Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, (...) mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology. (shrink)

This article describes the main topics of Descartes’ ethics through discussion of key primary texts and corresponding interpretations in the secondary literature. Although Descartes never wrote a treatise dedicated solely to ethics, commentators have uncovered an array of texts that demonstrate a rich analysis of virtue, the good, happiness, moral judgment, the passions, and the systematic relationship between ethics and the rest of philosophy. The following ethical claims are often attributed to Descartes: the supreme good consists in virtue, which is (...) a firm and constant resolution to use the will well; virtue presupposes knowledge of metaphysics and natural philosophy; happiness is the supreme contentment of mind which results from exercising virtue; the virtue of generosity is the key to all the virtues and a general remedy for regulating the passions; and virtue can be secured even though our first-order moral judgments never amount to knowledge. -/- Descartes’ ethics was a neglected aspect of his philosophical system until the late 20th century. Since then, standard interpretations of Descartes’ ethics have emerged, debates have ensued, and commentators have carved out key interpretive questions that anyone must answer in trying to understand Descartes’ ethics. For example: what kind of normative ethics does Descartes espouse? Are the passions representational or merely motivational states? At what point in the progress of knowledge can the moral agent acquire and exercise virtue? Is Descartes’ ethics as systematic as he sometimes seems to envision? (shrink)

Al-Ghazālı̄ famously claims in the Incoherence of the Philosophers that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are unbelievers because they hold philosophical positions that conflict with Islam. What is less well-known, however, is that Averroës claims in the Decisive Treatise that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are not unbelievers; rather, al-Ghazālı̄ is the true unbeliever for writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. In this paper, my aim is to present a sustained reconstruction of Averroës’ legal and philosophical argument for why al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever. The (...) crux of Averroës’ argument is that al-Ghazālı̄ has expressed false allegorical interpretations of scripture to unqualified persons, which has led them into unbelief. By being causally responsible for other people’s unbelief, al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever as well. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error has received much attention in recent literature, often in the context of comparing him with Descartes. However, there is one curious text that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. In his account of how he overcame scepticism vis-à-vis a divine light cast unto his heart, al-Ghazālī makes a cryptic claim that suggests that primary truths are inherent to the mind, and that said cognitive status of primary truths is related to (...) his overcoming of scepticism. Although this one text does not straightforwardly prove that al-Ghazālī is a nativist, I argue that there are other texts that plausibly reveal his nativism. As such, I argue that al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist, and I reconstruct a way in which his nativism helps explain how he overcomes scepticism. In doing so, I defend the (standard) strong divine interventionist reading of al-Ghazālī’s response to scepticism, against Hadisi’s recent weak divine interventionist reading. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of Descartes's ethics maintains that virtue presupposes knowledge of metaphysics and the sciences. Lisa Shapiro, however, has argued that the meditator acquires the virtue of generosity in the Fourth Meditation, and that generosity contributes to her metaphysical achievements. Descartes's ethics and metaphsyics, then, must be intertwined. This view has been gaining traction in the recent literature. Omri Boehm, for example, has argued that generosity is foundational to the cogito. In this paper, I offer a close reading of (...) Cartesian generosity, arguing that the meditator cannot acquire generosity in the Second or Fourth Meditation. (shrink)

A revisionary reading of Descartes's epistemology has emerged in the literature. Some commentators have argued that Descartes subscribes to passionate epistemology, which claims that epistemic progress in the Meditations requires contributions from the meditator's passions. This paper argues that the passions cannot perform any epistemic work in the Meditations. As such, the meditator's passions do not require us to revise our canonical understanding of the Meditations as an exercise of pure thought. Furthermore, we need not abandon the standard claim that (...) ethical practice emerges in the tree of philosophy only after metaphysics and epistemology have been established. (shrink)

In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation : the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes’ virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist (...) solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief. (shrink)

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...) helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power. (shrink)

Commentators have neglected a tension in Descartes’s virtue theory. In some texts, Descartes seems to argue that there are distinct virtues. In other texts, Descartes seems to argue that there is only a single virtue—the firm and constant resolution to use the will well. In this paper, I reconcile this tension. I argue that Descartes endorses a specific version of the unity of the virtues thesis, namely, the identity of the virtues. Nonetheless, Descartes has the resources to draw conceptual distinctions (...) between various virtues. Distinct virtues are conceptually generated when we regard the firm and constant resolution to use the will well in different ways, that is, based on the different ways this resolution manifests in moral situations. (shrink)

That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims of early modern philosophy. The significance of this (purported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical, infused in how we teach and think about the _Meditations_. Though prevalent, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his analysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized this, (...) given his insistence that God is not a deceiver, and the role this plays in his system. But this is a concession Descartes can grant if we are careful about the kind of deception at play—a kind Descartes _does_ recognize, albeit not without some ambiguity. On our story, Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology are not driven by concerns about deception _per se_, but by concerns about God’s _benevolence_. (shrink)

