Mark Crooks effectively demolishes Dennett's theory by concentrating on its internal defects. In which case I would like to contribute to this discussion by examining some scientific evidence that may be relevant. Dennett claims that hallucinations do not involve any actual sensory element but only a change in our beliefs. A schizophrenic does not actually hear the voices he complains about--he develops the false belief that he is hearing something. This puts hallucinations on a par with the patient's delusions e.g. (...) his false belief that other people are persecuting him. The majority view, in contrast, is that hallucinations represent defective function in the sensory system. In this impasse, evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging studies should help. These allow us to identify those areas of the brain that are activated under the conditions we are interested in. If the majority are right, then a subject having hallucinations should show increased activity in some part of his sensory brain. On the other hand, if Dennett is right, the subject should show no such increased activity but, instead, possibly abnormal activity in the part of the brain related to the formation of delusions. To answer this question I performed a Medline search of the literature on imaging studies in hallucinations occurring under various circumstances. The results were interesting. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Routledge is now re-issuing this prestigious series of 204 volumes originally published between 1910 and 1965.

This review considers a number of recent theories on the neural basis of consciousness, with particular attention to the theories of Bogen, Crick, Llinás, Newman, and Changeux. These theories allot different roles to various key brain areas, in particular the reticular and intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus and the cortex. Crick's hypothesis is that awareness is a function of reverberating corticothalamic loops and that the spotlight ofintramodalattention is controlled by the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. He also proposed different mechanisms (...) for attention and intention . The current review presents a new hypothesis, based on elements from these hypotheses, includingintermodalattention and olfaction and pain, which may pose problems for Crick's original theory. This work reviews the possible role in awareness and intermodal attention and intention of the cholinergic system in the basal forebrain and the tegmentum; the reticular, the intralaminar, and the dorsomedial thalamic nuclei; the raphe and locus coeruleus; the reticular formation; the ventral striatum and extended amygdala; insula cortex, and other selected cortical areas. Both clinical and basic research data are covered. The conclusion is reached that the brain may work by largely nonlinear parallel processing and much intramodal shifts of attention may be effected by intracortical, or multiple corticothalamic mechanisms . But this is constrained by the functional anatomy of the circuits concerned and waking “awareness” is modulated by the many “nonspecific” systems . But the principal agents for intermodal attention shifts, the “searchlight,” may be two key nuclei of the cholinergic system in the mesencephalon. Clinical loss of consciousness results from damage to these nuclei but not from damage to the cholinergic nucleus basalis of the basal forebrain. (shrink)

Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness brings together leading neuroscientists and philosophers to explain and defend their theories on consciousness. The book offers a one-of-a-kind look at the radically opposing theories concerning the nature of the objects of immediate perception-whether these are distal physical objects or phenomenal experiences in the conscious mind. Each side-neuroscientists and philosophers-offers accessible, comprehensive explanations of their points-of-view, with each side also providing a response to the other that offers a unique approach on (...) opposing positions. It is the only book available that combines thorough discussion of the arguments behind both direct and indirect realism in a single resource, and is required reading for neuroscientists, neurophilosophers, cognitive scientists and anyone interested in conscious perception and the mind-brain connection. Combines discussion of both direct realism and indirect realism in a single, accessible resource Provides a thorough, well-rounded understanding of not only the opposing views of neuroscientists and philosophers on the nature of conscious perception, but also insight into why the opposition persists Offers a unique "dialog" approach, with neuroscientists and philosophers providing responses and rebuttals to one another's contributions. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on the basic properties of ''consciousness'' that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception-Direct Realism and the Representative (...) Theory. This includes a discussion of the concept of the body-image, phantom limbs, the alleged projection of sensations, the ontological status of phenomenal space, the homunculus argument, the validity of topographic coding, the difference between the stimulus field and the visual field, and two theories of brain-mind relationship-the Identity Theory and the Bohr-Heisenberg theory of brain-mind complementarity. Finally I suggest that the binocular rivalry obtained in the case of the stroboscopic patterns that result from intermittent photic stimulation of one eye, when used in animal expeiments with unit recording, offers a good experimental method of investigating the binding problem. (shrink)

