Neutralists have argued that there is something illiberal about linking access to gift-like resources to work requirements. The central liberal motivation for basic income is to provide greater freedom to choose between different ways of life, including options attaching great importance to non-market activities and disposable time. As argued by Philippe Van Parijs, even those spending their days surfing should be fed. This article examines Van Parijs' dual commitment to a ‘real libertarian’ justification of basic income and the public enforcement (...) of a strong work ethos, which serves to boost the volume of work at a given rate of taxation. It is argued (contra Van Parijs) that this alliance faces the neutrality objection: the work ethos will largely offset the liberal gains of unconditionality by radically restricting the set of permissible options available. A relaxed, non-obligatory ethos might avoid this implication. This view, however, is vulnerable to the structural exploitation objection: feasibility is achieved only because some choose to do necessary tasks to which most people have the same aversion. In light of these objections, the article examines whether there is a morally untainted feasibility path consistent with liberal objectives. (shrink)

In response to recent policy trends towards linking social rights more tightly to work requirements, this article argues that those sharing Rawlsian commitments have good reasons to prefer a radical‐liberal policy agenda with a universal basic income at its core. Compared to its main rivals in present policy debates, the politics of basic income has greater potential to promote the economic life prospects of the least advantaged in a way that provides a robust protection for the bases of social recognition (...) and non‐subservience. The argument seeks to establish that these concerns should be ascribed priority in the most plausible balancing of Rawlsian objectives and that doing so generates a strong case for basic income. As recent arguments for basic income have suggested that Rawls’ theory is insufficient to make the case for such a reform, this analysis also demonstrates that a powerful argument for basic income can be built on Rawlsian foundations alone. (shrink)

How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, people’s fair shares of resources should normally take the form of unconditional, individual cash endowments, thereby supporting the freedom to do whatever they might want to do. This view, of which Van Parijs’ philosophy of ‘real freedom for all’ is the clearest and most well-known example, has become a powerful weapon to criticize work conditionality as unfair and perfectionistic (or illiberal), and to (...) motivate political struggles for the emancipation of the precariat. However, similar views are also expressed in many other justifications of basic income that stress the strategic importance of exit-based empowerment. This article argues that the reliance of these theories on concepts and assumptions of libertarianism makes them ill-equipped to justify core requirements of social empowerment, and to identify the forms of agency needed to sustainably advance the radical objectives they favour. The implication of this is not to reject the link between social justice and unconditional resource endowments but to dissociate the justification and design of such measures from libertarian ways of thinking. (shrink)

Self-Ownership, Liberal Neutrality and the Realm of Freedom: New Reflections on the Justification of Basic Income. A review of Axel Gosseries and Yannick Vanderborght (eds), Arguing about Justice: Essays for Philippe Van Parijs.

A central task in efforts to identify pathways to ecologically and socially sustainable economies is to reduce inequality and poverty while reducing material consumption, which has recently inspired future post-growth scenarios. We build a model to explore the potential of a universal basic income (UBI) to serve these objectives. Starting from the observation that post-growth trajectories can take very different forms we analyze UBI in two scenarios advanced in the literature. Comparing UBI in a “local self-sufficiency” economy to a UBI (...) in an “automation” economy, we show that although both scenarios satisfy central sustainability criteria, the impact of a UBI would differ greatly between these contexts. Our analysis shows that a UBI is less compatible with a labor-intensive local self-sufficiency economy than a capital-intensive, high tech economy. We conclude that the feasibility and attractiveness of a UBI in a post-growth scenario depends greatly on the specific characteristics of the economy. (shrink)

How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, people’s fair shares of resources should normally take the form of uncon...

On the Life of Abraham displays Philo's philosophical, exegetical, and literary genius at its best. Philo begins by introducing the biblical figures Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as unwritten laws. Then, interweaving literal, ethical, and allegorical interpretations, Philo presents the life and achievements of Abraham, founder of the Jewish nation, in the form of a Greco-Roman bios, or biography. Ellen Birnbaum and John Dillon explain why and how this work is important within the context of Philo's own (...) oeuvre, early Jewish and Christian exegesis, and ancient philosophy. They also offer a new English translation and detailed analyses, in which they elucidate the meaning of Philo's thought, including his perplexing notion that Israel's ancestors were laws in themselves. (shrink)