We propose a novel reading of Descartes' views on the nature of pain, thirst, and hunger: imperativism. According to imperativism, rather than (exclusively) having intentional contents individuated by a set of correctness conditions specifying the way the world is, pain thirst, and hunger have contents individuated by satisfaction conditions, which specify the way the world ought to be. Unlike representationalist treatments, the imperativist reading satisfies the unique health-preserving role Descartes sets out for pain, thirst, and hunger, without inflating his austere (...) metaphysics of res extensa. (shrink)

In recent literature commentators have challenged the standard interpretation that the Cartesian Self is a res cogitans. Various modifications have been proposed: the will should be regarded as an essential feature of thought as well (not just the intellect), and even the body – in some sense – belongs to the Cartesian Self. While these modifications are important, commentators have neglected Descartes’ wholly different conception of the Self in the Passions of the Soul. In his definition of generosity, Descartes claims (...) that the Cartesian Self is a res volans: the only thing that truly belongs to the generous person is her free will. I aim to unpack what Descartes means in the “truly belongs” locution (TBL), ultimately arguing for what I call the weak essentialist reading. Descartes’ grounds for claiming that free will truly belongs to the Cartesian Self is that free will constitutes the activity – not passivity – of the mind. And that is the most important property in the essence of a mental substance. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that foundational to attaining Cartesian generosity, both as a passion and as a virtue are the clear and distinct perceptions of mind, God, and body. I challenge Lisa Shapiro’s account of generosity, and her suggestion that generosity regulates the passions expressed in the Meditations. Unlike Shapiro I attend closely to the distinction between the passion of generosity and the virtue of generosity, and how to acquire these different states of the soul. I propose that the (...) passion of generosity cannot be aroused in the soul until after the meditations have been completed and the full inventory of clear and distinct perceptions attained. I interpret the meditations as orienting the meditator towards attaining virtue; by putting her in a position to attend frequently to the nature of free will after the six meditations have been completed. I interpret this frequent attendance to the will as a “Seventh Meditation,” which arouses the passion of generosity. After the passion has been attained, the virtue of generosity can then be acquired through self-cultivation, which instills generosity as a habit of the soul. The virtue of generosity is what allows one to gain mastery of the passions, and I provide an account of how this can be done through a process of reconditioning the passions. (shrink)

Descartes is not widely recognized for his ethics; indeed, most readers are unaware that he had an ethics. However, Descartes placed great importance on his ethics, claiming that ethics is the highest branch of his philosophical system. I aim to understand the systematic relationship Descartes envisions between his ethics and the rest of his philosophy, particularly his metaphysics and epistemology. I defend three main theses. First, I argue against the recent trend in the literature that claims that the chief virtue (...) in Descartes’ ethics—generosity—is acquired in the Meditations. On this view, the presence of moral virtue in the Meditations shows that ethical practice is intertwined with metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that generosity cannot be acquired in the Meditations because acquiring generosity presupposes several metaphysical and physical truths that the meditator cannot access given her epistemic position. Thus, I maintain that metaphysics and epistemology is foundational to ethics. Second, I resolve the tension between Descartes’ description of distinct virtues, and his insistence that there is only a single virtue—the disposition to judge well. Drawing from his theory of conceptual distinction in his metaphysics, I argue that Descartes offers a unique account of the unity of the virtues. Although Descartes describes different virtues, he thinks that all of them are identical to each other because they are reducible to the disposition to judge well. Nonetheless, we can conceptually distinguish between the virtues because we can regard the disposition to judge well in different ways given the various applications it has in different types of moral situations. Third, I show that some of Descartes’ ethical concepts inform his epistemology. I draw from Descartes’ theory of virtue to address “the problem of knowledge preservation,” that is, how to render perfect knowledge— scientia—stable in light of the instability of clear and distinct perceptions. I argue that Descartes intends to preserve scientia by grounding items of scientia in virtuous habits of belief. These habits of belief are established through repeated engagement with cognitive routes to clear and distinct perceptions, and are ultimately grounded in memory. This reading has the advantage of explaining Descartes’ notoriously confusing remarks about memory in response to the Cartesian circle. (shrink)

