La succession récente de crises économiques et financières constitue le symptôme le plus évident des dysfonctionnements du système économique. De nouvelles approches comme la responsabilité sociale des entreprises et la finance socialement responsable proposent d’humaniser le capitalisme et de reconfigurer l’économie de marché. Ces deux courants de pensée ont d’ailleurs contribué à opérer un important changement dans l’imaginaire social quant à la façon de concevoir la légitimité des activités économiques. Malgré leur grand intérêt, ces nouvelles approches comportent des limites relativement (...) à leur efficacité et leur capacité de remédier aux dysfonctionnements reconnus. C’est pourquoi nous souhaitons examiner ces deux approches et envisager la discussion des questions éthiques dans une perspective plus large. Nous le ferons en affirmant que le dilemme éthique de l’économie se pose assez simplement dans les termes suivants : moraliser l’économie de l’intérieur ou reformuler la question éthique à l’extérieur du discours économique, notamment par la voie politique et démocratique. Dans le premier cas de figure, c’est l’effectivité des approches normatives comme la RSE et la FSR qui doit être examinée. Dans le second cas de figure, c’est la place de l’éthique dans le discours social et sa relation avec l’économie qui doit être discutée. Nous discuterons donc ces deux cas de figure et proposerons de reformuler la question éthique à l’extérieur de la sphère économique en utilisant l’éthique comme cadre d’analyse transversale et matrice des choix sociopolitiques. (shrink)
Poses four questions about human persons: 1) Who am I in this world wherein I try to live well? 2) What is the meaning in trying to live well in this world? 3) Am I able to make free decisions about living well in this world? and 4) What is the way I am to live well in this world?
This interdisciplinary volume of contributed essays focuses on issues of gender in the British novel of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly Hardy and Trollope. Approaching the topic from a variety of backgrounds the contributors reinvigorate the law-and-literature movement by displaying a range of ways in which literature and law can illuminate one another, and in which the conversation between them can illuminate deeper human issues with which both disciplines are concerned.
Kasm does not offer any concept of proof which is regulative for all metaphysics, for he is convinced that each metaphysical approach requires its own proper logic and methodology. Within this pluralistic framework he seeks to discern the structure of formal truth as expressed in the concept of proof inherent in various metaphysical approaches.--L. S. F.
Alison L. LaCroix is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, where she specializes in legal history, federalism, constitutional law and questions of jurisdiction. She has written a fine, scholarly volume on the intellectual origins of American federalism. LaCroix holds the JD degree (Yale, 1999) and a Ph.D. in history (Harvard, 2007). According to the author, to fully understand the origins of American federalism, we must look beyond the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and range (...) over the colonial, revolutionary, and founding periods including developments in the early republic. LaCroix questions both the idea that American federalism originated, all at once, at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the idea that republican ideology (with its strong emphasis on legislative power) was the single dominant framework of eighteenth-century American political thought. Versions and elements of federalist or con-federative ideas were also long present and in a process of development. (shrink)
Domanda. Se il paziente sa quello che sta facendo, e lei sa perché lo sta facendo, perché interpretare quello che sta facendo anziché chiedergli perché lo fa? Bion. Questo è un altro mistero. Perché non trasferirlo direttamente da lui stesso a lui stesso? Perché è necessaria una persona esterna? Perché l’essere umano non può essere come un lombrico? Perché avere un partner? Perché non avere una vita sessuale con sé stessi senza altre seccature? Perché non si può avere una relazione (...) direttamente con sé stessi senza l’intervento di una specie di levatrice mentale o fisica? Pare che abbiamo bisogno di “rimbalzare” su un’altra persona, di avere qualcosa che rifletta indietro quello che diciamo prima che esso possa diventare comprensibile.Per sapere chi sono io devo chiederlo a te. Quindi la mia essenza è fuori di me. Tu, gli altri, siete il ‘mio’ segreto. La natura eccentrica dell’animale umano viene percorsa attraverso una riflessione sull’opera dello psicoanalista Wilfred Bion. Avendo in mente una domanda finale: se io sono tu, l’Io – propriamente - non esiste. Allora è un impostore? C’è un modo per essere io che non sia fittizio? (shrink)
