This book features 20 essays that explore how Latin medieval philosophers and theologians from Anselm to Buridan conceived of habitus, as well as detailed studies of the use of the concept by Augustine and of the reception of the medieval doctrines of habitus in Suàrez and Descartes. Habitus are defined as stable dispositions to act or think in a certain way. This definition was passed down to the medieval thinkers from Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, Augustine, and played a (...) key role in many of the philosophical and theological developments of the time. Written by leading experts in medieval and modern philosophy, the book offers a historical overview that examines the topic in light of recent advances in medieval cognitive psychology and medieval moral theory. Coverage includes such topics as the metaphysics of the soul, the definition of virtue and vice, and the epistemology of self-knowledge. The book also contains an introduction that is the first attempt at a comprehensive survey of the nature and function of habitus in medieval thought. The material will appeal to a wide audience of historians of philosophy and contemporary philosophers. It is relevant as much to the historian of ancient philosophy who wants to track the historical reception of Aristotelian ideas as it is to historians of modern philosophy who would like to study the progressive disappearance of the term “habitus” in the early modern period and the concepts that were substituted for it. In addition, the volume will also be of interest to contemporary philosophers open to historical perspectives in order to renew current trends in cognitive psychology, virtue epistemology, and virtue ethics. (shrink)

Henry of Ghent, one of the most important theologians of the late 13th century, is well-known for, among other things, defending the unique thesis that theologians can rely on a specific kind of divine illumination to secure their theological knowledge: the lumen medium. His theory of faith, however, which also relies on a kind of divine illumination, has hardly been examined until now. It is, however, most interesting: indeed, within a system that allows for a special kind of theological knowledge (...) of the objects of faith, one is led to wonder what kind of relationship there can be between such a superior knowledge and obscure faith. Can an object of faith also be an object of proper theological knowledge? If it is the case, does theological knowledge build upon faith, as in traditional doctrines, or are they separate? And how can one know that they have been illuminated by God in such or such a way?In order to answer these questions, and others, we will first study the nature of faith and the correspondi.. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms or mechanisms to account for them. While Dennett’s latest work on cultural evolution does marvelously well (...) on the first point, it has only whet our appetite on the second. Accordingly, the present paper aims to show what an evolutionary explanation of culture that takes the variety of cultural evolution mechanisms seriously would look like. We will focus on the cultural evolution of social epistemic mechanisms and we will propose that Darwinian algorithms should be complemented with a cultural analogue of the error reduction mechanism proposed to account for human cognition, with a particular emphasis on the necessity to build independencies between different sub-systems in charge of tracking states of the world. To illustrate our point, we will present how the evolution of the legal system as epistemic systems can be understood as a process of building increasingly better independencies and how various criticisms of the actual legal system calls for building even more of them. (shrink)

Recent research has challenged our view of the Abrahamic religious traditions as unilaterally intolerant and incapable of recognizing otherness in all its diversity and richness; but a diachronic and comparative study of how these traditions deal with otherness is yet to appear. This volume aims to contribute to such a study by presenting different treatments of otherness in medieval and early modern thought. Part I: Altruism deals with attitudes and behaviors that benefit others, regardless of its motives. We deal with (...) the social rights and emotions as well as the moral obligations that the very existence of other human beings, whatever their characteristics, creates for a community. Part II: Religious recognition and toleration considers identity, toleration and mutual recognition created by the existence of religious or ethnic otherness in a given social, religious or political community. Part III: Evil deals with religious otherness that is considered evil and rejected such as heretics and malevolent, demonic entities. The volume will ultimately inform the reader on the nature of religious toleration (including beliefs and doctrines, even emotions) as well as of the self-definition of religious communities when encountering and defining otherness in different ways. (shrink)

Giles of Rome’s view of faith in the reportatio of his questions on book III of the Sentences is founded on a likening of faith to rhetoric. The firm intellectual assent that characterizes them both is caused by the will, motivated by emotion, or affective bias. This paper argues that this is made possible by Giles’ move away from Aquinas’ position on the assent produced by rhetorical discourse, which Aquinas thought to be of little certainty, while Giles affirms that, based (...) on the will’s natural control over the intellect, it can be as certain as faithful assent, and that the psychological process that produces it can serve as a model for that which produces faithful assent. The new function Giles gives to rhetoric underlines the evolution of thirteenth-century views on faith, as shown through a comparison of Giles’ view with two other doctrines of faith that use examples similar to the one Giles employs: those of Philip the Chancellor and Peter John Olivi. For the former, faith founded on affective bias is a typical example of non-virtuous faith, while for the latter, just as for Giles, it is the very model of virtuous faith. (shrink)

