Objective: Present research examined children’s behavioural and cognitive functioning by using data from a screening study based on reports given by parents and teachers, and investigated the strongest predictors of children’s fluid intelligence. Method: Scales: Conners Early Childhood Behaviour Scale and Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Preschool were filled out by parents and teachers of preschool children. Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices was used to measure fluid intelligence among preschool children. Results: Parent-teacher concordance was low to moderate. Working memory in BRIEF-P (...) estimated by teachers and parents mediated the relationship between inattention/hyperactivity in CEC BEH [S] and fluid intelligence among preschoolers. The difficulties with working memory assessed by teachers and parents were significant predictors of Raven scores; however, predictions based on teachers’ assessments were stronger. Conclusion: Clinicians should collect reports from various observers in order to implement prevention programs and optimize clinical diagnoses for children. Information from both parents and teachers give significant and complementary contribution to understanding difficulties with cognitive and behavioural functioning of preschoolers. (shrink)

The impact of background category information on the creation of social cliques: The role of need for cognitive closure and decisiveness This article focuses on the role of need for cognitive closure in the process of mental model creation about social relations. We assumed that high need for closure participants tend to rely on background category information when forming social cliques. We predicted that this tendency to employ categorical information as a mental aid, used in order to form social cliques, (...) would be efficient in simple task structures but would lead to increased error rates in complex task structures. The results confirmed our predictions, showing especially strong effects for the decisiveness component of need for closure. The importance of individual differences in need for closure and decisiveness in social reasoning is discussed. (shrink)

The paper presents an overview of research on working memory as a predictor of early school achievements. We contrast two main areas of research on the role of working memory in school achievements: the first concerns the structural model of working memory and the second focuses on executive functions. Then, we discuss the facet model of working memory as a promising approach merging the two research branches on working memory tasks as predictors of early school achievements. At the end we (...) present exemplary results of the research conducted on a national sample of six- and seven-year-olds in Poland, which indicates strong relation of working memory functions with the measures of competences in mathematics, reading, and writing. Additionally, the mediation analyses, with parents’ education as a covariate, indicate that the influence of age on achievements in math, reading, and writing in six- and seven-year olds is mediated by working memory functions. (shrink)

The widely accepted view states that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. Proponents of this view, the so-called non-deceptionists, argue that lies are simply insincere assertions. We conducted three experimental studies with false explanations, the results of which put some pressure on non-deceptionist analyses. We present cases of explanations that one knows are false and compare them with analogical explanations that differ only in having a deceptive intention. The results show that lay people distinguish between such false (...) explanations and to a higher degree classify as lies those explanations that are made with the intention to deceive. Non-deceptionists fail to distinguish between such cases and wrongly classify both as lies. This novel empirical finding indicates the need for supplementing non-deceptionist definitions of lying, at least in some cases, with an additional condition, such as an intention to deceive. (shrink)

The speech act of inquiry is generally treated as a default kind of asking questions. The widespread norm states that one inquires whether p only if one does not know that p. However, the fact that inquiring is just one kind of asking questions has received little to no attention. Just as in the declarative mood we can perform not only assertions, but various other speech acts, like guesses or predictions, so in the interrogative mood we can also make various (...) speech act types. I propose a speech-act-theoretic account of a distinct kind of question that I label exam questions. According to the proposed account, one performs an exam question p only if (i) one has access to the answer to p, and (ii) one does not officially know whether the hearer knows the answer to p. Exam questions satisfy all the necessary requirements of being a distinct kind of speech act. Additionally, my proposal contributes to the recent expansion of the normative approach to a variety of speech acts. (shrink)

In Dystopia: A Natural History, Gregory Claeys observes that the collectivist ethos is one of the common features of both utopia and dystopia. The crucial difference is that in utopia cooperation is free and voluntary, whereas in dystopia it takes the form of what Leszek Kołakowski has called compulsory solidarity, that is, solidarity imposed by means of coercion and thus deprived of its actual value.1 And yet, just as dystopia and utopia may well be two sides of the same coin, (...) dystopian compulsory fraternity is often counterbalanced by voluntary cooperation within an actual social system or a textual representation thereof. This is precisely what happens in the social science fiction of Janusz A. Zajdel... (shrink)

