Results for 'Peter Klein'

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  1.  10
    Skepticism.P. Klein - 2002 - In P. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it (...)
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  2.  6
    Peter Schmitter, Hg., Zur Theorie und Methode der Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik.Carsten Klein - 1997 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):303-311.
  3.  5
    Peter Schmitter, Hg., Zur Theorie und Methode der Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik. [REVIEW]Carsten Klein - 1997 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):303-311.
  4. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  5.  20
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein & D. M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  6. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
  7. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  8. What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  9. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  10. Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
  11. Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  12. How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  13. When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
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  14. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so-called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non-basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification. If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition and if it is a proposition, then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima (...)
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  15. Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  16. A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  17.  19
    Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
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  18. The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
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  19. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
     
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  20.  16
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge.Jennifer Trusted, Alan White, Douglas Odegard, Peter Klein, Robert Shope & Marshall Swain - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):95-104.
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  21. Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge.Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
  22. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94.
     
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  23.  20
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
  24. Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  25. No Help for the Coherentist.Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
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  26. Epistemology.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Craig Edward (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
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  27. Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  28.  10
    Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - Noûs 18 (3):531-533.
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  29.  80
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
  30. Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma.Peter Klein - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and infinitism.
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  31. On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
    According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he (...)
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  32.  6
    What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Alonso Church - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129.
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  33.  10
    Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):560-565.
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  34. Infinitism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 245-256.
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  35. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  36.  71
    Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  37. Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter. pp. 487-508.
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  38.  93
    Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  39. Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  40.  22
    Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  41.  5
    When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718-729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
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  42. Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  43.  46
    Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
  44. ``Useful False Beliefs&Quot.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63.
  45. ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge".Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165--184.
  46.  46
    Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  47. 30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  48. Ascent and Assent?Peter D. Klein - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
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  49.  13
    What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief?Peter D. Klein - 2012 - In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter (...)
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  50. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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