Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences, they argue, risk committing “the moralistic fallacy”, a mistake they (...) claim is widespread throughout the work of contemporary and historical moral philosophers. I argue that many basic and familiar forms of moral assessment of the emotions are not subject to these arguments. I illustrate this by reconsidering the idea that to assess an emotion as “fitting” is to assess it as what a virtuous person would feel. After showing how assessments akin to this “virtue-theoretical” notion of fit may be prevalent even outside of the Aristotelian tradition, I suggest some more charitable and philosophically productive interpretations of the philosophical views of the emotions that D’Arms and Jacobson criticize, and argue that we cannot coherently theorize about the fittingness conditions of the emotions in a morally neutral way. (shrink)

As with certain other self-reflexive emotions, such as guilt and shame, our understanding of self-hatred may be aided by views of the mind which posit an internalized other whose perspective on oneself embodies and focuses a set of concerns and values, and whose perspective one is in some sense vulnerable to. To feel guilt for some transgression is not solely to feel the anger that one would feel toward another’s trespasses, now directed back onto oneself as an object of that (...) anger; it is at the same time to react to that anger – perhaps, for example, to accept it as deserved, or to welcome the lashing of one’s bad conscience. To feel shame before oneself is not just to see oneself in some compromising way, it is to feel compromised by one’s own gaze. Likewise, the person who hates herself does not feel the hatred that she might have for another, simply taking herself as object of that attitude. She is not merely the seat of an internalized hostile voice and perspective that she may, for example, react to with indifference. She does not only tell herself that she is “worthless” but, will typically feel herself so in response. And her suffering may not just result from pain she is inclined to inflict, but suffering that, in some sense, she is inclined to suffer. But how is this so? How, in self-hatred, does one become not only subject to, but vulnerable and even receptive to one’s own hostility? (shrink)

According to an attractive conception of love as attention, discussed by Iris Murdoch, one strives to see one’s beloved accurately and justly. A puzzle for understanding how to love another in this way emerges in cases where more accurate and just perception of the beloved only reveals his flaws and vices, and where the beloved, in awareness of this, strives to escape the gaze of others - including, or perhaps especially, of his loved ones. Though less attentive forms of love (...) may be able to render one’s continued love coherent and justifiable in these cases, they risk further alienating the beloved precisely because they are less attentive and because of the operations of the beloved’s shame. I argue that attentive love is well-suited to alleviate this problem of alienation, but that in order to do so, it must be supplemented with grace. I propose a conception of gracious love as an affectionate love for the qualities of human nature, distinguishing this from a love of humanity, and show how this complex emotion, in being responsive to the complexities of shame, is able to alleviate the problem of alienation. (shrink)

L.A. Paul argues that “transformative experiences” challenge our hopes to live up to an ideal that she believes is upheld within western, wealthy cultures. If these experiences reveal information to us about the world and ourselves that is in principle unavailable to us before we undergo them, it seems that there is no hope for us to be rational, authentic and autonomous masters of our own lives. Supposing that Paul is right about this, how concerned should we be? Here, I (...) challenge the ideal of "rational mastery" that guides Paul’s project, and which must be granted in order to motivate the philosophical challenge purportedly generated by experiences that drastically change who we are and what we know. (shrink)

The guise of the good thesis can be understood as an attempt to distinguish between human motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. I propose, first, that we understand the intelligibility at stake here as the kind necessary for the experience of reactive attitudes, both negative and positive, to the behavior and motivations of an agent. Given this, I argue that the thesis must be understood as proposing substantive content restrictions on how human agents perceive objects (...) of their desires; it cannot be a purely formal constraint. Moreover, while proponents of the guise of the good thesis who posit substantive content restrictions on human desire are right to do so, they are mistaken to claim that we always desire the apparently good. Instead, I propose a different limit: the naturally attractive. This alternative to the guise of the good thesis nonetheless captures the compelling idea that human desires are intelligent, quasi-perceptual responses to the world. (shrink)

