Climate change and other global environmental problems constitute a significant challenge to contemporary political philosophy, especially with respect to complacency. This paper assesses Rawls? theory, and argues for three conclusions. First, Rawls does not already solve such problems, and simple extensions of his theory are unlikely to do so. This is so despite the rich structure of Rawls? philosophy, and the appeal of some of its parts. Second, the most promising areas for extension ? the circumstances of justice, the duty (...) to maintain and promote just institutions, and his vision of social development ? are those that have not yet been explored. Third, unfortunately, Rawls? views on these topics are both seriously underdeveloped, and largely stipulative. Hence, in trying to meet climate change, Rawlsians are more likely to add new theories to Rawls, and perhaps even to transform his original account, than to generate an approach ?from the inside out? (shrink)

In this work, which has survived only in manuscript form and in Italian, Gardiner analyses the great dynastic changes in England's past in order to provide Phillip II with a guide to ruling England and establishing a Catholic dynasty. Gardiner's work is perhaps the clearest example of an attempt to relate Machiavelli's political theories to practical political problems.

Climate change is a global problem that is predominantly an intergenerational conflict, and which takes place in a setting where our ethical impulses are weak. This "perfect moral storm" poses a profound challenge to humanity. This book explains how the "perfect storm" metaphor makes sense of our current malaise, and why a better ethics can help see our way out.

Very few moral philosophers have written on climate change.1 This is puzzling, for several reasons. First, many politicians and policy makers claim that climate change is not only the most serious environmental problem currently facing the world, but also one of the most important international problems per se.2 Second, many of those working in other disciplines describe climate change as fundamentally an ethical issue.3.

This collection gathers a set of central papers from the emerging area of ethics and climate change.

The peculiar features of the climate change problem pose substantial obstacles to our ability to make the hard choices necessary to address it. Climate change involves the convergence of a set of global, intergenerational and theoretical problems. This convergence justifies calling it a 'perfect moral storm'. One consequence of this storm is that, even if the other difficult ethical questions surrounding climate change could be answered, we might still find it difficult to act. For the storm makes us extremely vulnerable (...) to moral corruption. (shrink)

In this volume, Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach present arguments for and against the relevance of ethics to global climate policy. Gardiner argues that climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue, since it is an early instance of a distinctive challenge to ethical action, and ethical concerns are at the heart of many of the decisions that need to be made. Consequently, climate policy that ignores ethics is at risk of.

“[T]he Precautionary Principle still has neither a commonly accepted definition nor a set of criteria to guide its implementation. “There is”, Freestone … cogently observes, “a certain paradox in the widespread and rapid adoption of the Precautionary Principle”: While it is applauded as a “good thing”, no one is quite sure about what it really means or how it might be..

ABSTRACTThis article offers a constructive critique of the Oxford Principles for the governance of geoengineering and proposes an alternative set of principles, the Tollgate Principles, based on that critique. Our main concern is that, despite their many merits, the Oxford Principles remain largely instrumental and dominated by procedural considerations; therefore, they fail to lay the groundwork sufficiently for the more substantive ethical debate that is needed. The article aims to address this gap by making explicit many of the important ethical (...) questions lurking in the background, especially around values such as justice, respect and legitimacy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Debating Climate Ethics, David Weisbach and I offer contrasting views of the importance of ethics and justice for climate policy. I argue that ethics is central. Weisbach advocates for climate policy based purely on narrow forms of self-interest. For this symposium, I summarize the major themes, and extend my basic argument. I claim that ethics gets the problem right, whereas dismissing ethics risks getting the problem dangerously wrong, and perpetuating profound injustices. One consequence is that we should reject (...) the alleged “feasibility constraint” of short-term, economic self-interest. (shrink)

A critical study of two recent books in climate ethics by Dale Jamieson (Reason in a Dark Time, Oxford 2014), and Darrel Moellendorf (The Moral and Political Challenges of Climate Change, Cambridge 2014).

