This is a new edition of the manual published in 1974 and 1984. Compared with those earlier editions it is revised, enlarged and more precise in its argumentation. In its beginnings the manual aimed at meeting the didactic needs to present students of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the ATK a complete handling of Christian ethics. The author, who wrote his manual in difficult times of communist ideology, decided to include in one work, besides a positive exposition of Christian (...) ethics, a critical discussion with other ethical systems as well as his own explicit theory on Augustinian and Thomistic ethics, which he endeavoured to develop. Thus the work interlocked the didactic objectives and the process of growth and justification of the Author's views, Krakow 2001, p. 308). (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this (...) book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory. (shrink)

I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...) rationally/informationally-constrained means of achieving them; however, it does not require the attribution of unobservable mental states, like beliefs, that are causally responsible for behavior. (shrink)

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is (...) not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology. (shrink)

The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...) interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The present volume offers a selection of papers written by Tadeusz Czezowski. one of the most prominent representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw ...

The aim of this paper is to pose a problem for theories that claim that belief reports are context dependent. Firstly, I argue that the claim is committed to verbalism, a theory that derives the context sensitivity of belief reports from the context sensitivity of the psychological verbs used in such reports. Secondly, I argue that verbalism is not an attractive theoretical option because it is in conflict with the non-proto-rigidity of verbs like ‘believe’. Finally, I describe various consequences that (...) the argument has for invariantism and moderate contextualism. (shrink)

Although Brandom is critical of some features of narrowly conceived classical pragmatism, at the same time he explicitly embraces a version of pragmatism, both in his overall philosophical outlook, and in his philosophy of language. Brandom’s distinctive theoretical approach is based on what he calls rationalist pragmatism, which is a version of fundamental pragmatism. Within the philosophy of language it takes the form of semantic pragmatism. The paper briefly discusses Brandomian version of fundamental pragmatism and its semantic underpinning, and subsequently (...) formulates a basic dilemma it encounters there. (shrink)

The paper contains a critical analysis of pluripropositionalism (or: multiple proposition approach), the view defended in recent years by authors such as Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta and John Perry.

We prove that all finitely axiomatizable tense logics with temporal operators for ‘always in the future’ and ‘always in the past’ and determined by linear fows time are coNP-complete. It follows, for example, that all tense logics containing a density axiom of the form ■n+1F p → nF p, for some n ≥ 0, are coNP-complete. Additionally, we prove coNP-completeness of all ∩-irreducible tense logics. As these classes of tense logics contain many Kripke incomplete bimodal logics, we obtain many natural (...) examples of Kripke incomplete normal bimodal logics which are nevertheless coNP-complete. (shrink)

I criticize Herbert Simon 's argument for the claim that complex natural systems must constitute decomposable, mereological or functional hierarchies. The argument depends on certain assumptions about the requirements for the successful evolution of complex systems, most importantly, the existence of stable, intermediate stages in evolution. Simon offers an abstract model of any process that succeeds in meeting these requirements. This model necessarily involves construction through a decomposable hierarchy, and thus suggests that any complex, natural, i.e., evolved, system is constituted (...) by a decomposable hierarchy. I argue that Stuart Kauffman's recent models of genetic regulatory networks succeed in specifying processes that could meet Simon 's requirements for evolvability without requiring construction through a decomposable hierarchy. Since Kauffman's models are at least as plausible as Simon 's model, Simon 's argument that complex natural systems must constitute decomposable, mereological or functional hierarchies does not succeed. (shrink)

Using randomly generated sequences of binary events we asked participants to make predictions about the next event. It turned out that while predicting uncertain events, people do not behave unsystematically. Our research identifies four types of relatively consistent strategies for predicting uncertain binary events: a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run majority events, hereafter called the long-run momentum strategy ; a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run (...) minority events, called the long-run contrarian strategy ; a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run majority events, called the short-run momentum strategy ; and a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run minority events, called the short-run contrarian strategy . When the character of events remains unknown, the most common strategy is the short-run momentum strategy. With the increase of a perceived randomness of the situation, people tend more often to use the short-run contrarian strategy. People differ in their general beliefs about the continuation or reversal of a trend in various natural and social processes. Trend believers, when facing sequences of binary events commonly perceived as random, tend to use momentum strategies, whereas those who believe in the trend's reversal tend to use contrarian strategies. (shrink)

The paper shows that the paradox of the totality of propositions rest on assumptions characteristic of some theories of structured contents (like Jeffrey King's "new account of structured propositions").

Medicine is a scientific discipline, but it is sometimes difficult to separate what is scientific and what is a clinical, practical activity. Man is the object, but he is always the subject of medical research and therefore these two elements become closely bound together by a thread of moral interdependencies. Every mentor of a young academic and all institutions dealing with the teaching of and research into medicine must understand multidimensional, multifaceted, and multilevel aspects of their activity and give them (...) due regard in the educational process. The educational mission of an academic institution and of the teacher working there may be summed up in one phrase: Teach thinking! At the same time, the task of a school and the individual mentor is to teach the student to distinguish personal freedom from a lack of the feeling of responsibility. The medieval principle “Universitas magistrorum et scholarium”, and thus the corporation, the community of teachers and students, has not lost any of its relevance and value today. The situation is, in its far-reaching consequences, tragic in which the “insufficiently tutored teach”. Both physician and teacher, and especially physician-teacher, are not only professions, but also callings. (shrink)

Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by (...) the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis. (shrink)

I pose the following dilemma for Millikan's teleological theory of mental content. There is only one way that her theory can avoid Gauker's [(1995) Review of Millikan's White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, Philosophical Psychology, 8, 305-309] charge that it relies on an unexplained notion of mapping or isomorphism between mental state and world. Mental content must be explained in terms of the mapping relation that is required for mental state producing and consuming mechanisms to perform their biologically (...) proper functions, i.e. producing mental states that are consumed in systematically adaptive practical inferences. However, this proposal leads to unacceptably counterintuitive ascriptions of content to mythological beliefs and related desires: such beliefs and desires must "map onto" environmental states that make them adaptive, not onto the mythological states of affairs that (would) make them true or fulfilled. I conclude by discussing the merits and drawbacks of a potential solution to this problem: the view that the contents of mythological beliefs and desires are determined by the non-mythological concepts out of which they are constructed, rather than by the environmental states that make them adaptive. The affinities of this proposal with Pascal Boyer's recent theory of mythological concepts [(2001) Religion explained, New York: Basic Books] are also discussed. (shrink)