On one predominant conception of virtue, the virtuous agent is, among other things, wholehearted in doing what she believes best. I challenge this condition of wholeheartedness by making explicit the connections between the emotion of boredom and the states of continence and akrasia. An easily bored person is more susceptible to these forms of disharmony because of two familiar characteristics of boredom. First, that we can be – and often are – bored by what it is that we know would (...) be best to do, and second, that occurrent states of boredom tend to give rise to positive interest in performing actions that we know are bad to perform. Moreover, while a person’s susceptibility to boredom can indicate a lack of attentiveness or acuity, or be evidence of a vice such as ingratitude or shallowness, it can in others indicate positive qualities of character, such as perspicacity, liveliness, and certain forms of intelligence. Upon imagining certain bored akratics without the psychological qualities that give rise to their boredom, we will either imagine them without these positive qualities, or with others that – though perhaps psychologically possible – are not clearly better. This yields the result that a person who is continent or even akratic because of her susceptibility to boredom may have a character no less excellent than that of the wholehearted agent. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in implicit bias. Driving this concern is the thesis, apparently established by tests such as the IAT, that people who hold egalitarian explicit attitudes and beliefs, are often influenced by implicit mental processes that operate independently from, and are largely insensitive to, their explicit attitudes. We argue that implicit bias testing in social and empirical psychology does not, and without a fundamental shift in focus could not, establish this startling thesis. We suggest (...) that implicit bias research has been conducted in light of inadequate theories of racism and sexism. As a result, such testing has not sufficiently controlled for subjects’ prejudiced explicit beliefs and emotions, and has not ruled out the possibility that explicit prejudice best explains test subjects’ discriminatory associations and behavior. (shrink)

To act akratically is to act, knowingly, against what you judge is best for you to do, and it is traditionally assumed that to do this is to be weak-willed. Some have rejected this identification of akrasia and weakness of will, arguing that the latter is instead best understood as a matter of abandoning one's reasonable resolutions. This paper also rejects the identification of akrasia and weakness of will, but argues that this alternative conception is too broad, and that weakness (...) of will is best understood in relation to certain kinds of pain and pleasure. Moreover, the phenomenon of strong-willed akrasia, cases in which a person must exhibit strength of will to do precisely what she judges she should not do, suggests that strength of will is an executive virtue, and that being weak-willed is just one way (among others) in which a person can fail to manifest this virtue. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What is the ethical significance of the suffering of nonhuman animals? For many, the answer is simple. Such suffering has clear moral significance: nonhuman animal suffering is suffering, suffering is something bad, and the fact that it is bad gives us reason to alleviate or prevent it. The practical problem that remains is how to do this most efficiently or effectively. I argue that this does not exhaust the ethical significance of certain evils, once we consider how the existence (...) of those evils may detract from the meaning of human life, even on fully “naturalistic” conceptions of meaning in life. I will draw a distinction between what I will call “spiritual” problems and “moral” problems and consider why moral philosophers may be well suited to addressing both problems, as long as the domain of the ethical is not taken to be exhausted by the domain of the moral. Finally, I will elaborate on why marking a distinction between these problems—the moral and the spiritual—may help illuminate some disagreements between Utilitarians and their opponents about the ethical significance of the suffering of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Boredom can motivate us to perform actions that are painful, imprudent, morally objectionable, or unwise in other respects. It can also give rise to forms of akrasia: we may be unwilling to do what we know we must, simply because we will find it boring; when we are racked with boredom—bored stiff, bored to tears—actions that might otherwise never occur to us to do can begin to appear attractive, and sometimes remain attractive against our better judgment. But boredom is also (...) relevant to another set of moral or ethical con- cerns. Alongside questions about what we may do out of boredom, and about whether such actions are morally justifiable, conducive to our well-being, or instrumentally rational, a person’s character can be revealed by how her dispositions of boredom express themselves. And just as our emotional dispositions can be not just criticized, but also improved, so we may think that our dispositions of boredom, too, may be both criticized and improved. From a virtue-theoretical approach to boredom that would encourage this shift of focus from the ethical significance of actions to include assessments of character and motive as well, three questions emerge. What kind of atti- tude is boredom, such that it can motivate (sometimes objectionable) forms of action, while also reflecting or disclosing something about the kind of character one has? What does it disclose or reveal about a person that she is bored by particular things, and not others, and to greater and lesser extents? And is there a virtue that could come to govern our dispositions of boredom, providing an ideal that one might aspire to? (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