Most ethical discussions about diet are focused on the justification of specific kinds of products rather than an individual assessment of the moral footprint of eating products of certain animal species. This way of thinking is represented in the typical division of four dietary attitudes. There are vegans, vegetarians, welfarists and ordinary meat -eaters. However, the common “all or nothing” discussions between meat -eaters, vegans and vegetarians bypass very important factors in assessing dietary habits. I argue that if we want (...) to discover a properly assessed moral footprint of animal products, we should take into consideration not only life quality of animals during farming or violation of their rights—as is typically done—but, most of all, their body weight, life time in farms and time efficiency in animal products acquisition. Without these factors, an assessment of animal products is much too simplified. If we assume some easily accepted premises, we can justify a thesis that, regardless of the treatment of animals during farming and slaughtering, for example, eating chicken can be 163 times morally worse than eating beef, drinking milk can be 58 times morally better than eating eggs, and eating some types of fish can be even 501 times worse than eating beef. In order to justify such a thesis there is no need to reform common morality by, for example, criticizing its speciesism. The thesis that some animal products are much worse than others can be justified on common moral grounds. (shrink)

DESCARTES’S PASSIONS OF THE SOUL AND THE CONTEMPORARY DISPUTE ABOUT THE NATURE OF EMOTION In my article I discuss the connection between the Cartesian theory of passions of the soul and the contemporary dispute between the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions. Defenders of the cognitive theory of emotions identify emotions with judgments. On the other hand, non-cognitivists claim that emotions are feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating to the autonomic and motor functions. Both cognitivists’ and non-cognitivists’ approaches (...) meet serious problems. In the paper, I want to show that the Cartesian theory of passions can be considered an anticipation of contemporary views and a compromise between the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions. Keywords: DESCARTES, NATURE OF EMOTION, SOUL, COGNITIVE AND NON-COGNITIVE THEORIES OF EMOTIONS. (shrink)

In my paper I discuss the argument that the absence of the legal possibility to contract same-sex marriages is discriminatory. I argue that there is no analogy between the legal situation of same-sex couples and African-Americans, women or disabled persons in the nineteenth century. There are important natural differences between same-sex and different-sex couples that are good reasons for the legal disparities between them. The probability of having and raising children is one of them. Therefore, demanding that same-sex couples have (...) rights similar to those that married couples currently have in Poland and justifying that claim by alleged discrimination is neither correct nor fair. (shrink)

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's (...) claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical. (shrink)

My paper is a reaction to polemic of Tomasz Sieczkowski "Discrimination nonetheless. A reply to Krzysztof Saja” [ICF "Diametros" (36) 2013] that he wrote against my paper "Discrimination against same-sex couples" [ICF “Diametros" (34) 2012]. The purpose of the paper is to refute Sieczkowski’s objections that rely on wrong interpretation of the structure of my main argument. I will describe the proper course of the reasoning that I have expressed in the first article and undermine the Sieczkowski’s proposal to (...) justify gay marriages by referring to values such as dignity, freedom and equality. (shrink)

