Gert Scobel zeigt in seinem kenntnisreichen Buch, dass uns heute kaum etwas so sehr fehlt wie Weisheit: Im Umgang mit der Welt, mit anderen und uns selbst. Denn in unserer immer komplexer werdenden Umwelt, die uns mit Widersprüchen ebenso konfrontiert wie mit immer mehr Faktenwissen, brauchen wir Orientierung. Doch die fehlt. Und Weisheit stellt sich auch im Alter nicht von selbst ein. Gert Scobel belegt fundiert, dass man sie erlernen kann - und sollte. Dabei speist sich (...) die Gelassenheit, von der der Autor spricht, nicht aus esoterischen Höhenflügen, die oft mit einer unsanften Bauchlandung enden. Vielmehr ist sie inspiriert von den Lehren des Buddhismus, die Scobel überraschend mit der westlichen Geistesgeschichte versöhnt. Er verfolgt die Weisheit bis zu ihren Ursprüngen, ins Mittelalter und in den fernen Osten. Das Buch bringt uns aber auch die neusten Erkenntnisse zur Weisheit aus Psychologie, Neurowissenschaften, Biologie, Glücks- und Komplexitätsforschung nahe. Entstanden ist die faszinierende und anschaulich erzählte Geschichte einer Geisteshaltung, die sich nicht nur unterhaltsam und spannend liest, sondern auch mit großem persönlichem Gewinn. Denn Weisheit ist die Grundvoraussetzung für ein sinnvolles und geglücktes Leben. (shrink)

Prologue: on the weakness of education -- Creativity -- Communication -- Teaching -- Learning -- Emancipation -- Democracy -- Virtuosity -- Epilogue: for a pedagogy of the event -- Appendix: coming into the world, uniqueness, and the beautiful risk of education: an interview with Gert Biesta by Philip Winter.

Considered by many to be Abraham Robinson's magnum opus, this book offers an explanation of the development and applications of non-standard analysis by the mathematician who founded the subject. Non-standard analysis grew out of Robinson's attempt to resolve the contradictions posed by infinitesimals within calculus. He introduced this new subject in a seminar at Princeton in 1960, and it remains as controversial today as it was then. This paperback reprint of the 1974 revised edition is indispensable reading for anyone interested (...) in non-standard analysis. It treats in rich detail many areas of application, including topology, functions of a real variable, functions of a complex variable, and normed linear spaces, together with problems of boundary layer flow of viscous fluids and rederivations of Saint-Venant's hypothesis concerning the distribution of stresses in an elastic body. (shrink)

The second volume in Joel Feinberg's series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Offense to Others focuses on the "offense principle," which maintains that preventing shock, disgust, or revulsion is always a morally relevant reason for legal prohibitions. Feinberg clarifies the concept of an "offended mental state" and further contrasts the concept of offense with harm. He also considers the law of nuisance as a model for statutes creating "morals offenses," showing its inadequacy as a model for understanding "profound (...) offenses," and discusses such issues as obscene words and social policy, pornography and the Constitution, and the differences between minor and profound offenses. (shrink)

This edited collection focuses on the contextual presence of theory, the practices of doing theory, and refractions on and agendas for theory respectively. The contributors to the first volume from around the world reflect a range of perspectives and positions in the debate about the purpose and value of educational theory.

A reprint of the 1972 Doubleday edition. Contains the most helpful version of Hobbes's political and moral philosophy available in English. Includes the only English translation of De Homine, chapters X-XV. Features the English translation of De Cive attributed to Hobbes.

In this essay, Gert Biesta provides a critical analysis of the idea of evidence‐based practice and the ways in which it has been promoted and implemented in the field of education, focusing on the tension between scientific and democratic control over educational practice and research. Biesta examines three key assumptions of evidence‐based education: first, the extent to which educational practice can be compared to the practice of medicine, the field in which evidence‐based practice was first developed; second, the role (...) of knowledge in professional actions, with special attention to what kind of epistemology is appropriate for professional practices that wish to be informed by the outcomes of research; and third, the expectations about the practical role of research implicit in the idea of evidence‐based education. Biesta concludes that evidence‐based practice provides a framework for understanding the role of research in educational practice that not only restricts the scope of decision making to questions about effectivity and effectiveness, but that also restricts the opportunities for participation in educational decision making. He argues that we must expand our views about the interrelations among research, policy, and practice to keep in view education as a thoroughly moral and political practice that requires continuous democratic contestation and deliberation. (shrink)

