In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 564-565 [Access article in PDF] Samuel J. Kerstein. Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 226. Cloth, $60.00. Summed up in a sentence, this book is both a critical examination of Kant's claim to have derived a supreme moral principle and a limited defense of Kant's project that appears to depart (...) significantly from Kant's own approach. Methodologically, a large portion of this book is devoted to analyzing various key concepts and claims about the nature of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason and testing them against "everyday" moral intuitions via numerous examples and counterexamples.Kerstein begins by distinguishing between the tasks of deduction and derivation of a supreme moral principle, whereby a deduction is understood as an argument for the existence of a supreme moral principle, and a derivation simply assumes this conditionally and goes on to argue that a particular principle and no other can claim the title. Kerstein waives the discussion of whether Kant succeeds in giving a deduction and hence satisfactorily refutes moral skepticism. His focus in the book is on the derivation proposed primarily in Groundwork I and II that if there is a supreme moral principle, then it must be that law expressed in his formulations of the Categorical Imperative (hereafter "CI"). Kerstein addresses Bruce Aune's "traditional" reading of Kant's derivation, wherein the argument utterly fails because Kant allegedly infers a relatively substantive command ("Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be universal law") from a purely formal, higher order, and hence relatively empty one ("Conform your actions to universal law"). He then devotes a chapter each to two recent, influential defenses of Kant's derivation that seek his argument outside the Groundwork. Kerstein addresses Henry Allison's attempt to rescue the derivation via an account of agency rooted in Kant's notion of transcendental freedom, elaborated in the second Critique. Kerstein rejects Allison's reconstruction on the grounds that it remains too abstract to generate the degree of specificity arrived at in Kant's Groundwork universalization formulation. Chapter Three examines Christine Korsgaard's alternative reconstruction of Kant's argument that focuses on the formulation of humanity ("Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only"). He rejects her interpretation because, again, the move from the abstract command to conform to universal law to the substantive formulation about humanity as a universally recognizable unconditional good fails. From the former, more abstract claim, he argues, it does not follow that there is a universally recognizable unconditional good, let alone that this good is humanity in itself (and not, say, utility [happiness], or even some intrinsic value unrelated to humanity, both of which Kant rejects as candidates for the unconditionally good).In his own reconstruction, Kerstein dissolves the criticism of the traditional reading of Kant's Groundwork derivation of the formula of universal law by simply denying that Kant [End Page 564] argues directly from the more generic principle to the specific versions of the CI (91ff). Instead he suggests that Kant's argument is less direct, made by way of laying out a set of criteria that any supreme principle must meet, and showing how the CI meets them while no other candidates can. In the second half of the book he takes a painstaking and critical look at a total of eight criteria, each of which Kant holds to be necessary and together are jointly sufficient for establishing the CI as "the supreme norm for the evaluation of the moral permissability and requiredness of an action, but not of its moral value" (165). This statement includes Kerstein's most controversial and interesting reconstructive claim, namely his denial that moral worth attaches only to actions done in accordance with duty as determined by the test... (shrink)

In this book Jane Kneller focuses on the role of imagination as a creative power in Kant's aesthetics and in his overall philosophical enterprise. She analyzes Kant's account of imaginative freedom and the relation between imaginative free play and human social and moral development, showing various ways in which his aesthetics of disinterested reflection produce moral interests. She situates these aspects of his aesthetic theory within the context of German aesthetics of the eighteenth century, arguing that Kant's contribution (...) is a bridge between early theories of aesthetic moral education and the early Romanticism of the last decade of that century. In so doing, her book brings the two most important German philosophers of Enlightenment and Romanticism, Kant and Novalis, into dialogue. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in both Kant studies and German philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (shrink)