This chapter consists of a systematic introduction to the nature and function of habitus in Latin medieval philosophy. Over the course of this introduction, several topics are treated: the theoretical necessity to posit habitus; their nature; their causal contribution to the production of internal and external acts; how and why habitus can grow and decay; what makes their unity when they can have multiple objects and work in clusters. Finally, we examine two specific questions: why intellectual habitus represent a special (...) case that triggered considerable debate; how human beings can be said to be free if their actions are determined by moral habitus. (shrink)

This excellent book provides a novel analysis of medieval theories of faith, using as its conceptual basis the notion of doxastic voluntarism: the thought that belief is in some sense in our power to choose. This notion fits very neatly with medieval accounts, since, other than in cases in which the intellect's assent is compelled, the medieval philosophers all maintained that assent to a given proposition—paradigmatically the supernatural claims of Catholic Christianity, the principal interest of the earliest thinkers in (...) class='Hi'>Nicolas Faucher's account—was in some sense voluntary. Indeed, one thing that the book illustrates very nicely is the way in which problems that begin in the... (shrink)

In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.

Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of the (...) mind. But depending on the kind of modules that are considered, be they Chomskyan, Fodorian, Darwinian, or some other kind, the answer to this question might well be different. The twelve new essays in this volume address the question of whether emotions, or at least some of them, are, in some sense of the word, modules, and explore how this could potentially influence our understanding of emotional phenomena. (shrink)

The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in (...) neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people. (shrink)

Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that there are many different though related projects and tasks which need to be addressed if we are to attain a comprehensive understanding of reasoning.

At the end of a chapter in his book Race, Racism and Reparations, Angelo Corlett notes that “[t]here remain other queries about racism [than those he addressed in his chapter], which need philosophical exploration. … Perhaps most important, how might racism be unlearned?” (2003, 93). We agree with Corlett’s assessment of its importance, but find that philosophers have not been very keen to directly engage with the issue of how to best deal with, and ultimately do away with, racism. Rather, (...) they have tended to make cursory remarks about the issue at the end of papers devoted to defining “racism” or attempting to capture the essence of racism itself. In this article, we put the issue of how to best deal with racism front and center. We need not start from scratch, however. Despite not being central to many philosophical discussions about race, a number of different strategies for dealing with racism have been suggested. To that end, we have identified three of the most concrete proposals made by philosophers and social theorists, each of which seeks to mitigate racism by inducing psychological changes in individuals.2 For each, we formulate the.. (shrink)

There has been little serious work to integrate the constructionist approach and the cognitive approach in the domain of race, although many researchers have paid lip service to this project. We believe that any satisfactory account of human beings’ racialist cognition has to integrate both approaches. In this paper, we propose a step toward this integration. We present an evolutionary theory that rests on a distinction between various kinds of groups (kin-based groups, small-scale coalitions and ethnies). Following Gil-White (1999, 2001a, (...) b), we propose that ethnies have raised specific evolutionary challenges that were solved by a specific evolved cognitive system. We suggest that the concept of race is a by-product of that mechanism. To integrate the social constructionists’ and the cognitive theorists’ insights, we rely on the psychology that underlies Boyd and Richerson’s theory of cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985, forthcoming). (shrink)

Taste as Experience puts the pleasure of food at the center of human experience. It shows how the sense of taste informs our preferences for and relationship to nature, pushes us toward ethical practices of consumption, and impresses upon us the importance of aesthetics. Eating is often dismissed as a necessary aspect of survival, and our personal enjoyment of food is considered a quirk. Nicola Perullo sees food as the only portion of the world we take in on a daily (...) basis, constituting our first and most significant encounter with the earth. Perullo has long observed people's food practices and has listened to their food experiences. He draws on years of research to explain the complex meanings behind our food choices and the thinking that accompanies our gustatory actions. He also considers our indifference toward food as a force influencing us as much as engagement. For Perullo, taste is value and wisdom. It cannot be reduced to mere chemical or cultural factors but embodies the quality and quantity of our earthly experience. (shrink)

