Developments in contract law over the past century have led to the proliferation of interpretive theories according to which contract law is no longer a sui generisi legal branch. It is widely accepted that if there is a sui generis contractual obligation, it must somehow be based on the wills of the parties. But a new orthodoxy in contract theory claims that the role of the will of the parties in contract law has been progressively shrinking due to judicial doctrines (...) within the law of contract and also to general statutory provisions. It is no longer apparent that there is any interesting sense in which contractual liability is based on the will of the parties. Hence, so it is claimed, contract law has lost its sui generis nature. The article challenges this new orthodoxy. But rather than reverting to the old orthodoxy—the will theory of contracts (or its contemporary rendition, contract as promise)—it argues that we should resist being forced to choose between them. The article argues that the purpose of contractual liability is to support the practice of voluntary obligations. This view preserves an important connection between contractual liability and voluntary undertakings and meets the objections that beset the will theory. (shrink)

This article offers arefutation of the corrective justiceinterpretation of tort law – the view that itis essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary andsecondary tort duties and claims that tort lawis best understood as the union of its primaryand secondary duties. It then advances twoindependent criticisms of the correctivejustice interpretation. The article firstargues that primary tort duties have nothingfundamentally to do with corrective justice andthat, if one understands what is meant by``primary tort duties,'' one is (...) compelledto regard this fact as a decisive objection tothe corrective justice interpretation. Second,it argues that, whatever relation thereis between secondary tort duties and correctivejustice, that relation also holds betweencorrective justice and secondary duties ofother legal branches. In sum, the concept ofcorrective justice is neither capable ofunifying tort law nor of demarcating it fromother legal branches.The article also offers a general alternativeinterpretation of tort law. Rather thanbeing essentially corrective, tort law isessentially protective. Under this picture, iftort law has a most important point, it is theprotection of legal subjects and valuablesocial interests from harm. This is theoverarching ambition that unifies primary andsecondary tort duties. It does not, however,demarcate tort law from other legal branches. (shrink)

This volume, which comprises sixteen original contributions, is the first collection of philosophical papers on promises and agreements - topics enjoying a renaissance in social, moral, and legal philosophy.

Unrejectability is the property shared by things no one could reasonably reject. Following the lead of T. M. Scanlon, modern contractualists hold Principle Contractualism: An act is obligatory when conformity to unrejectable principles requires its performance. This article entertains Act Contractualism: An act is obligatory when its performance is unrejectable. The article hypothesizes that Principle Contractualism owes its initial plausibility to the assumption that following it somehow realizes unrejectability, if only indirectly. The article then argues that, whereas following Act Contractualism (...) realizes unrejectability, following Principle Contractualism realizes a convoluted, principle-mediated, non-causal conformity relation between acts and unrejectability. But then the notion that this relation is what matters ultimately in action does not seem to enjoy independent plausibility. After interrogating Scanlon's objection that the challenge to the principle-based nature of contractualism is , I conclude that Act Contractualism is the more fitting contractualist theory of obligation. (shrink)

This article offers a refutation of the corrective justice interpretation of tort law – the view that it is essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary and secondary tort duties and claims that tort law is best understood as the union of its primary and secondary duties. It then advances two independent criticisms of the corrective justice interpretation. The article first argues that primary tort duties have nothing fundamentally to do with corrective justice and that, (...) if one understands what is meant by ``primary tort duties,'' one is compelled to regard this fact as a decisive objection to the corrective justice interpretation. Second, it argues that, whatever relation there is between secondary tort duties and corrective justice, that relation also holds between corrective justice and secondary duties of other legal branches. In sum, the concept of corrective justice is neither capable of unifying tort law nor of demarcating it from other legal branches.The article also offers a general alternative interpretation of tort law. Rather than being essentially corrective, tort law is essentially protective. Under this picture, if tort law has a most important point, it is the protection of legal subjects and valuable social interests from harm. This is the overarching ambition that unifies primary and secondary tort duties. It does not, however, demarcate tort law from other legal branches. (shrink)

