Every month some one pronounces that science must be rejected if we are to preserve a belief in human freedom, or that only by a faith in freedom that flies in the face of logic and the principle of causality can democracy be justified. Equally often other authors insist that the increase of knowledge in the science of human behavior makes plain the irrelevance and sentimentality of pious talk about free and rational choice. What is the source of this dispute? (...) Why is no resolution of it arrived at? (shrink)

A philosopher who is influential owes his influence to dealing with questions which his readers recognize as questions of importance to themselves as well. It might be thought that since Dewey was so influential in his lifetime, his philosophy is not likely to have much of relevance to generations rising in 1964. It is, however, my belief that the study of Dewey’s writings on certain topics has enabled me to come by ideas that are helpful in getting a clearer understanding (...) of reasoning, choice, and freedom. (shrink)

Most handbooks on statistics and the theory of probability leave the reader in a mysterious tangle of mathematical rules for computing apparently arbitrarily chosen numerical functions. At first sight, then, a treatise on the Logical Foundations of Probability raises hopes that it will be a guide to clarity in these matters. These hopes are strengthened if the reader remembers that the author, Professor Rudolph Carnap of the University of Chicago, is noted for his thesis that philosophy is the study of (...) the logic of science. On the other hand, a first glance into this book may discourage a reader who, though familiar with statistics, is not familiar with modern logic and its notation. For this reason particularly I shall try to give an account of this book that will enable the interested student to form some opinion of its usefulness to him. (shrink)

Neuroscience, brain based learning and education -- Collaborative reports in neuroscience and education -- A local paradigmatic example, founded on an international research phenomenon -- The mereological fallacy -- First-person/third-person asymmetry -- Neuroscience and irreducible uncertainty -- Inner and outer : the epistemology of the mind -- Inner and outer : the challenges of crypto-cartesianism, materialism and reductionism -- Intrinsic and relational models of education -- Education, psychology and physics -- Bohr's philosophy of physics and its application to psychology and (...) education -- A new educational philosophy based on Bohr's interpretation of quantum physics -- Conclusions : wittgenstein-bohr model of education. (shrink)

Although the commentary on Aristotle’s problematic discussion of slavery is vast, his discussion of nobility receives little attention. The fragments of his dialogue On Noble Birth constitute his most extensive examination of nobility, and while their similarity to the παμβασιλεύς of the Politics has recently been recognized, their relevance to natural slavery has hitherto gone unnoticed. Yet by declaring that true nobles – particularly the god-like ἀρχηγός – preternaturally possess superhuman characteristics, Aristotle precludes their easy inclusion in the kind “human” (...) in a manner inversely mirroring the preternatural subhumanity of natural slaves. Building on recent scholarship which argues that Aristotle’s “defense” of natural slaves is better understood as an indictment, On Noble Birth becomes most coherent if read as a hypothetical investigation into what would be required for “nobility” to name something true rather than equivocal, with the conclusion that “true nobility” is an empty set. (shrink)

Interrogating received knowledge is constitutive to any critical project, and recently there has been a wave of scholarship which argues for locating the origin of racist-thinking prior to modern Europe—even prior to the Common Era—without any real consideration of the potential dangers accompanying such a seismic redefinition. By expanding “racism” to include potentially any pre-modern xenophobic or ethnicist atrocity, even well-meaning scholarship dilutes the peculiar injustice of modern Europe’s most successful epistemological weapon. As a result, we lose any criteria to (...) distinguish ubiquitous oppressive projects from specifically racist-projects of hegemony and domination. However laudable its intent, such scholarship falls prey to methodological, epistemological, and practical errors that hamstring the ameliorative impact of contemporary anti-racist work while ironically diminishing racism’s impact. For if every conflict is racist, then contemporary colorblindness is correct: if white supremacy isn’t particularly white, then racism is a distinction without a difference. (shrink)