The question “Why be moral?” is open to at least three extremely different interpretations. One way to distinguish these interpretations is by picturing the question as being asked by, respectively, Allan, who is going to act immorally unless he can be convinced to act otherwise, Beth, who is perfectly happy to do what is morally required on a certain occasion but who wants to know what is it about the act that makes it morally required, and Charles, who is trying (...) to understand why rational people act morally. An answer to the question as understood by Allan is, for some, the holy grail of moral philosophy, and it is also perhaps the default understanding of the question. The question as asked by Beth is what David Copp, in his contribution to this volume, calls the “why-think-morality-requires-this” question. The question as asked by Charles can be called the “what-rationally-justifies-moral-behaviour” question. Charles’ question, importantly, is about rationalpermissibility,and it is most pointed when moral behaviour requires sacrifice. (shrink)

Im 19. Jahrhundert vollzog die Philosophie eine signifikante Kehrtwende, kam es doch zu einem Bruch mit der vorherrschenden Orientierung an metaphysischen Welterklärungsmustern. Jenes Denken, welches später als Existenzphilosophie bezeichnet werden sollte, stellte fortan den Menschen und seine situativen Bedingungen in den Mittelpunkt. Es war die Feststellung leitend, dass die vertraute Welt- und Lebensordnung fragil geworden war. In dieser Formulierung klingt an, was zu einem wesentlichen Erkennungsmerkmal existentiellen Denkens wurde, denn aus der Tatsache des Existierens resultiert Scheitern. Nach Jaspers ist das (...) Scheitern manifester Ausdruck der existentiellen Grundsituation des Menschen. Darin aber eröffnet sich die Chance zur Existenzerhellung, die sich bildend vollzieht. (shrink)

I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various elements of the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorders, I show that even though not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions, not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and not all mental disorders lead to irrational actions, there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality and mental disorders because both involve (...) suffering or an increased risk of suffering an evil or harm, independent of the circumstances one is in. (shrink)

How have different civilizations throughout different epochs mastered fundamental challenges of life? The series analyses the basic questions of cultural anthropology. All epochs and the most significant civilizations worldwide, as well as different epistemological aspects including historical sciences, sociology, ethnology, art, literature and philosophy are brought together.

The use of philosophy in educational programmes and practices under such names as philosophy for children, philosophy with children, or the community of philosophical enquiry, has become well established in many countries around the world. The main attraction of the educational use of philosophy seems to lie in the claim that it can help children and young people to develop skills for thinking critically, reflectively and reasonably. By locating the acquisition of such skills within communities of enquiry, the further claim (...) is that engagement with philosophy can foster the development of moral reflection and sensitivity and of social and democratic skills more generally. Claims like these provide a set of arguments for the inclusion of philosophy in the school curriculum that goes well beyond philosophy as just another curricular subject or body of knowledge. The aim of this article is to raise some questions about the conception of education that appears to inform the discussion about the educational use of philosophy. My ambition is to suggest an additional rather than an alternative view about the educational use of philosophy in the hope that this may act as a reminder of a different way in which one can engage with philosophy in educational settings which, in turn, might also act as a reminder of how philosophy might engage with us. The philosophical distinction in which my argument is phrased is that between humanism and post-humanism and the guiding educational concept is that of exposure. (shrink)

In den sozialwissenschaftlichen und sozialtheoretischen Diskussionen ruckt nach einer langeren Interimszeit wieder zunehmend die Frage nach den Konstitutionsbedingungen des Sozialen, von Sozialitat bzw. sozialen Gebilden in den Vordergrund.

Studies of the association between wealth and fertility in industrial populations have a rich history in the evolutionary literature, and they have been used to argue both for and against a behavioral ecological approach to explaining human variability. We consider that there are strong arguments in favor of measuring fertility (and proxies thereof) in industrial populations, not least because of the wide availability of large-scale secondary databases. Such data sources bring challenges as well as advantages, however. The purpose of this (...) article is to illustrate these by examining the association between wealth and reproductive success in the United States, using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979. We conduct a broad-based exploratory analysis of the relationship between wealth and fertility, employing both cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches, and multiple measures of both wealth (income and net worth) and fertility (lifetime reproductive success and transitions to first, second and third births). We highlight the kinds of decisions that have to be made regarding sample selection, along with the selection and construction of explanatory variables and control measures. Based on our analyses, we find a positive effect of both income and net worth on fertility for men, which is more pronounced for white men and for transitions to first and second births. Income tends to have a negative effect on fertility for women, while net worth is more likely to positively predict fertility. Different reproductive strategies among different groups within the same population highlight the complexity of the reproductive ecology of industrial societies. These results differ in a number of respects from other analyses using the same database. We suggest this reflects the impossibility of producing a definitive analysis, rather than a failure to identify the “correct” analytical strategy. Finally, we discuss how these findings inform us about (mal)adaptive decision-making. (shrink)