This book is the first extensive treatment of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. Nicolas de Warren uses detailed analysis of texts by Husserl, some only recently published in German, to examine Husserl's treatment of time-consciousness and its significance for his conception of subjectivity. He traces the development of Husserl's thinking on the problem of time from Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology, and situates it in the framework of his transcendental project as a whole. Particular discussions include the significance of time-consciousness for (...) other phenomenological themes: perceptual experience, the imagination, remembrance, self-consciousness, embodiment, and the consciousness of others. The result is an illuminating exploration of how and why Husserl considered the question of time-consciousness to be the most difficult, yet also the most central, of all the challenges facing his unique philosophical enterprise"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Le Laboratoire d’ANalyse Cognitive de l’Information (LANCI) effectue des recherches sur le traitement cognitif de l’information. La recherche fondamentale porte sur les multiples conceptions de l’information. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux modèles cognitifs de la classification et de la catégorisation, tant dans une perspective symbolique que connexionniste. La recherche appliquée explore les technologies informatiques qui manipulent l’information. Le territoire privilégié est celui du texte. La recherche est de nature interdisciplinaire. Elle en appelle à la philosophie, à l’informatique, à la linguistique (...) et à la psychologie. Volume 6, Numéro 2007-02 – Août 2007 Publication du Laboratoire d’ANalyse Cognitive de l’Information Directeurs : Luc Faucher, Jean-Guy Meunier, Serge Robert et Pierre Poirier Université du Québec à Montréal Document disponible en ligne à l’adresse suivante : www.lanci.uqam.ca Tirage : 5 exemplaires Aucune partie de cette publication ne peut être conservée dans un système de recherche documentaire, traduite ou reproduite sous quelque forme que ce soit - imprimé, procédé photomécanique, microfilm, microfiche ou tout autre moyen - sans la permission écrite de l’éditeur. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. / All rights reserved. No part of this publication covered by the copyrights hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means - graphic, electronic or mechanical - without the prior written permission of the publisher. Dépôt légal – Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada Dépôt légal – Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec.. (shrink)

Contemporary research on racial categorization is mostly encompassed by two research traditions—social constructionism and the cognitive-cum-evolutionary approach. Although both literatures have some plausible empirical evidence and some theoretical insights to contribute to a full understanding of racial categorization, there has been little contact between their proponents. In order to foster such contacts, we critically review both traditions, focusing particularly on the recent evolutionary/cognitive explanations of racial categorization. On the basis of this critical survey, we put forward a list of eleven (...) requirements that a satisfactory theory of racial categorization should satisfy. We conclude that despite some decisive progress, we are still far from having a complete theory of why humans classify people on the basis of skin color, body appearance or hair style. (shrink)

In the historical context of a crisis in biological psychiatry, psychedelic drugs paired with psychotherapy are globally re-emerging in research clinics as a potential transdiagnostic therapy for treating mood disorders, addictions, and other forms of psychological distress. The treatments are poised to soon shift from clinical trials to widespread service delivery in places like Australia, North America, and Europe, which has prompted ethical questions by social scientists and bioethicists. Taking a broader view, we argue that the ethics of psychedelic therapy (...) concerns not simply how psychotherapies are different when paired with psychedelic drugs, but how psychedelic therapies shape and are shaped by different values, norms, and metaphysical commitments. Drawing from the published literature and interviews with seven psychedelic therapists working in clinical trials in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia, this article opens the black box of the treatments to consider the values and informal debates currently animating the therapies. Considering questions of patient autonomy, mechanisms of therapeutic action, and which therapies are best suited to pair with psychedelic substances, we examine the ethics of psychedelic therapy as an emergent form of life. To bring this form of life out in fuller relief, we conclude by comparing and contrasting it with ayahuasca use in Amazonian shamanism. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that it can be fruitful for philosophers interested in the nature and moral significance of racism to pay more attention to psychology. We do this by showing that psychology provides new arguments against Garcia's views about the nature and moral significance of racism. We contend that some scientific studies of racial cognition undermine Garcia's moral and psychological monism about racism: Garcia disregards (1) the rich affective texture of racism and (2) the diversity of what makes (...) racial ills morally wrong. Key Words: racism • emotions • implicit bias • psychology • racial ills • pluralism. (shrink)

For decades, liberal democracy has been extolled as the best system of governance to have emerged out of the long experience of history. Today, such a confident assertion is far from self-evident. Democracy, in crisis across the West, must prove itself. This highly timely volume is both a conceptual and practical guide of impressive scope to the challenges of good governance as the world continues to undergo profound transformation in the coming decades.