Après le succès du Courage de la nuance, Jean Birnbaum poursuit son enquête sur l''héroïsme du doute' avec une réflexion personnelle et politique sur l'enfance. Dans ce nouveau livre, il montre comment la naissance d'un enfant fait vaciller toute certitude. Ce qui l'intéresse, c'est une expérience banale mais qui a peu attiré l'attention des penseurs: devenir le parent d'un enfant, c'est constater ses effets sur notre rapport aux autres et sur notre vision politique des choses. Si, depuis Socrate, le (...) philosophe est celui qui dynamite nos préjugés, alors le bébé s'impose comme le plus subversif des philosophes. Cette fois encore, Jean Birnbaum mêle réflexions et émotions. Il se tourne vers des auteurs aimés (Hannah Arendt, Georges Bernanos, Roland Barthes, Rosa Luxemburg...) et puise dans sa propre expérience. À l'heure où le mouvement 'No kids' dénonce la procréation comme une catastrophe intime et écologique, ce livre proclame la solidarité essentielle entre espoir d'une société meilleure et promesse de la vie donnée, transmise, sauvée ; il n'y a pas d'émancipation sans générations, pas d'avenir sans enfants, pas de fraternité sans bébés."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Avec l’espace, disait Emmanuel Kant, le temps constitue la « forme a priori » de notre sensibilité. Autrement dit, le temps est l’horizon à travers lequel nous faisons l’expérience du monde, il structure notre façon d'aller à la rencontre de ce qui est. Or la modernité semble désormais compromettre les conditions de cette rencontre. Tout va de plus en plus vite : entre « fast-food », « speed dating » et haut débit, notre époque se distingue par la toute-puissance de (...) la vitesse. Ce qui est en jeu, ici, ce n’est plus seulement l’emballement de l’innovation technique, mais l’accélération du réel lui-même. Voilà l’une des désillusions du progrès : plus nous sommes équipés de machines, d’appareils censés nous faire gagner du temps, et plus nous avons le sentiment d’en manquer. Dans les relations sociales comme dans la vie intime, en politique comme en amour, notre quotidien est marqué par l’urgence, la peur de ne pouvoir suivre. La tyrannie du court terme comprime l’espace. Le triomphe de l’immédiat rend impossible toute vie au présent. Le règne de l’instantanéité enterre la mémoire et dynamite l’avenir. Bref, l’accélération des choses rétrécit le champ de l’expérience, à commencer par cette condition de toute vie humaine qu’on nomme confiance : « La confiance ne saurait être de l'ordre de l'instantané, écrit le philosophe Paul Virilio. Elle doit se construire, se mériter, dans le temps. La confiance instantanée, la foi instantanée, cela ne marche pas. Il faut du temps pour avoir confiance ». Reconstruire un espace de discussion, d’amitié et de justice, c’est donc ralentir le rythme, repartir à la conquête du temps long. Artistes, philosophes, géographes ou historiens, hommes d’images ou femmes de lettres, les intervenants tenteront de répondre ensemble à cette question : « Où est passé le temps? ». Trois jours durant, fidèle à sa tradition d'échanges et de dialogue, le Forum a confronté leurs réponses aux interrogations et aux objections du public. (shrink)

Il y a quelques années, un Forum Philo Le Monde/ Le Mans entièrement consacré au thème de la "peur" aurait été impensable. Trop étroit, ou trop sombre. Pourtant, lorsque cette idée a été suggérée à l'automne 2016, la réaction a été unanime : ce qui aurait naguère suscité une réticence relevait maintenant de l'urgence. La peur s'imposait comme une évidence. Est-ce un effet des attentats djihadistes? Le résultat de la précarité sociale, des nouvelles tensions géopolitiques ou des multiples dérèglements climatiques? (...) Quoi qu'il en soit, la peur est là, multiforme et solide. Plutôt que de l'écarter d'un revers de main en affirmant qu'elle est sans objet ou qu'elle relève d'une orchestration politique (le fameux "gouvernement de la peur"), il convient de l'affronter. L'enjeu importe. En effet, si la crainte est classiquement envisagée comme le ressort du despotisme, la communauté de la peur ne saurait tenir lieu de communauté politique. D'où la nécessité de la surmonter, ou du moins de la déconstruire. Des philosophes, des historiens mais aussi des écrivains, un comédien, un cinéaste et même un artiste de cirque ont tenté de penser cet effroi collectif qui entrave le présent et menace d'annuler l'avenir. Voici le fruit de leurs réflexions. (shrink)