To promise someone to do something is to commit oneself to that person to do that thing, but what does that commitment consist of? Some think a promissory commitment is an obligation to do what’s promised, and that while promising practices facilitate the creation of promissory obligations, they are not essential to them. I favor the broadly Humean view in which, when it comes to promises (and so promissory obligations), practices are of the essence. I propose the Practice Reason Account (...) of promises, according to which a promise is basically to give oneself a self-interested practice reason to do what’s promised. One achieves this feat by invoking self-enforcing independent practice rules thanks to which one’s doing what’s promised preserves one’s promissory trust(worthiness) and promising power. However, nothing in this account supports the Hume-Rawls claim that promise-keeping or promise-breaking is right just when and because it conforms to practice rules that are justified by their good- or right-making properties. (shrink)

Justice, you might think, is the first virtue of the law. After all, we call our judges justices, the administration of law the administration of justice, and the government's legal department the Justice Department. We should reject this Priority of Justice for the Law in favor of the more moderate Priority of Justice for the Courts, the view that justice is the first virtue of the law courts. Under its comparative conception, justice is distinguishable by its concern with the relative (...) positions of subjects. I claim that legal duties divide into primary and secondary, that primary legal duties are not essentially comparative, and that this impugns the Priority of Comparative Justice for the Law. Still, the bipolar structure of litigation appears to suggest that comparative justice is the first virtue of the courts. I explain why that is not so. I then introduce a desert-based conception of justice I dub requitative justice. I argue that the Priority of Justice for the Law cannot draw succor from this conception of justice because primary legal duties are no more requitative than they are comparative. However, the special affinity between law courts and secondary legal duties suggests that requitative justice is the first virtue of the courts. Finally, I concede that the Priority of Justice for the Courts gives us reason to accept the Priority of Justice for the Law after all, if we accept the common Priority of Courts for the Law, the view that the courts are the first institution of the law. We should not do so, however. (shrink)

This article offers arefutation of the corrective justiceinterpretation of tort law – the view that itis essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary andsecondary tort duties and claims that tort lawis best understood as the union of its primaryand secondary duties. It then advances twoindependent criticisms of the correctivejustice interpretation. The article firstargues that primary tort duties have nothingfundamentally to do with corrective justice andthat, if one understands what is meant by``primary tort duties,'' one is (...) compelledto regard this fact as a decisive objection tothe corrective justice interpretation. Second,it argues that, whatever relation thereis between secondary tort duties and correctivejustice, that relation also holds betweencorrective justice and secondary duties ofother legal branches. In sum, the concept ofcorrective justice is neither capable ofunifying tort law nor of demarcating it fromother legal branches.The article also offers a general alternativeinterpretation of tort law. Rather thanbeing essentially corrective, tort law isessentially protective. Under this picture, iftort law has a most important point, it is theprotection of legal subjects and valuablesocial interests from harm. This is theoverarching ambition that unifies primary andsecondary tort duties. It does not, however,demarcate tort law from other legal branches. (shrink)

Reason and Value collects fifteen brand-new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics--including especially his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value--make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. The volume honors Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and will contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the (...) subject. (shrink)

Comment on Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility.

The aim of this paper is to familiarize the reader with the concept of psychological energy, and the role it plays in deepening our understanding of psychosocial adaptation to traumatic life events and, more pointedly, the onset of chronic illness and disability. In order to implement this aim, the following steps were undertaken: First, a brief historical review of the nature of energy, force and action, as traditionally conceived in the field of physics, is provided. Second, an overview of PE (...) is presented, with a shared emphasis on both its historical underpinnings and its present conceptualizations in the fields of social, health and rehabilitation psychology. Particular emphasis is placed upon applications of PE in the domains of adaptation to stress, trauma and CID onset. Third, reviewed are measuring instruments that have been traditionally applied to the assessment of the nature, content and magnitude of PE and its dynamics. Finally, new perspectives are offered on the dimensional structure, processes and dynamics, assumed to undergird PE, its underlying conceptual similarities to physical energy, and its potential and deeper link to the process of psychosocial adaptation in the aftermath of experiencing trauma and CID. (shrink)

