This paper aims to establish three major theses: (1) Not only declarative sentences, but also interrogatives and imperatives, may be classified as true or as false. (2) Declarative, imperative, and interrogative utterances may also be classified as honest or as dishonest. (3) Whether an utterance is honest or dishonest is logically independent of whether it is true or is false. The establishment of the above theses follows upon the adoption of a principle for identifying what is meant by any sentence, (...) declarative, interrogative, or imperative. The analysis aims to show that meaning is to be attributed to the uttered or written sentence-token, rather to the thereby exhibited sentence-type. Further, the meaning of the sentential token is to be identified with a purpose of the speaker, that the speaker would reveal to the addressee by uttering the sentence. The to be revealed purpose is analysed into two components: an ultimate concern (that the addressee stand in such and such a relation--e.g., of believing, or informing the speaker about, or making it true that) and an ultimate topic of concern (the state of affairs, i.e., proposition, relative to which the speaker would have the addressee stand in the specified relation). Sentential utterances "signify" different purposes by "expressing" different ultimate concerns and "indicating" different ultimate topics of concern. Variations in expressed concern are correlated with variations in sentential form, such as declarative, interrogative and imperative. Variations in indicated topic of concern are correlated with variations in the subject and predicate of the uttered sentence. Thus, for example, utterances of "Johnny will jump in the lake," "Will Johnny jump in the lake?" and "Johnny, go jump in the lake!" all indicate one and the same ultimate topic of concern but express different ultimate concerns with this topic. A sentential utterance is true or false according as its indicated topic of concern is true or false. Hence, declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives may all be classified as true or as false. But honesty or dishonesty is a function (explained in the paper) of the expressed concern, rather than of the topic of concern. Hence, although utterances of all sentential forms are honest or dishonest, their honesty or dishonesty is logically independent of their truth or falsity. (shrink)

I am grateful to Professor Wheatley for his note, [3], on my analysis of interrogatives, [1]. His comments bring out very clearly a number of considerations that deserve our closest attention. For example, he shows that if we can classify interrogatives as true and false—as I proposed to do—then we can properly inquire about what sentences contradict them, and what sentences are contingently or logically equivalent to them. Furthermore, he shows that, on my analysis, no indirect question can contradict any (...) other indirect question and he accordingly, and correctly, looks for such contradictories among declarative sentences. Finally, he notes, [3], p. 54, that in my article, I have treated only inquisitive questions and have said nothing about deliberative or practical questions. While practical questions demand a different kind of treatment than that which Wheatley speculatively, albeit very tentatively, extrapolates for me, still these questions do form a kind of interrogative that did not get any attention in my article. (shrink)

This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two "presupposed theories": of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading. The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. `Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. `Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and (...) laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed. The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes `Rt(a,p,q)' as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q. The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so. The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus "meaning" of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering. (shrink)

The fifth volume of the Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce, entitled Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, contains papers dealing with two distinguishable, but interconnected doctrines: Pragmatism and Critical Common-sensism. The latter, antedating in its earliest expositions the first formulation of the pragmatic doctrine in 1877, 8, is however later conceived by Peirce as a consequence of pragmatism. The two doctrines will be advisedly treated here in isolation, and first pragmatism.

The fifth volume of the Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce, entitled Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, contains papers dealing with two distinguishable, but interconnected doctrines: Pragmatism and Critical Common-sensism. The latter, antedating in its earliest expositions the first formulation of the pragmatic doctrine in 1877, 8, is however later conceived by Peirce as a consequence of pragmatism. The two doctrines will be advisedly treated here in isolation, and first pragmatism.

Evidence-based medicine (EBM), by its ability to decrease irrational variations in health care, was expected to improve healthcare quality and outcomes. The utility of EBM principles evolved from individual clinical decision-making to wider foundational clinical practice guideline applications, cost containment measures, and clinical quality performance measures. At this evolutionary juncture one can ask the following questions. Given the time-limited exigencies of daily clinical practice, is it tenable for clinicians to follow guidelines? Whose or what interests are served by applying performance (...) assessments? Does such application improve medical care quality? What happens when the best interests of vested parties conflict? Mindful of the constellation of socially and clinically relevant variables influencing health outcomes, is it fair to apply evidence-based performance assessment tools to judge the merits of clinical decision-making? Finally, is it fair and just to incentivize clinicians in ways that might sway clinical judgment? To address these questions, we consider various clinical applications of performance assessment strategies, examining what performance measures purport to measure, how they are measured and whether such applications demonstrably improve quality. With attention to the merits and frailties associated with such applications, we devise and defend criteria that distinguish between justice-sustaining and justice-threatening performance-based clinical protocols. (shrink)

