Three plausible views—Presentism, Truthmaking, and Independence—form an inconsistent triad. By Presentism, all being is present being. By Truthmaking, all truth supervenes on, and is explained in terms of, being. By Independence, some past truths do not supervene on, or are not explained in terms of, present being. We survey and assess some responses to this.

Al-Taftāzānī introduces the Liar Paradox, in a commentary on al-Rāzī, in a short passage that is part of a polemic against the ethical rationalism of the Muʿtazila. In this essay, we consider his remarks and their place in the history of the Liar Paradox in Arabic Logic. In the passage, al-Taftāzānī introduces Liar Cycles into the tradition, gives the paradox a puzzling name—the fallacy of the “irrational root” —which became standard, and suggests a connection between the paradox and what it (...) tells us about truth and falsehood, and arguments for divine voluntarism and what they tell us about the nature of goodness and badness. On this last point, we also discuss a passage from al-Rāzī, which suggests similar connections. (shrink)

In an article in an earlier issue of this journal Vivienne Gray sought to challenge my claim that Xenophon's account of Prodicus' narrative concerning the Choice of Heracles represents ‘a very close approximation to Prodicus’ actual wording'. Since that time, Gray's article has been cited approvingly by Louis-André Dorion and David Wolfsdorf, both of whom consider that Gray has settled the matter, at least as far as the linguistic aspect of my argument is concerned. In view of this, I (...) feel it necessary to point out that Gray's argument is fundamentally flawed. In addition, I should like to take this opportunity to show that the arguments of Dorion and Wolfsdorf, which are aimed at other aspects of the case that I made for Xenophon's faithfulness to Prodicus' text, are likewise invalid. (shrink)

The article seeks to show that, contrary to the standard view, the 'Choice of Heracles' preserved at Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-33 is not a summary or paraphrase, but is a very close approximation to the actual wording of Prodicus' epideixis. The language and style are shown to be uncharacteristic of Xenophon, and the fact that Prodicus' original was known to exist in both written and orally performed versions serves to explain why the piece is framed by language that disclaims strict accuracy (...) in reproducing it. It is further shown that the way in which near-synonyms are used in the piece is not necessarily inconsistent with other evidence for Prodicus' practice: it is rather the personified character Vice whose usage conflicts with that of Prodicus himself and with that of the personification of Virtue. Finally, it is proposed that the 'Choice of Heracles' represented the contents, not of Prodicus' advanced teaching, but of the popular, cut-rate lecture intended for a general audience. (shrink)

The authors consider a recurring objection to fictional realism, the view that fictional characters are objects. The authors call this the counting objection. Russell presses a version of the objection against Meinong’s view. Everett presses a version of the objection against contemporary fictional realist views, as do Nolan and Sandgren. As the authors see it, the objection assumes that the fictional realist must provide criteria of identity for fictional characters, so its force depends on the plausibility of that assumption. Rather (...) than coming up with such criteria, a fictional realist might argue that the demand is misplaced. (shrink)

We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. e early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sentences, like the (...) Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix. (shrink)

The possibility of Junk is the possibility that something exists and everything is a proper part. Just as we might imagine that there are no simples—that everything has a proper part, all the way down—we might imagine that there are no caps—that everything is a proper part, all the way up. It is not obvious that this apparent possibility can be accommodated within a Lewisian modal framework. For Lewis, every possibility involves the existence of a possible world, and a possible (...) world is just is a maximal sum, and so a cap. But the Lewisian can accommodate Junk, if she wishes, by allowing parts of possible worlds to represent complete possibilities. (shrink)

We want to say both that Sherlock Holmes does not exist, and that he is a fictional character. But how can we say these things without committing ourselves to the existence of Sherlock Holmes? Here I develop and defend a non-commital paraphrase of quantification over fictional characters, modeled on the non-commital paraphrase Kit Fine provides for quantification over possibilia. I also develop and defend the view that names for fictional characters are weakly non-referring, in Nathan Salmon’s sense, and so provide (...) us with a non-commital means to express singular propositions. The resulting position allows us to reap the benefits of Fictional Realism without paying the associated ontological cost. (shrink)