The primary goal of this monograph is to justify the possibility of building a hybrid theory of normative ethics which can combine ethical consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. The aim of the book is to demonstrate the possibility of constructing a synthetic theory from ethical traditions that are generally considered to be contradictory. In addition, I propose an outline of an original theory which tries to carry out such a synthesis. I call it Institutional Function Consequentialism. The justification for a (...) hybrid theory of normative ethics requires the resolution of certain meta-ethical issues. I discuss them in part 1.1. After a brief overview of my research aims I consider the answer to the following questions: “What kind of meta-ethical beliefs must we assume for normative ethics?” and "Why should we build ethical theories?". I also discuss the various forms of ethical scepticism, which should be rejected if we develop a hybrid theory of normative ethics. I also describe possible methods of justifying any ethical theory. At the end of part 1.1 I explain that the best method for justifying any ethical theory is the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In parts 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 I analyse three main types of normative ethics which are considered to be competitive: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Part 1.2 is about consequentialism and its difference between utilitarianism and teleological theories. I also present the main reasons for the popularity of consequentialism. In part 1.3 I define deontology, present its variations and show important benefits that motivate its continuous growth. In part 1.4 I discuss virtue ethics, which is often referred as the viable alternative to consequentialism and deontology. If we want to build any new ethical theory, first we should describe the problems of the old ones. For this reason, in chapter 2 I describe the most important arguments against ethical consequentialism, and in chapter 3 I explain the difficulties of deontology. Critical remarks on virtue ethics are considered in part 1.4. The last two chapters directly concern the main aim of the monograph. Because in chapter 3 I show that deontology suffers from a number of problems such as the paradox of deontology, in chapters 4 and 5 I present only consequentialist versions of hybrid theories. These versions try to avoid the common pleas of utilitarianism and combine the advantages of opponents to utilitarianism. I answer the question (4.1) "What is hybrid consequentialism?" and briefly describe (4.2) the most important examples of hybrid theories by others. I discuss the prerogatives without restrictions idea by Samuel Scheffler, rule consequentialism by Brad Hooker, Kantian consequentialism by Richard M. Hare, David Cummiskey and Derek Parfit and consequentializing procedure proposed by Douglas W. Portmore. In the last chapter I present a new hybrid version of consequentialism that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism. I start from the thesis (5.1) that traditional meta-ethics of analytic philosophy incorrectly defines the main field of its research. Rather than focusing on the philosophy of language and metaphysics it should try to answer one question: “What should morality and ethics be for?”. Therefore I introduce an original methodology for meta-ethics that I call the Functional Model of Analysis (FMA). It is a meta-ethical framework in which the fundamental questions concern the practical functions of normative domains such as morality and ethics and the most rational way of achieving them. FMA is meta-ethical project that (a) explains the persistence of fundamental ethical disagreement among experts, (b) sets the background for explaining or justifying the correct structure of the ethical theory, (c) gives the possibility to create a hybrid theory of normative ethics. In part 5.2 I formulate a generalized argument against various popular theories of normative ethics which states that most of the popular theories are too narrow and one-sided, causing permanent dispute between them. There are many distinct practical functions of morality that are usually based on different types of normative theories such as Aristotelian ethics, utilitarianism, contractarianism and contractualism. In order to remove these conflicts, the correct ethical theory should try to take into account all of these relevant features of moral life. Unfortunately, most ethical theories are mono-functional. This means that their supporters consciously or unconsciously (1) recognize or accept only one genuine practical function, (2) think that this one practical function overrides all other practical functions or (3) try to reduce all practical functions to the one that is chosen. In part 5.2 I present a description and justification of a new normative account that I call Hybrid Function Consequentialism. The formal scheme of this consequentialism can be summarized in the following way: we should act according to some important focal points P1…Pn with contents C1…Cn that are selected on the basis of considerations about which kind of P with C will bring the best realization of the best mix of normative functions F1...Fn. In the next part (5.2.2) I present the new way of “consequentializing” particular theories of normative ethics by applying the scheme of Hybrid Function Consequentialism. As an example of the use of this procedure, I formulate perfectionist virtue consequentialism, contractarian institution consequentialism, contractualist rule consequentialism and consequentialism of salvation. In part 5.3 I formulate an original theoretical concept that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism (IFC). It is a hybrid theory that is based on the previously described Functional Model of Analysis and a reflection on the role of institutions in modern developed societies. IFC claims that we should always act according to some rules, virtues, motives and intentions that constitute the homeostasis of normative institutions whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of the best realization of the equilibrium of the most important practical functions of normative domains. Responsibility and sanctions related to wrongful actions should be dependent on the particular institution whose standards have been violated. IFC has several unique features which are described and justified in part 5.3. It is a form of hybrid consequentialism – it mixes features of consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. It does this on three different levels: justification, structure and content. The main focal point of the theory is not rules or virtues, but normative institutions. Values to be optimized in the framework of consequentialism are not "happiness", "well-being" or "preferences", but the fulfilment of normative functions. IFC is not limited to the field of ethics only, but it is a meta-normative account of justification for an entire social order which is comprised of a number of different institutions. It also assumes a specific, circular relationship between practical ethics (e.g. research on such important issues as civil disobedience, fair distribution of wealth, philosophy of punishment or autonomy of conscience), and the content of the general rules that may constitute the optimal homeostasis of institutions. It rejects the simplistic belief that moral thinking is based solely on deductive implications from general ethical principles or meta-ethical beliefs. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples (...) of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here. (shrink)

Authorized Polish translation of Rabinowicz, Wlodek "Preference utilitarianism by way of preference change?" In: Grüne-Yanoff, Till and Hansson, Sven Ove, 'Preference change: approaches from philosophy, economics and psychology.' Theory and decision library A. Springer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp. 185-206. ISBN 9789048125920. Translated by Krzysztof Saja.

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's (...) claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical. (shrink)

The article is a reductio ad absurdum of assumptions which are shared by a large number of followers of the animal welfare movement and utilitarianism. I argue that even if we accept the main ethical arguments for a negative moral assessment of eating meat we should not promote vegetarianism but rather beefism (eating only meat from beef cattle). I also argue that some forms of vegetarianism, i.e. ichtivegetarianism, can be much more morally worse than normal meat diet. In order to (...) justify these thesis I show that there are significant moral differences in the consumption of animal products from different species. (shrink)

Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into (...) three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. I also explain his concept of internal motivation and argue that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism. (shrink)