Poprzednie Antologie dotyczyły I Rzeczypospolitej, okresu zaborów oraz myśli politycznej po 1989 r., obecna obejmuje okres dwudziestolecia międzywojennego. Naszą – redaktorów – intencją było zapewnienie czytelnikowi możliwości bezpośredniego obcowania ze źródłem. Każde omówienie zawiera bowiem – nawet niezamierzoną – interpretację. Niezależnie od tego współcześnie możemy dostrzec powrót do części idei powstałych w okresie międzywojennym. Dajemy więc odbiorcy możliwość odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy mamy do czynienia z epigonami, czy z twórczymi kontynuatorami dawnych koncepcji. Wśród tekstów reprezentatywnych znalazły się zatem także te (...) nieznane, a wartościowe, sięgnęliśmy do publicystyki mniej znanych reprezentantów oraz grup marginalnych jak anarchiści czy synarchiści. Zdecydowaliśmy się na przyjęcie układu według nurtów politycznych. Z kolei w obrębie każdego z nurtów zastosowano kryterium chronologiczne. Dzięki temu możliwe było zasygnalizowanie kierunków ewolucji opinii i trendów np. w odniesieniu do instytucji państwa. Zbiór nasz adresujemy do szerokiego grona odbiorców: studentów, pracowników nauki, a także wszystkich osób zainteresowanych ideami politycznymi. (shrink)

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (...) (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion’s conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. (shrink)

I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions (...) can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies. (shrink)

Black Monday and the National Women’s Strike in 2016 caused a new wave of feminist/women’s activists to appear. One of the main determinants of the success of these protests was their geographical distribution: most of the demonstrations took place in small towns and cities. The main aim of this article is to present the civic practices of activists – organizers of the above-mentioned protests – from small towns and cities. On the basis of 24 in-depth interviews the authors intend to (...) present the characteristics of civic practices in provincial Polish cities. The proposed article will present a look at civic practices from a completely new perspective, using the dividing lines so far ignored in research on social movements, especially pro-women’s movements in Poland. (shrink)

We define a σ-ideal J D on the set of functions ω ω with the property that a real x ∈ ω ω is a Hechler real over V if and only if x omits all Borel sets in J D . In fact we define a topology D on ω ω related to Hechler forcing such that J D is the family of first category sets in D. We study cardinal invariants of the ideal J D.

Questions about the intrinsic value of nature are not only an abstract philosophical speculation, they have a practical meaning, can inspire and motivate people to act. Environmental ethics attempts to overcome the anthropocentric and personalistic attitude of traditional ethics. It emphasizes the intrinsic value of nature, value, which is independent from humans. Within non-anthropocentric environmental ethics there are individualistic and holistic trends. Biocentric individualism raises problems with resolving conflicts of interests of different organisms, with the hierarchy of beings, while holistic (...) ethics does not count with the well-being of individuals. Ethical holism should be contrasted with practical holism as a methodological postulate. The pragmatic current of ecological ethics acknowledges that the good of people and the intrinsic good of nature coincide. In a pluralistic, liberal society there should be a convergence of radical, biocentric and moderate, anthropocentric concepts of ecological ethics. (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic classification and characterization of speech acts and their norms. Recently, the normative approach has been applied to various speech acts, most notably to constatives. I start by showing how the work on the norms of assertion has influenced various approaches to the norms of other speech acts. I focus on the fact that various norms of assertion have different extensions, i.e., they denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to an assertion. I argue that this (...) has consequences for theorising about norms of other speech acts and generates certain arbitrary divisions. In the central part, I analyse two groups of speech acts. Firstly, ordinary speech acts, like predictions or retractions. Secondly, I indicate how the normative view can be extended to so-called ancillary speech acts, like presuppositions or implicatures. I end with a discussion of possible extensions of the normative approach, focusing on the debate on lying. (shrink)

