Nowadays a completely paralysed human being can do many different things using his or hers neurones. This is a new situation. The author of the article tries to find a proper language to describe the situation. He also tries to show the consequences of the phenomenon for some philosophical theories of mind.
Professor Prognosis is a fictional character. His name - Prognosis - is meaningful and refers to a wonderful theory. Using his theory Professor is able to predict the behaviour of a human being with stunning accuracy; its predictive power is much greater than any other scientific theory. As for its predictive power the theory in question is so great that it seems impossible. We are inclined to think that it cannot be a theory. It must be something else. But what (...) else could it be? The mystery has a simple solution. It turns out that the 'theory' applies only to one man and the man is Professor Prognosis himself. Now everything seems crystal clear. Professor Prognosis has deceived us. There is neither theory, nor predictions. As a matter of fact he does not predict but uses his power to control his behaviour. Every human being can do it. It is obvious. So what is the problem? The problem is that this solution is very traditional. It involves agency and free will. The main point of the paper was to make it look obvious. (shrink)
The text is a rejoinder to critical remarks which Zdzislawa Piatek aimed at the paper of the author of „Cats, demon, spells and ... naturalisation”. It appears that the differences between the standpoints of both polemicists are not as great as it might seem. In the author's opinion, one of the sources of the impression that those differences are substantial has been an overfree style of the essay, and in particular a little irresponsible use of the term „magic strategy”. The (...) author tries presently to expose his views in a more accurate way. In particular, he stresses that he did not mean to reduce the phenomenon of ethnic language to magic behaviour, but rather to look for the origins of this language in such a behaviour. (shrink)
What would it be like to have a materialistic theory of language? Are humans able (not in principle but in practise) to develop such a theory? The author tries to show that the answer to the second question is „No”. The main argument is that the qualities of the theory in question would go far beyond what seems available for creatures of limited cognitive power.
The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and (...) acts from the non-intentional ones. Next, the general desiderata for theories providing criteria for singling out the class of intentional sentences are introduced. Finally, distinct proposals for providing such criteria are analyzed. Author argues that neither is satisfactory. (shrink)
The reason for my disagreement with TadeuszSkalski is my objection to his attempts at demonizing the problems connected with the functioning of mind as presented in his essay. In my opinion, the inclination of the author towards demonization stems from the fact that he accepts an extremely limited „natural picture of the world”, a picture which is both reductionistic and mechanistic. It is no wonder then that neither intentionality nor the usage of language fits into this picture (...) and - what amounts to the same thing - can be naturalized. Both seem to be magic phenomena. Moreover, the range of „purely natural” categories in this picture seems to be so limited that even the behaviour of a cat which comes to his master when he whistles for it - i.e. which knows what the whistling means - cannot be described. The behaviour of chimpanzees which have an inborn knowledge that snakes are dangerous and should be avoided cannot be described on this view either. Hence, it is no surprise that each theory of how mind is functioning which has been constructed by a natural philosopher has a status of a „magic theory”. (shrink)
The paper is a response to TadeuszSkalski's paper „The and... a Platform to Human Speech”, published in Filozofia Nauki 1/2000. Despite Skalski's claim that the essence of our controversy lies in verbal misunderstandings, I will demonstrate that I disagree with him on three issues: (i) the question of both in the context of using ethnic languages and in the context of the origin of these languages; (ii) the concept of emergence; (iii) the evaluation of naturalisation a (...) la Searle. (shrink)
The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this (...) book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory. (shrink)
