“Why is there something rather than nothing?” This is perhaps one of the most annoying questions posed in recent times by and to philosophers. It has troubled at least two major thinkers in the last and in this century, namely the romantic idealist Friedrich Schelling and the contemporary existentialist Martin Heidegger, since it was first formulated by Leibniz. We can easily get rid of the question as being simplistic; since although it may be true that nothing is simpler than something, (...) we have no notion of what the simplicity of nothing might consist in. Or we can say that the question is related to the theological answer of a benevolent creator, and hence is not able even to be asked within the ambient of the finite human understanding. Or we may say that the question is supremely hypothetical, in that it would presuppose what is not, in fact, the case; and philosophy can be concerned only with what is. Furthermore, to ask the question in any genuine fashion, the nonexistence of the questioner would seem to be required. The question, therefore, appears Zen-like: “What is the answer to a question posed by a nonexistent questioner?”. (shrink)

The paper deals with the meaning of the transcendental imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, comparing it with the productive imagination proposed by Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. It also presents Heidegger’s views concerning both Kant and Fichte. Regarding Kant there is also a discussion of the difference between the first and second editions of the First Critique. It may be noted that Heidegger prefers the first edition to the second, since, in his view, the latter leads into (...) German Idealism. In Fichte’s philosophy the imagination plays a considerably larger role than it does in Kant. And Heidegger early on recognizes the importance of Fichte as a philosopher in its own right, and not just, as was customary in the period, a mere transitional figure between Kant and Hegel. The paper concludes with a critique of Heidegger’s views regarding both Fichte and Kant. Though there is an addendum discussing the function of the imagination in the aesthetics of Kant, in that of Fichte, and a brief comparison with Heidegger’s own aesthetics. (shrink)

The paper deals with the meaning of the transcendental imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, comparing it with the productive imagination proposed by Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. It also presents Heidegger’s views concerning both Kant and Fichte. Regarding Kant there is also a discussion of the difference between the first and second editions of the First Critique. It may be noted that Heidegger prefers the first edition to the second, since, in his view, the latter leads into (...) German Idealism. In Fichte’s philosophy the imagination plays a considerably larger role than it does in Kant. And Heidegger early on recognizes the importance of Fichte as a philosopher in its own right, and not just, as was customary in the period, a mere transitional figure between Kant and Hegel. The paper concludes with a critique of Heidegger’s views regarding both Fichte and Kant. Though there is an addendum discussing the function of the imagination in the aesthetics of Kant, in that of Fichte, and a brief comparison with Heidegger’s own aesthetics. (shrink)

L'A. donne une interprétation radicalement nouvelle des «Beiträge zur Philosophie» de Heidegger en en faisant une «contribution» à une christologie. Il fait reposer son interprétation sur l'utilisation du terme ancien «seyn» et non «sein» qui, chez Fichte, désigne Dieu, tandis que «Daseyn» désigne Jésus-Christ. Dès lors se trouve reposée la question de l'ontothéologie selon Heidegger.

There is something very flattering, to the artist, in Schelling’s view of creativity. Put simply: the creativity of the artist is like the creativity of God. There can, however, be something disturbing, not so say embarrassing, about flattery. Even if one can be certain of the complete seriousness of the flatterer—and German philosophers tend to take themselves very seriously—one may feel a little uncomfortable in the face of what could be overflattery. Of course, the creativity of the artist may tell (...) us something about the creativity of God, if, indeed, God created the artist; however, to argue successfully the similarity between the two will require at least one assumption: namely, a similarity in the concept of person or personality in God and in the artist. (shrink)

Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930’s. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees (...) as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel’s “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradi­tion of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche. It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event. (shrink)