Le mouvement ouvrier et étudiant de 68 a fissuré l'assise savante du pouvoir. Jacques Rancière, qui en prend acte, instaure un renversement fondamental : il ne saisit plus l'égalité comme but, mais comme point de départ. C'est d'une déconnexion avec l'ordre hiérarchique qu'elle procède. Sont ainsi mises en avant les capacités des opprimés à inventer des pratiques indociles. Pourtant, depuis une vingtaine d'années, Rancière tend à rétrécir la portée de ce geste : en le déplaçant vers le champ esthétique, il (...) le limite à des "redistributions polémiques du dicible et du visible". Ce livre rompt avec une telle orientation. Il élucide l'égalité dans des luttes impliquant la violence, réintroduit une rationalité du désir et de l'antagonisme. L'aspiration à abolir le rapport capitaliste fait pleinement partie de l'obstination lucide qui anime la confiance égalitaire. Ainsi radicalisée, l'égalité noue l'antagonisme, qui combat un ennemi à détruire, au litige, qui s'inclut dans le monde de l'adversaire par polémique. Elle rencontre les questions que le féminisme pose à l'universel, et s'empare de la défaite comme d'un moment immanent à sa pratique, tirant ses ressources de possibles déjà accomplis, mais aussi des chances manquées d'une lutte."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This bestselling dictionary is written by one of the leading philosophers of our time, and it is widely recognized as the best dictionary of its kind. Comprehensive and authoritative, it covers every aspect of philosophy from Aristotle to Zen. With clear and concise definitions, it provides lively and accessible coverage of not only Western philosophical traditions, but also themes from Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Jewish philosophy. New entries on philosophy of economics, social theory, neuroscience, philosophy of the mind, and moral (...) conceptions, bring this authoritative third edition up to date. It is the ideal introduction to philosophy for anyone with an interest in the subject, and it is an indispensable work of reference for students and teachers. (shrink)

Simon Critchley's first book, The Ethics of Deconstruction, was originally published to great acclaim in 1992. This edition contains three new appendices and a new preface where Critchley reflects upon the origins, motivation and reception of The Ethics of Deconstruction.

Gilles Deleuze’s engagements with mathematics, replete in his work, rely upon the construction of alternative lineages in the history of mathematics, which challenge some of the self imposed limits that regulate the canonical concepts of the discipline. For Deleuze, these challenges provide an opportunity to reconfigure particular philosophical problems – for example, the problem of individuation – and to develop new concepts in response to them. The highly original research presented in this book explores the mathematical construction of Deleuze’s philosophy, (...) as well as addressing the undervalued and often neglected question of the mathematical thinkers who influenced his work. -/- In the wake of Alain Badiou’s recent and seemingly devastating attack on the way the relation between mathematics and philosophy is configured in Deleuze’s work, Simon Duffy offers a robust defence of the structure of Deleuze’s philosophy and, in particular, the adequacy of the mathematical problems used in its construction. By reconciling Badiou and Deleuze’s seeming incompatible engagements with mathematics, Duffy succeeds in presenting a solid foundation for Deleuze’s philosophy, rebuffing the recent challenges against it. -/- Simon B. Duffy is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Yale-NUS College, Singapore, and Honorary Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, Australia. He is the author of The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity, and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze (2006). (shrink)

I intend to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility. To put it another way, it is not always possible to be both a good friend and a diligent believer.

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare’s (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their inter-relationships. Most (...) importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts. (shrink)

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and (...) the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful. (shrink)

The human genome consists of more than 3 billion base pairs built from four different nucleotides that hold the genetic information for the entire organism. The genome is commonly divided into coding and noncoding DNA sequences, with coding DNA sequences defined as those that can be transcribed into mRNA and translated into proteins, or genes. The genetic code determines the impact of a nucleotide change in a gene on the protein sequence and function, and it is essential to understanding the (...) genetic basis of many congenital diseases. The Human Genome Project has accelerated our understanding about the genome function. We now know that our genome consists of 20,000–25,000 genes that occupy only.. (shrink)