In two celebrated and widely-anthologized articles, as well as several books, the biologist Garrett Hardin claims (a) that the world population problem has a certain structure – it is a tragedy of the commons - and, (b) that, given this structure, the only tenable solutions involve either coercion or immense human suffering. In this paper, I shall argue for two claims. First, Hardin’s arguments are deeply flawed. The population problem as he conceives it does not have the structure of a (...) commons; and even if it did, this would not necessitate the extreme responses he canvasses. Second, nevertheless, much of Hardin’s pessimism is justified. Some environmental problems associated with population do have tragic structures, though these are of a different form than Hardin envisions. For example, the problem of global climate change has an intergenerational aspect that makes it importantly worse than Hardin’s commons, and for this reason (as opposed to Hardin’s) extreme responses may be needed to avert environmental catastrophe. (shrink)

Over the last twenty years, the idea that climate change – and indeed global environmental change more generally – is fundamentally a moral challenge has become mainstream. But most have supposed that the challenge is one of acting morally, rather than to our morality itself. Dale Jamieson is a notable exception to this trend. From the earliest days of climate ethics, he has argued that successfully addressing the problem will involve a fundamental paradigm shift in ethics. In general, Jamieson believes (...) that our current values evolved relatively recently in “low-population-density and low-technology societies, with seemingly unlimited access to land and other resources,” and so are ill-suited to a globalized world. More specifically, he asserts that these values include as a central component an account of responsibility which “presupposes that harms and their causes are individual, that they can be readily identified, and that they are local in time and space.” But, he claims, global environmental problems such as climate change fit none of these criteria, so that a new value system is needed, one which addresses “fundamental questions” about “how we ought to live, what kinds of societies we want, and how we should relate to nature and other forms of life.” In particular, he declares that there is little hope of success without direct appeal to a hitherto underappreciated “duty of respect for nature.” In my view, Jamieson is right to question the adequacy of conventional ethical thinking for addressing global environmental problems. However, I also contend that the situation with respect to responsibility is less clear cut than he suggests. In this paper, I offer several objections to Jamieson’s main arguments, and propose an alternative, less revisionary, account of our predicament. Nevertheless, I also suggest that much of the spirit of Jamieson’s position remains intact, so that my proposal is more of a “friendly amendment” to his view than an outright rejection of it. According to this amendment, climate change involves a failure of our attempts to delegate responsibility to political institutions charged with acting on our behalf. Such failures are jarring, since they throw many of our normal practices into doubt, and threaten to restore to us demanding social burdens to which we have become largely unaccustomed. This situation need not cast doubt on our basic account of ethical responsibility. Indeed, that account helps to illuminate what is going on. Still, it does imply that we face a large (although somewhat familiar) moral and political challenge. (shrink)

The Carnegie Council's work “is rooted in the premise that the incorporation of ethical concerns into discussions of international affairs will yield more effective policies both in the United States and abroad.” In honor of the Council's centenary, we have been asked to present our views on the ethical and policy issues posed by climate change, focusing on what people need to know that they probably do not already know, and what should be done. In that spirit, this essay argues (...) that climate change poses a profound ethical challenge, that the ongoing evasion of this challenge produces ineffective policy, and, therefore, that a fundamental paradigm shift is needed. More specifically, I maintain that the climate problem is usually misdiagnosed as a traditional tragedy of the commons, that this obscures two deeper and distinctively ethical challenges, and that we should address these challenges head on, by calling for a global constitutional convention focused on future generations. (shrink)

The Royal Society's landmark report on geoengineering is predicated on a particular account of the context and rationale for intentional manipulation of the climate system, and this ethical framework probably explains many of the Society's conclusions. Critical reflection on the report's values is useful for understanding disagreements within and about geoengineering policy, and also for identifying questions for early ethical analysis. Topics discussed include the moral hazard argument, governance, the ethical status of geoengineering under different rationales, the implications of understanding (...) geoengineering as a consequence of wider moral failure, and ethical resistance to invasive interventions in environmental systems. (shrink)

