing the quote from Saraha, on the other hand, lead us to take seriously into consideration the possibility that the citation borrowed from the Dohākośagīti could have been embedded into the text a little after its composition, by someone different from its original author. (shrink)

Analisi di un aspetto di "circolarità" delle funzioni implicate nella teoria psicologica del buddhismo antico.

This article presents the first annotated English translation and edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 5, whose original Sanskrit is to be considered lost. The Introduction contains a primary analysis of contents and aims of the chapter, together with general observations on the epoch and compositional style of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. It is suggested that the text is probably a 10 th century explanatory handbook of Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā for beginner students. Chapter 5, in particular, relying strongly upon the (...) “two truths” dialectics, focuses on how students can consistently respond to the main objections opponents used to raise against the Madhyamaka standpoint. (shrink)

ATTI DEL IV «SEMINARIO POPOLARE SUL PENSIERO DELL'ESTREMO ORIENTE», TERMINI IMERESE (5-6 MAGGIO 2012).

Introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione del Madhyamakabhramaghāta, opera attribuita ad Āryadeva.

An interview with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya on Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy.

book review: Sylvain Lévi, "La dottrina del sacrificio nei Brāhmaṇa. Con tre saggi di Roberto Calasso, Charles Malamoud e Louis Renou", traduzione di Silvia D’Intino. Adelphi, Milano 2009, 224 pp.

Ciò che qui chiamo Materialismo indiano non deve intendersi come scuola filosofica unica ed univocamente impostata, bensì come insieme di correnti di pensiero, propugnanti differenti punti di vista, ma tutte collocate entro l’orizzonte concettuale che nega ciò che in Occidente si usa chiamare Trascendente. Inoltre, com’è ovvio, bisogna distinguere tra un Materialismo filosofico – che prenderò in considerazione qui – ed un Materialismo, per così dire, popolare – al quale mi riferirò solo se necessario. Due sono le impostazioni materialiste che (...) intendo trattare: l’una riguarda i sostenitori dell’esistenza di cinque elementi materiali (bhūtapañcakavādin) che chiamerò, seguendo Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, proto-Materialisti, l’altra concerne i sostenitori dell’esistenza di quattro elementi materiali (bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin), tra cui i Cārvāka. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch on the way Nāgārjuna deals with the idea of 'relation'. The concept of 'relation' as expressed in the Pāli sources is here theoretically systematized according to three patterns: 1. logical, 2. strictly subordinative existential, 3. non-strictly subordinative existential. After having discussed Nāgārjuna's acceptance and treatment of these three patterns, particular attention is paid to the non-strictly subordinative existential relation. This kind of relation is meant to describe the way the (...) factors of the conditioned co-origination are linked to each other and is exemplified by Nāgārjuna by means of the father-son bond. A possible way to explain the conditioned co-origination doctrine in the light of the father-son example is here suggested by having resource to the 'Cambridge change' theory. Even if in the Pāli Canon the non-strictly subordinative existential pattern is said to apply to all the other factors of the conditioned co-origination, there is no direct evidence that it concerns also the avidyā-saṃskāras link. It will be shown how Nāgārjuna, by applying it to the avidyā-saṃskāras link, seems to introduce a new perspective in the conditioned co-origination theory. RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é proporcionar um esboço da maneira na qual Nāgārjuna aborda a ideia de 'relação'. O conceito de 'relação' que encontramos nas fontes pāli é aqui sistematizado teoricamente conforme três padrões: 1. lógico, 2. existencial estritamente subordinativo, 3. existencial não estritamente subordinativo. Após ter discutido a recepção e o tratamento nagarjunianos desses três padrões, este estudo dedica atenção especial à relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa. Esse tipo de relação visa descrever a maneira na qual os fatores da cooriginação condicionada estão ligados entre eles, e é tipificada por Nāgārjuna pelo exemplo da ligação pai-filho. Para explicar a doutrina da cooriginação condicionada à luz do exemplo pai-filho, um modo possível aqui sugerido é por meio do recurso à teoria do 'Cambridge change'. Embora no cânone pāli se diga que o modelo de relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa se aplique a todos os outros fatores da cooriginação condicionada, não há nenhuma evidência direta de que ele concerna também à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras. Será mostrado como Nāgārjuna, ao aplicar esse modelo à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras, pareça introduzir uma nova perspectiva na teoria da cooriginação condicionada. (shrink)