This book offers even more than its title promises. Embarrassed with my translation of échec, I emphasize that its authors not only reflect on "Man and Failure," but design a vast anthropological fresco by approaching their topic from psychological, economical, medical, religious and philosophical points of view. Jean Lacroix published a book on Failure some years ago; in 1968 he asked thirteen outstanding French writing personalities for contributions to an interdisciplinary study on the same issue. The result is a (...) remarkable collection of insights into this basic experience in human life. Joseph Nuttin, professor in experimental psychology, presents his most recent researches on the transformation of a person's needs and energies into a "project" of life. Failure, the unsuccess of such a project, gives cognitive information useful for subsequent conduct. Raymond Carpentier sees failure in the area of communication: it reveals the ambiguity of any information. On the level of consciousness, he writes, reality only exists in so far as its own failure is contained in its very structure. "Ambiguous like life itself, communication is what has reality only when it does not succeed in its materializations." François Perroux, economist, both calmly and alarmingly sketches the perhaps imminent failure of our economic system. Three other articles deal with ethnological and medical problems. The philosopher and psychoanalyst Mrs. Eliane Amado Lévy-Valenski, author of L'humanisme psychanalytique, le mythe grec et la phénoménologie biblique, pursues her threefold investigation: "Psychoanalysis, Phenomenology or Ontology of Failure?" To fail in one's efforts is both a trial and a temptation, but it also points toward the emergence of infinity within finitude. The three religious contributions give the most personal penetration of the subject. They are the center of the book. The last section deals with three philosophies: the failing thought of Being, the critique of humanism, the restoration of motivations in action. The first of them is due to Rouven Gilead, professor at the University of Tel-Aviv and author of one of the best books on Heidegger. His paper suggests what radical Failure would mean: not of man, nor of given historical situations, nor even of metaphysics, although these three approaches are true. But the "truth of Being" in modern subjectivity, in sciences and in philosophy remains hidden. Our horizon of thought is the nihilism of Being. The fundamental Failure, then, is the history of Being itself.--R. S. (shrink)
This compact sketch of Fichte's idealism is No. 82 in the PUF series "Initiation philosophique," directed by Jean Lacroix. Bourgeois' book follows the classic division proposed by Gueroult of the genesis of Fichte's thought into three stages: the early philosophy of the ego up to 1800, including the 1794 edition of the Wissenschaftslehre and the celebrated "two introductions" of 1794; the philosophy of Being, 1800-1804, especially The Vocation of Man; and finally the philosophy of the Absolute, 1804 and thereafter, (...) which includes the Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Age and The Way to the Blessed Life. For Bourgeois, these may be just as well characterized, respectively, as the philosophy of moral obligation, of vocation, and of love. He hopes to defend the early Fichte against the charge of "subjective" idealism levelled at him by Schelling and Hegel. He singles out for emphasis the close connection that Fichte makes--Kierkegaard notwithstanding--between life and idealism, and finds this a recurrent characteristic of all of Fichte's works. His interpretation of the first Wissenschaftslehre focusses upon Fichte's remark in the First Introduction that "the kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon the kind of man that one is." This deserves emphasis, anticipating as it does not only the Existentialist interpretation of philosophy but also the Lebensphilosophie of Dilthey. The book is brief and to the point and should prove helpful in the difficult task of unravelling Fichte's thought.--J. D. C. (shrink)
Hegel attempts both to give evil its metaphysical due and to give it intelligibility within a processive idealistic system. To accomplish these ends, he consistently employs the contrast between the natural and the free act of the subject and the contrast between the particular and the universal. He places these contrasts within the situation of an original and presupposed unity of spirit that itself is the ground of the mediation required for thinking freedom, for evil, and for ultimate reconciliation. He (...) argues for evil’s ultimate intelligibility in terms of its necessity as a consequent moment in the development of spirit from its ground; he resolves problems of evil’s penultimate irrationality in terms of its unstable contradictory elements in spirit’s history which is not yet fully concrete, a simultaneity of “ought to be” and “ought not to be” in the sense that the instability must be surpassed but not that it should never have been. The aims of this paper will be to summarize and evaluate Hegel’s efforts to give evil both significance and intelligibility within his system and to estimate if a system of progressive idealism contributes a philosophically new dimension to the problem of evil in a universe. (shrink)
Hegel’s basic position so far on the various meanings of evil as necessary and thereby intelligible directly in the development of spirit might be summed up as follows. Evil is always a necessary moment of instability which gives impetus in the movement from various meanings of particularity to various meanings of universality; from the more abstract expression of potential unity and truth to the more actualized notion and unity.