The paper presents the main idea of point-free theories of space based on Tarski's system of point-free geometry. First, the general idea of the so-called point-free ontology was discussed, as well as the epistemological and methodological reasons for its adoption. Next, Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction, which is the methodological basis for the construction of point-free theories of space, is presented, and the fundamental concepts of mereology are discussed. The main part of the paper is a discussion of Tarski’s geometry (...) of solids, its postulates and metatheoretical properties. The paper ends with a short description of the contribution of Polish researchers to the development of research on point-free theories of space. (shrink)

We investigate definable topological dynamics of groups definable in an o‐minimal expansion of the field of reals. Assuming that a definable group G admits a model‐theoretic analogue of Iwasawa decomposition, namely the compact‐torsion‐free decomposition, we give a description of minimal subflows and the Ellis group of its universal definable flow in terms of this decomposition. In particular, the Ellis group of this flow is isomorphic to. This provides a range of counterexamples to a question by Newelski whether the Ellis group (...) is isomorphic to. We further extend the results to universal topological covers of definable groups, interpreted in a two‐sorted structure containing the o‐minimal sort and a sort for an abelian group. (shrink)

The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first place, that non˗deterministic theories of modern science are largely irrelevant to the philosophical issue of the causality principle. As it seems to be the ‘moral’ of the uncertainty principle, the reason why a deterministic theory cannot be applied to the description of certain physical systems is that it is impossible to capture such properties of the system, which are required by a desired theory. These properties (...) constitute what is called ‘the state’ of a system. However, the notion of a state of a system is relative: it depends on a particular theory which one would like to use to describe given kinds of phenomena. This implies that, even in the case where the desired state of a system is fundamentally impossible to be captured, neither ontological nor epistemological determinism may be excluded. Some following critical considerations are also offered with regard to the claim that uncertainty is “rooted in the things themselves”. The cradle of modern discussions about causality and determinism is, of course, quantum mechanics. Because, as it appears, a judgment on deterministic or non˗deterministic character of a theory can be made only after some interpretation of this theory has been given, the paper briefly reminds some chosen interpretations of quantum mechanics (Schrödinger's, probabilistic, statistical, Copenhagen, and the interpretation of quantum ensembles). Many of such interpretations, offered in the past, have now been rejected, and some gained more credibility than the others. Nonetheless, even the claim that indeterminism is irremovable from the description of the micro-world doesn't imply the rejection of the most general formula of the philosophical causality principle. There is no direct implication between theses of the epistemology of scientific knowledge and those of the ontology of the real world. (shrink)

The paper points to quite a surprising change of the attitude among general public towards science and scientific progress that seems to have happened at the turn of the 20th century, and, to an extent, stays on: from holding scientific enterprise in high esteem to treating scientists and fortune˗tellers on a par, from hopes that science will eventually resolve our problems, both theoretical and practical, to anxiety and fear of what scientific experiments can bring about in nature and human life. (...) After considering, in Part 1, possible reasons for this change, the paper focuses on supposedly real dangers associated with some particular scientific achievements. Part 2, “Physicist’s nightmares”, recalls some historical instances of the progress in physics, from the Manhattan Project to the opening of the Large Hadron Collider at CERN in 2008, fears that those experiments raised, and arguments ˗ both convincing and not quite so ˗ that were offered to reassure the public of their safety. Part 3, “Biologist’s dangerous plays”, turns to genetic engineering and certain fears this discipline raises which are captured in the term the “Frankenstein Syndrome”, e.g. the danger of genetically modified organisms getting to an unintended environment, or unexpected results of intended modifications. Here the paper offers some considerations regarding the notions of “intention” and “expectation”, which leads to fundamental doubts about plausibility of the conviction of the dangerous character of the research in question. Final conclusions point to a quite fundamental discrepancy between the power of science and the power of nature as the ultimate argument against exaggerated fears of scientific progress, and the post˗concluding remark offers additional support for it in terms of a brief theological observation for those who share Christian tradition. (shrink)