If reality is temporary, then reality changes, and if reality changes, the past has explanatory work to do, and it cannot do that work unless it is no longer real. This tells against the Moving Now Theory, the Growing Block Theory, and any form of Presentism that attempts to understand the past in terms of the present, including Tensed Properties Presentism and Tensed Facts Presentism. It tells in favor of a form Presentism that allows us to appeal to unreal past (...) facts. I suggest that Priorian Presentism, conjoined with a certain way of understanding the role played by tense operators, is one such view. (shrink)

Possible worlds are maximal possibilities. But what kind of thing is a maximal possibility? Not a maximal individual: there are maximal possibilities that are not maximal individuals, because each maximal individual could have any one of several maximal properties. And not a maximal property: there are maximal possibilities that are not maximal properties, because each maximal property could be had by any one of many possible maximal individuals. So if you like your worlds concrete, you should say that they are (...) maximal facts, and if you like your worlds abstract, you should say that they are maximal propositions. (shrink)

At Ar. Ran. 1028 read ην ηκoυσ ɛυχην for the metrically defective ηνικ' ηκoυσα.

The ghost of Darius provides a versified history of the Persian kingship, from the beginning down to the reign of his luckless son Xerxes, that starts out as follows in Martin West's Teubner text :Mῆδος γὰρ ἦν ὁ πρῶτος ἡγεμὼν στρατοῦ, 765ἄλλος δ’ ἐκείνου παῖς τόδ’ ἔργον ἥνυσεν·ϕρένες γὰρ αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ᾠακοστρόϕουν·τρίτος δ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Κῦρος, εὐδαίμων ἀνήρ,ἄρξας ἔθηκε πᾶσιν εἰρήνην ϕίλοις,Λυδῶν δὲ λαὸν καὶ Φρυγῶν ἐκτήσατο 770Ἰωνίαν τε πᾶσαν ἤλασεν βίᾳ·θεὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἤχθηρεν, ὡς εὔϕρων ἔϕυ.Κύρου δὲ παῖς τέταρτος (...) ηὔθυνε στρατόν·πέμπτος δὲ Mάρδος ἦρξεν, αἰσχύνη πάτρᾳθρόνοισί τ’ ἀρχαίοισι· 775First comes ‘the Mede Cyaxares, whom A[eschylus] probably saw as the first king of a united Media and Persia, and therefore the right person to begin his list’. Unless ἄλλος is corrupt, the first two members of the dynasty are anonymous. This is not perhaps surprising, given Aeschylus’ limited knowledge of early Median and Persian history and given his use of these rulers as foils to the blest Cyrus. Each of them is, like the equally anonymous Cambyses, accorded only one or two lines, in contrast to the five lines devoted to Cyrus the Great. What is surprising is that the second of these is singled out for his good sense and his restraint. Further, it is not clear what point is being made by attributing ‘this deed’ to the good sense and restraint of the son of the Mede, particularly since it is not immediately apparent to what deed reference is being made. As Alexander Garvie notes in his recent commentary on the play, ‘That this line [767] is out of place in the codd. is highly likely’. (shrink)

In response to Mnesilochus′ disparaging comments regarding Agathon's unusual dress, the tragic poet replies:.

Odysseus has just entered the acting area following the choral song, during which he witnessed the Cyclops butchering, cooking and then eating two of his companions. In these lines Odysseus seemingly presents himself as being at a loss for words, and claims that what he witnessed inside the cave is not to be believed. These are, of course, nothing more than rhetorical ploys, with frequent parallels in Euripides and elsewhere. When Odysseus says οὐ πιστά he means not that what he (...) is about to recount lacks credibility—he does, after all, expect the satyrs to accept his account as reliable—but that it surpasses the bounds of ordinary human experience. And the account that follows belies his apparent profession of being at a loss for words, since he is about to deliver what is in effect a messenger-speech of over fifty lines. Expressions of aphasia are common in Euripides, sometimes accompanied, as here, by lengthy exposition. Characters use such expressions to indicate that the circumstances in which they find themselves are beyond the power of language to convey. There is, therefore, something discordant in Odysseus immediately following his expression of aphasia by saying that what he has witnessed is ‘like stories’, especially when he is about to tell the story of the circumstances in which he finds himself. It is the purpose of this note to suggest that the words μύθοις εἰκότ’ have been universally misunderstood, and that Odysseus is here saying something quite other than that the events in the cave have a greater resemblance to stories than to reality. (shrink)

