The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...) account given by de Vignemont and Jacob—is compatible with the direct-perception view. My argument has two parts: My first step is to show that the conflict between these accounts is not—as it seems at first glance—a disagreement on the mechanism by which empathy comes about. Rather, it is due to the fact that their proponents attribute two very different roles to empathy in understanding others. My second step is to introduce Stein’s account of empathy. By not restricting empathy to either one of these two roles, her process model of empathy helps to see how the divergent intuitions that have been brought forward in the current debate could be integrated. (shrink)

On the issue of abortion, Ireland and Poland have been among the most conservative countries in Europe. Their legal and cultural approaches to this issue have been deeply influenced by the institution of the Catholic Church and its purported role as a defender of an authentic national identity. However, their political climates for abortion reform are increasingly divergent: Ireland has liberalised its abortion law substantially since 2018, while Poland is moving towards further criminalisation with the repeated introduction of restrictive laws (...) in parliament. Both have seen active pro-choice movements who mobilise for reform and widespread non-compliance with their restrictive abortion laws, but the policy impact of these trends varies significantly. What accounts for this difference? This article draws on comparative analysis of Ireland and Poland to assess their divergent trajectories on abortion reform, arguing that the most significant driver of change between the two is the disparity in influence of the Catholic Church on politics and policymaking. (shrink)

Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant (...) capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we (...) better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship. On the other hand, it is precisely... (shrink)

What’s the basis for considering an egg donor a genetic parent but not a mitochondrial donor? I will argue that a closer look at the biological facts will not give us an answer to this question because the process by which one becomes a genetic parent, i.e., the process of reproduction, is not a concept that can be settled by looking. It is, rather, a concept in need of philosophical attention. The details of my argument will rest on recent developments (...) in biological technology, but the persuasiveness of my argument will turn on the history of another biological concept, death. Given some important similarities between the two concepts, the way in which ‘death’ evolved in the recent past can provide guidance on how we should think about ‘reproduction.’. (shrink)

The article focuses on Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech and its recontextualisation 50 years later in view of the rising anti-immigration sentiment and Brexit campaign. Having discussed the dynamics of the threat construction process and its role in shaping public attitudes to migration and policies related to it across time and space, we proceed to analyse Powell’s speech in terms of lexical, grammatical, and discursive fear-inciting devices and strategies. While doing so we draw on the insights from neuroscientific research (...) on the role of lexis in fear stimulation and functional-cognitive models of grammatical structure. The second part of our analysis is meant to demonstrate how the semiotic potential of cyberspace and social media, along with multimodal integration of various forms, intertextuality, and interdiscursivity they enable, endow fear-inciting discourse with new spatiotemporal and affective qualities. To this end we examine one of the most popular YouTube videos making “Rivers of Blood” speech part of its anti-immigration stance. (shrink)

Media reporters often announce that we are on the verge of bringing back the woolly mammoth, even while there is growing consensus among scientists that resurrecting the mammoth is unlikely. In fact, current “de-extinction” efforts are not designed to bring back a mammoth, but rather adaptations of the mammoth using close relatives. For example, Harvard scientists are working on creating an Asian elephant with the thick coat of a mammoth by merging mammoth and elephant DNA. But how should such creatures (...) be classified? Are they elephants, mammoths, or both? Answering these questions requires getting clear about the concept of reproduction. What I hope to show is that with an appropriate notion of reproduction—one for which I will argue—resurrecting a member of Mammuthus primigenius is a genuine possibility. (shrink)

With an increasing number of ways to ‘assist’ reproduction, some bioethicists have started to wonder what it takes to become a genetic parent. It is widely agreed that sharing genes is not enough to substantiate the parent–offspring relation, but what is? Without a better understanding of the concept of reproduction, our thinking about parent–offspring relations and the ethical issues surrounding them risk being unprincipled. Here, I address that problem by offering a principled account of reproduction—the Overlap, Development and Persistence account—which (...) I believe best captures the meaning of ‘genetic parenthood’. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...) of the core expressions in a different way. I will illustrate this claim by focusing on Reddy’s and Gallagher’s accounts and argue that these authors use the notions of knowing and of understanding other minds differently than traditionally assumed. As a consequence, second person accounts thus conceived do not directly address the questions that gave rise to the theory of mind debate. They invite us, however, to critically reflect upon the way the debate has been set up. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn Deutschland stellen sich in Bezug auf die pflegerische Versorgung grundlegende Gerechtigkeitsprobleme. Sechs sozialethische Probleme werden behandelt, deren Lösung Priorität hat, wenn es um gerechtere Rahmenbedingungen für die berufliche Pflege geht: Da jeder Pflegekräftemangel insofern menschenrechtsrelevant ist als berechtigte Hilfsansprüche Pflegebedürftiger nicht erfüllt werden können, muss erstens die Überwindung des Personalmangels oberste Priorität erhalten. Zweitens verteilen Pflegegutachter ein großes Finanzvolumen aus der Pflegeversicherung mittels Pflegegradbeurteilungen. Aus Gründen der Bedürfnisgerechtigkeit wird vorgeschlagen, dass Pflegende sich bei dieser sozialstaatlichen Aufgabe stärker am Selbstverständnis (...) der Sozialarbeit orientieren und die Weiterbildungen in einen Studiengang überführt werden. Angesichts weitreichender Auswirkungen von Zeitdruck auf pflegerische Interaktionen und das Berufsbild ist drittens ein Teil der Zeitverdichtung zurückzunehmen. Viertens wird dargelegt, welche Belastungen mit einem hohen Krankenstand und Personalmangel einhergehen und wie Risikofaktoren entgegenzuwirken ist. Fünftens müssen den speziellen Belastungen des Pflegeberufs Ressourcen zur Seite gestellt werden, und sechstens könnten Strukturen der Ethikberatung moralischen Stress verringern. (shrink)

