Bourdieu suggested that the habitus contains the ‘genetic information’ which both allows and disposes successive generations to reproduce the world they inherit from their parents’ generation. While his writings on habitus are concerned with embodied dispositions, biological processes are not a feature of the practical reason of habitus. Recent critiques of the separate worlds of biology and culture, and the rise in epigenetics, provide new opportunities for expanding theoretical concepts like habitus. Using obesity science as a case study we attempt (...) to conceptualise the enfolding of biological and social processes (via a Deleuzian metaphor) to develop a concept of biohabitus – reconfiguring how social and biological environments interact across the life course, and may be transmitted and transformed intergenerationally. In conclusion we suggest that the enfolding and reproduction of social life that Bourdieu articulated as habitus is a useful theoretical frame that can be enhanced to critically develop epigenetic understandings of obesity, and vice versa. (shrink)

Dialectical materialism was born in 1857, when Marx returned to studying Hegel. In opposition to Hegel, Marx adopted a realist epistemology. Abandoning the pragmatist ambiguities of his Economic?Philosophical Manuscripts, he became a materialist in the traditional sense of that word. Influenced by Hegel, Marx simultaneously attempted a dialectical proof for the labor theory of value. Abandoning his positivist critique in The Holy Family, he started using dialectic to discover beneath appearances an otherwise inaccessible reality. But his dialectic was incompatible with (...) his materialism. The identification of reality with Praxis, rejected at the level of philosophical statement, was retained at the level of economic argument. Turning Hegel upside down proved harder than Marx thought. (shrink)

The challenge to Marxian theory presented by the current collapse of communist economies centers on the role of markets. _Marx versus Markets _points out that Marx defines communist economies—even in their lower stage of development—as classless economies without markets. It then examines his claims that classless economies with markets are in some sense inferior to communist economies. Two conclusions emerge from Stanley Moore's analysis. First, Marx's major arguments for abolishing commodity exchange rely on moral and philosophical premises, derived (...) from Feuerbach in the earlier writings and from Hegel in the later. Second, Marx's ideal of communist economy in incompatible with his materialistic approach to history. Marx's attack on markets flunked the test of theory one hundred years before it flunked the test of practice. (shrink)

Hobbes lays down three requirements for harmonizing self-Interest with morality: the principles of rule-Egoism, Equal treatment, And reasonable security. Though he attempts to base all three principles upon prudential considerations, In the first two cases he does not succeed. His laws of nature are moral - as distinct from merely prudential - rules, Because these two principles function in his argument as moral imperatives in disguise.

(1977). Justice and imagination. The necessity of Utopian thinking to a humane social order. World Futures: Vol. 15, Utopia and World Order, pp. 69-81.

Marx versus Markets points out that Marx defines communist economies--even in their lower stage of development--as classless economies without markets.

This study provides a comprehensive reinterpretation of the meaning of Locke's political thought. John Dunn restores Locke's ideas to their exact context, and so stresses the historical question of what Locke in the Two Treatises of Government was intending to claim. By adopting this approach, he reveals the predominantly theological character of all Locke's thinking about politics and provides a convincing analysis of the development of Locke's thought. In a polemical concluding section, John Dunn argues that liberal and Marxist interpretations (...) of Locke's politics have failed to grasp his meaning. Locke emerges as not merely a contributor to the development of English constitutional thought, or as a reflector of socio-economic change in seventeenth-century England, but as essentially a Calvinist natural theologian. (shrink)

Marx wrote two critiques of Hegel’s political philosophy, which are brought together here in English translations. In 1843 he laid aside, unfinished, a lengthy manuscript - known since its publication in 1927 as the Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts - containing a detailed criticism of §§ 261–313 of The Philosophy of Right. In 1844 he published a short article, “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung”, proclaiming the imminence of a proletarian revolution in Germany. His specific criticisms of Hegel’s political theory are (...) to be found, not in the article, but in the manuscript, which is presented here in its first complete English translation. (shrink)

When the utility of masks or vaccinations became politicized during the COVID-19 pandemic and lost its mooring in scientific evidence, an already-developing crisis of expertise was exacerbated. Those who believe in consensus science wondered: “How can ‘those people’ not see the truth?” With a foreword by Harry Collins, this book shows that the crisis is not a scientific controversy, but an ideological dispute with believers on both sides. If the advocates for consensus science acknowledge the uncertainties involved, rather than insisting (...) on cold, hard facts, it is possible to open a pathway towards interaction and communication, even persuasion, between world views. As the crisis of expertise continues to be a global issue, this will be an invaluable resource for readers concerned about polarized societies and the distrust of consensus science. (shrink)