In 1962, Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) was asked about the political implications of his ethics and the possible similarity between his philosophy and the writing of Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948). They both were aware of the considerable tensions between politics and ethics. Both tried to construct ethical politics, and both thought about the ethical aspects of politics. The differences were obvious. Gandhi was an Indian thinker who embraced Hinduism, Christian ethics, Western philosophy, and Leo Tolstoy’s spiritual writings. Levinas was a Western (...) philosopher with a traditional Jewish background, familiar with Russian literature. Gandhi was a social figure and political leader who based his attitude and activism on spirituality. Levinas was a phenomenological philosopher who based his perspective on ethics, underpinning his political philosophy. Nevertheless, this article suggests a philosophical study of Gandhi’s writings compared to Levinas’s teachings. This new perspective explains Gandhi’s philosophy by focusing on the establishment of the subject, the validity of ethics, the search for truth, and the epistemological stance. This study would structure Gandhi’s political position based on spiritual and ethical thinking. This could clarify three main principles of Gandhi’s doctrine: striving for the truth, self-control, and nonviolence. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article develops a theory of just contractual relationships for a liberal society. As a liberal theory, our account is premised on liberalism's canonical commitments to self-determination and substantive equality. As a theory of contract law, it focuses on the parties’ interpersonal interactions rather than on the justice of the social order as a whole.Normatively, the article claims that the rules governing cases where one party experiences harsh circumstances or vulnerability during the bargaining process or operates under significant informational disadvantage (...) must be guided by the commitment to relational justice, that is, to reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. Jurisprudentially, the article studies the systemic difficulties hindering the translation of these normative prescriptions into legal language and analyzes how they affect the form assumed by the law of precontractual justice and its institutional pedigree. (shrink)

This study presents a reconsideration of Levinas's concept of the feminine. This reconsideration is facilitated by a philosophically informed analysis of Levinas's Talmudic readings on that subject.The innovation of this research is in its methodology, which combines the two corpora of Levinas' writings as important components of an integrated system of thought. Two main phenomena are derived here from Levinas' Talmudic readings and raise main principles of his ethics. In the heart of the discussion on Eros we find a statement (...) of the differentiation between feminine and masculine in Levinas's thought, and its implication for gender and for the ethics of otherness. In the center of Levinas's terminology of maternity we uncover his phenomenology of pregnancy, and its ethical implication regarding responsibility to the other. The extreme responsibility committed to the other since there is a immanent conflict between parents and their child. (shrink)

We introduce a two-valued and a three-valued truth-valuational substitutional semantics for the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). We then prove that the 2-valid arguments are identical to the 3-valid ones with strict-to-tolerant validity. Next, we introduce a Lemmon-style Natural Deduction system and prove the completeness of Quarc on both two- and three-valued versions, adapting Lindenbaum’s Lemma to truth-valuational semantics. We proceed to investigate the relations of three-valued Quarc and the Predicate Calculus (PC). Adding a logical predicate T to Quarc, true of (...) all singular arguments, allows us to represent PC quantification in Quarc and translate PC into Quarc, preserving validity. Introducing a weak existential quantifier into PC allows us to translate Quarc into PC, also preserving validity. However, unlike the translated systems, neither extended system can have a sound and complete proof system with Cut, supporting the claim that these are basically different calculi. (shrink)

Descartes was the first to hold that, when we perceive, the representation need not resemble what it represents but should correspond to it. Descartes developed this ground-breaking, influential conception in his work on analytic geometry and then transferred it to his theory of perception. I trace the development of the idea in Descartes’ early mathematical works; his articulation of it in Rules for the Direction of the Mind; his first suggestions there to apply this kind of representation-by-correspondence in the scientific (...) inquiry of colours; and, finally, the transfer of the idea to the theory of perception in The World. (shrink)

