Georg Agricola’s De Re Metallica (1556) is an impressive work about mining arts and sciences, still used as a reference work to understand the mining world of his time and to analyze the relationships between scholars and practitioners. This essay begins by studying how Agricola presents the underground surveying, also known as geometria subterranea. How does the author’s mathematics relate to contemporary geometry or to actual surveying practices? Second, the essay contrasts his scholarly approach with sixteenth-century administrative and technical documents, (...) as well as mining sermons. Comparing the practical geometry contained in the De Re Metallica with different kinds of sources helps to question the relationships between the arts and natural and exact sciences in the practical settings of early modern Europe. Finally, it argues for a distinction between the inquiry on the historical progress of mathematics in civil life and philosophical questions about the rise of new sciences. (shrink)

La géométrie souterraine est une science mathématique pratique, qui se développe dans les exploitations minières et dont la diffusion est considérablement modifiée au cours du xviiie siècle. Ce phénomène est lié à l’institutionnalisation graduelle de la discipline, de l’établissement d’un système de compagnonnage à la création d’académies des mines. Progressivement, les pratiques vont faire appel à de nouvelles méthodes et intégrer une solide formation en mathématiques théoriques. La circulation et l’enseignement des connaissances sont dans un premier temps basés sur un (...) système de manuscrits qui sera étudié en détail. L’exemple du Markscheider August Beyer (1677-1753) illustre ce processus collectif de constitution et de transmission de connaissances, dont la diffusion est cependant contrôlée. Nous analysons dans un second temps l’évolution des vecteurs de circulation et son influence sur la discipline, en nous appuyant sur la biographie de deux mathématiciens saxons, J.A. Scheidhauer (1718-1784) et son discipline J.F. Lempe (1757-1801). Leurs parcours croisés symbolisent la transformation de la discipline. Le passage à l’imprimé, la publication d’articles dans des revues spécialisées et la création de chaires académiques font de la géométrie souterraine une science reconnue qui reste cependant en dehors du corpus de connaissances et des débats universitaires. (shrink)

La géométrie souterraine est une science mathématique pratique, qui se développe dans les exploitations minières et dont la diffusion est considérablement modifiée au cours du xviiie siècle. Ce phénomène est lié à l’institutionnalisation graduelle de la discipline, de l’établissement d’un système de compagnonnage à la création d’académies des mines. Progressivement, les pratiques vont faire appel à de nouvelles méthodes et intégrer une solide formation en mathématiques théoriques. La circulation et l’enseignement des connaissances sont dans un premier temps basés sur un (...) système de manuscrits qui sera étudié en détail. L’exemple du Markscheider August Beyer illustre ce processus collectif de constitution et de transmission de connaissances, dont la diffusion est cependant contrôlée. Nous analysons dans un second temps l’évolution des vecteurs de circulation et son influence sur la discipline, en nous appuyant sur la biographie de deux mathématiciens saxons, J.A. Scheidhauer et son discipline J.F. Lempe . Leurs parcours croisés symbolisent la transformation de la discipline. Le passage à l’imprimé, la publication d’articles dans des revues spécialisées et la création de chaires académiques font de la géométrie souterraine une science reconnue qui reste cependant en dehors du corpus de connaissances et des débats universitaires. (shrink)