Antyrealizm etyczny reprezentowany jest obecnie przez około 30% filozofów analitycznych. Podzielają oni przekonanie, że nie istnieją moralne własności, fakty czy wartości. Przez długi okres rozwijany był on zwłaszcza przez akognitywistów. Jednak od czasu publikacji książki J. Mackiego Ethics. Inventingright and wrong (1977) antyrealistyczny sceptycyzm został zradykalizowany, przybierając także formę teorii globalnego błędu. Przyjęcie powyższego przekonania prowadzi do trzech strategii postępowania: 1. fikcjonalizmu asertorycznego (J. Mackie), 2. fikcjonalizmu nieasertorycznego (R. Joyce) oraz 3. eliminatywizmu (I. Hinckfuss i R. Garner). W artykule, przyjmując (...) antyrealistyczny punkt wyjścia przedstawicieli teorii globalnego błędu, analizuję powody, dla których warto wyeliminować etykę, i powody, dla których moglibyśmy mieć z tym problem. Następnie przedstawiam argumenty, ze względu na które pomysł eliminacji etyki pośrednio wspiera zmianę myślenia o realizmie etycznym z paradygmatu ontologicznego na racjonalistyczny. W związku z tym prezentuję koncepcję rewizyjnego realizmu racji oraz dowodzę, że nie poddaje się ona argumentom zwolenników eliminacji etyki. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES OF ETHICAL ANTI-REALISM S u m m a r y ! In the contemporary analytic philosophy about one-third of authors tend toward moral antirealism. Sources of its popularity have to be found in many arguments justifying the abandonment of moral realism. Every realist should meet them. Unfortunately, in Polish literature about ethics it is difficult to find a presentation and a critique of these arguments. Many philosophers who represent continental philosophy like Neo-Thomism, material Value-Ethics, hermeneutic ethics, assume ethical (...) realism and do not respond to the arguments of anti-realists. The purpose of the article is to present in one place the most important arguments that are important sources of ethical antirealism in metaethics of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In recent years, with the appearance of a new wave of realism and non-descriptivism, the old dispute in meta-ethics between cognitivism and non-cognitivism has resurfaced. At present one of the most intensely discussed arguments among meta-ethicists is the so-called Moral Twin Earth argument of Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons. It was presented in a series of articles published at the beginning of the nineties. However, a similar argument was put forth much earlier by Richard Hare, though the participants of the (...) discussion that has arisen in connection with the Moral Twin Earth have passed over it in silence. It appeared for the first time at the beginning of the fifties in The Language of Morals as the Missionary and the Cannibal Islands argument. Hare later renamed it the Reductio ad Absurdum of Descriptivism in an article published in 1986 under the same name. Since then he has made it as his basic instrument against descriptivism. In the present article the author outlines the argument of Moral Twin Earth, presents its prototype, and offers a concise criticism of it. (shrink)

Standardowy, podręcznikowy wykład etyki ujmuje kantyzm jako formę deontologii. Wpływ na to miał sam I. Kant, który krytykował konsekwencjalizm i bronił prawomocności deontycznych rygorów. Wielu jego kontynuatorów podziela jego opinie, uznając, że etyk-kantysta musi być deontologiem. Jednak kantowski konsekwencjalizm nie jest stanowiskiem wewnętrznie sprzecznym – twierdzą tak m.in. R.M. Hare, D. Cummiskey, S. Kagan czy D. Parfit. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiam sposób godzenia kantyzmu i konsekwencjalizmu, skupiając się na teoriach D. Cummiskeya i D. Parfita. Rozważam również najczęściej stawiany zarzut wobec (...) kantowskiego konsekwencjalizmu, iż nie jest on w stanie oddać kantowskiej idei autonomii i godności. Argumentuję, że nie można stwierdzić, iż konsekwencjalistyczny nakaz, aby w niektórych rzadkich sytuacjach poświęcić jedną niewinną osobę w celu ratowania kilku innych, automatycznie i z konieczności gwałcił kantowską ideę autonomii, jeśli autonomię tę rozumie się nie jako millowską autonomię osób, lecz jako kantowską autonomię zasad. (shrink)

Od początku rozwoju stuletniej historii metaetyki rozważania językowe grały kluczową rolę przy wyborze dobrej teorii metaetycznej. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie i wyjaśnienie tego faktu poprzez wskazanie na najistotniejsze motywy rozwoju dociekań metaetycznych. Postawiona została również teza, że główny problem metaetyki ująć należy szerzej, niż uczynił to w ostatnich latach we wpływowy sposób M. Smith. W tym celu zaprezentowane zostały dwa kryteria dobrej teorii metaetycznej postulowane przez M. Timmonsa i T. Horgana: kryterium koherencji i doświadczenia oraz cechy języka moralności, jak również (...) inne istotne, psychologiczne, epistemologiczne i ontologiczne fenomeny, które w kluczowy sposób determinują kształt współczesnej debaty metaetycznej. Następnie ich wpływ zobrazowany został na przykładach kilku najgłośniejszych polemik metaetycznych. (shrink)

