Beschouwing vanuit een filosofisch perspectief van bio-ethische onderwerpen met een rooms-katholieke achtergrond.

Benadering van enkele klassieke filosofische kwesties vanuit een door de Angelsaksische taalfilosofie geïnspireerde visie op de zingevende rede.

Echte Freiheit läßt sich nach Leibniz nicht auf die Möglichkeit reduzieren, so zu handeln, wie man handeln will. Vielmehr muß echte Freiheit mit dem moralischen Verdienst in Verbindung gebracht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Idee der logischen Kontingenz von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Eine Person hat kein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie blindlings durch das Gute geleitet wird. Sie hat allein dann ein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie das Schlechte zurückweist und bewußt das Gute wählt, das sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Insofern ist (...) derjenige, der moralisch richtig handelt, sich anderer Möglichkeiten bewußt. Leibniz trägt dieser Erfahrungstatsache durch den Gedanken Rechnung, daß eine freie Handlung logisch kontingent ist. Diesem Gedanken verleiht Leibniz einen metaphysischen Status: die möglichen Welten haben einen objektiven Gehalt. (shrink)

Levinas' view on ethical commitment seems at first sight incompatible with the cultivation of particularistic ideals. The Other from whom the moral imperative originates, is also a Stranger: in submitting ourselves to his appeal, we obey a law radically transcending our autonomy. Therefore, our responsibility for the Other is not a loyalty based on personal sympathies, preferences or common interests. From Levinas' stern universalistic perspective, particularistic loyalty might appear as a form of moral self-indulgence. In this article we draw attention (...) to two forms of particularistic attachment which can paradoxically be seen as a confrontation with a radical moral heteronomy. The moral obligation imposed on us by nearness in space and relations of close kinship are in a sense arbitrary and contingent. Just because they are beyond rational justification, they also transcend the autonomy of our rational will. In this sense it seems to be true that some forms of particularistic commitment can make us aware of the radical heteronomy as it is meant by Levinas. (shrink)

The debate about the relation between science and truth is manifestly epistemological, but latently and fundamentally metaphysical. Popper's theory of verisimilitude provides us with a striking example. According to Popper, science aims at bringing us nearer to 'absolute, objective truth'; the growth of scientific knowledge is seen as a never ending realisation of that ultimate aim. This thesis of verisimilitude can be interpreted in two ways. In the first interpretation the thesis appears as a correct, but formal and even trivial (...) statement. Here the thesis that science aims at bringing us nearer to truth is as unilluminating as the thesis that moral endeavor aims at bringing us nearer to the Moral Good or that artistic endeavor aims at bringing us nearer to Aesthetic Beauty. According to the second interpretation, however, the thesis has a more substantial and metaphysical meaning. Here it consists of three different claims : 1. scientific endeavor points to something which is beyond and actual or humanly possible scientific achievement; 2. it is in this relation with something transcendent that the ultimate purpose of science is to be sought; 3. the relation between actual science and its transcendent should be seen as a part-whole relation, i.e. the transcendent goal should be represented as the ideal of total intelligibility. In this article the first and second claim are accepted; the third is rejected. One should accept the idea (put forward by Einstein ) that science points to a mystery beyond science. One should beware, however, of equating the sense of mystery with an anticipation for yet hidden information, inaccessible to us, but 'quoad se' accessible to reason. Science's transcendent mystery should be viewed in a more radical way. That is to say, the relation between actual science and its transcendent mystery is analogous to the relation between, on the one hand, the information contained in and derivable from a (good) poem and, on the other hand something else which is poetically suggested, yet does not consist in hidden information. What is evoked by poetry and science, is not even in principle translatable in terms of an informative content. Therefore the ultimate goal of science is not the ideal of knowing everything with the clarity and precision of science ; it is rather the awareness of a mystery which does not even exist as the sort of intelligible content scientific theories attempt to mirror. (shrink)

