There are very few medical ethics courses in British medical schools which are a formal part of the clinical curriculum. Such a programme is described in the following, along with the way in which the long-term curriculum committee of the University College and Middlesex Hospital Joint Medical School was persuaded to make it compulsory for first-year students. Pedagogical lessons which have been learned in its planning and implementation are outlined and teaching materials are included concerning student and course assessment which (...) should be useful for others engaged in similar work. Finally, some of the institutional obstacles facing such attempts are discussed, particularly problems concerning timetabling, different types of opposition and the consequent importance of building alliances among clinical teaching staff. (shrink)
Marcia Baron has offered an illuminating and fruitful discussion of extra-legal excuses. What is particularly useful, and particularly important, is her focus on our excusatory practices—on the ways and contexts in which we make, offer, accept, bestow and reject excuses: if we are to reach an adequate understanding of excuses, their implications and their grounds, we must attend to the roles that they can play in our human activities and relationships—and to the complexities and particularities of those roles. However, (...) I want to focus my comments less on the details of Baron’s discussions of excuses in extra-legal contexts than on the implications of her discussion for our understanding of excuses in the criminal law. What light (if any, a sceptic might add) can such analyses of our extra-legal concepts and practices throw on legal concepts and doctrines? (shrink)
In this analysis of Marcia Baron’s account of excuses, I seek to do two things. I try to draw out the nature of the distinction between forgiving and excusing. I also defend the distinction between excuses (like duress), and denials of responsibility (like insanity).
Richard Bernstein has, for several decades, been one of the most prominent thinkers in the tradition of American pragmatism, but he has never narrowly confined his work to pragmatism or American philosophy. His intellectual profile manifests a remarkable pluralism—which, of course, is something that is inherent in the pragmatist tradition itself. The collection of essays honoring Bernstein's legacy edited by Megan Craig and Marcia Morgan is aptly subtitled: "Thinking the Plural". In their various ways, the contributors to this anthology—all (...) of whom have at some point been Bernstein's students in a number of "generations"—not only examine but also exemplify their mentor's deep commitment to... (shrink)
Marcia Cavell’s recent book is the continuation of a ‘conversation between philosophy and psychoanalysis’ in which she has been engaged for some time. Her previous monograph, The Psychoanalytic Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), was a powerful and sustained argument in favour of an interpretation of psychoanalysis and children’s mental development informed by a broadly Davidsonian perspective on mind and meaning. Her theme in Becoming a Subject is the nature of self, which she understands as the self-conscious, reflective, (...) judging, reason-giving self – ‘someone who recognizes herself as an ‘I’, as having her own peculiar perspective’ (1). (shrink)