The article deals with the recently published Besinnung, a work dating from 1938–1939, one among the unpublished treatises in Part III of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. It follows the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936–1938), taking up the same themes as that work, such as the last God, the first and the other beginning, etc. But whereas the earlier work, especially the notion of the last God, relates more to Schelling, this one muses on Kierkegaard. The article sets Besinnung within the context (...) of related works of the same period, not only the Beiträge but also Metaphysik und Nihilismus and Geschichte des Seyns. However, Besinnung also breaks new ground, finding a deeper ontological distinction between Seyn and Sein as the basis for the earlier ontological difference between being and beings. The work is part and parcel with Heidegger's destructuring of metaphysics, which he sees as really a freeing up of the beginning, as also the issue of onto-theology. Thus it is integral with Heidegger's program of getting God out of metaphysics and being out of theology. It is in virtue of the meaning he attaches to Seyn (Logos) in Da-sein that it is possible for him not only to retrieve the meaning of the other beginning, the en-owning (Er-eignis) of Da-sein, and with it the meaning of the first beginning (in the two senses the phrase has in this work), but also thereby to recover the forgotten meaning of being (Sein). The approach to Seyn, with Kierkegaard, is not through the thinking (Denken) that thinks being, which cannot really get beyond beings and/or the Supreme Being of metaphysics, but through a thinking, a musing, that thinks through to (Er-denkt) Seyn. The article concludes with some reflections on the significance of Heidegger as theo-logian. (shrink)

Following upon his Soundings in St. Augustine's Imagination, O'Connell is sensitive to the "image-clusters"--images moving on and into each other--found in the discursive language of St. Augustine's classic work. In the Confessions, the overarching image of conversion he finds to be wayfaring, departure, being in the wrong direction or upside down, and return. It is the image of the prodigal rising up and returning to his father. Along the way, the author teases out the meaning of many a controverted passage (...) from the rhetor's terse Latin style. (shrink)

This important new work surveys the source and ramifications of the famed Nuremburg Code -- recognized around the world as one of the cornerstones of modern bioethics.

To the uninitiated, academic philosophy can be intimidating. Its extensive history (over two millennia) and seemingly all-encompassing breadth and depth of study makes knowing everything about philosophy impossible. Philosophers are fortunate because they are expected to specialize in specific areas, but librarians are not as fortunate. Librarians often have collection development responsibilities for a variety of academic disciplines. Collection development in philosophy can seem like a world unto itself in part because philosophical inquiry reaches into other academic disciplines. Amongst academic (...) philosophers, there are different approaches or methodologies for doing philosophy, including eastern and western philosophy, as well as a divide between analytic and continental philosophers. In addition to growing the collection, the philosophy subject librarian may be called upon by philosophers and aspiring philosophers (i.e., students) for research assistance. To make matters more intimidating, philosophers seem to think and speak differently than others. The complex ideas and esoteric terminology that rarely finds its way outside of the philosophy classroom can make collection development, research services, and even simple faculty-to-librarian communication difficult. To succeed as a librarian subject specialist, you should work hard to develop an adequate understanding of the types of materials that are most valuable to your community. Cultivating this knowledge is critical because budgets are limited. This volume will help librarians thrust into the position of philosophy subject specialist to get up to speed and begin excelling in their new roles. The goal of this guide is to simplify collection development and research assistance for philosophy. To accomplish this, I will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a field and share the information you need to succeed in your role as the new philosophy selector. This volume will help to alleviate some of the communication barriers between philosophers and librarians and will provide practical advice, recommendations, and resources for building a strong philosophy collection. (shrink)

To the uninitiated, academic philosophy can be intimidating. Its extensive history (over two millennia) and seemingly all-encompassing breadth and depth of study makes knowing everything about philosophy impossible. Philosophers are fortunate because they are expected to specialize in specific areas, but librarians are not as fortunate. Librarians often have collection development responsibilities for a variety of academic disciplines. Collection development in philosophy can seem like a world unto itself in part because philosophical inquiry reaches into other academic disciplines. Amongst academic (...) philosophers, there are different approaches or methodologies for doing philosophy, including eastern and western philosophy, as well as a divide between analytic and continental philosophers. In addition to growing the collection, the philosophy subject librarian may be called upon by philosophers and aspiring philosophers (i.e., students) for research assistance. To make matters more intimidating, philosophers seem to think and speak differently than others. The complex ideas and esoteric terminology that rarely finds its way outside of the philosophy classroom can make collection development, research services, and even simple faculty-to-librarian communication difficult. To succeed as a librarian subject specialist, you should work hard to develop an adequate understanding of the types of materials that are most valuable to your community. Cultivating this knowledge is critical because budgets are limited. This volume will help librarians thrust into the position of philosophy subject specialist to get up to speed and begin excelling in their new roles. The goal of this guide is to simplify collection development and research assistance for philosophy. To accomplish this, I will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a field and share the information you need to succeed in your role as the new philosophy selector. This volume will help to alleviate some of the communication barriers between philosophers and librarians and will provide practical advice, recommendations, and resources for building a strong philosophy collection. (shrink)