In Deutschland stellen sich in Bezug auf die pflegerische Versorgung grundlegende Gerechtigkeitsprobleme. Sechs sozialethische Probleme werden behandelt, deren Lösung Priorität hat, wenn es um gerechtere Rahmenbedingungen für die berufliche Pflege geht: Da jeder Pflegekräftemangel insofern menschenrechtsrelevant ist als berechtigte Hilfsansprüche Pflegebedürftiger nicht erfüllt werden können, muss erstens die Überwindung des Personalmangels oberste Priorität erhalten. Zweitens verteilen Pflegegutachter ein großes Finanzvolumen aus der Pflegeversicherung mittels Pflegegradbeurteilungen. Aus Gründen der Bedürfnisgerechtigkeit wird vorgeschlagen, dass Pflegende sich bei dieser sozialstaatlichen Aufgabe stärker am Selbstverständnis (...) der Sozialarbeit orientieren und die Weiterbildungen in einen Studiengang überführt werden. Angesichts weitreichender Auswirkungen von Zeitdruck auf pflegerische Interaktionen und das Berufsbild ist drittens ein Teil der Zeitverdichtung zurückzunehmen. Viertens wird dargelegt, welche Belastungen mit einem hohen Krankenstand und Personalmangel einhergehen und wie Risikofaktoren entgegenzuwirken ist. Fünftens müssen den speziellen Belastungen des Pflegeberufs Ressourcen zur Seite gestellt werden, und sechstens könnten Strukturen der Ethikberatung moralischen Stress verringern. (shrink)

Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the (...) implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail: monika.piotrowska@utah.edu. (shrink)

The number of people without rights of residence or work in the territory of Western Europe's nation states is growing. In official representations of political life this group is commonly 'symbolically eliminated' or taken up by an increasingly hostile discourse on 'illegal immigrants' and 'international terrorism'. This article explores what a rereading of the work of Hannah Arendt can contribute to the analytical task of giving an alternative meaning to the presence of this group. Arendt opens up new ways of (...) thinking and acting in view of the present situation. She shows us the rightless migrant as subject to a very specific form of domination - total domination. With Arendt we can see the migrant also as an emblematic philosophical figure, whose status exposes the contradiction of state-centred citizenship and the discourse of human rights. Lastly, the migrant comes into view as a potential political actor; protests by sans papiers become visible as sites of active citizenship. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...) if one subscribes to the Davidsonian standard model of action explanation. So far, philosophers have had three different reactions to this challenge. Rationalists insist that such actions can be rationalized by re-interpreting them. Arationalists insist that there simply is no reasoning process moving agents in emotional states to act. A third reaction questions the intentionality of such actions altogether. All three reactions, however, share the assumption underlying the standard account: if an agent is thought to act for a reason - and hence acts intentionally - he must entertain a desire and some means-end belief reflecting his reasoning process about how to attain what he desires by acting. In this paper, I try to show that this reflective reasoning mechanism is only one way to rationalize an action. Another way is by tracing an action to an unreflective valuing stance respresenting reasons the agent has from his point of view. Emotions are attitudes that help to grasp reasons the agent has. Since emotions come with a strong motivational potential they move the agent to act expressively. But the agent typically allows himself to do so, thereby monitoring the way in which he does it. To the extent that the agent unreflectively acts on a motive that is itself representative of his point of view, his expressive actions can be regarded as rationalizable. (shrink)