Rita Felski presents a critical account of current American and European feminist literary theory, and analyzes contemporary fiction by women to show that no theorist can identify a specifically "female" or "feminine" kind of writing without reference to what gender means at a given historical moment. She argues that the idea of a feminist aesthetic is a non-issue needlessly pursued by feminists. She calls for a consideration of the social and cultural context in which these texts were produced and received, (...) and demonstrates her method of an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of literature which can integrate literary and social theory. ISBN 0-674-06894-7: $25.00; ISBN 0-674-06895-5 (pbk.): $9.95. (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the foremost Kant scholars of our time is a welcome and timely addition to the literature. Henrich is a very prolific scholar, and the lack of English translations of most of his works may account in some measure for the fact that there has been surprisingly little sustained engagement with them by Anglo-American scholars, especially those working on Kant’s ethics. It is to be hoped that this volume will help provoke such an engagement.

This volume presents the first complete translation of Fichte Studies, a powerful, creative and sustained critique of Fichtean philosophy by the young philosopher-poet Friedrich von Hardenberg, who under the pen-name Novalis went on to become the most well-known and beloved of the early German Romantic writers. Anyone interested in the fate of German philosophy and literature immediately after Kant will find this collection of notes and aphorisms a treasure-trove of original contributions on the nature of self-consciousness, the relation of art (...) to philosophy, and the nature of philosophical inquiry. There are also the beginnings of a strikingly contemporary-sounding semiotic theory. The text is translated by Jane Kneller, who also provides an introduction situating the Fichte Studies in the context of Novalis' life and work. (shrink)

English translation by Kneller and Losonsky of Klaus Reich, Die Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel -/- "This classic of Kant scholarship, whose first edition appeared in 1932, deals with one of the most controversial and difficult topics in the Critique of Pure Reason: Kant's table of judgments and their connection to the table of categories. Kant's attempt to derive the latter from the former is called the "Metaphysical Deduction," and it paves the way for the Transcendental Deduction that is universally (...) recognized as the heart of the Critique." "Many commentators have passed over the Metaphysical Deduction in silence, as if embarrassed by Kant's fatuity, and his critics are almost unanimous in finding its premise ungrounded, its argument incorrect, and its conclusion false. At the heart of the failure of the Metaphysical Deduction, it is alleged, is Kant's inability to justify the table of the forms of judgment. Critics argue that Kant simply took these forms of judgment from the logic textbooks of his day and doctored them so as to yield the required categories. Such objections were current even in Kant's time; they were repeated by Hegel, and are commonplaces of Kant criticism today." "This book is the fullest and most systematic evaluation ever made of the Metaphysical Deduction. Reich argues that its principal conclusion is correct even though Kant failed to establish it in the Metaphysical Deduction proper, and he defends the conclusion by using Kant material far removed from the text of the Metaphysical Deduction, notes by Kant that only became available in the 1920's and that remain even now untranslated into English. With the publication of this translation for English-speaking Kant scholars, a neglected and impugned part of the Critique of Pure Reason can finally receive the attention it deserves."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Neste livro, Jane Kneller foca o papel da imaginação como uma força criativa na estética de Kant e em toda sua filosofia. Ela analisa a explicação de Kant para a liberdade imaginativa e a relação entre a representação imaginativa livre, o social humano e o desenvolvimento moral, mostrando várias formas nas quais sua estética da reflexão desinteressada explica o interesse moral. Ela localiza esses aspectos da teoria estética de Kant dentro do contexto estético alemão do século XVIII, argumentando (...) que sua contribuição é uma ponte entre as primeiras teorias da educação moral estética e o Pré-Romantismo da última década daquele século. Ao fazer isso, seu livro dialoga com os dois filósofos alemães do Iluminismo e do Romantismo - Kant e Novalis. (shrink)

In Autonomy and Community, contemporary Kant scholars apply Kant's moral and political views to current social issues, examining contemporary topics through the ...

_Shows how Kant's basic position applies to and clarifies present-day problems of war, race, abortion, capital punishment, labor relations, the environment, and marriage._.