Radical forms of geoengineering, such as stratospheric sulfate injection (SSI), raise serious concerns about justice and the plight of the most vulnerable. However, these are sometimes dismissed on the basis of a challenge: “What if, in the face of catastrophic impacts, the most vulnerable countries initiate geoengineering themselves, or beg the richer, more technically sophisticated countries to do it? Wouldn’t geoengineering then be ethically permissible? Who could refuse them?” As a US tech billionaire put it, “Frankly, the Maldives could say, (...) ‘F--- you all—we want to stay alive’. Would you blame them? Wouldn’t any reasonable country do the same?” Such questions are intended to be rhetorical: it is assumed simply to be obvious that the appeals of the desperate would justify radical geoengineering. Moreover, the framing suggests that other nations would have strong moral reasons either to respect intervention by the desperate, or even to aid them by deploying themselves. Sometimes such arguments are also used to justify accelerating research on geoengineering now. If the desperate might attempt geoengineering, it is said, we should work out how best to do it, so as to assist them through advice. In general, the overriding thought is that the threat of catastrophe coupled with the plight of vulnerable populations provides most of the justification needed for the wider pursuit of a geoengineering agenda. Desperation becomes a trump card in the policy discourse. In this article, I argue that the desperation argument misses much of what is at stake, ethically speaking, in geoengineering policy. I focus on two further questions. The more obvious—the justificatory question—asks “under what conditions would geoengineering become justified?”, where the conditions to be considered would include, for example, the threat to be confronted, the governance mechanisms, the individual protections to be provided, the compensation provisions to be made, and so on. The less obvious question is the contextual question: “What is the ethical context within which geoengineering is likely to occur, and what difference does this make to our analysis of it?” (Gardiner 2013). In light of this distinction, I argue for two claims. First, on neither of the two most obvious interpretations of it does the desperation argument clearly justify the pursuit of geoengineering. Indeed, it may even count against such pursuit. Second, in any case, the context in which SSI is actually being pursued reveals more about the live threats and ethical import of geoengineering. For example, to push the most vulnerable to the point where they feel forced to accept pronounced subjugation to those who have made them desperate is a morally horrifying prospect which we have strong ethical reason to avoid. Such possibilities should not be concealed behind the superficial bravado of “f--- you all” and “what any reasonable country would do.” None of this implies that ethical geoengineering is impossible. However, it does suggest that geoengineering is morally complex in ways unappreciated by simple appeals to desperation. (shrink)

Contract theories – such as contractarianism and contractualism - seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of “mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals” (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as (...) Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, the chapter maintains that thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed. (shrink)

This paper argues that extortion is a clear threat in intergenerational relations, and that the threat is manifest in some existing proposals in climate policy and latent in some background tendencies in mainstream moral and political philosophy. The paper also claims that although some central aspects of the concern about extortion might be pursued in terms of the entitlements of future generations, this approach is likely to be incomplete. In particular, intergenerational extortion raises issues about the appropriate limits to the (...) sway of central values such as welfare and distributive justice. We should be wary of ways in which such values invite us to buy off, or perhaps to join, an intergenerational climate Mafia. (shrink)

Geoengineering – roughly “the intentional manipulation of the planetary systems at a global scale” (Keith 2000) – to combat climate change is often introduced as a “plan B”: an alternative solution in case “plan A”, reducing emissions, fails. This framing is typically deployed as part of an argument that research and development is necessary in case robust conventional mitigation is not forthcoming, or proves insufficient to prevent dangerous climate impacts. Since coming to prominence with the release of the Royal Society (...) report in 2009 (Shepherd et al. 2009, v), the Plan B framing has proved popular with scientists, in policy circles, and in the news media (see Nerlich and Jaspal 2012; Luokkanen, Huttunen, and Hilden 2014). Though sometimes used to refer to geoengineering as a whole, it is associated particularly strongly with stratospheric sulfate injection (SSI) techniques. Consequently, these will be our focus here. We argue that the plan B framing is particularly ill-suited to the integrative assessment of options within climate policy, because it oversimplifies a complex issue in a misleading and deceptive way. For instance, it highlights extreme positions, presents SSI as an alternative independent from mainstream policies, ignores the multiplicity of options available, and neglects threats of morally indecent SSI in a context of ongoing political inertia. We are particularly concerned about the way ‘Plan B’ risks conveying an implicit hyper-optimism about SSI, and so obscures the need for ethical standards. (shrink)

In 2001, 178 of the world's nations reached agreement on a treaty to combat global climate change brought on by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Despite the notable omission of the United States, representatives of the participants, and many newspapers around the world, expressed elation. Margot Wallström, the environment commissioner of the European Union, went so far as to declare, “Now we can go home and look our children in the eye and be proud of what we have done.”In this (...) article, I argue for two theses. First, the rhetoric and euphoria surrounding the 2001 deal is misplaced. This is not, as is often said, because the Kyoto agreement is too demanding but rather because it is much too weak. In particular, the Kyoto agreement does little to protect future generations. On the contrary, (at best) it seems to be a prudent wait-and-see policy for the present generation, narrowly defined. Hence, even those countries who have endorsed the Kyoto agreement should be wary of looking their children in the eye, and none should relish facing their children's children.Second, the failure of the Kyoto agreement can be explained in terms of the underlying structure of the problem. Climate change involves the intersection of a complex set of intergenerational and intragenerational collective action problems. This structure, and in particular its intergenerational aspect, has not been adequately appreciated. Yet until it is, we are doomed to an ineffectual environmental policy. (shrink)