This article presents a critical reevaluation of the thesis—closely associated with H. L. A. Hart, and central to the views of most recent legal philosophers—that the idea of state coercion is not logically essential to the definition of law. The author argues that even laws governing contracts must ultimately be understood as “commands of the sovereign, backed by force.” This follows in part from recognition that the “sovereign,” defined rigorously, at the highest level of abstraction, is that person or entity (...) identified by reference to game theory and the philosophical idea of “convention” as the source of signals with which the subject population has become effectively locked, as a group, into conformity. (shrink)
The content of this paper is an elaboration of Hubert L. Dreyfus’s philosophical critique of Artificial Intelligence (AI), computers and the internet. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1929-2017) is Ua SA philosopher and alumni of Harvard University who teach at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of California, Berkeley. He is a phenomenological philosopher who criticize computer researchers and the artificial intelligence community. In 1965, Dreyfus wrote an article for Rand Corporation titled “Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence” which criticizes the masterminds (...) of Artificial Intelligence. Dreyfus also criticized the order of computers via two books: (1) What Computers Can’t Do (1972) and (2) What Computers Stills Can’t Do (1992). He favored human intuition rather than the computer logic in his book Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (1986). In 2001, Dreyfus wrote a book On the Internet, which considers the prominent phenomenon in the recent Industry 4.0. By elaborating on Dreyfus’s philosophy on the computer, artificial intelligence, and the internet, we will know the philosophical debate on the result of industry 3.0 (computer and artificial intelligence) and 4.0 (artificial intelligence and internet). Moreover, we will know the relation between humans and those industrial products. (shrink)
La colonisation suivie du règne communiste a laissé sa marque sur l’ancienne Indochine française, constituée des trois pays Vietnam, Laos et Cambodge. Cet article vise à analyser la relation étroite entre des bouleversements politiques de la fin XIXe-début XXe siècle et l’évolution des institutions religieuses en Indochine, pour conclure sur l’interaction et l’influence réciproque entre politique et religieux.
In ‘Other Minds’, J.L. Austin advances a parallel between saying ‘I know’ and saying ‘I promise’: much as you are ‘prohibited’, he says, from saying ‘I promise I will, but I may fail’, you are also ‘prohibited’ from saying ‘I know it is so, but I may be wrong’. This treatment of ‘I know’ has been derided for nearly sixty years: while saying ‘I promise’ amounts to performing the act of promising, Austin seems to miss the fact that saying ‘I (...) know’ fails to constitute a performance of the act of knowing. In this paper, I advance a defense of Austin’s position. I diagnose the principal objections to Austin’s account as stemming from detractors’ failure to acknowledge: (1) that Austin never characterizes ‘I know’ as a pure performative; (2) that saying ‘I know p’, unlike simply knowing p, occurs in specific interpersonal contexts in which others rely on our knowledge claims; (3) Austin’s considered account of the felicity conditions of performative utterance; (4) Austin’s ultimate repudiation of the performative/constative distinction. I conclude that Austin’s treatment of ‘I know’ rests on a more general commitment to the intrinsically normative nature of ordinary language. (shrink)