Examines Bergson’s work from the perspectives of critical philosophy of race and decolonial theory, placing it in conversation with theorists from Africa, the African Diaspora, and Latin America. Building upon recent interest in Henri Bergson’s social and political philosophy, this volume offers a series of fresh and novel perspectives on Bergson’s writings through the lenses of critical philosophy of race and decolonial theory. Contributors place Bergson’s work in conversation with theorists from Africa, the African Diaspora, and Latin America to examine (...) Bergson’s influence on literature, science studies, aesthetics, metaphysics, and social and political philosophy within these geopolitical contexts. The volume pays particular attention to both theoretical and practical forms of critical resistance work, including historical analyses of anti-racist, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist movements that have engaged with Bergson’s writings—for example, the Négritude movement, the Indigenismo movement, and the Peruvian Socialist Party. These historical and theoretical intersections provide a timely and innovative contribution to the existing scholarship on Bergson, and demonstrate the importance of his thought for contemporary social and political issues. Andrea J. Pitts is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte. Mark William Westmoreland is a doctoral candidate and instructor of ethics and philosophy at Villanova University. (shrink)

Rerum Novarum, the papal encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, has had a major impact on Catholic thinking. Issued in 1891 it immediately received much public attention. This was especially the case in the United States where it was seen as the response re-affirming the sanctity of private property long sought by the American bishops in the public debates with Henry George and his supporters. George was a central public figure in the United States, England and Ireland, whose speeches and (...) writings supported free market ideas, especially free trade. But, George's main idea was that the sole tax should be a singletax on land values.His justification seemed to place the sanctity of private property in doubt. Since some Catholics were strong supporters of George, the Catholic bishops were anxious that the Pope clearly state the morality of private property. Rather than condemn the writings of George directly, Leo XIII prefered to reaffirm the sanctity of private property in a positive form. The American origins of Rerum Novarum had not been appropriately recognized.Rerum Novarum, l’encyclique papale de Léon XIII, a eu un impact majeur sur la pensée catholique. Publiée en 1891 elle reçut immédiatement une très grande attention. Ce fut spécialement le cas aux Etats-Unis où elle fut prise comme une réponse réaffirmant le caractère sacré de la propriété privée longtemps recherchée par les évêques Américains dans leurs débats publics avec Henry George et ses partisans. George était un personnage public central aux Etats-Unis, en Angleterre et en Irlande, dont les discours et les écrits étaient en faveur des idées du libre marché et notamment celles qui concernent l’échange libre. Mais, l’idée majeure de George était que le seul impôt qui devait exister était celui sur la valeur des terrains.Sa justification semblait émettre des doutes à l’égard du caractère sacré de la propriété privée. Alors que quelques Catholiques étaient de forts partisans de George, les évêques catholiques tenaient beaucoup à ce que le Pape se positionne clairement sur la moralité de la propriété privée. Plutôt que de condamner directement les écrits de George, Léon XIII préféra réaffirmer le caractère sacré de la propriété privée de manière positive. Les origines américaines de Rerum Novarum n’ont pas été reconnues à leur juste valeur. (shrink)

This major study examines Thoreau's participation in the economic discourse of his time and place. It focuses on the cultural conditions in the time of Thoreau, his awareness of them, and his responses to them as a literary artist who identified his writing as his vocation.

Rerum Novarum, the papal encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, has had a major impact on Catholic thinking. Issued in 1891 it immediately received much public attention. This was especially the case in the United States where it was seen as the response re-affirming the sanctity of private property long sought by the American bishops in the public debates with Henry George and his supporters. George was a central public figure in the United States, England and Ireland, whose speeches and (...) writings supported free market ideas, especially free trade. But, George's main idea was that the sole tax should be a singletax on land values.His justification seemed to place the sanctity of private property in doubt. Since some Catholics were strong supporters of George, the Catholic bishops were anxious that the Pope clearly state the morality of private property. Rather than condemn the writings of George directly, Leo XIII prefered to reaffirm the sanctity of private property in a positive form. The American origins of Rerum Novarum had not been appropriately recognized.Rerum Novarum, l’encyclique papale de Léon XIII, a eu un impact majeur sur la pensée catholique. Publiée en 1891 elle reçut immédiatement une très grande attention. Ce fut spécialement le cas aux Etats-Unis où elle fut prise comme une réponse réaffirmant le caractère sacré de la propriété privée longtemps recherchée par les évêques Américains dans leurs débats publics avec Henry George et ses partisans. George était un personnage public central aux Etats-Unis, en Angleterre et en Irlande, dont les discours et les écrits étaient en faveur des idées du libre marché et notamment celles qui concernent l’échange libre. Mais, l’idée majeure de George était que le seul impôt qui devait exister était celui sur la valeur des terrains.Sa justification semblait émettre des doutes à l’égard du caractère sacré de la propriété privée. Alors que quelques Catholiques étaient de forts partisans de George, les évêques catholiques tenaient beaucoup à ce que le Pape se positionne clairement sur la moralité de la propriété privée. Plutôt que de condamner directement les écrits de George, Léon XIII préféra réaffirmer le caractère sacré de la propriété privée de manière positive. Les origines américaines de Rerum Novarum n’ont pas été reconnues à leur juste valeur. (shrink)

Moral reasoning is individual or collective practical reasoning about what, morally, one ought to do. Philosophical examination of moral reasoning faces both distinctive puzzles — about how we recognize moral considerations and cope with conflicts among them and about how they move us to act — and distinctive opportunities for gleaning insight about what we ought to do from how we reason about what we ought to do.

