The possible relation of an individual's personality structure and the choice of occupation he makes is an intriguing study. Periodically interest in this general area waxes; recently there has been some work done on the personality determinants involved in intellectual work. In the case of science and philosophy, this may be related to what type of scientific or philosophic work the individual thinks should be done, what areas he feels should be studied, and even what he takes science or philosophy (...) to be. The purpose of this paper is first to consider briefly some representative statements about the effect of personality factors on one's approach to science, and then go on to a more thorough treatment of the philosopher's personality and the type of philosophy he does. (shrink)

The problem of the “proper” relation of philosophy and science has been the source of many disputes in our intellectual history. Recently some philosophers and scientists have insisted that technical philosophy is neglecting the results of the social sciences to the detriment of philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to consider the attempts made by contemporary philosophers to utilize material from the behavioral sciences, to review certain of the arguments in favor of the utilization of such material, and to (...) consider the criticisms of that approach. (shrink)

Raphael's volume is an excellent example of both the logical and the psychological clarity often achieved by the British analysts. He regards moral philosophy as the application of the tools of philosophy to moral judgment and experience. Its data consist of "the reflective moral judgements of ordinary life," in contrast to merely habitual, non-reflective evaluations. Reflective moral judgments are those we are prepared to stand by if they are challenged, regardless of the dictates of custom. Although Raphael makes much of (...) ordinary language, he insists that moral philosophy is not merely a description of common usage. Its task is "to make more coherent and systematic the scheme of moral concepts and principles vaguely used in everyday life". (shrink)

Many writers assume one of the major functions (if not the major function) of ethical theory is to analyze the “ordinary language”; of moral discourse. This paper argues that different social groups develop quite different concepts of values; that there are many “ordinary languages.”; What analysts often in practice arc concerned with is middle-class ethical usage. In addition, it is argued that widely accepted moral usages may be incorrect because they are based on faulty empirical generalizations, pre-scientific opinions, or socially-determined (...) prejudices. “Ordinary language”; needs to be viewed critically, therefore, rather than to be assumed as correct. (shrink)

Rollo Handy's recent discussion of “Personality Factors and Intellectual Production” is interesting and timely. It seems to me that one of the things he is saying is that, since we lack objective criteria for the evaluation of the various philosophies, we may be forced, reluctantly, to judge them, at least partially, on the basis of what type of person produced them. “But since we do not have generally accepted criteria for the worth of philosophic endeavors … we should (...) at least become aware of the possible personality determinants of one's attitude toward philosophy. If certain distinguished philosophers, appearing in a psychological clinic, would be diagnosed as having severe personality disturbances, this is something we should know. The psychologists may be wrong, but then again they may be right. To say that this has no relevance at all to the worth of the philosopher's views seems ostrich-like.”. (shrink)