The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure is (...) his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

This has all the appearance of being a straightforward, even conventional, transition. Indeed, the conceit of Night′s chariot is common and has a history stretching back at least as far as the beginning of the fifth century B.C. Night is elsewhere described by Virgil as umida, the epithet reflecting the traditional view that Night, like Dawn , arises from and sinks back into the stream of Ocean. In fact, the chariot of Night had been referred to as recently as lines (...) 721 and 738 of this book, in the latter instance with the epithet umida applied to Night. What is new and interesting in our passage is the ‘meta caeli’ round which Night′s chariot turns. The effect of this novelty is to make of Night′s vehicle a racing chariot, as it is the chariots in the Circus that must negotiate a meta. The programmatic reasons for Virgil′s having done this in Book 5 are obvious. Earlier in the book Virgil had described the games held in honour of the anniversary of Anchises′ death. The first and most elaborately portrayed event in these games had been the boat-race, which is plainly modelled on the chariot-race in Iliad 23, the first and most elaborately portrayed event in the funeral games for Patroclus. Just as Achilles had required the competing chariots to race once around a distant turning-post, so Aeneas requires the competing ships to race once around a rock out at sea, which rock is three times called a meta . A simile comparing the sailors and their ships to charioteers and their teams makes the connection explicit. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I tried to make sense of the view that the facts that constitute reality—the facts about what there is, and what properties things instantiate—are temporary facts.

À l’instar de nombreux dialogues socratiques de Platon, le Ménexène s’ouvre sur une rencontre fortuite, près de l’agora, entre Socrate et le jeune Ménexène (qui est présent dans le Lysis et aussi dans le Phédon). Ils engagent une discussion à propos de l’éloge des soldats morts au combat traditionnellement prononcé lors de leurs funérailles publiques à Athènes, qui doivent bientôt avoir lieu et pour lesquelles l’orateur doit être choisi par le Conseil. Socrate estime que ce type de discours n...

Objectives: This study was designed to explore the prevalence and types of stipulations required of investigators by the institutional review board of one institution over a five year period.Design: Stipulations to research proposals were documented from the minutes of the IRB meetings.Setting: Community hospital.Participants: IRB submissions.Main measurements: Number and type of IRB stipulations.Results: Nineteen research submissions were approved without any stipulations. For the remainder, the majority of stipulations related to consent forms .Conclusions: Consent forms appear to be at highest risk (...) for IRB stipulations. Being aware of high risk areas before submission of research proposals may reduce the frequency of stipulations required of investigators. (shrink)

What are the philosophical views of professional philosophers, and how do these views change over time? The 2020 PhilPapers Survey surveyed around 2000 philosophers on 100 philosophical questions. The results provide a snapshot of the state of some central debates in philosophy, reveal correlations and demographic effects involving philosophers' views, and reveal some changes in philosophers' views over the last decade.

A leading political theorist’s groundbreaking defense of ideal conceptions of justice in political philosophy Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question (...) whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? Utopophobia argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. David Estlund does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does he assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. Estlund engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, he counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, Utopophobia stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy. (shrink)

David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is the definitive statement of the greatest philosopher in the English language. His arguments in support of reasoning from experience, and against the "sophistry and illusion"of religiously inspired philosophical fantasies, caused controversy in the eighteenth century and are strikingly relevant today, when faith and science continue to clash. The Enquiry considers the origin and processes of human thought, reaching the stark conclusion that we can have no ultimate understanding of the physical world, or (...) indeed our own minds. In either sphere we must depend on instinctive learning from experience, recognizing our animal nature and the limits of reason. Hume's calm and open-minded skepticism thus aims to provide a new basis for science, liberating us from the "superstition" of false metaphysics and religion. His Enquiry remains one of the best introductions to the study of philosophy, and his edition places it in its historical and philosophical context. (shrink)

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)

By means of an example, shows the possibility of beliefs that are separately rational whilst together inconsistent.