David Estlund’s Democratic Authority develops a novel doctrine of “normative consent,” according to which the nonconsent of those with a duty to consent is null. This article suggests that this doctrine can be defended by confining it to contexts involving consent to an authority, which raise distinctive normative challenges, but argues that Estlund’s attempt to deploy the doctrine fails, for it does not provide convincing reasons to think that citizens have any duty to consent. In closing, the article suggests that (...) the doctrine of normative consent might yet do some useful work in a quite different theoretical setting. (shrink)

Throughout this text, many of the research paradigms and methodologies across experimental analysis of behavior (EAB) and applied behavior analysis (ABA) are presented within the "bench-to-bedside" approach of translational research described by the National Institutes of Health. The first few chapters of the text introduce underlying core tenets of behaviorism as well as core characteristics and methods that define the field of behavior analysis. The next several chapters of the book introduce the reader to some of the foundational principles of (...) behavior analysis, with coverage from both the EAB and ABA perspectives. The final chapters of the book cover topics for which there has been ample basic, applied, and translational research conducted. The text concludes with a chapter on ethics, which includes content related to ethical issues in research, ethical issues in clinical practice, and the ethical use of nonhuman animals and special populations in research. (shrink)

I am going to be discussing a mode of moral responsibility that anglophone philosophers have largely neglected. It is a type of responsibility that looks to the future rather than the past. Because this forward-looking moral responsibility is relatively unfamiliar in the lexicon of analytic philosophy, many of my locutions will initially strike many readers as odd. As a matter of everyday speech, however, the notion of forward-looking moral responsibility is perfectly familiar. Today, for instance, I said I would be (...) responsible for watching my nieces while they swam. Neglecting this responsibility would have been a moral fault. When people marry, they undertake responsibilities, of moral import, of fidelity and mutual support. When people have children, they accrue moral responsibilities to feed, rear, and educate them. Not all forward-looking responsibilities are moral. While finishing this essay, I have had to keep an eye on a number of my administrative responsibilities, and, while reading it, you may well be occasionally distracted by some of your own. The notion of a responsibility that we accrue or take on, to look out for some range of concerns over some range of the future, is, then, perfectly familiar. Because this common notion of forward-looking responsibility has not been integrated into recent moral theory, however, my philosophical discussion of it will initially seem strange. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Introduction Henry Somers-Hall; 1. Deleuze and the history of philosophy Daniel W. Smith; 2. Difference and repetition James Williams; 3. The Deleuzian reversal of Platonism Miguel Beistegui; 4. Deleuze and Kant Beth Lord; 5. Phenomenology and metaphysics, and chaos: on the fragility of the event in Deleuze Leonard Lawlor; 6. Deleuze and structuralism François Dosse; 7. Deleuze and Guattari: Guattareuze and Co. Gary Genosko; 8. Nomadic ethics Rosi Braidotti; 9. Deleuze's political philosophy Paul Patton; (...) 10. Deleuze, mathematics, and realist ontology Manuel Delanda; 11. Deleuze and life John Protevi; 12. Gilles Deleuze's aesthetics of sensation Dorothea Olkowski; 13. Deleuze and literature Ronald Bogue; 14. Deleuze and psychoanalysis Eugene Holland; 15. Deleuze's philosophical heritage: unity, difference, and onto-theology Henry Somers-Hall. (shrink)

Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work (...) of several contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

Researchers do not owe their subjects the same level of care that physicians owe patients, but they owe more than merely what the research protocol stipulates. In keeping with the dynamics of the relationship between researcher and subject, they have limited but substantive fiduciary obligations.

The philosopher Henry Richardson's short book is a defense of a position on a neglected topic in medical research ethics. Clinical research ethics has been a longstanding area of study, dating back to the aftermath of the Nazi death-camp doctors and the Tuskegee syphilis study. Most ethical regulations and institutions have developed in response to those past abuses, including the stress on obtaining informed consent from the subject. Richardson points out that that these ethical regulations do not address one (...) of the key dilemmas faced by medical researchers -- whether or not they have obligations towards subjects who need care not directly related to the purpose of the study, termed 'ancillary care obligation'. (shrink)

Henry S. Richardson is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. From 2008-18, he was the editor of Ethics. His previous books include Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Democratic Autonomy, and Moral Entanglements. He has held fellowships sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.

Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work (...) of several contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

The notion that it is useful to specify norms progressively in order to resolve doubts about what to do, which I developed initially in a 1990 article, has been only partly assimilated by the bioethics literature. The thought is not just that it is helpful to work with relatively specific norms. It is more than that: specification can replace deductive subsumption and balancing. Here I argue against two versions of reliance on balancing that are prominent in recent bioethical discussions. Without (...) meaning to address the substance or the overall merits of either view I criticize, I attack Gert, Culver and Clouser's implicit reliance on some overall dimension of balancing as a basis of resolving conflicts among norms and Beauchamp and Childress's residual acceptance of 'justified balancing'. The former authors' description of resolving conflicts depends upon a type of value commensurability that (as they otherwise seem to admit) does not obtain, while the latter authors' role for justified balancing would be better served by continued specification. (shrink)