Johann Jakob Wagner (1775-1841), disciple de Schelling et important acteur de la Naturphilosophie allemande, publie en 1803 un ouvrage intitulé Von der Natur der Dinge où il lance le projet d’une réforme de la mathématique visant à l’intégrer à la philosophie. Il provoque ainsi un débat animé dans lequel divers acteurs, scientifiques et philosophes, vont exprimer leur point de vue sur la relation entre les deux disciplines. Nous nous intéresserons en particulier à la réponse de Johann Schön (1771-1839), un mathématicien (...) qui publie l’année suivante un livre aujourd’hui oublié dans lequel il rejette vigoureusement le projet de Wagner. L’analyse de ce débat aide, dans le contexte des réformes universitaires du début du xixe, à comprendre l’histoire de l’émergence en Allemagne d’une discipline mathématique autonome, ainsi que l’apparition de nouvelles problématiques autour de l’axiomatisation et de la systématique. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag befasst sich mit der Mathematisierung in der praktisch-technischen Ausbildung im letzten Drittel des 18. und ersten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts. Anhand von zwei Fällen werden Variantenreichtum und Problemlagen des praktisch-mathematischen Wissens in der Zeit um 1800 herausgearbeitet. Nach einer Einführung zu institutionellem Rahmen und sozialem Status der praktischen Mathematiker (eigentlich mathematischen Praktiker) in den deutschen Gebieten, beschäftigt sich der erste Teil mit dem Bergmeister Johann Andreas Scheidhauer (1718–1784). Die Biographie dieses bislang wenig beachteten Praktikers führt zu einer Analyse (...) seiner Handschriften und deren Rezeption, in erster Linie durch Johann Friedrich Lempe (1757–1801), Professor für Mathematik an der Bergakademie Freiberg. Ein Praktiker der nachfolgenden Generation steht im Fokus des zweiten Teils. Carl Friedrich Steiner (1774–1840) war ein Baumeister im Weimar der Goethezeit. Gewissermaßen reflektiert sein Lehrbuch zur Geometry descriptive die Folgen der fortlaufenden Mathematisierung und den Stellenwert mathematischen Wissens in der Ausbildung junger Praktiker und Künstler. Beide Teilstudien geben Aufschluss zum historischen Verständnis praktischer Mathematik. (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

In this paper the scholastic question 'On the Subject of Virtues' is taken as starting point for a discussion of the vision of man that supports Thomas Aquinas' moral doctrine. According to Thomas not the will, but the sensualitas itself must be the subject of moral virtues. For a virtuous action the right decision and the right intention in the will do not suffice, there must also exist „a perfect disposition in the sensitive appetite to follow the judgement (...) of reason”. If the principle of all virtues is the will, their perfection and completion is in the emotional life which makes someone act with pleasure and spontaneously. Thomas' ethical doctrine is confronted with the sharp criticism of William of Ockham. According to Ockham only dispositions of the will can be moral virtues. It is even questionable whether the sensitive faculties may acquire any habits, and certainly those habits are never intrinsically good, but only good „denominatione extrinseca”. In Ockham's view it is superfluous to postulate habitus in the irrational soul besides the corporeal qualities (which we may acquire through drugs or physical training). Ockham's vision about man is dichotomic. Morality is situated exclusively on the level of reason and will. The body with its sensitive functions is the realm of the passionate life, the indifferent material that must be ordered by the virtuous man. The ethical life is understood as a struggle, requiring will power and firmness. In this context, the difference between temperance and continence disappears. In Thomas' view the sensitive appetite is much more than a biological function, because it can be integrated in a rational desire. The relation between nature and morality is understood als 'participation'. When this metaphysics of participation is abandoned we find a rigoristic voluntarism, as is evident in Ockham. (shrink)

La querelle du matérialisme fait figure d'un moment oublié de la vie intellectuelle européenne. Une enquête historique fait réémerger son impact majeur : philosophie, science, religion, politique s'y nouent en révélant des lignes de clivage à multiples facettes dans la société moderne en formation.

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

This volume brings together for the first time a significant number of Reid's manuscript papers on natural history, physiology and materialist metaphysics. An important contribution not only to Reid studies but also to our understanding of eighteenth-century science and its context.

Schelling demandait: 'Pourquoi y a-t-il du sens, non du non-sens au lieu du sens?' Dans cette question, la notion n'est pas un signe renvoyant à quelque chose, pas plus que lorsque l'on dit communément non pas d'un énoncé, mais d'une chose, d'un état de fait, qu'ils 'ont un sens' ou non. Comment aborder philosophiquement cette version du sens? Notre ouvrage part d'une conviction : la structure philosophique sous-tendant l'idée du sens s'ouvre avec Kant, dans la mesure où on peut le (...) définir, pour commencer, comme le renvoi d'une réalité donnée à l'horizon d'une réalité (ou d'une idéalité) simplement postulée, que l'on peut certes nommer, mais pas directement connaître. Ainsi par exemple de Dieu. On cherche ainsi à cerner comment le sens est devenu une catégorie directrice de la philosophie, constamment au travail dans les variations de l'idéalisme, l'émergence de la phénoménologie, des philosophies de la vie, de l'existence, de la culture, de la psychanalyse."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Conçue à l'origine comme une épistémologie du savoir sensible, l'esthétique a connu trois siècles d'évolution pour devenir une philosophie de l'art. Cette réunion d'études croisées évalue la présence de la logique dans le champs esthétique, et l'évolution de leur relation dans l'histoire de la pensée.