How can it be explained that we are able to be captivated by fictions and to sympathize with characters about whom we know that they are merely the figments of someone's imagination ? In the current debate about this question it is often taken for granted that the interest in fiction is a peculiar deviation from something which is to be considered as perfectly rational and normal, viz. our interest in what really happened. In this article, however, I try to (...) describe a perspective from which our interest in what really happened turns out to be as paradoxical and peculiar as our interest in fiction. According to a second presupposition — which is often taken for granted in the current discussion — the desires and emotions, evoked by fictions, would be some kind of pretending. At first sight our interest in fiction is strikingly similar to daydreams and other forms of mild self-deception. But this similarity is misleading : some fictions are great works of art and it would be contradictory to suppose that the response to their artistic value should be rooted in a lack of lucidity. A genuine aesthetic experience is contemplative and contemplation is to be considered as lucidity — as ‘concentration without elimination’. In the final part of the article I try to explain how the interest in artistic fictions can be related to the traditional ideal of contemplation. (shrink)

The classical formulations given to the problem of free will and determinism in analytical philosophy can be split into two groups according to a double function of the element : „to be able to act otherwise”. In the first case we speak of „the problem of autonomy” and in the second of „the problem of justifying punishment”. Both formulations are inadequate. „The problem of autonomy” is wrongly formulated, since determinism does not threaten our possibilities. „The problem of justifying punishment” is (...) likewise a wrong formulation, since the question of „being able to act otherwise” merely has a secondary role in the attribution of guilt. Nevertheless certain elements can be found in both formulations to provide us with a new formulation and it is in this direction that we should like to move. (shrink)

In this article I have pointed to some contradictions which appear in Popper's „Of Clouds and Clocks”. These contradictions are explained on two different levels. First, they are represented as the result of conceptual confusions. Secondly, they are connected with a paradox which is never explicitly stated by Popper, but which seems fundamental for a better understanding of what the freewill-controversy is about. The paradox is this : on the one hand freedom is usually and naturally considered as self-determination, i.e. (...) as the power to act in accordance with one's own motives, desires, intentions ; but on the other hand, the kind of freedom which is at stake in the freewill-debate, seems to require a determination by „external” elements (rules, theories, ideals, „objectivity”). The influence of these elements goes beyond our control and therefore also beyond our self-determination. The freedom which is defended by Popper, consists in the possibility to be determined by objective standards, i.e. by something which is external to our motives and desires. It is not clear, however, how we should draw a line between the kind of external influence which is opposed to this „freedom” and the kind of external influence which is required by this „freedom”. (shrink)

Strawson's view on punishment has been either neglected or recoiled from in contemporary scholarship on ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR). Strawson's alleged retributivism has made his view suspect and troublesome. In this article, we first argue, against the mainstream, that the punishment passage is an indispensable part of the main argument in FR (section 1) and elucidate in what sense Strawson can be called ‘a retributivist’ (section 2). We then elaborate our own hypothesis of symbolic retribution to explain the continuum between (...) moral reactive attitudes and punishment that Strawson only adumbrates (section 3). After this justification of the punitive response to wrongdoing, we compare and contrast our specific kind of retributivist hypothesis with other positions in the so-called ‘new retributivism’ (section 4). Our hypothesis differs from other subvarieties of expressive retributivism in putting centre stage the idea of punishment as taking up a reverential stance towards the victim. (shrink)