A closer look at the lived illness experiences of medical professionals themselves shows that shared decision making is in need of a logic of care. This paper underlines that medical decision making inevitably takes place in a messy and uncertain context in which sharing responsibilities may impose a considerable burden on patients. A better understanding of patients’ lived experiences enables healthcare professionals to attune to what individual patients deem important in their lives. This will contribute to making medical decisions in (...) a good and caring manner, taking into account the lived experience of being ill. (shrink)

Is fertility relevant to evolutionary analyses conducted in modern industrial societies? This question has been the subject of a highly contentious debate, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to this day. Researchers in both evolutionary and social sciences have argued that the measurement of fitness-related traits (e.g., fertility) offers little insight into evolutionary processes, on the grounds that modern industrial environments differ so greatly from those of our ancestral past that our behavior can no longer be expected to be (...) adaptive. In contrast, we argue that fertility measurements in industrial society are essential for a complete evolutionary analysis: in particular, such data can provide evidence for any putative adaptive mismatch between ancestral environments and those of the present day, and they can provide insight into the selection pressures currently operating on contemporary populations. Having made this positive case, we then go on to discuss some challenges of fertility-related analyses among industrialized populations, particularly those that involve large-scale databases. These include “researcher degrees of freedom” (i.e., the choices made about which variables to analyze and how) and the different biases that may exist in such data. Despite these concerns, large datasets from multiple populations represent an excellent opportunity to test evolutionary hypotheses in great detail, enriching the evolutionary understanding of human behavior. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Don Ihde’s ‘postphenomenology’ may constitute a proper access to the question concerning sustainable technology and I do so in three steps. First, I lay bare how a modern framework that systematically separates facts and instruments from values, choices and responsibilities yields no space for engaged decisions and responsible action towards more sustainable societies. In a second step, I elaborate how postphenomenology’s ‘in-between’ perspective opens up the possibility of questioning science and technology as an inherent (...) part of our human existence. Building on this, I argue how a ‘normativity of the in-between’ may be developed around the concept of ‘topical measure’ and which is grounded in the foundationless foundation of postphenomenology’s relational ontology. In a last step, I show how such a ‘topical measure’ opens up two fields of normative action vis-à-vis the question concerning sustainable technology: one critical, the other empowering. Whereas ‘topical criticism’ focuses on bringing into the open the powerful subpolitics of science and technology, the field of ‘topical responsibility’ rather aims at actively assuming responsibility in these political circles. Besides its main interest, which lies in forging a genuine and adequate way into the issue of sustainability, this paper also constitutes an entry into Ihde’s philosophical oeuvre. The question concerning sustainable technology does not only touch upon Ihde’s relational trinity human-technology-world, it also deals with the degree of normative inquiry present in Ihde’s philosophy, an issue he has been repeatedly questioned about by his interlocutors. (shrink)

Proper procedures for informed consent are widely recognized as an ethical requirement for biomedical research involving human beings, in particular as a means to respect the autonomy and personal integrity of potential and actual research participants.

Gert Biesta; How General Can Bildung Be? Reflections on the Future of a Modern Educational Ideal, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 36, Issue 3, 16 Dec.

In this paper, I elaborate on the very political dimension of epistemology that is opened up by the radical change of focus initiated by constructivism: from science as knowledge to science as practice. In a first step, this brings me to claim that science is political in its own right, thereby drawing on Mouffe and Laclau’s framework of radical democracy and its central notion of antagonism to make explicit what is meant by ‘the political.’ Secondly, I begin to explore what (...) this intrinsic political dimension of science might entail for democratic thought. I do so by connecting my preliminary explorations in the field of science with Andrew Feenberg’s elaborate frame of thought on the democratization of technology. Interestingly, Feenberg is one of the few thinkers who have connected questions of power and ideology, typically treated of within the field of political theory, with a constructivist approach to technological progress. In this sense, this paper can be seen as a first attempt to expand Feenberg’s framework of democratic rationalization from the world of technology to the world of science. (shrink)

Good nursing is more than exercising a specific set of skills. It involves the personal identity of the nurse. The aim of this article is to answer two questions: (1) what kind of person should the hospice nurse be? and (2) how should the hospice nurse engage in caring conversations? To answer these questions we analyse a nurse’s story that is intended to be a profile of an exemplary hospice nurse. This story was constructed from an analysis of five semistructured (...) interviews with hospice nurses, based on the ‘ethics of the caring conversation’, which is inspired by the ethical perspective of Paul Ricoeur. The research questions concentrate on the norms of respect, responsibility and reciprocity, which are integral parts of the ‘ethics of the caring conversation’. (shrink)