Methexiology is not a particular theory, but rather a general philosophical orientation. Therefore, in Methexiology: Philosophical Theology and Theological Philosophy for the Deification of Humanity, Nicolas Laos elucidates the significance of methexiology for the study of ontology, epistemology, ethics, philosophical psychology, theory of justice, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. Laos argues that, faced with the modern and the postmodern crises of meaning, we need a new myth, a new spiritual formula, for the resacralization of humanity and the (...) cosmos, without restoring defunct totems, without using tales as "cheap" substitutes for the lack of a life-giving myth, and without negating history. In his Methexiology, Laos studies the "genealogy" of the modern and the postmodern crises of meaning, and, based on his new interpretation of classical Greek philosophy and Hesychasm, proposes methexiology as a way of overcoming the crises of meaning and as a way of resacralizing humanity and the cosmos through a new metaphysically grounded humanism. (shrink)

Philosophers have not been very preoccupied by the link between emotions and attention. The few that did (de Sousa, 1987) never really specified the relation between the two phenomena. Using empirical data from the study of the emotion of fear, we provide a description (and an explanation) of the links between emotion and attention. We also discuss the nature (empirical or conceptual) of these links.

Blaise Pascal est le penseur radical des limites et des contradictions de l'homme, ni ange ni bête. Contrairement à ce qu'en prétend l'orgueil de toute une modernité, la raison ne peut pas tout ; mais contrairement au désespoir du fanatisme, la raison n'est pas sans force. Jusqu'où alors peut-elle s'exercer? Pour Pascal, la philosophie ne saurait faire l'économie de la question de Dieu, Elle doit donc croiser la théologie. Mais comment vont se nouer l'ordre de l'esprit et celui de la (...) charité? Pascal produit ainsi une analyse critique de la philosophie comme telle, de ses capacités et de ses limites, que le présent ouvrage se donne pour tâche de clarifier. Que peut la philosophie? Mais qui décide de ce qu'elle peut, et surtout de ce qu'elle ne peut pas? Comment s'établissent alors ses rapports avec la théologie? Ce que Pascal nous invite ainsi à penser, c'est toujours à la fois la misère et la grandeur de la philosophie. (shrink)

Dans son dernier cours au Collège de France, Michel Foucault nous parle d'un oubli, plus fondamental à ses yeux que le fameux "oubli de l'être", ou plus précisément d'une négligence ; une négligence dont la philosophie est responsable, ce qui est d'autant plus paradoxal qu'il concerne précisément la vie philosophique. "Je voudrais, en tout cas, suggérer simplement que s'il est vrai que la question de l'être a bien été ce que la philosophie occidentale a oublié et dont l'oubli a rendu (...) possible la métaphysique, peut-être aussi la question de la vie philosophique n'a-t-elle pas cessé d'être, je ne dirais pas oubliée, mais négligée ; elle n'a pas cessé d'apparaître comme en trop par rapport à la philosophie, à la pratique philosophique, à un discours de plus en plus indexé au modèle scientifique" Cette négligence a une histoire. Car le problème de la vie philosophique a été posé dans toute sa radicalité dans l'Antiquité ; il n'était pas complètement oublié à l'époque moderne, comme en témoigne l'oeuvre de Spinoza ; mais à partir du moment "où la philosophie est devenue un métier de professeur, c'est-à-dire au début du XIXème siècle", elle a évacué du champ des problèmes pertinents, des problèmes "sérieux", cela même qui pourtant lui avait donné son horizon et sa raison d'être : la possibilité de définir une vie philosophique, c'est-à-dire une vie juste, une vie bonne, une "vraie vie". (shrink)

Die Utopien sind tot, es leben die Utopien. In diesem Buch wird die Utopie sozialer Gerechtigkeit entwickelt. INhaltlich besteht es in dem Dreischritt, (1) aus im Alltag von jedermann hin und wieder geauSSerten situativen Urteilen das gemeinsame Grundverstandnis von Gerechtigkeit zu destillieren, (2) anhand dieses Gelanders die bedeutendsten zeitgenossischen Theoretiker sozialer Gerechtigkeit akribisch zu lesen und in konstruktiver Absicht zu kritisieren, um (3) in ersten Ansatzen eine gerechtere Zukunftsgesellschaft zu skizzieren, deren quer zu tradierten Ideologien liegendes System sich ethischer Sozialismus (...) nennen lieSSe. (shrink)