The distant future poses a severe moral problem, the nature and extent of which has not yet been adequately appreciated. This paper offers a brief, initial account of this problem and its main features. It also argues (1) that the problem is the main concern of distinctively intergenerational ethics, and (2) that it occurs both in a pure, long-term form manifest across human history and global populations, and also in degenerate forms which apply to shorter time periods and to social (...) institutions. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that ethical concerns are central to decision-making about, and governance of, geoengineering. This is especially true of the most prominent and paradigm example of climate engineering, the spraying of sulfate particles into the stratosphere in order to block incoming sunlight and so limit global warming ). Geoengineering ethics, like geoengineering science, is still in its early, exploratory days. This chapter offers an introductory overview of the emerging discussion and some of the challenges moving forward, taking SSI (...) as its key example. It identifies a range of values relevant to geoengineering, exposes some misleading early framings, argues that questions of justification and context are both important, and summarizes the Tollgate principles for geoengineering governance. One theme is that despite the initial agreement on the centrality of ethics, in practice there are profound risks that ethical considerations will be marginalized, both in the short-term as research is developed, and in the longer-run, in any deployment. (shrink)

In early policy work, climate engineering is often described as a global public good. This paper argues that the paradigm example of geoengineering—stratospheric sulfate injection (hereafter ‘SSI’)—does not fit the canonical technical definition of a global public good, and that more relaxed versions are unhelpful. More importantly, it claims that, regardless of the technicalities, the public good framing is seriously misleading, in part because it arbitrarily marginalizes ethical concerns. Both points suggest that more clarity is needed about the aims of (...) geoengineering policy—and especially governance—and that this requires special attention to ethics. (shrink)

Existing institutions do not seem well-designed to address paradigmatically global, intergenerational and ecological problems, such as climate change. 1 In particular, they tend to crowd out intergenerational concern, and thereby facilitate a “tyranny of the contemporary” in which successive generations exploit the future to their own advantage in morally indefensible ways (albeit perhaps unintentionally). Overcoming such a tyranny will require both accepting responsibility for the future and meeting the institutional gap. I propose that we approach the first in terms of (...) a traditional “delegated responsibility” model of the transmission of individual responsibility to collectives, and the second with a call for a global constitutional convention focused on future generations. In this paper, I develop the delegated responsibility model by suggesting how it leads us to understand both past failures and prospective responsibility. I then briefly defend the call for a global constitutional convention. (shrink)

Two questions are central to the ethics of geoengineering. The justificatory question asks ‘Under what future conditions might geoengineering become justified?’, where the conditions to be considered include, for example, the threat to be confronted, the background circumstances, the governance mechanisms, individual protections, compensation provisions, and so on. The contextual question asks ‘What is the ethical context of the push toward geoengineering, and what are its implications?’ Unfortunately, early discussions of geoengineering often marginalize both questions because they tend to focus (...) on arguments from emergency that illegitimately brush them aside. One sign of this is that some emergency arguments are ethically short-sighted, and morally schizophrenic. In this paper, I illustrate this problem by appeal to two abstract examples. Although both are extreme and idealized, even the imperfect analogies provide reasons for concern about our current predicament. Ethically serious discussion of geoengineering should confront such worries, rather than hide behind overly simplistic appeals to moral emergency. As Michael Stocker puts it in his seminal discussion of moral schizophrenia, “to refuse to do so bespeaks a malady of the spirit.” . (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Many of humanity's most serious problems are global, intergenerational, and ecological, yet current institutions are poorly placed to confront such problems. In part, this institutional challenge reflects difficulties with our basic concepts and theories. Bioethics is a central area where such questions arise. Although some have argued for an environmentalized bioethics since its inception, biomedicine has thus far failed to embrace the challenge, and some accuse most bioethicists of being "asleep at the wheel" (Schenck and Churchill 2021). This paper discusses (...) the basic ethical challenge, offers the "perfect moral storm" analysis, and explores one promising new concept for bioethics, planetary health, in light of that analysis. Drawing on the foundational report of the Rockefeller Foundation–Lancet Commission (Whitmee et al. 2015) and using climate change as the example, the author argues that planetary health has significant strengths but also some weaknesses, and that identifying both is helpful in charting a path forward for environmentalized bioethics. (shrink)

A cutting-edge introduction to environmental ethics in a time of dramatic global environmental change, this collection contains forty-five newly commissioned articles, with contributions from well-established experts and emerging voices in the field.