The concept of the dialogical soul proposed by Joseph Ratzinger is a contemporary attempt to describe the anthropology of humanity in terms of basic, fundamental theological concepts. Epistemological approach of the dialogic soul is not about the division, but co-existence in the concept of humanity significantly different anthropological concepts. Modern neuroscience, although following completely different paths of knowing is currently concerning an important issue "of the embodied mind". Such a holistic effort to discover the truth about the man, though carried (...) out on completely different epistemological platforms, however, have some points in common. The difficulty in finding a common language for the dialogue in this field can be overcome and lead to dialogue, which is extremely difficult but doable. We must, however, at the beginning formulate certain fundamental axioms that define class concepts used in different areas of scientific activity. The concept of dialogical soul of Ratzinger’s now exceeds the barrier of scientific paradigms axioms. It does not stop on the vision of human oneself, but recognition of one in the area of relationships and makes room for a substantial dialogue with the world of modern science. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...) as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re‐affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re‐adapt to the environment and re‐establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division. (shrink)

The article will attempt a reading of Alan Spence’s play No Nothing. Special attention will be given to the issue of literal and metaphorical space, a peculiar, liminal setting of the play, and the ways it determines the flyting between the two characters, two iconic Glaswegians: Edwin Morgan and Jimmy Reid. It seems that in this theatrical space history, politics and poetry inter-are. We may notice how two completely different masters of speech exchange their views on life, how they reflect (...) upon the meaning of their achievements, and how they find a space of convergence in their affirmation of life. As their flyting is “about life, the Universe and everything—from Glasgow to Infinity and beyond,” the article will also address the space of dialogue between Spence’s and Morgan’s poetry. The metaphor of Indra’s net will serve as a useful tool in exploring spatial dimensions of the play and the issue of interconnectedness. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary, social scientific analysis of the regulatory discourse on nanotechnology in the three German-speaking countries of Germany, Austria and Switzerland and in the EU between 2000 and 2013 has shown three distinct phases, characterised by shifts in the configuration of actors and in the thematic scope from nanotechnology to nano-materials. Compared to modes of governance based on traditional statutory law, modes of governance based on less binding forms of soft law and self-regulation (like codes of conduct, guidelines and certification (...) systems) and new modes of governance (like assessment studies, risk management frameworks as well as participatory and cooperative forms of communication and negotiation) have gained importance. Despite some similarities, two different cultures in governing nanotechnology can be distinguished: a product-oriented culture in statutory regulations (when speaking about products, the article is also referring to substances) and a risk-based culture in applying soft law based on new modes of governance. In addition, the different regulatory cultures have led to four strategic approaches: modes of governance mainly based on hard law and soft law at the EU level, modes of governance mainly based on cooperative and self-regulatory approaches in Germany, cooperative governance approaches in Austria and modes of governance mainly based on self-regulatory and soft law approaches in Switzerland. (shrink)

In the course of 20th-century European history Jews and Arabs, as well as Jews and Muslims, were put in the position of a ‘civilizational’ conflict that is not only political but also quasi-metaphysical. This article examines an impact of the conflict on the attitudes towards anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and considers Islamophobic implications of the ‘new anti-Semitism’ discourse. A thesis of the text is that both the struggle against anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and the one against the mechanism creating, in certain circumstances, (...) a kind of negative feedback loop between them requires not only opposing the anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim prejudices, but also a deep, critical reconsideration of the concepts of Europeanness that lie at their foundation. The author suggests that a good starting point for this reconsideration might be the postcolonial reading of the Jewish intellectual tradition, especially the one focusing on the figure of the Mizrahi Jew. (shrink)

Seit 2003 ist neben Medizingeschichte und -theorie Medizinethik Bestandteil des Pflichtstudiencurriculums (Querschnittsbereich GTE). Zuvor, seit Ende der 80er Jahre, hatte es an vielen medizinischen Fakultäten optionale Veranstaltungen zur Medizinethik gegeben. Die Analyse von Veröffentlichungen zur Didaktik der Medizinethik und von Unterrichtscurricula zeigt, dass einem relativ geringen Stundenkontingent anspruchsvolle kognitive, emotionale und handlungsorientierte Lehrziele gegenüberstehen. Offenbar wird von der Medizinethik praxisbezogene Problemlösungskompetenz erwartet. Zugleich zeigt sich, dass die Vorbereitung der Studierenden auf schwierige moralische Entscheidungen nach wie vor ein Desiderat darstellt. Angesichts (...) der unausweichlichen Kluft zwischen Lehrzielen und Vermittlungsergebnissen bedarf es einer erneuten Lehrziel- und Curriculumsdiskussion. (shrink)

Using the example of cross-cultural philosophy’s relation to disciplinary philosophy, this article seeks to think through some of the issues relevant to diversifying philosophy as an academic discipline. Guided by James Tully’s ruminations on non-domination, it attempts to make a case for a practice of philosophy which is more attuned to its social situatedness in a postindustrial, liberal society. Within this context, it argues that disciplinary philosophy must seek to contribute to making meaning of our place in the world.