In ‘The Choice Theory of Contracts’, we advance a claim about the centrality of autonomy to contract. Since publishing Choice Theory, we have engaged dozens of reviews and responses; here, we reply to Robert Stevens, Arthur Ripstein, and Brian Bix. All this rigorous debate confirms for us one core point: contract’s ultimate value must be autonomy, properly understood and refined. Autonomy is the telos of contract and its grounding principle. In Choice Theory, we stressed the proactive facilitation component of autonomy, (...) in particular, the state’s obligation regarding contract types. Here, we highlight two additional, necessary implications of autonomy for contract: regard for future selves and relational justice. These three aspects of autonomy shape the range, limit, and floor, respectively, for the legitimate use of contract. They provide a principled and constrained path for law reform. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Dylan Evans proposed that emotions could help solve what has been known as ‘the frame problem’. In the process, he first questioned the utility of using the frame problem as a framework. After tackling this issue, he provided an alternative terminology to the frame problem—termed ‘the search hypothesis of emotion’—in order to re-examine how emotions aid rational agents. His new terminology, however, opens itself to other critiques. While accepting the basic tenets of his analysis, I question (...) (i) whether a single search theory of emotion is adequate, and (ii) whether his theory would have been better termed ‘the search hypothesis of feeling’. Finally, I extend some of the ideas developed in Evans' paper. 1. Introduction 2. Emotion, reason and ends 3. The search hypothesis of emotion revisited 4. Conclusion. (shrink)

Am Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs wurde Albert Einstein eingeladen, seine intellektuelle Autobiografie für die Library of Living Philosophers zu schreiben. Das Ergebnis war sein einzigartiger Text, Autobiographisches, ein Klassiker der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, der die Entwicklung seiner Ideen mit unvergleichlicher Prägnanz erklärt. Hanoch Gutfreund und Jürgen Renn stellen Einsteins wissenschaftliche Überlegungen dem heutigen Leser vor, zeichnen seine intellektuelle Entwicklung von der Kindheit bis ins hohe Alter nach und bieten ein fesselndes Porträt der Entwicklung eines Wissenschaftlers und Philosophen. Einstein über Einstein enthält, (...) neben den Originaltext, Essays, die Einsteins Überlegungen in den Kontext der verschiedenen Phasen seines wissenschaftlichen Lebens stellen. Gutfreund und Renn stützen sich auf Einsteins Schriften, persönliche Korrespondenz und Kommentare von seinen Zeitgenossen, um neue Perspektiven auf seine größten Entdeckungen zu eröffnen. Ebenfalls enthalten sind Einsteins Antworten auf seine Kritiker, die ein zusätzliches Licht auf seine wissenschaftliche und philosophische Weltanschauung werfen. Gutfreund und Renn zitieren ausführlich aus Einsteins ersten, unveröffentlichten Skizzen seiner Antworten. Der Band umfasst außerdem einen kurzen autobiografischen Text, den Einstein wenige Wochen vor seinem Tod geschrieben hat. Einstein über Einstein ist mit eindrucksvollen Zeichnungen des Künstlers Laurent Taudin sowie mit zeitgenössischen Fotografien illustriert. (shrink)

For private property to be legitimately recognized as a universal human right, its meaning should pass the test of self-imposability by an end. In this Essay, we argue, negatively, that the prevailing understanding of private property cannot plausibly meet this demanding standard; and develop, affirmatively, a liberal conception which has a much better prospect of meeting property’s justificatory challenge. Private property, on our account, is an empowering device, which is crucial both to people’s personal autonomy and to their relational equality. (...) The liberal conception of the human right to property has both vertical and horizontal significance — it implies respect from both the public authority and other individuals — which means that it is thoroughly political but not necessarily statist. Our account generates important implications, both domestic and transnational. Domestically, it implies that whereas some property rights should be subject to strong constitutional protection, state law should facilitate other types of private and non-private property institutions, and these property institutions may well be subject to non-owners’ claims to access and, more broadly, to being treated respectfully. Furthermore, our conception of the human right to property requires that everyone have the unusual authority typical of full-blown private ownership. Transnationally, our analysis highlights a freestanding dimension of relational justice, which is relevant across borders even given that our distributive obligations are statist. This injunction of relational justice in transnational interactions brings into question the adequacy of the current state of the law, according to which these interactions are mainly governed by choice-of-law rules that conceptualize them as wholly subsumed under the capacities of the parties as citizens of their respective polities. (shrink)