Recently, I have been arguing for a global constitutional convention focused on protecting future generations. This deliberative body would be akin to the American constitutional convention of 1787, which gave rise to the present structure of government in the United States. It would confront the “governance gap” that currently exists surrounding concern for future generations. In particular, contemporary institutions tend to crowd out intergenerational concern, and thereby facilitate a “tyranny of the contemporary.” They not only fail to address a basic (...) standing threat to humanity and other species, but help that threat become manifest. Climate change is a prime example. In this paper, I sketch out a natural argumentative path toward the global constitutional convention and argue that is difficult to resist. I also insist that we should be evenhanded in the way we treat the proposal. Those who put their faith in alternatives must also confront standard complaints about naivety, urgency, threats to democratic values, and the like. Moreover, the global constitutional convention has the advantage of addressing the problem we face head on. (shrink)

This makes study of it paradoxical. On the one hand, there are grounds for saying that contemporary work is, if not quite in its theoretical infancy, ...

Ethics is highly relevant to grand technological interventions into basic planetary systems on a global scale (roughly, “geoengineering”). Focusing on climate engineering, this chapter identifies a large number of salient concerns (e.g., welfare, rights, justice, political legitimacy) but argues that early policy framings (e.g., emergency, global public good) often marginalize these and so avoid important questions of justification. It also suggests that, since it is widely held that geoengineering has become a serious option mainly because of political inertia, there are (...) important contextual issues, especially around the paradoxical question, “What should we do, ethically speaking, given that we have not done, and will continue not to do, what we should be doing?” Taking such issues seriously helps to explain why some regard geoengineering as ethically troubling and highlights the largely neglected threat of interventions that discriminate against future generations (“parochial geoengineering”). We should take seriously the risk that, far from being simply a welcome new tool for climate action, geoengineering may become yet another manifestation of the underlying problem. (shrink)

Traditional concern for the gradual, incremental effects of climate change remains; but now greater attention is being paid to the possibility of breaching major thresholds in the climate system with catastrophic consequences. It might be thought that the potential for abrupt climate change (a) undermines the usual (economic, psychological, and intergenerational) analyses of the climate change problem, and (b) in doing so helps us to act. Against this, I argue both that much of the psychological and intergenerational analyses remains in (...) place, and that abrupt climate change may make action more difficult, perhaps even setting off an intergenerational arms race. (shrink)

Geoengineering is commonly defined as ‘the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change’. Technologies which...

A collection of seminal articles in climate ethics and climate justice.

Recently, I argued against framing geoengineering—understood here in terms of the paradigm example of stratospheric sulfate injection ('SSI')—as a global public good. My main claim was that this framing is seriously misleading because of its neglect of central ethical concerns. I also suggested that 'global public good' is best understood as an umbrella term covering a cluster of distinct, but interrelated ideas. In an effort to be charitable, I adopted an inclusive approach, considering two general attitudes to the technical definition, (...) six interpretations of the universal benefit claim, three of nonrivalness, and two of nonexcudability. I then argued that SSI as such does not fit the canonical definition, and that the more relaxed versions are unhelpful. Noticing that I agree that SSI is a global public good in one relaxed sense, David Morrow insists that this is the only acceptable interpretation, that describing SSI in this way is useful, and that it becomes misleading only when the concept is misunderstood by "non-economists", and that it is uncharitable to attribute such confusion to those presenting SSI as a global public good. I will suggest that Morrow's markedly exclusive approach is uncharitable, that his relaxed interpretation remains unhelpful, that there are good reasons to respect other uses, and most importantly that the definitional dispute is an unfortunate distraction that leaves my central point about the framing of SSI largely untouched. This discussion reinforces my suggestion that it is time to excise the term 'global public good' from the framing of SSI, and perhaps more generally. (shrink)