This book is an attempt to get to the bottom of an acute and perennial tension between our best scientific pictures of the fundamental physical structure of the world and our everyday empirical experience of it. The trouble is about the direction of time. The situation (very briefly) is that it is a consequence of almost every one of those fundamental scientific pictures--and that it is at the same time radically at odds with our common sense--that whatever can happen can (...) just as naturally happen backwards. Albert provides an unprecedentedly clear, lively, and systematic new account--in the context of a Newtonian-Mechanical picture of the world--of the ultimate origins of the statistical regularities we see around us, of the temporal irreversibility of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, of the asymmetries in our epistemic access to the past and the future, and of our conviction that by acting now we can affect the future but not the past. Then, in the final section of the book, he generalizes the Newtonian picture to the quantum-mechanical case and (most interestingly) suggests a very deep potential connection between the problem of the direction of time and the quantum-mechanical measurement problem. The book aims to be both an original contribution to the present scientific and philosophical understanding of these matters at the most advanced level, and something in the nature of an elementary textbook on the subject accessible to interested high-school students. Table of Contents: Preface 1. Time-Reversal Invariance 2. Thermodynamics 3. Statistical Mechanics 4. The Reversibility Objections and the Past-Hypothesis 5. The Scope of Thermodynamics 6. The Asymmetries of Knowledge and Intervention 7. Quantum Mechanics Appendix: Gedankenexperiments with Heat Engines Index Reviews of this book: The foundations of statistical mechanisms are often presented in physics textbooks in a rather obscure and confused way. By challenging common ways of thinking about this subject, Time and Chance can do quite a lot to improve this situation. --Jean Bricmont, Science Albert is perfecting a style of foundational analysis that is uniquely his own...It has a surgical precision...and it is ruthless with pretensions. The foundations of thermodynamics is a topic that has accumulated a good deal of dead wood; this is a fire that will burn and burn. --Simon W. Saunders, Oxford University As usual with Albert's work, the exposition is brisk and to the point, and exceptionally clear...The book will be an extremely valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of philosophical issues in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, a literature which has been thin on the ground but is now growing as it deserves to. --Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan. (shrink)

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. Much recent attention has been devoted to the "animal question" -- consideration of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In this book, David Gunkel takes up the "machine question": whether and to what extent intelligent and autonomous machines of our own making can be considered to have legitimate moral responsibilities and any legitimate claim to moral consideration. The machine question poses a (...) fundamental challenge to moral thinking, questioning the traditional philosophical conceptualization of technology as a tool or instrument to be used by human agents. Gunkel begins by addressing the question of machine moral agency: whether a machine might be considered a legitimate moral agent that could be held responsible for decisions and actions. He then approaches the machine question from the other side, considering whether a machine might be a moral patient due legitimate moral consideration. Finally, Gunkel considers some recent innovations in moral philosophy and critical theory that complicate the machine question, deconstructing the binary agent--patient opposition itself. Technological advances may prompt us to wonder if the science fiction of computers and robots whose actions affect their human companions could become science fact. Gunkel's argument promises to influence future considerations of ethics, ourselves, and the other entities who inhabit this world. (shrink)

How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.

Loot Boxes, i.e., virtual items embedded within video games with numerous features reminiscent of gambling, are increasingly widespread among adolescents. LB use is associated with problem gambling in youth, but few studies have been conducted on the association between LB use and gambling behavior considering adolescents. Thus, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not clear. As LB use is a significant and positive risk factor for video gaming severity, and video gaming is associated with problem gambling, we hypothesized that LB (...) use would be related to gambling frequency and problem gambling through the intermediary role of video gaming frequency and problem video gaming. We tested our hypothesis before COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown and during COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown, in Italy. Study 1 was conducted with 1,078 high school students before COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown, and Study 2 was conducted with 1,204 high school students during COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown. A path analysis was carried out to analyze the significance of indirect effects from LB use to gambling behavior and problem gambling through video gaming and problem video gaming. In both the studies, results showed that LB use exerted significant and positive direct effects on video gaming frequency, problem video gaming, and gambling frequency. Moreover, LB use had indirect significant and positive effects on problem gambling through video gaming frequency, problem video gaming, and gambling frequency. Findings attest that LB use can be related to problem gambling through a greater involvement in videogames. Thus, a specific subtype of young gamblers can develop Gambling Disorder symptoms from the use of LBs and through an intense use of video games. Practical implications for prevention and treatment are discussed. (shrink)