This book demonstrates how legal realism offers important and unique jurisprudential insights that are not just a part of legal history, but are also relevant and useful for a contemporary understanding of legal theory.

Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 422-433.

I try to identify elements of our mental capacities that separate us from animals. I focus on our command of logical concepts, demonstrable already in children in the second or third year of their life, which to date no animal has been shown to master. I draw various conclusions about the behavioural, intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities that depend on this mastery, and discuss recent empirical research that either supports or apparently disagrees with the claim that animals, even those we (...) consider intelligent, are limited in these respects. My discussion is built around observations extracted from Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This study presents a reconsideration of Levinas’s concept of the feminine. This reconsideration facilitated by a philosophically informed analysis of Levinas’s Talmudic readings on that subject. The innovation of this research is based on the methodology which combined the two corpuses of Levinas’ writings as important parts of his thought. Two main phenomena are derived from Levinas’ Talmudic readings and arouse main principles of his ethics. In the hearth of the discussion on Eros stated the differentiation of feminine and masculine (...) in Levinas’ thought, and its implication of gender and Ethics of otherness. In the center of Levinas’ terminology of maternity stated his phenomenology of pregnancy, and its ethical implication on responsibility to the other. The extreme responsibility committed to the subject since there is a immanent conflict between parents and their child. The characters of Leivnas’ discussion which described here are obligating the reconsideration of the philosophical question: are Levinas’ concepts of the feminine exclusive to the women? -/- The subjects of Levinas’s exploration of the feminine, in this view, emerge from his Talmudic readings, but his phenomenological analysis of those very subjects goes beyond what can be found in those readings. Analyzing the meaning of the difference between the sexes—the topic of one of the Talmudic readings—leads Levinas to a wider phenomenological treatment of the status of woman that does not bypass the feminine voice. Delving into the Talmudic concept of rodef (persecutor) as applied to the relationship of fetus and mother leads Levinas to a phenomenological analysis of the concept of maternity and readiness to accept responsibility (even suffering) for the Other. Those two discussions lead us to a rereading of Levinas’s essay “Phenomenology of Eros” and enable us to rebut the charge that in that essay Levinas presents only a masculine voice. Levinas’s concept of “responsibility” will be seen to resemble the feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan’s concept of “care.” We must then reconsider whether Levinas’s concept of the feminine is exclusively the domain of women. -/- . (shrink)

Property enhances autonomy for most people, but not for all. Because it both empowers and disables, property requires constant vigilance. A Liberal Theory of Property addresses key questions: how can property be justified? What core values should property law advance, and how do those values interrelate? How is a liberal state obligated to act when shaping property law? In a liberal polity, the primary commitment to individual autonomy dominates the justification of property, founding it on three pillars: carefully delineated private (...) authority, structural pluralism, and relational justice. A genuinely liberal property law meets the legitimacy challenge confronting property by expanding people's opportunities for individual and collective self-determination while carefully restricting their options of interpersonal domination. The book shows how the three pillars of liberal property account for core features of existing property systems, provide a normative vocabulary for evaluating central doctrines, and offer directions for urgent reforms. (shrink)

This article argues that contemporary accounts of justice miss a relational dimension of justice, which focuses on the terms private individuals’ interactions must meet for them to constitute relationships among equal, self-determining persons. The article develops the argument that the justice requirement to respect others as substantively free and equal individuals can sometimes be adequately discharged only if the relevant private persons are held responsible for its realization. It further elaborates the normative framework of relational justice to explain the generic (...) structure, content, and scope of such a requirement. (shrink)