Kant's account of aesthetic value is easily ignored or subordinated by the recent stress on the primacy of the practical in his system. For Kant, vindicating reason not only requires a methodological distinction between principles of thought and knowledge on the one side, and of action and morality on the other, but the introduction of a third "faculty," feeling, along with its own principle of judgment. Christine Korsgaard has interpreted Kant's overall account of rationality in terms of a kind of (...) rationalist constructivism, the spirit of which she traces to his humanism. She argues that, for Kant, the source of all value is ultimately humanity itself, or, to be more precise, humanity insofar as it is capable of full rational autonomy. Kant's own statement of the primacy of practical reason turns out to be far from clear. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 564-565 [Access article in PDF] Samuel J. Kerstein. Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 226. Cloth, $60.00. Summed up in a sentence, this book is both a critical examination of Kant's claim to have derived a supreme moral principle and a limited defense of Kant's project that appears to depart (...) significantly from Kant's own approach. Methodologically, a large portion of this book is devoted to analyzing various key concepts and claims about the nature of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason and testing them against "everyday" moral intuitions via numerous examples and counterexamples.Kerstein begins by distinguishing between the tasks of deduction and derivation of a supreme moral principle, whereby a deduction is understood as an argument for the existence of a supreme moral principle, and a derivation simply assumes this conditionally and goes on to argue that a particular principle and no other can claim the title. Kerstein waives the discussion of whether Kant succeeds in giving a deduction and hence satisfactorily refutes moral skepticism. His focus in the book is on the derivation proposed primarily in Groundwork I and II that if there is a supreme moral principle, then it must be that law expressed in his formulations of the Categorical Imperative (hereafter "CI"). Kerstein addresses Bruce Aune's "traditional" reading of Kant's derivation, wherein the argument utterly fails because Kant allegedly infers a relatively substantive command ("Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be universal law") from a purely formal, higher order, and hence relatively empty one ("Conform your actions to universal law"). He then devotes a chapter each to two recent, influential defenses of Kant's derivation that seek his argument outside the Groundwork. Kerstein addresses Henry Allison's attempt to rescue the derivation via an account of agency rooted in Kant's notion of transcendental freedom, elaborated in the second Critique. Kerstein rejects Allison's reconstruction on the grounds that it remains too abstract to generate the degree of specificity arrived at in Kant's Groundwork universalization formulation. Chapter Three examines Christine Korsgaard's alternative reconstruction of Kant's argument that focuses on the formulation of humanity ("Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only"). He rejects her interpretation because, again, the move from the abstract command to conform to universal law to the substantive formulation about humanity as a universally recognizable unconditional good fails. From the former, more abstract claim, he argues, it does not follow that there is a universally recognizable unconditional good, let alone that this good is humanity in itself (and not, say, utility [happiness], or even some intrinsic value unrelated to humanity, both of which Kant rejects as candidates for the unconditionally good).In his own reconstruction, Kerstein dissolves the criticism of the traditional reading of Kant's Groundwork derivation of the formula of universal law by simply denying that Kant [End Page 564] argues directly from the more generic principle to the specific versions of the CI (91ff). Instead he suggests that Kant's argument is less direct, made by way of laying out a set of criteria that any supreme principle must meet, and showing how the CI meets them while no other candidates can. In the second half of the book he takes a painstaking and critical look at a total of eight criteria, each of which Kant holds to be necessary and together are jointly sufficient for establishing the CI as "the supreme norm for the evaluation of the moral permissability and requiredness of an action, but not of its moral value" (165). This statement includes Kerstein's most controversial and interesting reconstructive claim, namely his denial that moral worth attaches only to actions done in accordance with duty as determined by the test... (shrink)

