"This is the first English translation of Pilo Albertelli's seminal translation of the work of Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides. It is a work that is cited and listed by leading philosophy scholars, acknowledging the importance of the original Albertelli Italian translation"--.

Placing Parmenides in his proper historical context by taking seriously the impact of Persian Zoroastrianism on his developing monoism, Henn supplies precise interpretation of the most difficult and vexing of Parmenides's fragments, while...

Das Lehrgedicht des Parmenides über das Wesen des Seienden (ca. 515 v. Chr.) begründete die Ontologie – und damit die abendländische Philosophie. Für diese Wirkungsgeschichte war es entscheidend, dass Parmenides nicht nur das in Wahrheit Seiende vom Nicht-Seienden unterschieden, sondern es auch als Eines, Unveränderliches, in sich Vollendetes, Ganzes und in sich Zusammenhängendes bestimmt hat. So kann Parmenides schon dadurch ein gegenwärtiges Bewusstsein beeindrucken, dass man bei ihm erstmalig die Unterscheidung begründet findet, ohne die auch wir in (...) der Bewältigung unserer Wirklichkeit nicht auskommen können, nämlich diejenige zwischen dem, was in Wahrheit ist, und dem, was in Wahrheit nicht ist, aber dennoch den Anschein erweckt, ein Wahres zu sein. Ebenso findet sich bei ihm ein Verständnis des Seienden, das sich nicht darauf beschränkt, ein bloßes Vorhandensein von etwas zu registrieren, sondern darin eine Kraft ausgedrückt findet, wie sie von einem Werk der Kunst oder der sinnlichen Präsenz einer Person ausgehen kann. Wir leben alle von solchen Eindrücken und zugleich von dem irritierenden Wissen, dass auch sie täuschen und in einer zunehmend durchmedialisierten Welt sogar häufig bewusst vorgetäuscht sein können, so dass es nach wie vor wichtig ist, Kriterien dafür an der Hand zu haben, überzeugend wirkliches Sein von Nicht-Seiendem unterscheiden zu können. Und vielleicht ist es auch für uns noch so, dass das, was für uns ein ›in Wahrheit Seiendes‹ ist, etwas Dauerhaftes darstellt, das nicht das eine Mal ist und dann wieder nicht oder mal diese und dann wieder jene Gestalt annimmt, sondern ein Wirkungskontinuum des Vollkommenen, das von seiner »Mitte aus nach allen Seiten gleich sich schwingt« (Parm., Fr. 9, 42ff.). (shrink)

La vision des sages de la Grèce archaïque est sortie profondément transformée par la réflexion qu'a menée tout au long de sa vie Jean Bollack. Son ambition est ici de surmonter la fragmentation d'un poème exceptionnel que nous avons perdu. Il construit un ensemble avec des pleins et des vides à remplir. Le caractère initiatique de cet exercice de méditation facilite la tâche du déchiffrement ; tout s'y tient et le lecteur moderne peut se conformer à ses lois. L'analyse du (...) langage prime. La pensée s'y libère et découvre un référent sûr. Une cosmologie s'y projette, des astres à la vie des hommes, de l'Etant au Monde, dont ce livre s'applique à dégager les correspondances. (shrink)

Von Parmenides (um 515-455 v. Chr.), dem zusammen mit Anaximander und Heraklit bedeutendsten Denker der Vorsokratik und Begrunder der Schule der Eleaten, ist ein in Versen abgefasstes "Lehrgedicht" erhalten. Das Fragment zahlt, nicht zuletzt aufgrund seiner Vermittlung durch Platon, zu den Grundungsdokumenten der abendlandischen Philosophie. Der Politiker und Philosoph Kurt Riezler (1882-1955) unternimmt es in seiner 1934 erstmals erschienenen Interpretation des parmenideischen Gedichts, das in seinen beiden Teilen dargelegte sachliche Verhaltnis von Schein und Sein als innere Verflechtung philosophisch zu (...) legitimieren. Die Ausgabe enthalt den griechisch-deutschen Text und wurde von Hans-Georg Gadamer bearbeitet und mit einem Nachwort versehen. (shrink)

Turnbull offers a close and detailed reading of the Parmenides, using his interpretation to illuminate Plato's major late dialogues. The picture presented of Plato's later philosophy is plausible, highly interesting, and original.

