Presents for the first time in English, this 1967 text which came to be known as the 'bible' of a new movement in German philosophy of language, the 'Erlanger School.' This school of linguistic philosophy's treatment of language is rooted in the tradition of transcendentalism, and bases its system on Kant and his Continental successors. For the Erlanger School, 'language is not just a fact we discover...but a human cultural accomplishment whose construction reason can and should be controlled.' An influential (...) work which will be a valuable resource for students of philosophy, particularly philosophy of language and transcendentalism. (shrink)

This is a facing-Page translation of a two-Page fragment of kant's on inner sense, Similar to the ""reflexionen"" collected in volumes 14-19 of the academy edition of kant's complete works. It is especially important because of its subject matter: inner sense plays a key role in kant's epistemology, But is discussed separately only in the "anthropology". The fragment has a number of points in common with a number of similar "reflexionen" on the refutation of idealism, But also differs from these (...) in important ways. Three articles dealing with the fragment's history and significance are published along with it. (shrink)

On one common reading, Kant's epistemology involves an "all-Or-Nothing" principle: the mind achieves either objective knowledge or nothing at all. But then we cannot account for dreams. L w beck maintains that the categories also function in non-Veridical contexts (including dreams), But do not serve to distinguish these from veridical contexts. I argue that the categories determine coherence both within and among different contexts of experience, And hence determine which are veridical.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik)Hoke RobinsonTillmann Pinder, editor. Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik), vols. 8 and 9 of the series Kant-Forschungen, general editors Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998. Vol. 8, pp. lxx + 268; vol. 9, pp. vii + 718. NP.Between 1755, (...) when he received the venia legendi, and 1796, when he ended his teaching activity, Kant taught logic some 30 times. In accordance with the requirements of the Prussian ministry of culture, his course lectures were built around a recognized text, G. F. Meier's 1752 Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Kant did not merely present Meier's views, however, but commented on and criticized these as he thought appropriate; his own copy of Meier was full of marginal notes and interleaved with notes on separate bits of paper. When in 1799 he entrusted G. B. Jäsche with this material for the compiling of a logic text, the thought was presumably of a Kantian logic organized around Meier's framework.Since logic plays such a prominent role in the Critical philosophy, one would expect the Jäsche logic to be viewed as an important tool for the interpretation of the Critical philosophy. But dissatisfaction with it was evident right from its original publication in 1800, and later scholars were even more negative (in 1913 Erich Adickes referred to it [End Page 603] as "the contrivance [Machwerk]... that Jäsche published under the name of Kant's logic," Erich Adickes, quoted in Ak. XXIV.960). And in fact, as Pinder's careful and detailed introduction points out, the nature and origin of the Jäsche logic presented a serious problem for Wilhelm Dilthey's organization of the now-standard Akademie-Ausgabe (Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der königlich preussischen [now: deutschen] Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902- Cited as "Ak.").Dilthey conceived of four divisions of the Akademie-Ausgabe: Kant's published writings, his correspondence, his literary remains ("handschriftlicher Nachlass") and his lectures ("Vorlesungen"). Where, exactly, did the Jäsche logic belong? Kant had himself compiled a similar text from his lecture notes on anthropology, and this text was published in the first division (in volume VII). But did the Jäsche logic count as Kant's work? It was indeed authorized by Kant and based on Kant's own lecture notes; but these notes themselves were to be published in the Nachlass division. Furthermore, as it turned out, Jäsche had also employed manuscripts compiled from the lectures themselves, and these were to be published in the Vorlesungen division. This would not include his own transcription, as Erdmann had conjectured. It turns out Jäsche never heard Kant lecture on logic—he was never in Königsberg when they were being held! (xxvi, n. 29). The resulting controversies delayed the publication of the Jäsche logic in vol. IX from 1908 until 1923, after the 1914 publication in the Nachlass division of the notes on which it was based.Dilthey's projected Vorlesungen division itself was called into question by Benno Erdmann, Dilthey's successor as Akademie-Ausgabe general editor. Erdmann recognized the questionable nature of the Jäsche logic and the other compilations, but considered Dilthey's aim for a "critically secured" edition of the lecture manuscripts as "hopeless." Still, interest in the manuscripts resulted in their piecemeal publication independently of the Akademie-Ausgabe, and when the Nachlass division's publication had been completed in 1955, the Vorlesungen division was resurrected. Vol. XXIV (in two parts) appeared in 1966; it contained the logics Blomberg, Philippi, Pölitz, Busolt, Dohna-Wundlacken and the Vienna logic, the short logic Herder, and fragments of the lost logics Hintz and Hoffmann. The Pinder volumes reviewed here contain the logics Bauch, Hechsel, and the Warsaw logic.What exactly are the manuscripts in question? If Kant had been concerned merely to explicate Meier, his students could perhaps have been content with their marginal notes in the text and a few further ones for elucidation. But... (shrink)

Kant holds that the a human subject's free causation, as well as the deliberations and decision preceeding it, are literally timeless. This paper tries to defend this doctrine of timeless agency by first distinguishing three senses of "cause", then showing the relationship between cause and time-determination in the theoretical philosophy, and finally relating the timelessness of free agency to the status of the representations of perception. The result is that whereas agency has no time in isolation, it may borrow enough (...) time for its purposes from the theoretical realm. Kant meint, daß die freie Verursachung durch ein menschliches Subjekt, genauso wie die Überlegungen und die Entscheidung, die ihr vorausgehen, buchstäblich zeitlos sind. Der Beitrag versucht, diese Lehre von einem zeitlosen Handeln zu verteidigen. Zunächst wird zwischen drei verschiedenen Bedeutungen von "Ursache" unterschieden. Dann wird die Beziehung zwischen Ursache und Zeitbestimmung in der theoretischen Philosophie dargestellt. Schließlich wird die Zeitlosigkeit freien Handelns mit dem Status der Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung in eine Beziehung gesetzt. Das Ergebnis ist, daß das Handeln, während es für sich selbst betrachtet keine Zeit hat, für seine Zwecke doch genügend Zeit aus der theoretischen Sphäre entlehnen kann. (shrink)

Most commentators (especially guyer and allison) assume kant's position on inner sense to follow the lockean model, With inner sense preceding outer sense. In a previous paper I argued that outer sense was primary. Here, On the basis of the newly discovered leningrad fragment and other texts, I argue that the establishment of temporal order requires outer-Sense priority, But in its use, Inner sense can be prior. I close with some remarks on embodiment.

For most commentators, Kant holds a basically lockean view of the order of knowledge acquisition: sensory affection produces inner-Sense representations from which outer objects are subsequently inferred; in particular, Outer time order is derived from inner time order in the second analogy. But kant actually holds that outer sense is prior to inner sense. This latter view is defended by distinguishing two senses of inner sense: inner sense in itself and inner sense as appearance. The first, If there is one, (...) Is prior to outer sense; but the second, The one kant meant, Is posterior. (shrink)