This paper reviews the present status of the material dualist theory of brain-consciousness relations. I cover first the history of its development by Priestly, Broad, Price, Carr, Jourdan, and myself. The theory is then described with its basis in higher-dimensional geometry, the phenomenology of consciousness, the neurological concept of the body image, and the application of Leibniz's Law to the current dominant identity theory of brain-consciousness relations. A model based on Flatland is developed to illustrate the theory followed by a (...) discussion of its application to recent findings in NDE cases together with the use by Jourdan and Brumblay of higherdimensional geometry to account for the remarkable phenomenology revealed. Finally I discuss possible ways to test the theory by experiment. (shrink)

This paper reviews four current theories of brain-consciousness relations—classical Cartesian Dualism, the Identity Theory, Eliminative Materialism, and a new form of Substance Dualism that includes a modified form of the Cartesian theory. This entails a critical examination of our basic concepts of what consciousness is, of the nature of the body image, and the relation of phenomenal space to physical space. This investigation reaches the same result as that attained recently by the physicist Bernard Carr (2008)—that what is needed is (...) a paradigm shift in our basic concepts of the geometry of the Universe. In order to understand phenomenal consciousness we need to replace the present four-dimensional model with a higher-dimensional structure, in which a phenomenal space (with its contents) and physical space (with its contents) are different cross-sections (branes) of a higher-dimensional space (the bulk). Keywords: brain—consciousness—mechanisms—substance dualism—brane theory. (shrink)

Presenting some modern views on the problem of the nature of mind and its relationship to the brain, this book, published in 1965, brings together contributors from various disciplines which are affected by this issue. Coming from different philosophical outlooks as well as subjects, these contributors also comment on each other's' chapters with a view of developing thought on the approaches to the problem. The theory of mind-brain relationship is vital to human interest and has been in debate throughout western (...) thought over centuries, split mainly into dualist and monistic theories. These discussions had and still have wide impact philosophy, psychology, religion and cosmology, among other areas. (shrink)

We can in fact obtain scientific information about the contents of consciousness by the methods of introspectionist psychology. An example comes from the author's work on the stroboscopic patterns and from the way psychedelic drugs alter color perception.

This paper presents the results of some recent experiments in neuroscience and introspectionist psychology that reveal the role of virtual reality in normal visual perception, and the use of television information compression technology by the visual brain. This involves particularly the cholinergic system in the forebrain. This research throws new light on the nature of consciousness, in particular in connection with the debate between Naïve Realists and Physiological Realists.

Mood in humans is a complex phenomenon that integrates emotion , cognition, perception, ideation, and action in a coherent manner. In bipolar disorder extremes of mood occur outside the normal range, in which all the above functions are coherently affected. Mood is controlled by a series of separate but interactive brain circuits that involve much of the brain, but particularly the limbic system. The question addressed in this paper is whether the coordination of all these separate systems into one coherent (...) functional mood is mediated by non-linear dynamics acting between these systems as equal participants; or whether it is affected by a single master regulator controlling the others. The possible roles, as master regulators, of non-linear dynamically linked populations of neurons, and of the C1–C3 adrenergic nuclei in the medulla is discussed. (shrink)

This paper presents an enquiry into the essential nature of phenomenal consciousness and its relation to the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain . It first combines critical accounts of current ideas about the nature of NCCs themselves and about what constitutes phenomenal consciousness. This is followed by an examination of how these two may be related with a particular focus on pointing out the defects in the currently most popular hypothesis in this field, namely the identity theory. The (...) conclusion is that we need a better theory. A candidate for this theory is presented in some detail that involves higher-dimensional geometry. (shrink)

This commentary reviews and extends the target article's treatment of the topic of the role of acetylcholine in hallucinatory experience in health and disease. Particular attention is paid to differentiating muscarinic and nicotinic effects in modulating the use of virtual reality mechanisms by the brain. Then, attention is drawn to the similarities between these aspects of brain function and certain aspects of television digital compression technology.

This paper reviews the evidence, from studies of acute denervation plasticity, that NCCs in the sensory cortex are composed of particular patterns of intracolumnar excitation in a certain type of neuron, and not of specific anatomically identified neurons. This leads to an enquiry as to what the microneurological basis of NCCs in general may be. Further evidence is examined as to the possible NCCs of the stroboscopic patterns. The hypotheses are presented that the geometrical bright phase patterns arise as dissipative (...) structures generated by interacting cortical rhythms; whereas the non-geometrical dark phase patterns have as their NCCs dendritic potentials in the GABAergic gap-junction linked network in layers II and III of the visual cortex. (shrink)

Conspectus of part of John R. Smythies' Analysis of Perception (1956). It presents a summary of his ideas on phenomenal space – the space of one’s imagination, dreams, psychedelic experiences, somatic sensations, visions, hynagogia, etc. – and its relation to physical space.