Tourism, as an industry, has become one of the most dynamic sectors of the world economy these days and has specific features that are different from other industries. In the tourism industry, production and consumption points occur spatially at the same time. In addition, the tourism industry contributes to the economic growth of developed regions and can simultaneously distribute the wealth created geographically. It is notable that the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused many challenges in the tourism industry (...) regarding the presence of tourists in tourism centres and the closing of all tourism service chains, including food, entertainment, transportation and travel services worldwide. Tourism-related businesses, which are considered as invisible export and one of the engines of development and occupation, have been rendered obsolete. In other words, the businesses, as well as multiple units and activities in the related chain, have been damaged and employees of this industry have lost their jobs. This has led to the recession and regressive course of the developing and large industry of tourism in the world. It is worth noting that the tourism industry includes various sections, the most important of which is religious tourism. All religions in the world have different religious places, works, traditions and customs, which have become amongst the most important tourist attractions. Meanwhile, Muslims and the religion of Islam play a significant role in this branch of tourism. The Hajj, pilgrimage to holy places and the existence of mourning ceremonies or religious celebrations of Muslims are amongst the largest religious tourism events in the world. Given the importance of this issue, the present study aimed to evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on religious tourism in Iraq in 2021. This field study was conducted on 4500 Muslim managers and staff of restaurants, hotels, grocery stores, clothing stores and souvenir shops around the holy shrines of imams and religious places in Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, Samarra and Kazemi. According to the results, the tourism of Iraq, which is mainly limited to Muslim religious sites in several major Iraqi cities, has also seen a decline in the number of religious tourists. The negative effects of COVID-19 on religious tourism have also been proved statistically by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), as µ ≥ 3 has been counted in all indices.Contribution: Our findings offered new insights into the impact of COVID-19 on tourism, based on statistical analysis. In this study, the authors showed how COVID-19 affects various aspects of religious tourism, which has not been addressed in previous researches. (shrink)

This article defends the thesis that, in light of the postulates of liberal ethics, it is not possible to put forward universal arguments in support of any form of marriage. The existing forms of marriage should be either deemed unjust or founded on specific arguments recognized within a particular political community and determining the understanding of justice in a particular society. It defends the thesis that the requirement of universality, and consequently of impartiality, is not met, since behind every form (...) of marriage there is a certain “minimum” anthropological approach. Marriage is discussed as a privilege granted to particular groups by the political community. The comments are made with reference to the discussion between Krzysztof Saja and Tomasz Sieczkowski concerning the problem of discrimination against same-sex couples in Polish legislation. (shrink)

Tujuan penelitian ini ialah untuk mengetahui hakikat dari heriditas, lingkungan, kebebasan berkehendak, dan hidayah Tuhan dalam membentuk kepribadian manusia. Pada penelitian ini menggunakan metode library research, yaitu penelitian menganalisis literatur tertulis berupa buku dan jurnal ilmiah sebagai sumber utama, hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa hakikat heriditas dan lingkungan dalam pembentukan kepribadian manusia berperan vital, dan juga kebebasan dalam artian, manusia tidak bisa didikte, jika manusia itu didikte maka hal itu sudah dikatakan tidak bebas lagi. Hal yang sama-sama diketahui adalah hanya (...) manusia yang memiliki kebebasan yang lebih dari makhluk hidup lainnya, sehingga hal ini tentu akan berdampak pada kepribadian manusia. Heriditas dan lingkungan yang baik boleh jadi terkalahkan dengan kehendak bebas manusia, sehingga bukan kepribadian baik yang tercipta, namun kepribadian yang buruk, begitu pula sebaliknya atas asas dari kebebasan dalam berkehendak manusia. Akan tetapi, dari ketiga faktor ini dibingkai atau dapat dikatakan terikat pada hidayah dari Tuhan, dan bahkan tak khayal bahwa hidayah Tuhan ini yang akan menentukan kepribadian dari manusia itu sendiri. Kemudian, dari faktor pembentukan kepribadian manusia yakni heriditas dan lingkungan sudah diakui di dalam Islam, namun kedua faktor tersebut tidak berjalan begitu saja selayaknya benda yang jatuh dari atas pohon tanpa ada hambatan ataupun gangguan, melainkan dalam pembentukan kepribadian manusia adakalanya kedua faktor tersebut tidak berkerja secara signifikan. Artinya, selain dua faktor tersebut yang sudah diakui di dalam Islam, maka ketika kedua faktor itu tidak berperan, artinya ada faktor lain yang bisa dikatakan cukup penting dalam membentuk kepribadian manusia itu sendiri, yaitu hidayah Tuhan. (shrink)

Bukti penyertaan Tuhan dalam kehidupan bangsa Israel sungguh nyata. Tuhan bukan saja memperkenalkan diri-Nya sebagai Tuhan, Allah pembebas, namun juga Tuhan, Allah yang menyertai kehidupan mereka. Sementara itu bagi Firaun, seharusnya peristiwa ini adalah pelajaran penting dalam sejarah kehidupannya dan bangsanya. Bahwa berperkara dengan Tuhan, Allah Israel adalah sebuah kesia-siaan. Baik bangsa Israel dan Firaun sama-sama diajarkan akan sifat dan karakter Tuhan, Allah yang adil dan penuh kasih. Ini pula yang seharusnya menjadi pelajaran bagi umat-umat Tuhan sepanjang zaman. Bahwa (...) penting percaya dengan segenap hati kepada tuntunan dan pemeliharaan Tuhan di dalam setiap jalan-jalan kehidupan. Metode penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan mengumpulkan data-data dari berbagai sumber Pustaka, sehingga setiap orang percaya akan penyertaan Tuhan melalui pengalaman bangsa Israel keluar dari Mesir dan menyeberangi Laut Teberau. (shrink)