La référence à la nature, qu'elle soit normative ou descriptive, croise les thèmes essentiels de l'éthique d'Aristote : la fin ultime, l'acquisition des vertus, le plaisir et les émotions, les liens relationnels, la justice et la vie en cité, la responsabilité. L'éthique aristotélicienne n'est pas pour autant "naturaliste" au sens où le bien humain dériverait de tendances et de prédispositions naturelles. Cet ouvrage, en procédant à une étude systématique de la référence à la nature dans l'éthique aristotélicienne, défend une nouvelle (...) interprétation du naturalisme pratique d'Aristote : un naturalisme critique, le plus souvent dialectique, qui s'interroge sur les conditions de base du bien humain ; non pas un naturalisme scientifique, en vertu duquel la biologie serait source de prescriptions morales, mais un naturalisme problématique qui délimite des possibilités d'agir. L'une des tâches primordiales du théoricien de l'éthique, comme celle du politique actif, est précisément d'évaluer dans quelle mesure le bien humain dépend de la nature ou s'en affranchit."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Thomas Reid was a philosopher who founded the Scottish school of 'common sense'. Much of Reid's work is a critique of his contemporary, David Hume, whose empiricism he rejects. In this work, written after Reid's appointment to a professorship at the university of Glasgow, and published in 1785, he turns his attention to ideas about perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste. He examines the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, arguing that 'when we find philosophers maintaining that (...) there is no heat in the fire, nor colour in the rainbow … we may be apt to think the whole to be only a dream of fanciful men, who have entangled themselves in cobwebs spun out of their own brain'. Written by one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most important thinkers, this work brings to life the intellectual debates of the time. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas produced a voluminous body of work on moral theory, and much of that work is on virtue, particularly the status and value of the virtues as principles of virtuous acts, and the way in which a moral life can be organized around them schematically. Thomas Osborne presents Aquinas's account of virtue in its historical, philosophical and theological contexts, to show the reader what Aquinas himself wished to teach about virtue. His discussion makes the complexities of Aquinas's (...) moral thought accessible to readers despite the differences between Thomas's texts themselves, and the distance between our background assumptions and his. The book will be valuable for scholars and students in ethics, medieval philosophy, and theology. (shrink)

"The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu's Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. (...) Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement.". (shrink)

There has been an explosion of interest in the metaphysics of fundamentality in recent decades. The consensus view, called metaphysical foundationalism, maintains that there is something absolutely fundamental in reality upon which everything else depends. However, a number of thinkers have chal- lenged the arguments in favor of foundationalism and have proposed competing non-foundationalist ontologies. This paper provides a systematic and critical introduction to metaphysical foundationalism in the current literature and argues that its relation to ontological dependence and substance should (...) be qualified in important ways. (shrink)

In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...) they are reliable. If this is true, Weinberg's new challenge comes down to the claim that philosophical intuitions are not reliable since they are significantly unstable. In the second part of my paper I will argue that and why the experimentally established instability of folk intuitions about philosophical cases does not show that philosopher's expert intuitions about these cases are instable. (shrink)

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism (...) in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena). Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, [volume 1] includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi. (shrink)

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism (...) in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena). Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, the book includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi. (shrink)

I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpressible properties, but its formulation presupposes the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. I discuss some ways (...) to reduce these existence assumptions, but ultimately suggest that deflationists can hardly avoid quantification over abstract objects of one sort or another. I conclude that property deflationism is perhaps not as deflationary as some philosophers want it to be, but that it’s still apt to call the position ‘deflationary’. (shrink)

Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.