According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle’s ethics, and ancient virtue ethics more generally, is fundamentally grounded in self-interest, and so in some sense egoistic. Most contemporary ethical theorists regard egoism as morally repellent, and so dismiss Aristotle’s approach. But recent traditional interpreters have argued that Aristotle’s egoism is not vulnerable to this criticism. Indeed, they claim that Aristotle’s egoism actually accommodates morality. For, they say, Aristotle’s view is that an agent’s best interests are partially constituted by acting morally, so that (...) the virtuous person sees morality as essential to her happiness. (Call this, ‘the Constitutive Thesis’.) In this paper, I argue that the constitutive thesis is unpersuasive, both from a theoretical standpoint and (for similar reasons) as an interpretation of Aristotle. It is unpersuasive because it is much more demanding in both respects than several nonegoist alternatives. My argument builds on an objection originally offered by John McDowell. McDowell claimed (1) that the Constitutive Thesis requires that there are independent standards of self-interest that can be agreed upon in advance by all parties to the dispute, both virtuous and nonvirtuous; and (2) that there are no such standards. I argue that McDowell is mistaken. The orthodox position requires much less than McDowell claims if it makes an appeal to the distinctiveness of the virtuous person’s point of view. However, unfortunately for traditionalists, the price of this point of view defence is high. First, to be even remotely plausible, the revised orthodox view must be almost frighteningly complex. Second, once this complexity is exposed, the orthodox view is much less plausible than its major rivals, in particular those which appeal directly to moral reasons. (shrink)

A brief critique of President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement.

Environmental Research Web, April 18, 2007.

Stephen Gardiner gets to grips with the Kyoto agreement on climate change — and asks whether our lack of commitment to seriously reducing emissions is down to the fact that the bad consequences of not reducing emissions won't affect us.

Climate change has been called “the biggest global health threat of the 21st century.” This chapter outlines some central ethical dimensions of the challenge. It begins by reviewing a few of the major health impacts expected from climate change. It then summarizes some key issues surrounding the ethical importance of health, and of injustices connected to global health inequalities. Finally, the chapter explores a recent concept – planetary health – that aims to environmentalize public health in order to confront climate (...) change more successfully. The basic conclusion is that issues of ethics and justice are central to the public health challenge moving forward. One aspect of this challenge is the need for a more philosophically robust account of the ethics of public health in general, perhaps pursued through a deeper exploration and development of the concept of planetary health. (shrink)

One prominent feature of contemporary virtue ethics is its insistence on the normative priority of the virtuous person. Another is its scepticism about the place of rules or principles in moral decision-making. But the Stoics seem paradoxical on this score. On the one hand, they are great proponents of the authority and privileged position of the sage; on the other, they see moral life as structured by an elaborate system of principles and rules. In this paper, I suggest a resolution (...) to this apparent paradox through an examination of Seneca's discussion of the place of rules in moral life. I also explain how this Stoic position avoids some of the problems normally attributed to virtue ethics because of its insistence on the normative priority of the virtuous person. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Environmental Midwifery and the Need for an Ethics of the Transition:A Quick Riff on the Future of Environmental EthicsStephen M. Gardiner (bio)It is worth remembering that in many ways environmental ethics is a very successful field. Over the course of only thirty or forty years, we have reached a point at which almost every significant philosophy program in the country offers a course in environmental ethics, there are (...) several established and well respected journals, and the subject is regarded as one of the core areas of "applied ethics." This is quite an achievement; and one that is easy to forget. (When I listen to the complaints of environmental colleagues in other disciplines, or of philosophers working in many areas of applied ethics, I am vividly reminded.)Still, there is a sense that the job is only half done. For one thing, although environmental ethics classes are ubiquitous, they are usually undergraduate survey courses taught by nonspecialists. For another, although good work appears in the specialist journals, it rarely makes it into the "mainstream" journals that most philosophers read. Finally, although environmental ethics counts as one of three or four core areas of applied ethics, environmental philosophers are rarely hired by (so-called) top departments (and if they are, it is often not because they are environmental philosophers, but because of the other things they do).Now, many questions arise about this situation. One of them, of course, is whether there is some kind of "glass ceiling" on environmental ethics, and if there is, what causes it? Another is whether the core problem [End Page 122] is that we're just not all that good at environmental ethics (yet)? These are reasonable worries (about which my own views would be rather sanguine). But I am more concerned about another issue, which one might call that of "interfacing".The claim that environmental ethics has some problems in interacting with philosophy more generally, with allied disciplines, and with the wider public has been widely discussed in recent years, especially in the emergence of what has come to be called "environmental pragmatism." There is something important about this debate, but my own sense is that it can become overblown. For example, when I teach my undergraduate survey course, mainly to nonphilosophers, they are, if anything, more excited about the Land Ethic, Biocentric Egalitarianism, and the worth of species than about climate change and sustainability. Still, there is something going on. However sympathetic they are to philosophy, I have the sense that my students (as well as my colleagues in other disciplines and the wider public) are dissatisfied. Having heard the critiques and the first set of grand visions, the new challenges and their problems, they want more. Irritatingly, they want to know what to do now—either how to turn grand visions into actions, or (more usually) how to successfully muddle through in the absence of a compelling grand vision. In short, they want an ethics for the transition.For what it is worth, my sense is that the main task of an ethics for the transition lies somewhere between grand theory and pragmatism. What people are hoping for is a way to transform serious environmental concern into social change. But they want this transformation to be responsive to, reflective of, and integrated with wider values. Sensing that modern life has significant vices, but also major virtues, they wish to see environmental ethics synthesize their concerns in new and creative ways. In short, like a Socratic midwife, they want environmental philosophy to help them to articulate the way forward.I'm sympathetic to the need for an ethics for the transition. I also think that taking on the task of articulating such an ethic may help the field to break through some of the institutional constraints now restricting it. But mainly it just seems to be a worthy topic in its own right. Environmental ethics should try to become an ethics for living now. In the nicest sense of the phrase, it should seek to "grow up."Stephen M. Gardiner Stephen M. Gardiner is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Program on Values in Society at the... (shrink)