Autonomy, self-determination, self-affirmation, emancipation: all these words refer to an ideal that orients the way in which our contemporary culture speaks about many moral and political problems. The importance of this ideal for us can be seen in the way we accept as obvious a number of ideas that follow from it. Most of us would certainly tend to accept that no universally valid answer can be given to the question of what kind of human life is truly meaningful or (...) valuable and that, because of this, people should be granted as much freedom as possible to pursue a life that best corresponds with their own personal tastes and preferences. Many would go a step further and claim that people should also be encouraged to live as much as possible according to what they have themselves chosen, and that they should give up traditional forms of life and role patterns.One aspect of this cult of individual freedom or autonomy is the idea that we should develop a critical attitude towards anything established, accepted or traditional: every form of power or authority, prevailing moral norms and educational customs, traditional role patterns, etc. A further feature of this is the tendency to describe any improvement in the fortunes of the weak, the vulnerable and the less well off as an ‘emancipation’. The idea that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly should receive more support, assistance, respect and attention is translated by the assertion that they, too, should be ‘liberated’.The ideals that we associate with words like ‘emancipation’ or ‘self-affirmation’ were at one time innovative and revolutionary, but they gradually became established as accepted ways of thinking and thus became part of a new common sense. Nowadays, anyone wanting to be provocative will attain their goal more easily by scoffing at everything falling under the rubric of emancipation than by speaking out in its defence.This fact is characteristic of an ambiguity in our culture. While the ideals of self-affirmation and emancipation enjoy enormous popularity, in certain intellectual circles they are treated with suspicion. At stake here is the general image of humanity associated with these ideals. Thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida or Baudrillard have, each in their own way, attacked the idea of the autonomous subject and stressed that people’s most intimate thoughts and desires are determined by something that transcends them: by the language they speak or the culture to which they belong.Rejecting the idea of the autonomous subject is usually one aspect of a more general critique of ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. The question whether and to what extent this critique is justified occupies a central position in many contemporary philosophical discussions, and much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy can be described in terms of the opposition between those who would defend Enlightenment ideals and those who would reject or cast doubt on those ideals.What I would like to discuss here undoubtedly fits into a framework that could be called ‘antiliberal’ or ‘anti-humanist’. However, it is certainly not my intention to criticize humanism or liberalism directly and systematically. (shrink)

Peter Strawson makes a crucial distinction between reactive attitudes and the objective attitude. Reactive attitudes such as gratefulness, anger and indignation imply that we take each other seriously as responsible agents. The objective attitude implies that we stop taking each other seriously. Strawson argues that the objective attitude is not merely psychologically difficult: it is inconceivable that we would systematically refrain from taking each other seriously and stop discussing with each other or blaming ourselves or others. Strawson, however, only discusses (...) the reactive attitudes from a general point of view. In this paper, we argue that the reactive attitudes of remorse and moral indignation are forms of ”symbolic restoration’. Retributive punishment should also be interpreted from this perspective. Consequently, our concern with moral blame cannot be understood independently from a concern with the harm that has occurred. Our attitude to the outcome determines our attitude to the agent. The concern with the mental state is secondary: it is structured by its place within the practice of symbolic restoration. (shrink)

Utopianism aims at a global transformation in virtue of which both the external world and our own reality will develop in such ways as to be in greater harmony with our wishes. What utopianism does not take into account, however, is the existence of two important kinds of desire. In the first place, human beings have the need to react symbolically to what cannot be changed. In the second place, they also have a desire for recognition and for a significant (...) life. With these desires, human beings have aims that go beyond morality’s protective ideals. Offering the example of transhumanism as a paradigm case of utopianism in our own days, the present article illustrates how utopianism ignores the fact that human beings indirectly desire that certain of their objects of desire remain beyond their control. (shrink)

Susan Wolf argues that meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness. Whereas we can agree with her claim that the conception of meaning invokes an objective standard, we think it is questionable whether a radically subjective fulfillment is a real possibility. Several reasons are provided why this cannot be the case.