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. (...) From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed. This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality. To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s original message. (shrink)

In questo saggio sono espresse alcune riflessioni concernenti l’orizzonte etico-morale proprio della scuola di materialismo indiana nota con il nome di Cārvāka/Lokāyata. La discussione si sviluppa secondo i seguenti punti: 1. Gli assunti ontologico-psicologici; 2. Gli assunti epistemologici; 3. L’etica e la morale; 4. Conclusioni.

Edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha attributed to Bhāviveka (based on the Co-ne, sDe-dge, dGa’-ldan and sNar-thaṅ versions), along with an Italian translation and an introductory philosophical study.

In Āryadevapāda’s Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi we find a problematic passage in which some Cārvāka theories are expounded. The problem here lies in the fact that, according to Āryadevapāda, the Cārvākas—who did not admit rebirth—would have upheld that happiness in this life can be gained by worshipping gods and defeating demons. As the Cārvākas were materialists, the reference to gods and demons does not fit so much with their philosophical perspective. In this paper, by taking into account several passages from Pāli and Sanskrit (...) Buddhist sources, I have tried to demonstrate that Āryadevapāda is here probably following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, where mention is made of some Lokāyatikas who are said to have been able to infatuate gods and demons. In both the Pāli Canon and the Mahāyāna sūtras, however, the term lokāyata does not refer to “materialism”. It rather conveys the meaning of “art of disputation”, and is generally used in the description of brāhmaṇas well versed in the Vedas, in the recitation of mantras and in dialectic methods in general. It is the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that introduces the idea—corroborated also by a passage from the Mahābhārata—that these brāhmaṇas, skilled in lokāyata, would have indulged in some materialistic tenet. When the two terms, Cārvāka and Lokāyata, came both to mean “materialism”, around the IV century CE, it is highly probable that non-Cārvāka thinkers and commentators—as could be the case of Āryadevapāda—had in some occasion assimilated and integrated certain points of view, originally belonging to the ancient lokāyata perspective (for instance, the references to gods and demons), into what they believed Cārvāka philosophy had to be. (shrink)

In this book the reader will find a tool-set of suggestions and thoughts, specifically selected for stimulating and enhancing a strategic approach to the early stage of assessment, validation and development of a business idea. This book doesn’t provide definitive solutions, nor a recipe for success, since definitive solutions and recipes for success (if they really exist) hardly can depend on reading a book. Rather, by taking inspiration from different philosophies and philosophers, each chapter will provide concepts, perspectives and examples (...) that can help the would-be entrepreneur to widen, change or clarify her/his own point of view, in order to strengthen her/his strategic thinking. The process that strategic thinking helps us to accomplish is first of all aimed at putting a functional and useful order among our thoughts, and accordingly at figuring out which particular actions should be done and in which sequence. Founding and developing a business today is indeed more and more an exercise that must hold together in a harmonious and complementary way a vision and a practice. An idea, with its load of aspirations, intuitions and desires, and an operative strategy, aiming at defining options, choosing timing, and developing suitable products and services. In other words, running a business is today more than ever before an exercise of sense, of excellent sense, in fact. And philosophy, when it comes to looking for sense in things, can offer surprising theoretical and practical advices. (shrink)