In his most recent book Rudolf Makkreel expands upon his previous work on the hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and its development in Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, as well as the hermeneutical importance of Kant’s theory of reflective judgment. The book begins with a helpful overview of key concepts of hermeneutics and contrasts Heidegger’s “ontological” hermeneutics with Dilthey’s “ontic” experiential views. Chapter 2 explores Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s account of aesthetic feeling and Gadamer’s assimilation of that rejection in his hermeneutics. (...) In general this first section presents interesting and helpful contrasts of the hermeneutical theories of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer.. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that by limiting the objects of genuine or purely aesthetic pleasure to the products of human artifice, Matthen wrongly excludes aesthetic pleasure in natural items. Cases of aesthetic reflection that yield the ‘facilitating pleasure’ he takes to be definitive of our experience of art regularly occur also in our aesthetic experience of nature. That is, many kinds of aesthetic appreciation of nature meet his criteria of ‘learned’ engagements that are ‘difficult’ and ‘costly’. Aesthetic appreciation of nature thus represents (...) a kind of facilitating pleasure that enlarges our conception of ourselves and our connection to the world in ways that are at least as sophisticated as art appreciation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 69~ created mind will reflect the divine essence in its own unique way (e.g., 77, 83) helps to solve some of the problems which Parkinson finds in the pbenomenalism that he attributes to Leibniz (see xxxi and xxxiv) and also partly motivates the original formulation of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles (50 and his doctrine of marks and traces (51). But the point of The (...) Yale Leibniz surely has less to do with interpretation and more to do with text. Parkinson's translations are generally good. There are only a few cases where the English obscures both Leibniz's Latin and his argument (e.g., a paragraph on p. i 14 contains instances of the Latinfigura which are translated differently). That The Yale Leibniz has the excellent policy of including the original language on facing pages renders irrelevant the fact that one is bound to disagree with this qualified translator on some minor points. Parkinson's edition might have been a bit more scholar-friendly than it is: while his text contains both the page and essay numbers of the Academy edition, his table of contents contains neither; this means that one can neither make a quick comparison between the contents of the two volumes nor easily move back and forth between them. Nor is one privy, in Parkinson's text, to the many and important corrections which Leibniz made to his essays and which are carefully noted in the Academy volume. This is a serious flaw: these papers afford an extraordinary ringside seat on the development of beibniz's philosophy; it is a pity that many of the details of this metaphysical sparring remain out of sight. Despite these minor disappointments, Parkinson's edition of De Summa Rerum remains a genuinely helpful research tool. By taking on these enormously difficult and profoundly important texts and by placing them so securely in the context of Leibniz's later thought, he has done us a very great favor. He has also whetted our appetite for more of The Yale Leibniz. CHRISTIA MERCER Columbia University Claudio Cesa and Norbert Hinske, eds. Kant und seinJahrhundert: Gedenkschriftfiir Giorgio ToneUi. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993. Pp. xiv + ~lZ. NP. Far-reaching both in historical and philosophical scope as well as in the diversity of scholars represented, this volume is a tribute to an important contemporary historian of philosophy, Giorgio Tonelli (1928-1978). A glance through the seventeen-page chronological bibliography confirms the breadth of Tonelli's historical interests, ranging over work on Albrecht von Hailer, Heine, and Maupertuis as well as his wellknown works on Kant and earlier figures of the Enlightenment. The editors point out in their brief introduction that Tonelli's work was important as an antidote to an earlier tendency in Kant scholarship to read Kant through the lenses of German idealism, rather than focusing on the Kantian corpus in the context of earlier traditions and philosophical achievements. "Sein Jahrhundert" includes essays that encompass the whole of the eighteenth century, as well as important seventeenth-century influences. The volume is quite 692 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 appropriately international and multilinguai, reflecting Tonelli's own background and widespread influence. The essays are for the most part clearly written, well-informed and carefully argued interpretations of important Enlightenment figures that aim to refocus our attention on neglected or misinterpreted aspects of these philosophers' views. What follows will give interested readers a brief overview of the contents. In "Corsi, Ricorsi and the Way Out of Modern Barbarism in Vico's New Science," Craig Walton offers an interesting 'third way' of reading Vico's notions of"course" and "recourse" that parallels Tonelli's approach to Kant. Walton argues against anachronistic idealist interpretations of corsi/ricorsi as cyclic or recurrence concepts, and also against ahistorical readings of these notions as aesthetic or ironic. Rather, for Vico, the "storia ideale eterna'" is to be understood as purposeful but open-ended, and this can only be fully appreciated if the notion of ricorso is interpreted as the possibility of human response to the course of human history. Ezequiel de Olaso's "Spinoza et l'Espagne ~clair6e... (shrink)

