La confrontation des conceptions whiteheadienne et merleau-pontienne de l?expérience est loin de constituer une tâche aisée. La difficulté la plus apparente est relative à la divergence sur laquelle nous butons dès que nous plaçons l?une à côté de l?autre les deux entreprises philosophiques. Alors que dans Procès et réalité , la perspective adoptée par Whitehead consiste en une recherche à « entrées multiples », la phénoménologie pourrait être hâtivement décrite comme dérivant toute signification du monde d?une conscience constituante. En d?autres (...) termes, l?expérience perceptive posséde­rait une dimension anthropocentrée chez Merleau-Ponty alors que cette même dimension ne paraîtrait avoir chez Whitehead que le statut du cas particulier. La différence s?expliquerait alors par le fait que Whitehead cherche à analyser la structure de toute expérience du monde comme proces­sus, et pas seulement l?expérience d?une conscience humaine. Plu­sieurs passages de Procès et réalité se veulent d?ailleurs très explicites dans leur rejet, ou tout au moins dans leur « secondarisation » du rôle de la conscience : La conscience est seulement le dernier et le plus grand des éléments par lesquels la sélectivité qui caractérise l?individu masque la totalité externe dont il provient et qu?il incarne. [?] La tâche de la philosophie est de recouvrer la totalité rejetée dans l?ombre par la sélection. Elle remet. (shrink)

In 1999, Dan Zahavi’s Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation initiated a critique of the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl’s analysis of time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness (Zahavi’s concern), but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness (Brough and Sokolowski’s rebuttal of Zahavi’s critique). Using insights gained from Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper (...) provides a new, more precise vocabulary in which to carry on the debate, in the hopes of bringing it to a mutually satisfactory resolution. After briefly laying out the terms of the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski debate (Sect. 2), I then elaborate a three-fold distinction in consciousness from the Analyses (Sect. 3) and relate that back to the issue of objectivity in the debate (Sect. 4). I end by suggesting how this three-fold model from the Analyses helps us preserve the essentially tripartite structure (as Brough and Sokolowski insist we do) while not making one of these levels the object of another (in keeping with Zahavi’s critique) (Sect. 5). (shrink)

Cet article cherche à montrer qu’en comprenant la protention comme fonctionnant comme la rétention mais en sens inverse, on ne rend pas correctement compte de la conscience interne du temps. L’auteur commence par explorer plus largement la place de la rétention dans la théorie husserlienne de la conscience interne du temps, puis par montrer qu’on ne peut faire l’expérience phénoménologique de la protention de cette manière. A travers une analyse approfondie du concept de remplissement, l’article montre ensuite comment au cœur (...) de l’analyse husserlienne de la conscience interne du temps, en fait même au cœur de son analyse de la rétention, nous voyons la protention fonctionner d’une façon unique et distinctive. En dégageant dans l’analyse du remplissement de Husserl l’importance de la directionalité inhérente de la protention et sa capacité à distinguer entre les modes clarifiant et confirmant de l’intuition, l’avant-dernière section de cet article montre une fois pour toutes ce qui distingue la protention de la rétention. La différence n’est pas simplement une différence de direction, mais aussi de fonction essentielle. Enfin, l’auteur avance pour terminer qu’en échouant à reconnaître le rôle unique de la protention, on prend le risque non seulement de comprendre incorrectement la protention, mais aussi de rendre compte de la rétention elle-même de manière erronée, qui empêche d’apprécier avec exactitude ce qui est innovant dans l’analyse husserlienne de la conscience interne du temps. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous abordons le problème de la traduction des noms propres. Nous présentons notre hypothèse, selon laquelle la thèse très répandue de la non-traductibilité des noms propres peut être contredite. Puis, nous décrivons la construction du corpus multilingue aligné que nous utilisons pour illustrer notre propos. Nous évaluons enfin les apports et les limites de ce corpus dans le cadre de notre étude.

This article argues that De trinitate advocates a process of “reading” God through metaphor. For Augustine, as for Plotinus, human beings understand God not by analyzing him rationally but by seeing him through the metaphor of the human mind. But unlike Plotinus, Augustine claims that the imago dei, with its triadic structure of memory, understanding, and will, serves as metaphor only to the extent that it experiences Christ’s redemptive illumination. The act of metaphor is a kind of interior “reading” during (...) which the mind reads the imago dei as a mental text, interprets this text through Christ’s aid, and is simultaneously transformed into a better image. (shrink)

This paper examines the relevance of Rosenzweig’s theory of translation to his concept of redemption. Rosenzweig’s statements on the redemptive virtues of translation, in the afterword to his Jehuda Halevi and in “Scripture and Luther,” are well known. However, when considered in connection with the Star of Redemption as well as with the later essays, Rosenzweig’s position appears more complex than what a first reading might suggest, for he seemed to have abandoned his first definition of translation – as an (...) imperfectly redemptive task, nevertheless providing effective understanding between the peoples – to adopt the notion of a true redemption of the tongues, be it at the expense of understanding. In what sense is translation, if at all legitimately, bound to Redemption? The paper argues that the concept of the spirit is central to Rosenzweig’s theory of translation, and examines the metamorphoses of this concept from the Star to the later essays. It accounts for the fact that language, in a certain sense, is the true subject of redemption, and allows for new insights into the philosophy of history. (shrink)