This article deals with the meaning and function of saññā in perception according to the Suttapiṭaka. As regards its meaning, the discussion stresses the fact that the renderings “perception” and “apperception” seem to overinterpret the actual function/activity of saññā. Also the translations “idea” and “ideation” should be used cautiously, in order to avoid misunderstandings, since these terms are fraught with very specific philosophical and psychological implications in the Western context. Moreover, though “cognition” could be a good rendering, “recognition” seems to (...) be a more adequate translation for saññā, because it conveys the meaning of both cognizing and naming, which are the two main activities carried out by saññā. In this sense, cognition should be envisaged as a recording process that labels (and gives names to) the data coming from the senses. As regards its role in perception, saññā takes place after contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā). Its task is to collect the not yet well-defined information provided by phassa and vedanā, and to organize this information into a datum that can be made available to, and handled by, the consciousness (viññāṇa). The task of viññāṇa, in its turn, is to interpret this datum according to sujbective “values”. The present study stresses also the fact that the recognition carried out by saññā can be either simple (colors, tastes, etc.) or complex (danger, death, etc.). For this reason, after having dealt with simple perceptions, a section is devoted to the analysis and possible explanation of complex recognitions. Moreover, since the textual sources record the fact that saññā can fail its task to recognize things, another section is added, in which incorrect recognitions are taken into consideration. (shrink)

This is the second part of a three-part study dealing with the Madhyamaka accounts of, and commentaries on, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. Here Avalokitavrata’s discussion of the tale and the stanzas is dealt with, together with the Tibetan edition and English translation of the corresponding passage from his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.

With the present study an analysis in three parts is provided of the Buddhist reception of two Cārvāka/Lokāyata stanzas, abbreviated as "wolf's footprint" and the "beautiful lady". These stanzas seem to be conceptually related to each other, having the common aim to emphasize the idea that one should rely only upon what is or can be perceived. Consequently, from here it is concluded that any perspective concerning the existence of an afterlife or of a moral retribution of our actions, since (...) these things cannot be directly perceived, should be abandoned. The first part of the article is a study of the occurrences of the two stanzas in the Buddhist sources, taking into account also new material, recently discovered, together with a comparison with the Jain sources. The second and third parts discuss respectively Avalokitavrata's and Jayānanda's interpretations of the stanzas, offering also for the first time to the reader a translation and analysis of their versions of the "wolf's footprint" tale, so far studied only from Jain sources. (shrink)

This is the third and final part of a study focused on the Madhyamaka accounts of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. In particular, this paper discusses Jayānanda’s short account of the tale and the stanzas contained in his Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. The Tibetan edition and English translation of Jayānanda’s relevant passages are also provided.

ATTI DEL CONVEGNO DI FILOSOFIA «IL SÉ – TRA ORIENTE E OCCIDENTE», TRIESTE (11-12 GENNAIO 2010).

La siguiente es una reseña del estudio realizado por el profesor Francisco Rodríguez Valls de la Universidad de Sevilla respecto a la incertidumbre que supone la naturaleza y la condiciónn de la realidad humana. El análisis se avoca a una visión paranorámica del trabajo del profesor Valls, y de manera introductoria apunta los aspecto claves de su texto a fin de que el lector pueda hacerse una idea clara y concisa de la propia postura del autor.

This volume critically explores the cultural significance and fate of 'the literary' in the European and Indian traditions as it traces the history of the reception of works that have a deep hold on the lives and sensibilities of people across time and culture. The book grapples with three major concepts in the humanities-the literary, the philosophical/theological, and the historical. It looks at Homer's reception by Plato; Virgil's reception by Christianity; the many responses that The Mahabharata has received over centuries (...) and across cultures in India; and the reception of Kumaravyasa's Kumaravyasabharata, among other works, and analyses the understanding of truth, time, and history that influence the reading of these works in different times and cultural contexts. Part of the Critical Humanities across Cultures series, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of philosophy, literature, history, comparative literature, cultural studies and post-colonial studies. (shrink)

The use of Nasogastric (NG) feeding in the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration at the end of life has, for the most part, been regarded as futile by the medical community. This position has been led chiefly by prevailing medical data. In Singapore, however, there has been an increase in its utilization supported primarily by social, religious and cultural factors expressly to prolong life of the terminally ill patient. Here this article will seek to review the ethical and clinical (...) impact of this treatment and provide some understanding for such decisions in the light of the Duty of Palliative Care [DoPC]. Complemented by virtue ethics theory, the DoPC highlights and seeks to realize the individual case specific goals of care that maximize comfort and quality of life of the patient in the face of rapid attenuation of treatment options and the eminence of the final outcome by considering each of these factors individually in order to provide the best outcome for the patient and the family. (shrink)