The essay presents some gnoseological themes with reference to the intellect of the separated soul according to John Duns Scotus. Four questions of the Ordinatio IV, d. 45 deal with these themes. In this concret cognitive situation is possible, according to Doctor Subtilis, to get to know the new quiddities of things, in spite of a lack of the empiric cognition. It means leaving behind the conception of generic empiricism and moving to the recognition of more cognitive abilities, as in (...) Aristoteles’s conception. In a post death state intellect continues to have the memory of the quiddities of things known while still connected with the body and can remember concret things and events known by the senses during earthly life. Such a gnoseological notion evidences the cognitive continuity of the human intellect after death, its incorruptibility and cognitive ability at least as such as one had during earthly life. We can see here the connection of philosophic and theological questions, which mutually condition and penetrate each other. According to Scotus it is possible for the intellect of the separated soul to remember the past and to acquire new cognition. Moreover, it is also possible for such an intellect to know the prayers we refer to the blessed in heaven. Such an intellectual approach evidences a strong Augustinian influence on John Duns Scotus’ epistemic conception. (shrink)

I argue against Milić's (2017) proposal of analyzing “selfless assertions” (Lackey 2007) as proper, i.e., as assertions which satisfy the norm of assertion. In his view, selfless assertions are hedged assertions governed by the knowledge norm. In my critique, I show that Milić does not make a case that selfless assertions constitute such a special class of assertions. Moreover, he does not deliver a clear criterion for differentiating between flat-out assertions and hedged ones. What is more, his proposal leaves some (...) cases of selfless assertions unexplained. The outcome is that we are still left without a satisfactory account of selfless assertions as proper assertions. (shrink)

Zasadnicza problematyka książki została podzielona na dwie części, uwzględniające tradycyjny podział na filozofię przyrody nieożywionej i filozofię przyrody ożywionej. Zastosowanie wspomnianego podziału jest uzasadnione zarówno charakterem bytów przyrodniczych, jak i dotychczasową literaturą przedmiotu. Te części poprzedzone zostały omówieniem zagadnień metodologicznych związanych z uprawianiem filozofii przyrody. Czwartą, dodatkową część publikacji, zatytułowaną Tajemnice przyrody, stanowią refleksje nad całością świata przyrodniczego ułożone w filozoficzny tryptyk: Przypadek, Cud, Sens. Są one próbą poszukiwania odpowiedzi na najbardziej podstawowe pytania, które pojawiają się na styku badań przyrodoznawstwa, (...) refleksji filozoficzno-przyrodniczej i teologii przyrody. (shrink)

The first part of the paper is a metatheoretical consideration of such philosophy of nature which allows for using scientific results in philosophical analyses. An epistemological 'judgment' of those results becomes a preliminary task of this discipline: this involves taking a position in the controversy between realistic and antirealistic accounts of science. It is shown that a philosopher of nature has to be a realist, if his task to build true ontology of reality is to be achieved. At the same (...) time he cannot be a realist ˗ a possibility that science itself is capable of deciding what beings really exist (a typical realistic claim is that scientific notions refer to something external and truly describe its characteristics) has to be denied, if the philosophy of nature is seen as a discipline investigating the natural world, while being epistemologically different from the natural sciences. A possibility of weakening this opposition is explored in the second part of the paper, where the idea of so-called "postulated ontology" of scientific theories is brought to the consideration. This idea appears in the context of a well-known thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data. It is argued in the paper, that the conviction of the existence of some kind of relation between a given theory and ontological ideas can be derived from this thesis, regardless of its particular form. Therefore, certain solutions to classical philosophical questions can be obtained, in principle, by careful inspection of scientific achievements. However, if the thesis of underdetermination holds, such philosophical solutions are not imposed by science itself. In order to arrive at some kind of ontology based on science, it seems necessary to accept certain philosophical presuppositions in the first place. This and the fact that scientific theories change in time show that although such a kind of ontology is possible, and perhaps desirable, it can never be ultimate. (shrink)