Issues concerning patients' rights are at the center of bioethics, but the political basis for these rights has rarely been examined. In Bioethics in a Liberal Society: The Political Framework of Bioethics Decision Making , Thomas May offers a compelling analysis of how the political context of liberal constitutional democracy shapes the rights and obligations of both patients and health care professionals. May focuses on how a key feature of liberal society -- namely, an individual's right to make independent (...) decisions -- has an impact on the most important relational facets of health care, such as patients' autonomy and professionals' rights of conscience. Although a liberal political framework protects individual judgments, May asserts that this right is based on the assumption of an individual's competency to make sound decisions. May uses case studies to examine society's approach to medical decision making when, for reasons ranging from age to severe mental disorder, a person lacks sufficient competency to make independent and fully informed choices. To protect the autonomy of these vulnerable patients, May emphasizes the need for health care ethics committees and ethics consultants to help guide the decision-making process in clinical settings. Bioethics in a Liberal Society is essential reading for all those interested in understanding how bioethics is practiced within our society. (shrink)

The Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid first published Essays on Active Powers of Man in 1788 while he was Professor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen. The work contains a set of essays on active power, the will, principles of action, the liberty of moral agents, and morals. Reid was a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment and one of the founders of the 'common sense' school of philosophy. In Active Powers Reid gives his fullest exploration of sensus communis as (...) the basis of all philosophical inquiry. He uses common sense realism to argue for the existence of a stable external world, the existence of other minds, and to offer a powerful challenge to versions of the Theory of Ideas advocated by Hume and Locke . This is a key work of the Scottish Enlightenment that made important contributions to fundamental debates about the basis of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes not-p—for example, ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is (...) going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever, but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We substantiate this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other. (shrink)

T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics is a classic of modern philosophy. It begins with Green's idealist attack on empiricist metaphysics and epistemology and develops a perfectionist ethical theory that aims to bring together the best elements in the ancient and modern traditions, and that provides the moral foundations for Green's own distinctive brand of liberalism. David Brink's new edition will restore this great work to prominence, after two decades in which it has been hard to obtain. The present edition (...) uses the text of the fifth edition, accompanied by a new introductory essay, bibliographical essay, and index. Translations are provided for Green's quotations from other languages. Of particular importance is the editor's extended introductory essay, which situates the Prolegomena in its intellectual context, sympathetically but critically engages its main themes, and explains Green's enduring significance for the history of philosophy and contemporary ethical theory. Students and scholars of the history of ethics, ethical theory, political philosophy, and nineteenth century philosophy will find this new edition an invaluable resource. (shrink)

L'Aufklärung allemande s'est réapproprié polémiquement le concept rousseauiste de perfectibilité, souvent avec d'importants déplacements. Théologie, philosophie, histoire naturelle, pédagogie, anthropologie concourent à un débat critique par lequel cette anthologie montre la pluralité des Lumières. --.

This paper presents a new approach to the class-theoretic paradoxes. In the first part of the paper, I will distinguish classes from sets, describe the function of class talk, and present several reasons for postulating type-free classes. This involves applications to the problem of unrestricted quantification, reduction of properties, natural language semantics, and the epistemology of mathematics. In the second part of the paper, I will present some axioms for type-free classes. My approach is loosely based on the Gödel–Russell idea (...) of limited ranges of significance. It is shown how to derive the second-order Dedekind–Peano axioms within that theory. I conclude by discussing whether the theory can be used as a solution to the problem of unrestricted quantification. In an appendix, I prove the consistency of the class theory relative to Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. (shrink)

Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...) example, is David Lewis on philosophy: Our “intuitions” are simply opinions: our philosophical theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular; some general; some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium. Our common task it to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of them… Once the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. Is that to say that there is no truth to be had? Or that the truth is of our own making, and different ones of us can make it differently? Not at all! If you say flatly that there is no god, and I say that there are countless gods but none of them are our worldmates, then it may be that neither of us is making any mistake of method. We may each be bringing our opinions to equilibrium in the most careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments, distinctions, and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake of fact. Which one is wrong depends on what there is (1983: x-xi). In addition to philosophy in general, the method of reflective equilibrium has also been endorsed as the appropriate procedure for investigating various other subject.. (shrink)