This book advances a new interpretation of Hart's penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal and constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this (...) means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart's key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart's philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law. (shrink)

Die Suche nach historischen Quellen für die Leibniz’sche Philosophie scheint zunächst unerschöpflich. Durch alle in diesem Band versammelten Arbeiten wird der Einfluss der Philosophie des Aristoteles auf das Leibniz’sche Denken näher umrissen. Ein wesentliches Ziel ist es hierbei, einen Beitrag zur Analyse dieser philosophischen Beziehung zu leisten und zu zeigen, dass auch Aristoteles’ Philosophie nach Ansicht unserer Autoren entscheidend zum Verständnis des Leibniz’schen Denkens beiträgt. Die Texte befassen sich mit wesentlichen Themen der Leibniz’schen Logik und Metaphysik, z. B. mit den (...) Grundbegriffen „Monade“ (und deren „Körperhaftigkeit“), „Entelechie“, „Nous“, mit dem Problem der Individuation (Individuum, Atomismus, Einheit), mit den substanziellen Formen, mit der Wissenschaft im Allgemeinen und der Technik, mit der Transformation der Logik, mit den Prinzipien (nämlich denjenigen des zureichenden Grundes, der Individuation und der Notwendigkeit), mit Zukunft und Kontingenz sowie Vergänglichkeit, mit der Theorie der syllogistischen Folgerung, usw. Diese Themen werden stets in der Gegenüberstellung von Leibniz und Aristoteles behandelt – sie zeigen daher, wie Leibniz aristotelische Thesen übernahm, veränderte oder kritisierte. The search for the historical sources of Leibniz’s philosphy initially seems to be unending. All the essays in this volume outline more clearly the influence of Aristotle’s philosophy on Leibniz’s thought. In this context a fundamental aim is to contribute to the analysis of this philosophical relationship and to demonstrate that Aristotle’s philosophy, in the opinion of our authors, plays a decisive role in the understanding of Leibniz’s thought. The texts address fundamental themes of Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics, e.g. the basic concepts of ‘monads’ (and their ‘corporality’), ‘entelechy’ and ‘nous; the problem of individuation (individual, atomism, unity); substantial forms; knowledge in general, and technology; the transformation of logic; principles (namely those of sufficient grounds, of individuation and of necesssity); future and contingency and transientness; the theory of syllogistic deduction, etc. These themes are regularly considered in the comparison between Leibniz and Aristotle – they demonstrate how Leibniz took over, treated or criticised Aristotelian theses. (shrink)

1. L'oeuvre musicale et son écoute -- 2. Le monde-musique et son solfège -- 3. Le musicien et son intellectualité musicale -- 4. Les raisonances du monde-musique ; postlude d'Alain Badiou.

Trente et un penseurs, parmi lesquels Jacques Derrida, Françoise Héritier, Edgar Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Onfray ou encore Jacques Rancière, pour comprendre les errements et les raisons d'espérer d'une planète convulsée. Dix-neuf entretiens et débats avec les intellectuels les plus engagés dans la réflexion sur le temps présent dressent un état des lieux des questions qui taraudent notre modernité. Issu du Théâtre des idées, cycle de rencontres intellectuelles du Festival d'Avignon (2004-2012), ces dialogues singuliers s'attachent à faire vivre l'esprit critique, (...) cette faculté de juger, de soumettre la réalité sociale, artistique ou politique au tamis du jugement argumenté, qu'il soit sérieux ou ironique, virulent ou tempéré. De très actuelles "résistances intellectuelles" qui esquissent ce que pourrait être un service public des idées, c'est-à-dire un accès direct, libre et partagé à l'intellectualité. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, inappropriate appeal to authority (IAA). IAA has many different facets. At its core, it is a fallacy that assumes that because someone is an authority, we should listen to that person. The problem with IAA is that it ignores content in favor of credentials and power. There are a few different ways in which IAA can occur. IAA seems to be the result of a flaw in human thinking. (...) Social cognitive theory, a theory that helps explain human action, notes that humans tend to act like each other. The tendency to listen to authorities who are not authorities explains why celebrities are able to sell us stuff. The important thing to remember about IAA is that it is not just a fallacy that comes up in arguments that do not matter. (shrink)