I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.

One of the main problems in the the study of Parmenides' poem is establishing the meaning of e0/00nai, 'to be'. Scholars often simply take it to mean: 'to exist', 'to be the case', 'to be so', or regard it as a copula. It's better to start by fathoming what Parmenides himself has to say about to be and about Being. This cannot be done without recognizing the logical pattern in his poem. Another main problem is: what does not-Being (...) mean? Is the so-called Doxa - as not-Being - a non-existing, hallucinatory world, an illusion, a fata morgana? Or is it only a detector of lies? In the present work the view will be advocated that the Doxa offers the description of a really existing world. A specific merit of this book is that all the problems involved will be examined in continuous debate with what scholars have offered as solutions so far. (shrink)

Das Werk des vorsokratischen Philosophen Parmenides, das nur fragmentarisch erhalten ist, kann als Lehrgedicht beschrieben werden. In diesem Buch werden zum ersten Mal die pädagogischen Aspekte des Gedichtes aufgrund einer detaillierten Diskussion von ausgewählten Fragmenten systematisch untersucht. Es werden u. a. folgende Fragen behandelt: Wie kommt der Suchende oder Lernende zur philosophischen Erkenntnis? Welche 'Wege' oder Methoden führen dorthin? Was für Lernstufen gibt es? Wie verhält sich der Lernende (der Kuros) zur Belehrenden (der Göttin)? Welcher geistige Zustand soll den (...) Erkennenden kennzeichnen? Parmenides' Ontologie wird hier als Beschreibung des Erkennenden in Betracht gezogen, insofern das erkennende Subjekt seinem Objekt entsprechen soll. Parmenides' philosophische Pädagogik wird im Rahmen der Erziehungstheorie und Praxis der antiken Philosophie dargestellt und mit dem Thema der Philosophie als Lebenskunst verglichen. (shrink)

" Studies in Continental Thought John Sallis, general editor This text, as one might expect in a book on ancient philosophy, is heavily flavored with Greek and Latin.

In After Parmenides, Tom Rockmore takes us all the way back to the beginning of philosophy. Parmenides held that thought and being are one: what we know is what is. For Rockmore, this established both the good view that we should think of the world in terms of what the mind constructs as knowable entities as well as the bad view that there is some non-mind-dependent "thing"-the world, the real-which we can know or fail to know. No, Rockmore (...) says: what we need to do is give up on the idea that there is any extra-mental "real" for us to know. We know and become acquainted with the objects of cognition that our mind constructs. After Parmenides illustrates the contest between variants of the "standard" view and variants of the "non-standard, constructivist view" in the history of philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes and Locke, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, post-Kantians including Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Marx, the early pragmatists, analytic philosophy, contemporary French speculative realism, and more. This ambitious but accessibly written book shows how new connections can be made in the history of philosophy when it is reread through a new lens. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 3 - 39 This paper pursues a new approach to the problem of the relation between Alētheia and Doxa. It investigates as interrelated matters Parmenides’ impetus for developing and including Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to Doxa’s investigations and to those in Alētheia, and the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. Parmenides, it is argued, maintained that Doxastic cognition is an ineluctable and even (...) appropriate aspect of mortal life. The mortal agent, however, is nonetheless capable of sustaining the cognition of Alētheia by momentarily coming to think with—or as—his divine soul. (shrink)

John Palmer develops and defends a modal interpretation of Parmenides, according to which he was the first philosopher to distinguish in a rigorous manner the fundamental modalities of necessary being, necessary non-being or impossibility, and non-necessary or contingent being. This book accordingly reconsiders his place in the historical development of Presocratic philosophy in light of this new interpretation. Careful treatment of Parmenides' specification of the ways of inquiry that define his metaphysical and epistemological outlook paves the way for (...) detailed analyses of his arguments demonstrating the temporal and spatial attributes of what is and cannot not be. An appendix presents a Greek text of the fragments of Parmenides' poem with English translation and textual notes. (shrink)