This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...) I’m not certain that he is”, or “I know that Bush it a Republican, even though it isn’t certain that he is.” In “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”, I argue that fallibilism in epistemology does not countenance the truth of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. In this paper, I argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though I’m not certain that he is” and “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it’s not certain that he is” are unassertible. More specifically, I argue that these are simply instances of Moore’s Paradox, such as “Dogs bark, but I don’t know that they do.” The right account of Moore’s Paradox does not involve the falsehood of the semantic content of the relevant utterances, but rather their pragmatic unacceptability. So the anti-fallibilist intuitions turn out to have pragmatic, rather than semantic import, and therefore do not tell against the truth of fallibilism. Fallibilism in epistemology is often thought to be theoretically desirable, but intuitively problematic. My purpose with these two papers is to show that fallibilism is not intuitively problematic. (shrink)

Fictionalist approaches to ontology have been an accepted part of philosophical methodology for some time now. On a fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense. Although in reality, the problematic entities do not exist, according to the pretense we engage in when using the discourse, they do exist. In the vocabulary of Burgess and Rosen (1997, p. 6), a nominalist construal of a given discourse (...) is revolutionary just in case it involves a “reconstruction or revision” of the original discourse. Revolutionary approaches are therefore prescriptive. In contrast, a nominalist construal of a given discourse is hermeneutic just in case it is a nominalist construal of a discourse that is put forth as a hypothesis about how the discourse is in fact used; that is, hermeneutic approaches are descriptive. I will adopt Burgess and Rosen’s terminology to describe the two different spirits in which a fictionalist hypothesis in ontology might be advanced. Revolutionary fictionalism would involve admitting that while the problematic discourse does in fact involve literal reference to nonexistent entities, we ought to use the discourse in such a way that the reference is simply within the pretense. The hermeneutic fictionalist, in contrast, reads fictionalism into our actual use of the problematic discourse. According to her, normal use of the problematic discourse involves a pretense. According to the pretense, and only according to the pretense, there exist the objects to which the discourse would commit its users, were no pretense involved. My purpose in this paper is to argue that hermeneutic fictionalism is not a viable strategy in ontology. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I discuss in detail several problematic consequences of any interesting application of hermeneutic fictionalism. Of course, if there is good evidence that hermeneutic fictionalism is correct in some cases, then some of these drastic consequences would have to be accepted.. (shrink)

Résumé La localisation des implantations des grands éléments d’infrastructure collective pose des problèmes de légitimation juridique spécifique. Ils délimitent en effet plusieurs territoires distincts en fonction de la nature des impacts qu’ils provoquent, lesquels, chacun, sont soumis à leurs propres législations et rentrent dans les compétences d’autorités différentes, y compris celle dont dépend la décision sur l’infrastructure envisagée. De telles situations normatives complexes empêchent la sémantisation légitimante que le droit est censé assurer dans les décisions de l’appareil étatique: elle sera (...) toujours partielle, voire lacunaire. Les compensations ne peuvent être que procédurales, et celles-ci sont insuffisantes à atteindre l’idéal postulé par le principe de légalité des activités publiques. Mais il ne peut en aller autrement pour ces infrastructures. (shrink)

In this classic collection of wide-ranging and interdisciplinary essays, Stanley Cavell explores a remarkably broad range of philosophical issues from politics and ethics to the arts and philosophy. The essays explore issues as diverse as the opposing approaches of 'analytic' and 'Continental' philosophy, modernism, Wittgenstein, abstract expressionism and Schoenberg, Shakespeare on human needs, the difficulties of authorship, Kierkegaard and post-Enlightenment religion. Presented in a fresh twenty-first century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface, written by Stephen Mulhall, illuminating (...) its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is now available for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

In print for the first time in over ten years, Act and Crime provides a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it. The book defends the view that human actions are always volitionally caused bodily movements and nothing else. The theory is used to illuminate three major problems in the drafting and the interpretation of criminal codes: 1) what the voluntary act requirement both does and should require; 2) (...) what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require ; and 3) when two actions are 'the same' for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book both contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy, and it provides both legislators and judges a grounding in three of the most basic elements of criminal liability. (shrink)

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an (...) External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

My reply to the comments of Parkinson (2010) and Kuppens (2010) is organized in three parts. The first part deals with Parkinson’s claim that the scope of our research is limited because no real emotions were elicited. I suggest that the outcomes in our studies are structurally similar to real emotions but that they lack intensity. In the second part, I try to correct three potential misunderstandings regarding the nature of the comparison process that I proposed. In the third part, (...) I respond to Kuppens’ suggestion that we also need to consider the transition of appraisal values into the other components of emotion (actions tendencies, responses, and subjective experience). (shrink)

Literary and philosophical reflections combine with true-life farm anecdotes to offer commentary on seeking the good life in the modern age.

This book focuses on six key practices for engaged learning: acknowledging and building on students' prior knowledge and experiences; facilitating relationships; offering feedback; framing connections to broader contexts; fostering reflection and metacognition; and promoting integration and transfer of knowledge and skills.