External reality is not moved by our personal dramas; even when our world is collapsing, the world continues its normal course, as if nothing had happened. Of course we know that the most poignant human suffering will not stop the sun from shining or the world from turning. Yet there are moments when the disharmony between objective reality and our own emotional state is painful and even surprising. It seems as if the world is provocatively uninterested in what is most (...) dear to us.The awareness of this rift is evoked in the first sentence of Borges’ well-known story translated into Dutch under the title De Aleph, "On the harrowing morning in February when Beatriz Viterbo died... I saw that the iron poster boards in the Plaza Constitución were being pasted over with some type of advertising for light cigarettes; this struck me, for I understood that the restless, enormous universe was already withdrawing from her, and that this was the first change in an endless series".What is the theoretical relevance of this experience, often roused by poetry and prose, but seldom discussed by philosophers? Is Borges referring to a purely subjective experience from which no conclusion can be drawn, or does he speak of an experience containing an important theoretical insight? Regardless, our ability to undergo this experience is evidently independent of our favourite philosophical concepts. Even someone who adheres to a theory that accepts a meaningful reality can experience this rift when he observes the sun shining triumphantly on a day of mourning. Similarly, someone having no metaphysical belief in a meaningful reality can remain immune to the type of rift Borges describes.Yet it cannot be denied that this rift experience is strengthened and legitimized by an important development in knowledge. The science has evoked a world view that strictly separates objective facts from subjective values. The reality presented by science, is not an inspired relationship or meaningful construction where humanity finds its place and from which it derives its dignity. Laws discovered by science say nothing of good or evil and contain no message on the meaning of life. Science is a source of trustworthy information not elevating, inspiring or comforting concepts. From a scientific viewpoint, knowledge of objective reality has nothing to do with insights people use to orient their lives.This separation of knowledge and wisdom contrasts sharply with a traditional view where knowledge of the most fundamental characteristics of reality also offers an insight in the meaning of human life. Nietzsche described this contrast as follows: while people have always tended to believe that what concerns them most also lies at the heart of reality, they must now realize that their moral, religious or aesthetic values merely form a superficial world of appearances; what elicits wonder or strong emotion is only a blossom on a reality that, in its deeper roots, is not at all beautiful or moving.The disenchantment brought on by science creates a breach or rift. Everything we experience as mysterious, enchanted or moving, appears also to exist as a reality coldly and neutrally described by science. Science demystified the rainbow that once appeared as a mysterious, divine phenomenon: what had always seemed wondrous can apparently be explained by the same natural laws that regulate the most banal or prosaic phenomena. (shrink)

Theoretical reflection on moral disagreement can be pertinent from a practical point of view. When far reaching policies depend on agreement about conflicting moral options, the need may be felt to reflect on strategies for reducing conflict and reaching a consensus. In such a context, it may for instance be useful to study mechanisms that tend to bring about bias and prejudice. In this paper, however, I will not be concerned with whatever might be done to reduce disagreement. My approach (...) will be purely theoretical and will concentrate on the nature of moral disagreement, more particularly on the question how disagreement about conflicting moral claims differs from disagreements about conflicting empirical claims. This will lead me to the defence of a kind of perspectivism. I will argue for the view that moral disagreement is to be expected if morality is intimately associated with the quest for meaning. I will conclude by making a couple of critical remarks about a doctrine that tries to free morality from the quest for meaning and hence also from perspectivism. (shrink)

The current debate about the moral status of animals is strongly determined by a misunderstanding of the role of moral intuitions. It is often assumed that our moral intuitions contain an implicit understanding of something that could ideally always be made explicit in terms of a consistent set of general principles. I have argued that this assumption is certainly wrong with respect to our moral intuitions about how we should behave towards animals. The meaning of these intuitions will always be (...) intimately tied up with deeply ingrained attitudes which precede the endorsement of any explicit moral view. While it cannot be excluded that these attitudes might radically change, it is wrong to suppose that such a transformation could result from abstract reasoning. (shrink)

I will limit myself to a brief description of a phenomenon which could perhaps be perceived as a distortion or perversion of caring. What I have in mind is something which is distinguished from volitional necessity. Being guided by volitional necessity is a form of being active because I am governed in my actions by something I really care about. This, however, could be contrasted with a phenomenon which perhaps does not occur in your work, but I was wondering what (...) you would say about it. What I have in mind is the desire of people to be identified with something that may be very different from what they actually are. (shrink)

Influential contemporary thinkers have declared that the belief in individual autonomy rests on an illusion. They have argued that our subjectivity is shaped by the language we speak and the traditions to which we belong. One should not, however, overestimate the impact of these theoretical criticisms. The idea of individual autonomy is part of a larger pattern of belief which has not ceased to exert its influence on our habits of thinking and behaving.The belief that we are fully autonomous subjects (...) is associated with the belief that we should identify ourselves with the detached, objectifying attitude which is an essential element of the scientific outlook. We like to believe that our real self is to be distinguished from any role we happen to fulfill or any position we happen to occupy. Instead of admitting that we are constituted in our deepest self by our commitments and allegiances, we would prefer to see these commitments and allegiances as the expressions of our individual desires and free decisions. The kind of individualism which is related to the idea of individual autonomy need not be amoral or egoistic, but it can easily be combined with a kind of moral universalism. A commitment to an abstract ideal is not incompatible with individual autonomy. (shrink)