Conspectus of part of John R. Smythies' Analysis of Perception (1956). It presents a summary of his ideas on phenomenal space – the space of one’s imagination, dreams, psychedelic experiences, somatic sensations, visions, hynagogia, etc. – and its relation to physical space.

It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.

For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.

Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...) But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to. (shrink)

Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...) normative requirements with reasons. (shrink)

This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.

This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.

John Hyman explores central problems in philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. His approach to the dimensions of human action culminates in an original analysis of the relation between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.

This study provides a comprehensive reinterpretation of the meaning of Locke's political thought. John Dunn restores Locke's ideas to their exact context, and so stresses the historical question of what Locke in the Two Treatises of Government was intending to claim. By adopting this approach, he reveals the predominantly theological character of all Locke's thinking about politics and provides a convincing analysis of the development of Locke's thought. In a polemical concluding section, John Dunn argues that liberal and (...) Marxist interpretations of Locke's politics have failed to grasp his meaning. Locke emerges as not merely a contributor to the development of English constitutional thought, or as a reflector of socio-economic change in seventeenth-century England, but as essentially a Calvinist natural theologian. (shrink)

This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The essays (...) seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism is one of the most important, controversial, and suggestive works of moral philosophy ever written. Mill defends the view that all human action should produce the greatest happiness overall, and that happiness itself is to be understood as consisting in "higher" and "lower" pleasures. This volume uses the 1871 edition of the text, the last to be published in Mill's lifetime. The text is preceded by a comprehensive introduction assessing Mill's philosophy and the alternatives to (...) utilitarianism, and discussing some of the specific issues Mill raises in Utilitarianism. (shrink)

This anthology is a thorough introduction to classic literature for those who have not yet experienced these literary masterworks. For those who have known and loved these works in the past, this is an invitation to reunite with old friends in a fresh new format. From Shakespeare's finesse to Oscar Wilde's wit, this unique collection brings together works as diverse and influential as The Pilgrim's Progress and Othello. As an anthology that invites readers to immerse themselves in the masterpieces of (...) the literary giants, it is must-have addition to any library. (shrink)

"A modern classic. Dewey's lectures have lost none of their vigor...The historical approach, which underlay the central argument, is beautifully exemplified in his treatments of the origin of philosophy."-- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research "It was with this book that Dewey fully launched his campaign for experimental philosophy."-- The New Republic Written by an eminent philosopher shortly after the shattering effects of World War I, this volume offers an insightful introduction to the concept of pragmatic humanism. Dewey presents persuasive arguments against (...) traditional philosophical constructs, suggesting their basis in self-justification. He proposes, instead, an examination of core values in terms of their ultimate effects on the self and others. This experimental philosophy was received with both outrage and acclaim for daring to mingle ethics and science. Delivered in 1919 as a series of lectures, Dewey's landmark work appears here in an enlarged edition that features an informative introduction by the author, written more than 25 years after the book's initial publication. (shrink)

I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this (...) proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification. (shrink)

This was scanned from the 1909 edition and mechanically checked against a commercial copy of the text from CDROM. Differences were corrected against the paper edition. The text itself is thus a highly accurate rendition. The footnotes were entered manually.

John Broome; V*—Fairness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/91.1.87.

Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a (...) theoretically satisfying treatment of their favoured epistemic source. It is argued, first, that intuitions and perceptual experiences are at a certain level of abstraction the same type of mental state, presentations, which are distinct from beliefs, hunches, inclinations, attractions, and seemings. The notion of a presentation is given a positive explication, which identifies its characteristic features, accounts for several of its substantive psychological roles, and systematically locates it in a threefold division among types of contentful states. Subsequently, it is argued that presentations, intuitive no less than sensory, are by their nature poised to play a distinctive epistemic role. Specifically, in the case of intuition, we encounter an intellectual state that is so structured as to provide justification without requiring justification in turn—something which may, thus, be thought of as ‘given’. (shrink)