Ein Buch nicht der Re-Mythisierung, sondern der Mythoskritik, allerdings einer Kritik, die den Mythos ernst nimmt. Daher: »Mein Thema lautet: die Funktion der Genealogie im Mythos. So formuliert, setzt es eine rationale Vorstellung vom Funktionieren des Mythos voraus – es fordert zu einer systematischen Erörtertung auf. Wir brauchen nicht zu befürchten, daß eine systematische Erörterung das Mystische des Mythos verfehlt, weil sie archaische Verhältnisse dem Zwang der Rationalität unterwirft. Eher wird sie die Verbindung deutlich machen, die zwischen Mythos, Rationalität und (...) Zwang besteht.«. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

Parmenides may fairly be said to have undertaken two parallel efforts: first, to offer a persuasive account of the nature of ‘what-is’ (to eon); and second, to establish ‘it is’ as the only true and trustworthy way of speaking and thinking about what-is. Fragment 7.3-6 plays a crucial role in this latter effort when Parmenides’ goddess directs the youth to put aside all information obtained through sense perception and instead ‘judge by reason the poludêris elenchos spoken by me.’ (...) Although the meaning of the phrase has been variously understood, I argue that it is properly taken to mean ‘a much-contested testing’ (of the possible ways of inquiry). In characterizing the elenchos as poludêris or ‘much contested’ the goddess is asserting that the decision to follow the ‘it is’ route of inquiry must be continually reaffirmed against the pull of custom and sense experience. (shrink)

In some of the Aristotelian accounts, Parmenides’ thesis is construed in opposition to the philosophy of nature; on the other hand, he is also depicted, in a different context, as a cosmologist, to whom the Stagirite (and a long tradition afterwards, ending with Simplicius) ascribes a theory of becoming and its principles. In this paper, I exhibit and analyse the relevant passages from Physics I 1-3, Metaphysics I 3 and 5 and On generation and corruption I 3, providing an (...) interpretation that aims to solve the apparent paradox, making sense of the information we can gather from Aristotle’s and Simplicius’ testimonies. Eventually, I propose a construal of the Two Ways of fr. 2 with an emphasis on the predicative reading of einai, which could hint at the Parmenidean approach to cosmology that runs in parallel with the argument on Being. (shrink)

"Gill's and Ryan's Parmenides is, simply, superb: the Introduction, more than a hundred pages long, is transparently clear, takes the reader meticulously through the arguments, avoids perverseness, and still manages to make sense of the dialogue as a whole; there is a fine selective bibliography; and those parts of the translation I have looked at in detail suggest that it too is very good indeed." --Christopher Rowe, _Phronesis_.

In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not , joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not . Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be , and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. (...) And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of is not , Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete. (shrink)

As is clear from the multiple references to knowledge in the proemium of fragment B1, Parmenides presented himself to his audiences as one who had achieved a profound insight into the nature of ‘what-is’. In support of this claim he conducted an elenchos or ‘testing’ of the ways of inquiry available for thinking, in the process revealing a set of sêmata or ‘signs’ indicating that what-is an eternal, indivisible, and unchanging plenum. In each of these respects, Parmenides was (...) speaking the language of discovery heard elsewhere in early Greek poetry. Similarly, his claim that we can neither learn nor know about what-is-not (hence must not say or think ‘it is not’) was justified by the ordinary meaning of the ancient Greek verbs for learning and knowing. Strikingly, Parmenides’ revisionary metaphysics rested in large measure on a widely shared view of what can be learned, known, and made known to others. -/- . (shrink)

Parmenides is one of the greatest thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. His thought has been a major point of reference for many metaphysical discussions that define the history of philosophy. Indeed there is virtually no moment in the history of metaphysics that his thought has not been influential. It is usual to contrast his philosophy of the unchanging reality of the One with Heraclitus' philosophy of change and becoming. While his counter-intuitive denial of change is questionable the (...) philosophical burden is rethink his monism by infusing change into it without prejudice to the general idea that reality is a whole in which unity and diversity are reconciled. (shrink)