When I was asked to formulate some questions or remarks about Prof. Barry’s paper, it was probably assumed that I would not confine myself to the expression of pure agreement. And yet, that is what I am inclined at first to do. I do agree that the view he criticizes is wrong for the reasons he mentions. And I admire the clarity and vigour of his arguments. However the reasons one has for agreeing with a thesis may belong to a (...) context that is very different from the context the thesis itself belongs to. Prof. Barry’s paper can be read at one level as the defence of a certain policy — it contains political recommendations. It is at that level that I entirely agree with it. But his recommendations are probably part of a theoretical outlook I do not share.The question I would like to deal with is: “How should the position which is the target of Brian Barry’s criticism be characterized?” One could say that it is anti-liberal. It is certainly opposed to the liberalism Brian Barry advocates. But there are, I think, also good reasons for characterizing it as a kind of liberalism. It is a sort of excessive, perverse, loony liberalism, but liberalism nevertheless. For the sake of convenience I call it quasi-liberalism. (shrink)

This paper does not question the thesis that the phenomena associated with the phrase 'moral luck' point to an important philosophical problem. The aim is, rather, to sketch an interpretation of these phenomena. It is argued that the notion of symbolic restoration is the key we need to understand why the out-come of our actions has a moral significance that is not reducible to the moral significance of the mental states from wich these actions arise.

Some moral philosophers view conventional morality as an instrument that has a certain function to fulfill, and that we can in principle correct or adjust on the basis of an understanding of that function. This instrumentalist approach to morality is an extension of a familiar pattern of thought constituted by the combination of two different elements. We tend, on the one hand, to believe that we have a clear understanding of what it is that we allow ourselves to be guided (...) by when we are motivated by something moral. We identify this moral motivation with something that is, at first sight, transparent and unproblematic, viz. with some sort of altruism. The willingness to act morally is the willingness to be concerned with the happiness, welfare and interests of others.On the other hand, we are also familiar with the idea that traditional or conventional morality is a culturally dependent product of historical processes which have created in us certain beliefs and patterns of feeling and response. The moral judgments that we are inclined to make on the basis of unexamined intuitions owe their existence and appeal, at least partially, to a contingent cultural and historical context.The combination of these two elements leads to a familiar project: we should view whatever is contingent with a critical eye, by determining towhat extent it can be justified on the basis of insight into what is essential . Or to put in another way, we should check if the unexamined, intuitive judgments that we tend to pronounce actually agree with the explicitly formulated universal principles which we consciously endorse.An illustration of this way of thinking can be found in the current discussion about what might be called ‘moral proximity’. The extent to which we feel involved in the joys and sorrows of others depends, among other things, on how near they are to us. This proximity can be conceived in different ways: familiarity, kinship, proximity in space or time. We feel greater sympathy towards our friends or acquaintances than towards people we have never met and about whom we know very little. The suffering of disaster victims in our own country affects us more deeply than the fate of those who experienced the same thing in some distant country. The tragedies of many centuries ago do not horrify us now, and we cannot easily get worked up over the fate of future generations. (shrink)

Two perspectives on religion are contrasted. From the internalist perspective religion is not in need of any neutral justification: its point is manifest within religious life itself, just as the point of morality is manifest within moral life. From the externalist perspective religious practices and attitudes are dependent on the truth of certain assumptions about supernatural realities. It is argued that there are good reasons for endorsing internalism and, consequently, for radically dissociating religion from belief: if religious discourse is non-literal (...) , belief becomes dispensable. Finally, however, it is admitted that the internalist, by drawing a sharp line between literal and non-literal language, might miss an important truth about religion. (shrink)

Two perspectives on religion are contrasted. From the internalist perspective religion is not in need of any neutral justification: its point is manifest within religious life itself, just as the point of morality is manifest within moral life. From the externalist perspective religious practices and attitudes are dependent on the truth of certain assumptions about supernatural realities. It is argued that there are good reasons for endorsing internalism and, consequently, for radically dissociating religion from belief: if religious discourse is non-literal (...) (as the internalist claims), belief becomes dispensable. Finally, however, it is admitted that the internalist, by drawing a sharp line between literal and non-literal language, might miss an important truth about religion. (shrink)