There is a lot to like in Neal DeRoo’s Futurityin Phenomenology. In it, he canvases his three titular authors’ treatments of time , and his scholarship on all three is impressive. He shows himself familiar with their most decisive texts on this subject, as well as with much of the relevant secondary literature. His treatment of Husserl is especially noteworthy. DeRoo’s treatment of this subject, which in part draws on his previous publications, equals, if not surpasses, especially in (...) its scope and detail, all others in English that bring Husserl’s work on time together with French “post-Husserlians,” such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida.Along with generally sound presentations of difficult texts, DeRoo also often wrestles admirably with the things themselves. On a number of occasions, having seemingly completed an argument or arrived at a conclusion, he turns around and calls it into question. (Thus, having associated futurity with ethicality, he repeated .. (shrink)

This book offers the first sustained reflection on the significance of futurity for the phenomenological method itself.

Protention is often understood as being equivalent to retention but functioning in the other (future) direction. This, I would argue, has prevented a full appreciation of protention’s importance to phenomenological scholarship. In this paper, I will elucidate Husserl’s positive account of protention. I will argue that the view that protention is like retention, but in the other direction, is insufficient. Abandoning this negative view, I will explain what is unique about protention, and how it helps make sense of such key (...) phenomenological concepts as fulfillment, passive intentionality, and self-constitution. (shrink)

This essay argues that Richard Kearney’s philosophical work has something important to say to phenomenological psychology and, in turn, has something important to learn from it. It begins by highlighting a movement of return after deconstruction, consistent throughout Kearney’s oeuvre, that emerges clearly in the recently published Imagination Now collection—which contains some of Kearney’s most important writings. It then shows how this movement is a fundamentally therapeutic endeavor. A quick review of several recent volumes about Kearney’s work makes clear how (...) his philosophy suggests an embodied and not simply a linguistic approach to therapy. As such, a certain phenomenological psychology is revealed as being implicitly operative in Kearney’s work. The essay then ends by highlighting three possible benefits of having phenomenological psychologists engage with Kearney’s work: a revaluation of the non-cognitive aspects of subjective constitution, a renewed look at the role of both the narrative and carnal dimensions in psychological research and psychotherapy, and an even more enhanced socio-cultural role for phenomenological psychology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : At the heart of Levinas’ work is an account of subjectivity that is premised on his account of temporality. In this regard, Levinas is like many other phenomenologists. However, in order to understand Levinas in this manner, we must first reconceive what Levinas means by ‘ethics’, so we can see the fundamental continuity in his accounts of subjectivity and temporality. By understanding the continuities, not just within but also between, Levinas’ ethical subject and his futural temporality, we are (...) able to reconceive of the scope and method of phenomenology, so as to adequately assess Levinas’ influence in that discipline. RÉSUMÉ : Au sein de I’ æuvre de Levinas, se trouve un exposé sur la subjectivité fondé sur son compte de temporalité. A cet égard, Levinas est comme de nombreux phénoménologues. Cependant, pour mieux le comprendre de cette façon, nous devons d’abord reconcevoir ce que Levinas veut dire par “1’ éthique”, pour voir la continuité essentiel de ses comptes de subjectivité et temporalité. En comprenant les continuités, entre et à 1’intérieur de son sujet moral et sa temporalité futurelle, nous sommes capables de redéfinir l’ envergure et le moyen de la phénoménologie, afin de suffisamment juger 1’ influence de Levinas dans cette discipline. (shrink)

Review of Phenomenology and Eschatology: Not Yet and the Now , edited by Neal DeRoo and John Panteleimon Manoussakis Content Type Journal Article Pages 503-504 DOI 10.1007/s11841-011-0252-6 Authors James M. McLachlan, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC, USA Journal Sophia Online ISSN 1873-930X Print ISSN 0038-1527 Journal Volume Volume 50 Journal Issue Volume 50, Number 3.

I argue in this essay that Edmund Husserl distinguishes three levels within time-consciousness: an absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, the immanent acts of consciousness the flow constitutes, and the transcendent objects the acts intend. The immediate occasion for this claim is Neal DeRoo’s discussion of Dan Zahavi’s reservations about the notion of an absolute flow and DeRoo’s own efforts to mediate between Zahavi’s view and the position Robert Sokolowski and I have advanced. I argue that the flow and (...) the tripartite distinction it introduces into consciousness is firmly grounded in Husserl’s texts and is philosophically defensible. The absolute flow is distinct but inseparable from what it constitutes. It is intentional in a nonobjectivating way, and accounts for the awareness I have of my individual acts of consciousness and of the unity and continuity of my conscious life. In its absence, consciousness would become an incoherent stream of episodic acts. There is nothing mysterious about the flow. What would be mysterious is consciousness without the flow. (shrink)