This study explored the relationship among the emotional labor, psychological capital, and mental health of preschool teachers. A questionnaire survey was conducted on 411 preschool teachers in China. The results revealed the following: One emotional labor strategy had a significant negative effect on mental health, whereas two emotional labor strategies had significant positive effects. The psychological capital of preschool teachers had a complete mediation on the relationship between expression of naturally felt emotions and mental health and between the deep acting (...) and mental health. (shrink)

兩甲子前，中國戰敗於日本，儒家士大夫遂尋求全面制度變革，行之數千年的堯舜周孔治理之道被棄如敝屣。此後百年，雖有仁人志士守護道統，復興儒學，唯多局限於精神、道德、文化領域，以為儒家未曾塑造、維護良好秩序 ，更不可能行於當世。 本書作者卻力排眾議，為當前中國之制度變革提出「儒家憲政」方案。作者認為，一國憲政當扎根於自身文明，儒家在中國文明中具有特殊地位，這决定了中國憲政必為儒家憲政。 本書上卷「義理」，參考中國數千年的治理實踐，疏解儒家經典，闡明常在常新的中國治理之道；下卷「更化」，探討當下中國通往儒家憲政之路。作者並不準備提出整全的憲制方案，反而保持充分開放的心態。作者認為，唯有 歸宗道統，中國之政治秩序才可趨於良善、穩定，但「人能弘道」，當世君子不能不因時而立制，為此不能不廣泛參照西方的法度。 故「儒家憲政」既不同於自由民主憲政或社會主義憲政，亦有別於「儒教憲政」。作者以為，前者無視中國文明傳統、憑空立憲，而失之於「不及」；後者「生乎今之世，反古之道」，而失之於「過」。儒家憲政中道而行，或可 供有志於治國平天下的賢明君子採擇一二。.

TikTok has one of the most advanced algorithm systems and is the most addictive as compared to other social media platforms. While research on social media addiction is abundant, we know much less about how the TikTok information system environment affects users’ internal states of enjoyment, concentration, and time distortion, which in turn influences their addiction behavior. To fill this gap, this study collects responses from 659 adolescents in China aged between 10 and 19 years old, and the data is (...) then analyzed using Partial Least Square. We find that the system quality has a stronger influence than information quality in determining adolescents’ experience with TikTok and that the flow experience has significant direct and indirect effects on TikTok addiction behavior. Notably, this study finds that TikTok addiction is determined by users’ mental concentration on the medium and its content. Several theoretical insights from the stimulus–organism–response model and the flow theory are used to explain the findings. (shrink)

This article aims to summarize the current ethical issues in the field of clinical and counseling psychology and the process of developing professional ethical standards in China. First, through a review of the history of counseling and psychotherapy in China, general background information is provided. Important ethical issues are then discussed based on the results from several empirical studies. Finally, the process of developing the new edition of the Chinese Psychological Society Code of Ethics for Clinical and Counseling Psychology, the (...) main contents as well as the considerations taken into account in the development of this code are presented. (shrink)

Les questions d’éthique reviennent aujourd’hui avec force dans les sciences sociales en général et en sociologie en particulier. Cet article met en évidence les écueils que doivent éviter les comités d’éthique de la recherche universitaire dans le domaine des sciences sociales. L’auteur soutient que les écueils en question ne peuvent aisément être évités que par le dialogue entre les principaux acteurs concernés. En dernière analyse, dit l’auteur, le rôle des comités d’éthique de la recherche universitaire doit être d’assurer l’éducation à (...) l’éthique à travers un débat démocratique au sein de la communauté universitaire. (shrink)

Ces textes sont ceux d'un artiste engagé dans la société et d'un critique affirmé. Ils abordent des thématiques fondamentales: le rapport de l'artiste avec son sujet de travail, la lecture explicative de textes littéraires et le dialogue avec les auteurs, le questionnement sur les fondements des manifestations culturelles en société. Mais ils évoquent aussi des aspects plus régionaux, avec un entretien sur un rite de société, l'explication de quelques fondamentaux de la musique en Afrique, un historique des arts visuels en (...) Côte d'Ivoire et au Togo. Ils ne pouvaient se clore que par l'analyse des corrélations entre fonds et formes, pour trouver et déterminer des évidences plastiques. (shrink)

戴震（1723—1777），字东原，休宁隆阜（今安徽黄山屯溪）人，清代著名思想家。全书考察了戴震心理学思想的历史背景及其来源，探讨了戴震心理学思想的基本观点，阐述了戴震的认知心理、人格心理、教育心理以 及品德心理等方面的基本思想和历史影响。戴震的心理学思想植根于中国历史与文化，具有理论的基础性、思想的民族性和时代的传承性，对中国心理学研究具有重要意义和启示。本书是目前国内第一本对戴震心理学思想全面系 统研究的学术著作。.