The realities and myths of long-term care and the challenges it poses for the ethics of autonomy are analyzed in this perceptive work. The book defends the concept of autonomy, but argues that the standard view of autonomy as non-interference and independence has only a limited applicability for long term care. The treatment of actual autonomy stresses the developmental and social nature of human persons and the priority of identification over autonomous choice. The work balances analysis of the ethical concepts (...) associated with autonomy with discussion of the implications of the ethical analysis for long term care. A central chapter involves a phenomenological analysis of four general features of everyday experience (space, time, communication, and affectivity) and explores their practical implications for long term care. This work concludes with a discussion of the advantages associated with a phenomenologically-inspired treatment of actual autonomy for the ethics of long-term care. (shrink)

This paper offers an exposition of what the question of method in ethics consultation involves under two conditions: when ethics consultation is regarded as a practice and when the question of method is treated systematically. It discusses the concept of the practice and the importance of rules in constituting the actions, cognition, and perceptions of practitioners. The main body of the paper focuses on three elements of the question of method: canon, discipline, and history, which are treated heuristically to outline (...) what the question of method in ethics consultation fully involves. (shrink)

How closely involved with hospital ethics committees should patients and their families become? Should they routinely have access to committees, or be empowered to initiate consultations? To what extent should they be informed of the content or outcome of committee deliberations? Seeing ethics committees as the locus of competing responsibilities allows us to respond to the questions posed by a patient rights model and to acknowledge more fully the complex moral dynamics of clinical medicine.

In addition, this book contains tools that, in principle, can search a set of algorithms to see whether a problem is solvable, or more specifically, if it can be solved by an algorithm whose computations are efficient.

The realities of long‐term care call for a refurbished, concrete concept of autonomy that systematically attends to the history and development of persons and takes account of the experiences of daily living.

Authority is an uneasy, political notion. Heard with modern ears, it calls forth images of oppression and power. In institutional settings, authority is everywhere present, and its use poses problems for the exercise both of individual autonomy and of responsibility. In medical ethics, the exercise of authority has been located on the side of the physician or the health care institution, and it has usually been opposed by appeal to patient autonomy and rights. So, it is not surprising, though still (...) ironic, that ethics consultation, which develops from this patient rights-dominated ethic, should itself bring forth questions of authority. Nonetheless, it does.Insofar as authority has been discussed in ethics consultations, it has been understandably approached from the broad perspective of legitimation and power, which are common themes in social and political treatments of authority. These treatments have dominated twentieth-century discussions of authority, which primarily view authority as legitimate power. (shrink)

Authority is an uneasy, political notion. Heard with modern ears, it calls forth images of oppression and power. In institutional settings, authority is everywhere present, and its use poses problems for the exercise both of individual autonomy and of responsibility. In medical ethics, the exercise of authority has been located on the side of the physician or the health care institution, and it has usually been opposed by appeal to patient autonomy and rights. So, it is not surprising, though still (...) ironic, that ethics consultation, which develops from this patient rights-dominated ethic, should itself bring forth questions of authority. Nonetheless, it does. Insofar as authority has been discussed in ethics consultations, it has been understandably approached from the broad perspective of legitimation and power, which are common themes in social and political treatments of authority. These treatments have dominated twentieth-century discussions of authority, which primarily view authority as legitimate power. (shrink)

Recent philosophical attention to the language of disease has focused primarily on the question of its value-neutrality or non-neutrality. Proponents of the value-neutrality thesis symbolically combine political and other criticisms of medicine in an attack on what they see as value-infected uses of disease language. The present essay argues against two theses associated with this view: a methodological thesis which tends to divorce the analysis of disease language from the context of the practice of medicine and a substantive thesis which (...) holds that disease language is evaluatively neutral. In particular, the essay critically focuses on the value neutral position adopted by Christopher Boorse, which he terms a functional theory of disease. The argument concerns whether or not one can have value neutral description of disease states or whether disease language essentially involves values. (shrink)