Contents: Preface. SCIENTIFIC WORKS OF MARIA STEFFEN-BATÓG AND TADEUSZ BATÓG. List of Publications of Maria Steffen-Batóg. List of Publications of Tadeusz Batóg. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: On the Scientific Works of Maria Steffen-Batóg. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: On the Scientific Works of Tadeusz Batóg. W??l??odzimierz LAPIS: How Should Sounds Be Phonemicized? Pawe??l?? NOWAKOWSKI: On Applications of Algorithms for Phonetic Transcription in Linguistic Research. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: Tadeusz Batóg's Phonological Systems. MATHEMATICAL LOGIC. Wojciech BUSZKOWSKI: Incomplete Information Systems and Kleene 3-valued Logic. Maciej (...) KANDULSKI: Categorial Grammars with Structural Rules. Miros??l??awa KO??L??OWSKA-GAWIEJNOWICZ: Labelled Deductive Systems for the Lambek Calculus. Roman MURAWSKI: Satisfaction Classes - a Survey. Kazimierz _WIRYDOWICZ: A New Approach to Dyadic Deontic Logic and the Normative Consequence Relation. Wojciech ZIELONKA: More about the Axiomatics of the Lambek Calculus. THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS. Jacek Juliusz JADACKI: Troubles with Categorial Interpretation of Natural Language. Maciej KARPI??N??SKI: Conversational Devices in Human-Computer Communication Using WIMP UI. Witold MACIEJEWSKI: Qualitative Orientation and Grammatical Categories. Zygmunt VETULANI: A System of Computer Understanding of Texts. Andrzej WÓJCIK: The Formal Development of van Sandt's Presupposition Theory. W??l??adys??l??aw ZABROCKI: Psychologism in Noam Chomsky's Theory . Ryszard ZUBER: Defining Presupposition without Negation. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCES. Jerzy KMITA: Philosophical Antifundamentalism. Anna LUCHOWSKA: Peirce and Quine: Two Views on Meaning. Stefan WIERTLEWSKI: Method According to Feyerabend. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language. Krystyna ZAMIARA: Context of Discovery - Context of Justification and the Problem of Psychologism. (shrink)
The paper depicts the evolution of the conception of the method of analytical description of Czeżowski, one of the most important figures of the Lvov-Warsaw School of Philosophy. It portrays Czeżowski as an author, whose voice on relation between theory and experience, as well as language and empirical reality, can be still considered important and significant. Generally speaking, Czeżowski distinguishes between two kinds of methods: the inductive ones and the no inductive, i.e. the method of analytic description. The results of (...) the former are the base of every further scientific activity, from the empirical sciences to philosophy. The method serves, first of all, to define abstract concepts and to precise scientific terms, what allow next to set and to express relations between them. Its application is an indispensable and essential part of process of building every abstract scientific theory. Despite some similarities between Czeżowski’s method and other methods of conceptual analysis, the former is not subjected to the paradox of analysis, according to the author of the paper. (shrink)
One of the factors that adversely influenced the worldwide reception of Fleck was the rather narrow critical interest that his ideas had aroused in Poland. Apart from a few reviews of his book, only two polemics were published before WWII, and these likewise fell into oblivion. The philosophical views of one of those polemists, Tadeusz Bilikiewicz, shared the same fate. Since an acquaintance with Bilikiewicz’s background would seem to be a necessary condition for a understanding of his controversy with (...) Fleck, the aim of this paper is to sketch his views on the history and sociology of science, and to clarify certain errors regarding the facts of his life. (shrink)
ABOUT THE PUTTING NAMES TO OBJECTS, I.E. HOW TADEUSZ KOTARBIjSKI TEACHES UNDERSTAND STANISkAW LE3NIEWSKI’S ONTOLOGY S u m m a r y This article presents an attempt to fund Ontology of Stanis;aw Lemniewski on a simple theory with one primitive relation “being denoted by”. Developed theory shows that to the linguistic model of the Ontology can belong only such general names that in their extensions have at least two objects (references) denoted by individual names.
„What thinks in man, is not he himself, but his social community.“ These words by the early sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz were quoted several times by Ludwik Fleck and seem to be in complete agreement with his own theory of thought collectives. The assumption that even scientific ideas were not so much generated by the scientist as an autonomous individual but rather by and within the social environment was still considered provocative by Fleck in the 1930s. This article will explore the (...) implications of this assumption by comparing Fleck with Gumplowicz as well as with Tadeusz Bilikiewicz, a psychiatrist, philosopher and historian of medicine working like Fleck in the cultural milieu of Lwów/lemberg. (shrink)