If science fiction is a genre, then attempts to think about the nature of science fiction will be affected by one’s understanding of what genres are. I shall examine two approaches to genre, one dominant but inadequate, the other better, but only occasionally making itself seen. I shall then discuss several important, interrelated issues, focusing particularly on science fiction : what it is for a work to belong to a genre, the semantics of genre names, the validity of attempts to (...) define genres, and the connections between genre and normativity. One important but neglected clue to the nature of genres lies in the kinds of disagreements they generate over the assignment of works to genres. I conclude by explaining why these disagreements tell us something about the nature of genres, and discussing in some detail two famous cases of disagreement about whether some work or works are science fiction. (shrink)

This book, designed for high-level undergraduates, postgraduates and fellow researchers, introduces the reader to the main areas of metaethical work today. As we as introducing familiar positions and arguments, Kirchin argues clearly and engagingly for a set of distinctive and arresting views.

Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.

Minds, Brains and Biology -- A Body of Knowledge -- Towards an Aesthetics of Behavior.

Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. This pervasive noncompliance raises two questions of nonideal political theory. First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of (...) action that should be undertaken (Section VI). Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’). The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice. (shrink)

Ethical discussions about Artificial Intelligence (AI) often overlook its potentially large impact on nonhuman animals. In a recent commentary on our paper about AI’s possible harms, Leonie Bossert argues for a focus not just on the possible negative impacts but also the possible beneficial outcomes of AI for animals. We welcome this call to increase awareness of AI that helps animals: developing and using AI to improve animal wellbeing and promote positive dimensions in animal lives should be a vital ethical (...) goal. Nonetheless, we argue that there is some value in focusing on technology-based harms in the context of AI ethics and policy discourses. A harms framework for AI can inform some of our strongest duties to animals and inform regulation and risk assessment impacts designed to prevent serious harms to humans, the environment, and animals. (shrink)

We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Marya Schechtman. Both philosophers distance their views from the individualistic ones standard in western thought and foreground the importance of extrinsic or relational features to personhood. For Menkiti, it is ‘the community which defines the person as person’; for Schechtman, being a person is to have a place in person-space, which involves being seen as a person by others. But there are also striking differences. (...) Schechtman sees this aspect as expanding the scope of personhood to infants and those who are severely mentally disabled. Menkiti thinks that there is a line to be drawn at some point between those humans that are persons and those who are not. We consider the cases offered in questioning how the dispute between the two views should be resolved. (shrink)

I here defend microphysical manyism. According to microphysical manyism, each composite or higher-level object is a mere plurality of microphysical particles. After clarifying the commitments of the view, I offer two physicalist-friendly arguments in its favour. The first argument appeals to the Canberra Plan. Here I argue that microphysical particles acting in unison play the theoretical roles associated with composite objects - that they do everything that we think of composite objects as doing - and thus that composite objects are (...) to be identified with pluralities of microphysical particles. Along the way I rebut the objections that pluralities of particles don’t display the right emergent, ‘lingering’, or modal properties to be good candidates for identification with higher-level objects. In the second argument I claim that microphysical manyism is uniquely able to capture a compelling and widespread physicalist intuition concerning the intimate nature of the relationship between higher-level, composite objects and the microphysical world. (shrink)

Required reading for anyone who believes in the equality of the sexes. A long awaited, highly acclaimed new translation of Simone De Beauvoir's landmark work.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The Politics of Belonging represents an innovative collaboration between political theorists and political scientists for the purposes of investigating the liberal and pluralistic traditions of nationalism. Alain Dieckhoff introduces an indispensable collection of work for anyone dealing with questions of identity, ethnicity, and nationalism.

Eric Olson argues in The Human Animal that thought-experiments involving body-swapping do not in the end offer any support to psychological continuity theories, nor do they pose any threat to his Biological View. I argue that he is mistaken in at least the second claim.