Ali comparative studies imply simultaneously an identity and a difference, a situation that is replete with intellectual difficulties which give rise to interminable disputes regarding whether we are talking about the same thing or different things. One may cut the gordian knot by deciding either way, but the situation would reappear again as it is bound up with the comparative perspective itself and not with any particular example of it. How long shall we go on “naming”, for the process is (...) unending and ultimately “everything is what it is. and not another thing”. Or, if we do not like “names” as they hardly give us any knowledge and if we opt for “description” which gives us “facts”, then they too are as unending as the “names”, for, as the Jains taught us long ago, they are a function of the dṛṣti that we have or the point of view that we adopt. (shrink)

The volume editors have organized the volume as a set of ten couplets and triplets.

God as a term denoting that which is ultimately real and absolutely valuational is simultaneously the necessary presupposition of all thought and action and also their ultimate goal. Yet, it is equally true that it is neither known nor even knowable in principle in the sense that any finite being or set of such beings may hope to know it in any determinate manner. Being generally conceived as beyond both space and time and transcending them in the sense that, even (...) when considered as immanent in the world, It can never be regarded as completely revealed at any particular point in space or time, it cannot but be unknown and unknowable in the deepest sense of the word. Yet, however paradoxical the idea of God may be, it is a symbol of that which man as a self-conscious reflective being, who both knows and acts, has to encounter at every turn. (shrink)

Familial determination, replete with its frequent usurping of patient autonomy, propagation of collusion, and circumnavigation of direct patient involvement in their own care deliberations, continues to impact clinical practice in many Asian nations. Suggestions that underpinning this practice, in Confucian-inspired societies, is the adherence of the populace to the familial centric ideas of personhood espoused by Confucian ethics, provide a novel means of understanding and improving patient-centred care at the end of life. Clinical experience in Confucian-inspired Singapore, however, suggests that (...) personhood is conceived in broader terms. This diverging view inspired a study of local conceptions of personhood and scrutiny of the influence of the family upon it. From the data gathered, a culturally appropriate, clinically relevant and ethically sensitive concept of personhood was proposed: the Ring Theory of Personhood that better captures the nuances of local conceptions of personhood. The Ring Theory highlights the fact that, far from being solely dependent upon familial centric ideals, local conceptions of personhood are dynamic, context dependent, evolving ideas delineated by four dimensions. Using the Ring Theory, the nature of familial influences upon the four dimensions of personhood – the Innate, Individual, Relational and Societal – are examined to reveal that, contrary to perceived knowledge, conceptions of personhood within Confucian societies are not the prime reason for the continued presence of this decision-making model but remain present within local thinking and practices as a sociocultural residue and primarily because of inertia in updating ideas. (shrink)

Small and medium-sized firms form 90% of the worldwide population of businesses. However, it has been argued that given their smaller scale of operations, resource access constraints and lower visibility, smaller firms are less likely to participate in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This article examines the different economic motivations of firms with varying combinations of visibility, resource access and scale of operations. Arguments are presented to propose that in terms of visibility, resource access and operating scale, very small and (...) very large firms are equally motivated to participate in CSR. However, the motivational bases for CSR participation are likely to be different. Medium-sized firms are the least motivated. This suggests a U-shaped relationship between firm size and CSR participation. This study contributes towards resolution of the long-standing debate on the effects of firm size on CSR participation, and highlights the importance of considering configurations of firm characteristics in the study of CSR outcomes. In conclusion, cautions are raised against the broad categorization of firms, without adequate attention to the underlying dimensions of such categorizations. (shrink)

To talk of God is almost a presumption, for who can say with any certainty that it is or if it is, in what sense of “is” it is, and what is its nature. And, perhaps, of all those who talk of God, the philosopher is the least qualified, as by temperament and training he lives in a world where concepts and arguments and ratiocinative thought are more real than anything else. And God, whatever it may or may not be, (...) is not an idea or a concept or the conclusion of a well-reasoned chain of argumentation. Nor is it even a hypothesis to be tested or a necessary postulate without which our experience would make no sense and life cease to have a meaning. (shrink)