Több politikatudománnyal foglalkozó kötettel jelentkezett már Szabó Márton, aki eddigi kutatásait összegezve, egy alternatív szemléletű politikatudomány szemléletébe és kutatásába kívánja bevezetni olvasóit. Célja, hogy bizonyítsa: a politika reális valóságában meghatározó módon jelen van az egyének nyilvános és közös értelmezése és diskurzusa. Hogy a politika ezért nem tekinthető pusztán csak objektív rendszernek, hanem emberek által teremtett és értelmezett valóság. A szerző ezen szemlélet jegyében hét nagyobb egységben mutatja be a politika minden fontos területét, kezdve a politikai tények összetett természetével, folytatva a (...) politikai cselekvések és megismerési módok sajátosságaival. Külön vizsgálja az intézményi kereteket, a politika szereplőit, a politikai ügyeket. Kritikailag elemzi az empirikus politikatudományi kutatás meghatározó területeit, végül a politikatudomány sokféleségével foglalkozik. A vaskos kötetet forrás- és irodalomjegyzék zárja. (shrink)

In the paper, I aim to reconstruct a charitable interpretation of Durkheimian utilitarianism, a normative theory of public morality proposed by well-recognised American moral psychologist – Jonathan Haidt, which might provide reasons to justify particular legal regulations and public policies. The reconstruction contains a coherent theory that includes elements of rule-utilitarianism, value pluralism, objective list theory and perfectionism, as well as references to Emile’s Durkheim views on human nature. I also compare Durkheimian utilitarianism with two similar theories – Brad Hooker’s (...) rule consequentialism and Krzysztof Saja’s institutional function consequentialism. (shrink)

The global environmental crisis and resulting disasters today have threatened life in general, especially human life. According to Fritjof Capra, one feasible solution to this global environmental crisis is to build sustainable human communities based on what he calls ecological literacy. Ecological literacy itself stands for our ability to understand the principles of organization common to all living systems and is used as a guideline for creating sustainable human communities. Capra underlines the need to redesign our communities, including our educational (...) communities, business communities, political communities and all aspects of our daily life, so that the principles of ecology become principles of all our human communities. For Capra, the implementation of such a sustainable society is possible to achieve through the so-called eco-design, which is both scientifically and technically feasible. Nonetheless, the success of the major project to develop a sustainable eco-literate society does not simply depend on the individual awareness of eco-literacy. It also depends on the political will of the government to issue public policies—including legislation—to force all stakeholders to act in accordance with, and based on, ecoliteracy. Keywords: Ecological literacy, ecological principles, sustainable human community, eco-design, sautopoesis dissipative systems, natural capital. Abstrak: Krisis dan bencana lingkungan hidup global telah mengancam kehidupan pada umumnya, termasuk kehidupan manusia. Menurut Fritjof Capra, salah satu solusi untuk mengatasi krisis dan bencana lingkungan hidup global itu adalah dengan membangun masyarakat manusia yang berkelanjutan berdasarkan apa yang disebutnya sebagai melek ekologi, yaitu kemampuan kita untuk memahami prinsip-prinsip pengorganisasi yang berlaku pada semua sistem kehidupan dan menggunakannya sebagai pedoman dalam menciptakan masyarakat yang berkelanjutan. Capra sangat menekankan perlunya merancang ulang komunitas-komunitas kita, termasuk komunitas pendidikan, komunitas bisnis, komunitas politik, dan seluruh kehidupan kita sehari-hari, agar prinsip-prinsip ekologis tersebut diwujudkan sebagai prinsip dari komunitas-komunitas tersebut. Bagi Capra, implementasi dari masyarakat berkelanjutan seperti itu dapat dicapai melalui apa yang disebutnya sebagai rancang bangun ekologis (eco-design) yang secara ilmiah dan teknis sangat layak diterapkan. Hanya saja, keberhasilan proyek besar membangun masyarakat berkelanjutan berdasarkan melek ekologi ini tidak hanya bergantung pada kesadaran moral individu akan melek ekologi di atas. Keberhasilan proyek besar itu juga sangat bergantung pada kemauan politik pemerintah untuk mengeluarkan kebijakan publik—termasuk undang-undang—guna memaksa semua pemangku kepentingan untuk bertindak sesuai dengan dan berdasarkan kesadaran ekologis tadi. Kata-kata Kunci: Melek ekologi, prinsip-prinsip ekologi, masyarakat berkelanjutan, rancang bangun ekologis, sistem autopoesis disipatif, modal alam. (shrink)