Climate change and similar problems pose a profound ethical challenge to existing institutions and theories. A human rights approach can play a role in addressing this challenge through its articulation, development and defense of a basic but often neglected ethical intuition. However, early work tends to overplay the initial advantages of human rights as such, and underestimate the role played by specific conceptions of human rights that are more controversial and ambitious. Moreover, current human rights paradigms are not directed to (...) the central characteristics of the profound challenge. Given all this, a practical and theoretical reorientation is needed. This has implications for the evolving project of political philosophy on a global, intergenerational and ecological scale. (shrink)

We are in the early stages of a new “intergenerational turn” in political philosophy. This turn is largely motivated by the threat of global climate change, which makes vivid a serious governance gap surrounding concern for future generations. Unfortunately, there is a lack of fit between most proposed remedies and the nature of the underlying problem. Most notably, many seem to believe that only piecemeal, issue-specific, and predominantly national institutions are needed to fill the intergenerational governance gap. By contrast, I (...) argue that we should adopt a genuinely global approach that treats intergenerational questions as foundational, and advocates for new permanent institutions with ongoing responsibilities to act on intergenerational threats. In this essay, I summarize my diagnosis of the underlying problem—that we face a basic standing threat that I call the “tyranny of the contemporary”—and sketch my proposal for a global constitutional convention aiming at institutions with standing authority and a broad remit. I then develop some of these ideas further through responses to fellow advocates for reform who nevertheless consider my proposals to go too far. In particular, I reject a counterproposal made by Anja Karnein, who argues that reforms should address only threats whose negative impacts would cross a high threshold. I argue that this would leave future generations vulnerable to what I call “squandering generations”. Among other things, these intergenerational squanderers violate appropriate relationships between past, present, and future generations. Yet, in my view, a central task of defensible intergenerational institutions is to protect the future against such abuse. (shrink)

The structure of Aristotelian virtue ethics has been misunderstood. Conventional wisdom has it that Aristotle, as indeed all of the major philosophers of ancient Greece, believed that the virtues are reciprocally entailing (RV): a person can have one of the virtues of character if and only if she has them all. But this is false. Instead, Aristotle distinguishes between a set of basic and a set of nonbasic virtues, and claims that only the basic virtues are reciprocally entailing. Furthermore, he (...) believes that, given at least a moderate amount of external goods, the basic virtues are both necessary and sufficient for happiness. The nonbasic virtues are, then, separable from the basic virtues, and unnecessary for happiness, on Aristotle’s view. This insulates Aristotelian virtue ethics from the charge that it demands unreasonable knowledge and resources of agent aiming for happiness. (shrink)