In this book Jeffrey A. Gauthier attempts to link Hegelian moral and political theory to contemporary feminist theory in a way that he hopes will prove useful to feminism. The book is divided into three parts: the first develops Gauthier’s interpretation of Hegel in relation to Kantian procedural ethics, the second applies this interpretation to feminist philosophical criticisms, and the third deals more specifically with extending de Beauvoir’s use of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic to issues of victimization and self-realization in feminist (...) debates. (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the foremost Kant scholars of our time is a welcome and timely addition to the literature. Henrich is a very prolific scholar, and the lack of English translations of most of his works may account in some measure for the fact that there has been surprisingly little sustained engagement with them by Anglo-American scholars, especially those working on Kant’s ethics. It is to be hoped that this volume will help provoke such an engagement.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy ed. by Jane Kneller and Sidney AxinnJeanine GrenbergJane Kneller and Sidney Axinn, editors, Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 334. Paper, $21.95.The intent of this volume is not narrow textual exegesis but the application of Kantian themes to “problems of contemporary society,” (...) (xi). The editors thus advise their readers that “[t]he present collection is … ‘Kantian’ in a broad sense,” and that the opinions put forward by the contributors may “diverge rather widely” (viii) from Kant’s own. In an introductory essay, Jane Kneller notes further that the book distinguishes between “political” philosophy in a narrow sense, and “social” philosophy, which is concerned with “the behaviour of human beings” more broadly construed. Kant, Kneller argues, does have such a “social philosophy,” and this volume will reveal it.The book is largely successful in its stated goal. The essays run the gamut of careful, if controversial, textual analyses (e.g., Allen Wood’s and Robert Paul Wolff’s essays) to those which take Kant simply as a launching pad for an analysis of a variety of social issues. At times, this relation to Kant is a positive one (e.g., Harry van der Linden’s claim that Kant provides the basis for enterprise democracy), and at times negative (e.g., Charles Mills’ claim that Kantian respect for persons masks a “dark ontology” which supports structural racism).A careful reader can find among these varied essays interestingly opposed approaches to similar topics. Wolff and Sharon Anderson-Gold [End Page 538] end up at loggerheads over the relation of Kant’s ethical and social philosophies. Wolff makes Kant’s justification of morality derivative of the establishment of the social contract. But Anderson-Gold argues for a reversed relationship; for her, Kant’s “principle of humanity” grounds a basic human right of persons in any society to be free from certain types of state interference.Another interesting juxtaposition is found between Nelson Potter and Thomas Auxter, both of whom tackle Kant’s views on retributivism. Potter seeks to humanize retributivism by showing its basis in equality and respect for persons. Auxter takes a diametrically opposed approach, arguing that Kant’s moral theory can stand unscathed if we eliminate his now outdated retributivist commitments.A meta-issue looms in all these discussions: what does and doesn’t count as “Kantian”? This book, wisely, provides no hard and fast definition; rather, by presenting a broad variety of at times seriously divergent points of view, it constitutes a refreshingly pluralistic response to what counts as Kantian: Kantian is as Kantian does. It is rare to find such diversity of interpretation in a single volume, and this book is to be commended for achieving it.There are, however, prices to pay for the achievement of diversity, the largest being a certain disconnectedness of thought. The sectioning of the book into two parts—“Kantian Social Theory” and “Kant and Contemporary Social Issues” —instead of helping to guide the reader, ends up encouraging an ultimately strained distinction. Why does Robin Schott’s essay on feminism belong with “social theory” instead of “contemporary social issues”? Why don’t Anderson-Gold’s reflections on the relationship between moral and social issues qualify as “social theory”? It might have been better, organizationally, to highlight more specific themes by distinguishing sections on “Retributivism,” “International Law,” and the like.The individual essays vary in their success in defending their stated theses. Allen Wood is insightful and even-handed in convincing this initially skeptical reader of what seems, at first blush, a rather implausible view of Kant as an historical materialist. Though some may not find his own position to be very “liberal,” Gerald Gaus’ assessment of the current state of Kantian liberalist approaches to environmental values and his proposed alternative are cogent, enlightening and challenging. Sidney Axinn’s acceptance, without argument, of a simple analogy between individual persons and individual nation states to argue for the need for a world government makes his account ultimately dissatisfying. Charles Mills rightly takes note of an editor’s concern that... (shrink)

Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry? While much of this thought seems right, this paper argues that the relationship between the epistemic and the zetetic is not as harmonious as one might have thought and liked. In particular, this paper argues that (...) some familiar contemporary epistemic norms are in tension with, and even in conflict with, central zetetic norms. (shrink)

In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an (...) inquiry or question settled. (shrink)

The Aesthetics of Design offers the first full treatment of design in the field of philosophical aesthetics, challenging the discipline to broaden its scope to include the quotidian objects and experiences of our everyday lives and concerns ...

Postcolonialism offers challenging and provocative ways of thinking about colonial and neocolonial power, about self and other, and about the discourses that perpetuate postcolonial inequality and violence. Much of the seminal work in postcolonialism has been shaped by currents in philosophy, notably Marxism and ethics. "Understanding Postcolonialism" examines the philosophy of postcolonialism in order to reveal the often conflicting systems of thought which underpin it. In so doing, the book presents a reappraisal of the major postcolonial thinkers of the twentieth (...) century.Ranging beyond the narrow selection of theorists to which the field is often restricted, the book explores the work of Fanon and Sartre, Gandhi, Nandy, and the Subaltern Studies Group, Foucault and Said, Derrida and Bhabha, Khatibi and Glissant, and Spivak, Mbembe and Mudimbe. A clear and accessible introduction to the subject, "Understanding Postcolonialism" reveals how, almost half a century after decolonisation, the complex relation between politics and ethics continues to shape postcolonial thought. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Biobanks are proliferating rapidly worldwide because they are powerful tools and organisational structures for undertaking medical research. By linking samples to data on the health of individuals, it is anticipated that biobanks will be used to explore the relationship between genes, environment and lifestyle for many diseases, as well as the potential of individually-tailored drug treatments based on genetic predisposition. However, they also raise considerable challenges for existing legal frameworks and research governance structures. This book critically examines the current governance (...) structures in place for biobanks in England and Wales. It shows that the technologies, techniques and practices involved in biobanking do not always conform neatly to existing legal principles and frameworks that apply to other areas of medical research. Using a socio-legal approach, including interview data gathered from the scientific community, this book provides unique insights and makes recommendations about appropriate governance mechanisms for biobanking in the future. It also explores the issues around the secondary use of information, such as consent and how to protect privacy, when biobanks are accessed by a number of different third parties. These issues have relevance both within England and Wales and to a wide international audience, as well as for other areas where large datasets are used.--Back cover. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Philosophy Pitfalls, and What Is Needed to Avoid Them Institutional History at Cambridge Cambridge Philosophy Reference.

"It is well to remind ourselves, from time to time, that "Ethics" is but another word for "righteousness," that for which many men and women of every generation have hungered and thirsted, and without which life becomes meaningless. Certain forms of personal righteousness have become to a majority of the community almost automatic. But we all know that each generation has its own test, the contemporaneous and current standard by which alone it can adequately judge of its own moral achievements. (...) To attain individual morality in an age demanding social morality, to pride one's self on the results of personal effort when the time demands social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation. This book is a study of various types and groups who are being impelled by the newer conception of Democracy to an acceptance of social obligations involving in each instance a new line of conduct."--. (shrink)