It is argued that the point of the ideal of human rights is to protect individuals against oppressive regimes or cruel traditions. This negative description should not be converted into a positive one: it would be wrong to speak in terms of human rights about whatever people need in order to have meaningful lives. The reason why many philosophers are tempted to make that wrong move is that two kinds of individualism are easily conflated. The thesis that individuals should not (...) be oppressed because of their choices or commitments is translated into the thesis that freedom of individual choice should be maximized. The ideal of individual autonomy which manifests itself in the latter thesis is also at the origin of the belief that our moral intuitions should be justified in terms of the principles we consciously and explicitely endorse. The author argues that this belief has implications which are unacceptable to anybody. (shrink)

One can assign three different aims to the desire for knowledge : utility, pleasure, truth-for-truth's-sake. Whereas the first two aims have a concretely determinable content and therefore look evident, the third one has been looked upon as strange and problematic : it is not immediately clear what kind of value is defended in this case. Popper is one of the recent defenders of the traditional ideal of truth-for-truth's-sake. He wants to defend the ideal against three positions : a primitive taboo-ridden (...) fear for knowledge and truth, relativism, instrumentalism. Analysing Popper's ethic of cognition we do not agree with the instrumentalist's critique of it. However, precisely in advocating a non-instrumentalist value, Popper's position is not unique, but paradoxically resembles the „primitive” position. Popper's belief that there is an objective or absolute truth is, in his opinion, implied by the belief that the search for knowledge makes sense. We try to show that this thesis of absolute truth is based on a conceptual mistake. In opposition to Popper's view, we sketch a form of relativism avoiding this confusion, without doing away with any concrete possibility of discussion or search for truth. At the same time, we try to understand Popper's aversion to relativism as well as the appeal of his position, in that it is a strange mixture of a heroic cognitive ethic and a desire for imaginary control over the uncontrolable. We argue that the form of relativism we advocate easily and perhaps better fulfilb the „heroic” readiness to forsake security in cognitive matters. (shrink)

One can assign three different aims to the desire for knowledge : utility, pleasure, truth-for-truth's-sake. Whereas the first two aims have a concretely determinable content and therefore look evident, the third one has been looked upon as strange and problematic : it is not immediately clear what kind of value is defended in this case. Popper is one of the recent defenders of the traditional ideal of truth-for-truth's-sake. He wants to defend the ideal against three positions : a primitive taboo-ridden (...) fear for knowledge and truth, relativism, instrumentalism. Analysing Popper's ethic of cognition we do not agree with the instrumentalist's critique of it. However, precisely in advocating a non-instrumentalist value, Popper's position is not unique, but paradoxically resembles the „primitive” position. Popper's belief that there is an objective or absolute truth is, in his opinion, implied by the belief that the search for knowledge makes sense. We try to show that this thesis of absolute truth is based on a conceptual mistake. In opposition to Popper's view, we sketch a form of relativism avoiding this confusion, without doing away with any concrete possibility of discussion or search for truth. At the same time, we try to understand Popper's aversion to relativism as well as the appeal of his position, in that it is a strange mixture of a heroic cognitive ethic and a desire for imaginary control over the uncontrolable. We argue that the form of relativism we advocate easily and perhaps better fulfilb the „heroic” readiness to forsake security in cognitive matters. (shrink)

We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because (...) of their material link with some significant individual person. Crucial for the hypothesis we wish to defend, is the fact that a human being can in some cases and for some others function as a relic of what she used to be; in these cases a human individual has a specific significance in virtue of a material link (bodily continuity) with her own past. We argue that this phenomenon can be extended and that the importance of bodily continuity for personal identity is constituted by the kind of symbolisation upon which the existence of relics is based.1. (shrink)

De latere Wittgenstein maakt een onderscheid tussen betekenissen die zich wel en betekenissen die zich niet laten parafraseren. Dit onderscheid tussen zwak en sterk belichaamde betekenissen is van groot belang bij het begrijpen van poëzie, muziek en religieuze taal, aangezien daar sprake is van sterk belichaamde betekenissen. Deze wekken bij ons een emotionele respons op, die echter niet in woorden te vatten is. Zo blijft het thema van het onzegbare ook bij de latere Wittgenstein een rol spelen.