The present volume elucidates the scope of responsibility in science and technology governance by way of assimilating insights gleaned from sociological theory and STS and by investigating the ways in which responsibility unfolds in social processes. Drawing on these theoretical perspectives, the volume goes on to review a 'heuristic model' of responsibility. Such a model provides a simple, tentative, though no less coherent analytical framework for further examining the idea of responsibility, its transformations, configurations and contradictions. This concise but insightful (...) and intellectually rich book offers a new departure in the growing corpus on responsible research and innovation. Scholars of both sociology and science and technology studies will be informed, and at times captivated, by the depth and clarity of argument provided by the authors and by its implications for the responsible governance of science and technology. Phil Macnaghten, Professor of Technology and International Development, Wageningen University, The Netherlands In this highly recommendable book, the authors make a convincing case for bringing social theory into the evolving discussion about responsibility in the context of science and technology. Their argument is stringently developed into an inspiring and promising heuristic framework for analysing responsibility. The book is a model of clarity and deserves a broad audience in science and technology studies, social theory, and beyond. Niels Mejlgaard, Centre Director, Danish Centre for Studies in Research and Research Policy, Aarhus University, Denmark Authors Simone Arnaldi is post-doctoral research fellow in sociology at the University of Padua, Italy. Luca Bianchi is adjunct professor of sociology at the University of Trieste, Italy. (shrink)

The return to religion has perhaps become the dominant cliche of contemporary theory, which rarely offers anything more than an exaggerated echo of a political reality dominated by religious war. Somehow, the secular age seems to have been replaced by a new era, where political action flows directly from metaphysical conflict. The Faith of the Faithless asks how we might respond. Following Critchley's Infinitely Demanding, this new book builds on its philosophical and political framework, also venturing into the questions of (...) faith, love, religion and violence. Should we defend a version of secularism and quietly accept the slide into a form of theism--or is there another way? From Rousseau's politics and religion to the return to St. Paul in Taubes, Agamben and Badiou, via explorations of politics and original sin in the work of Schmitt and John Gray, Critchley examines whether there can be a faith of the faithless, a belief for unbelievers. Expanding on his debate with Slavoj Zizek, Critchley concludes with a meditation on the question of violence, and the limits of non-violence. (shrink)

What it means for conspiracy theories to become mainstream In debates about conspiracy theories, it is often claimed that conspiracy thinking is on the rise or has even become mainstream. In this article, I want to explore this claim conceptually, and argue that there are at least three ways to interpret the claim that ‘conspiracy thinking has become mainstream’. First, there is the individual level, where it is a matter of counting heads. Mainstream then means that the majority believes in (...) conspiracy theories. But there are two other levels. There is the institutional level, which is about whether conspiracy theories circulate within social institutions in an acceptable way. Is it acceptable to express conspiracy theories as a politician, scientist or journalist? Mainstream here means that dominant institutions in society view conspiracy thinking as an acceptable form of communication. Finally, there is the cultural level. Here the question is whether conspiracy thinking is a culturally acceptable way of speaking and thinking about society. Is it socially accepted as normal behavior, or is it rather a form of deviant behavior, accompanied by (informal) sanctions or demands for additional justification or proof? Mainstream here means that conspiracy thinking is seen as a normal way of speaking, without being accompanied by strange looks, shunning or the need to justify oneself as a conspiracy thinker. By making this distinction, we can think more clearly about whether conspiracy thinking is actually on the rise, and how we should deal with it. (shrink)

Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives. We are aware of time on many scales, from the briefest flicker of change to the way our lives unfold over many years. But to what extent does this encounter reveal the true nature of temporal reality? To the extent that temporal reality is as it seems, how do we come to be aware of it? And to the extent that temporal reality is not as it seems, why does (...) it seem that way? These are the central questions addressed by Simon Prosser in Experiencing Time. He defends the B-theory of time, according to which the apparently dynamic quality of change, the special status of the present, and even the passage of time are all illusions. Prosser goes on to explore solutions to certain puzzles raised by experiences of temporal features such as changes, rates, and durations, and in doing so sheds light on broader issues in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

If the laws of nature are fine-tuned for life, can we infer other universes with different laws? How could we even test such a theory without empirical access to those distant places? Can we believe in the multiverse of the Everett interpretation of quantum theory or in the reality of other possible worlds, as advocated by philosopher David Lewis? At the intersection of physics and philosophy of science, this book outlines the philosophical challenge to theoretical physics in a measured, well-grounded (...) manner. The origin of multiverse theories are explored within the context of the fine-tuning problem and a systematic comparison between the various different multiverse models are included. Cosmologists, high energy physicists, and philosophers including graduate students and researchers will find a systematic exploration of such questions in this important book. (shrink)