Abstrak: Jacques Rancière, pemikir Prancis kelahiran Aljazair (1940-sekarang), konsisten dengan gagasannya tentang kesetaraan bagi setiap orang dan semua orang. Baginya, demokrasi bukanlah bentuk pemerintahan atau tatanan sosial. Kesetaraan yang kontingen dalam tatanan sosial, menurut Rancière, menjadikan demokrasi dapat terjadi kapan saja dan di mana saja, tidak dapat diprediksi. Rancière mengajak kita untuk terbuka pada gangguan-gangguan demos dan kemunculan subyek-subyek baru di masa datang sebagai dinamika dalam tatanan sosial yang tidak perlu ditumpas atau dihambat. Politik demokrasi adalah sebuah perselisihan. (...) Namun perselisihan tersebut bukan tindakan revolusi untuk menghancurkan tatanan sosial yang telah ada menjadi tatanan yang sama sekali baru. Demokrasi adalah subyektivasi politik yang mengganggu tatanan sosial dominan yang dilakukan oleh demos untuk memverifikasi kesetaraan. Kemunculan demos mentransformasi tatanan sosial menjadi bentuk yang berbeda, yang mengakomodasi keberadaan mereka yang tidak terhitung (the wrong, yang salah). Kata-kata Kunci: Demokrasi, kesetaraan, demos, perselisihan, subyektivikasi, yang salah. Abstract: Jacques Rancière, a French philosopher born in Algeria (1940-present), affirms the equality of anyone and everyone. He analyzes the so-called democracy not as a kind of state or social order. Equality which is contingent in the social order, for Rancière, shows that democracy could occurs everytime and everywhere, democracy could not be predicted. Rancière brings us to have an open eye in front of dispute of the demos and the subjectification of any new subjects. This is an inherent and a dynamic of the social order that should not be repressed or stopped. The democratic politics is a dispute. But the dispute is not an act of revolution to destroy the existing social order to create an entirely new order. Democracy is the political subjectification that disrupts the police order by the demos to verify the equality of anyone and everyone. The emergence of the demos transforms the social order into a different form when this order accommodates the existence of the wrong. Keywords: Democracy, equality, demos, dispute, subjectification, the wrong. (shrink)

Eksistensi Gambar dalam film menurut Gilles Deleuze adalah kehidupan manusia dan perjalanannya menyatu dengan Tuhan. Ketika manusia menyaksikan film pikirannya tertuju pada objek gambar- gambar yang bergerak sehingga dirinya ikut bersatu dengan realitas yang ada pada film. Otak manusia seperti layar film yang mampu menyingkap realitas dan pikiran manusia mulai tenggelam dan menyatu dengan alam semesta, karena otak manusia mengeluarkan elektron yang bermuatan negatif dari atom-atom kemudian elektron tersebut tertarik dan mengikuti gerakan dari gambar-gambar yang ada di film yang bermuatan (...) positif sehingga munculnya energi listrik dan gelombang, frekuensi cahaya yang mengakibatkan manusia mengalami pencapaian spiritual. Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah untuk membuktikan bahwa segala sesuatu di dunia ini mengalami perubahan dan ketidakpastian sedangkan eksistensi manusia di di dunia ini adalah tidak ada. Di dunia ini yang ada hanya energi dan hukum perubahan alam semesta. Hal itu dikarenakan manusia sudah menyatu dengan Tuhan dan alam semesta. Manusia yang sudah mengalami pencerahan memanifestasikan dirinya dengan mengimajinasikan semua hal tentang kehidupan dunia fisiknya. Dengan demikian, kehidupan di dunia adalah sebuah alam imajinasi atau pikiran saja. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan deskriptif analitis dan metode deskriptif kuantitatif yang bersifat saintifik dengan mengintegralkan aspek kesenian, filsafat, mistisisme, spiritualisme, fisika klasik, fisika kuantum, mekanika kuantum dan kimia kuantum. Kesimpulan dari tulisan ini adalah manusia mengalami pencerahan dan mengalami perubahan forma atau bentuk dianalisa secara spiritual dan saintifik serta dapat memanifestasikan dan mengaktualisasikan aspek spiritualitasnya dalam bentuk materialisme di berbagai bidang disiplin ilmu seperti politik, ekonomi, geopolitik, kesenian, teknologi, sains, psikologi, agama dan budaya. Dengan demikian, manusia yang sudah tercerahkan dan mengalir energi alam semesta di dalam dirinya menjadi sebuah mesin atau alat pembangkit listrik bertenaga energi spiritual yang termanifestasikan dan terealisasi di dunia fisik. (shrink)