In [16], Peterzil and Steinhorn proved that if a group G definable in an o-minimal structure is not definably compact, then G contains a definable torsion-free subgroup of dimension 1. We prove here a p-adic analogue of the Peterzil–Steinhorn theorem, in the special case of abelian groups. Let G be an abelian group definable in a p-adically closed field M. If G is not definably compact then there is a definable subgroup H of dimension 1 which is not definably compact. (...) In a future paper we will generalize this to non-abelian G. (shrink)

Buddhist teachings and practices can be viewed as a journey of soteriological transformation, where language, as a tool for the analysis of views, occupies a place of special significance and importance. This article examines how the concept of non-duality, from the Madhyamaka perspective, has served as a powerful rhetorical device with the explicit aim of fostering soteriological transformation. Among the various expressions representative of the Madhyamaka perspective, two are particularly explored in this article for their facilitation of soteriological transformation: the (...) expression of ‘neither a dharma nor a not-dharma’ and the teaching that ‘one should let go even of dharmas, still more so not-dharmas’ . I argue that the Madhyamaka expression of ‘neither A nor not-A’ is hardly ever just about conforming to any linguistic conventions. It is about gaining liberation from linguistic conventions and unexamined remarks. (shrink)

Richard Rorty's philosophy has two basic commitments: one to postmodernism and the other to liberalism. However, these commitments generate tension. As a postmodernist, he sharply criticizes the Enlightenment; as a liberal, he forcefully defends it. His postmodernist liberalism actually explains liberalism using irrationalism. /// 罗蒂哲学有两个基本承诺，一个是对后现代主义的承诺，一个是对自由主义 的承诺。但是这两种承诺之间存在着紧张关系: 作为后现代主义者，罗蒂对启蒙提 出了强烈的批评; 作为自由主义者，他又在极力地维护启蒙。罗蒂的后现代自由主 义实质上是以非理性主义来解释自由主义。.

The autophagy initiation complex is brought about via a highly ordered and stepwise assembly process. Two crucial signaling molecules, mTORC1 and AMPK, orchestrate this assembly by phosphorylating/dephosphorylating autophagy‐related proteins. Activation of Atg1 followed by recruitment of both Atg9 vesicles and the PI3K complex I to the PAS (phagophore assembly site) are particularly crucial steps in its formation. Ypt1, a small Rab GTPase in yeast cells, also plays an essential role in the formation of the autophagy initiation complex through multiple regulatory (...) pathways. In this review, our primary focus is to discuss how signaling molecules initiate the assembly of the autophagy initiation complex, and highlight the significant roles of Ypt1 in this process. We end by addressing issues that need future clarification. (shrink)

Objectives: Athlete burnout is a crucial concern affecting the development and athletic performance of young weightlifters. To reduce or relieve the prevalence of athlete burnout, this study examined the relationship across social support, sports motivation, mental toughness, and athlete burnout in weightlifters.Methods: A total of 315 weightlifters aged 17–28 years old from Sichuan, Chongqing, and Shanxi in China participated in this survey. The Perceived Available Support in Sport Questionnaire, Sports Motivation Questionnaire, Sports Mental Toughness Questionnaire, and Athlete Burnout Questionnaire were (...) used in this study. SPSS Statistics 19.0, AMOS 21.0, and PROCESS 3.0 macro were used to analyze the collected data.Results: The results indicated that weightlifters’ social support could negatively significantly affect athlete burnout [beta = −0.398; 95% confidence interval : −0.3699, −0.2184; P < 0.05) via mental toughness and sports motivation. The mediation analysis revealed that they had partial mediating effect, including three paths: First, social support had a direct effect on athlete burnout ; second, sport mental toughness had a mediating effect on athlete burnout ; and finally, sports motivation had a mediating effect on athlete burnout.Conclusion: The findings revealed that social support could inhibit or prevent athlete burnout via mental toughness and sports motivation; thus, to decrease or relieve the prevalence of burnout in weightlifters, it is an important solution to enhance their social support. (shrink)