While Aristotle's account of the happy life continues to receive attention, many of his claims about virtue of character seem so puzzling that modern philosophers have often discarded them, or have reworked them to fit more familiar theories that do not make virtue of character central. In this book, Paula Gottlieb takes a fresh look at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean. She shows how they form a thought-provoking ethic of virtue, one that deserves to (...) be developed and refined. The first part of the book addresses the nature of virtue and the virtues, illuminated by the doctrine of the mean. Building on the conclusions of this analysis, the second part explains the mentality of the good person and the type of society that will allow such a person to flourish. (shrink)

Aristotle's discussion of the motivation of the good person is both complicated and cryptic. Depending on which passages are emphasized, he may seem to be presenting a Kantian style view according to which the good person is and ought to be motivated primarily by reason, or a Humean style view according to which desires and feelings are or ought to be in charge. In this book, Paula Gottlieb argues that Aristotle sees the thought, desires and feelings of the (...) good person as interdependent in a way that is sui generis, and she explains how Aristotle's concept of choice is an innovative and pivotal element in his account. Gottlieb's interpretation casts light on Aristotle's account of moral education, on the psychology of good, bad and half-bad people, and on the aesthetic and even musical side to being a good person. (shrink)

Aristotle’s principle that “nature does nothing in vain” (NDNIV) is central to his teleological approach to understanding organisms. First, we argue that James G. Lennox’s influential account of NDNIV is unsuccessful. Second, we propose an alternative account that includes a natural state model. According to a natural state model of development, an organism will develop toward its natural state unless interfering forces prevent that from happening. Third, we argue that this account also fits Aristotle’s discussion in the Generation of Animals (...) and can explain monstrosities in nature that at first sight seem to be counterexamples to NDNIV. Fourth, we take a broader look at NDNIV, arguing that it does not entail that all structures are teleological (since it accommodates the thought that by-products and some neglected items that Aristotle calls “tokens” are nonteleological), that it does not entail that there is only one function per organ, that NDNIV is not an anthropocentric principle, and that, perhaps surprisingly, the teleological structures of an organism can benefit others apart from the organism and its progeny. Finally, we argue that Aristotle endorsed an empirical justification of NDNIV wherein the principle is justified by its many successful applications. (shrink)

While Aristotle's account of the happy life continues to receive attention, many of his claims about virtue of character seem so puzzling that modern philosophers have often discarded them, or have reworked them to fit more familiar theories that do not make virtue of character central. In this book, Paula Gottlieb takes a fresh look at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean. She shows how they form a thought-provoking ethic of virtue, one that deserves to (...) be developed and refined. The first part of the book addresses the nature of virtue and the virtues, illuminated by the doctrine of the mean. Building on the conclusions of this analysis, the second part explains the mentality of the good person and the type of society that will allow such a person to flourish. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Practical Side of Deliberation The Analogy between the Theoretical and Practical Syllogism and the Importance of the Middle Term Formulating the Practical Syllogism and the Analogous Middle Term The Middle Term and the Ethical Agent The Middle Term and Ethical Virtue: Deliberation Re‐visited A Note on the Enkratic, the Akratic, and the Learner Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes Reference Further reading.

The aim of Becker’s book is to bring stoicism up to date and to defend a contemporary stoic ethical theory against the prejudices of the skeptical modern reader. Becker imagines what would have happened if stoicism had had a continuous history from ancient times to the present. Since the stoics are thoroughgoing naturalists, according to Becker, they would have incorporated the insights of modern biology and psychology into their theory. They would have abandoned their teleological view of the universe and (...) they would have expanded their account of human psychological development using the latest textbooks in psychology. Stoics are often caricatured as leading bleak lives of forbearance and denial. According to Becker, modern stoics, in favorable circumstances, can enjoy life as much as anyone else and, like their ancient counterparts, can hail from all walks of life. Modern stoicism does not require that one always be cool and detached. Instead, one should be so only when the situation demands it. Nor does modern stoicism require that one lower one’s sights in order not to be disappointed. Instead, it merely enjoins one not to attempt the impossible. Modern stoics are determinists, not fatalists. Finally, despite the comments on the book jacket, modern stoics do not believe that virtue is the only good, although they still believe that virtue is a unique, unconditional, and incommensurable good. (shrink)

Professor Vlastos argues that Socratic irony was responsible for a momentous change in the way in which irony was understood in ancient times. Before Socrates, he argues, irony is connected with lying and deceit, but after Socrates it is associated with wit and urbanity. Vlastos claims that Socratic irony is distinctive and complex. According to Vlastos, Socratic irony involves no hint of deception; it consists simply in saying something which when understood in one way is false, but when understood in (...) another way is true. (shrink)

Professor Vlastos argues that Socratic irony was responsible for a momentous change in the way in which irony was understood in ancient times. Before Socrates, he argues, irony is connected with lying and deceit, but after Socrates it is associated with wit and urbanity. Vlastos claims that Socratic irony is distinctive and complex. According to Vlastos, Socratic irony involves no hint of deception; it consists simply in saying something which when understood in one way is false, but when understood in (...) another way is true. (shrink)

From the editor: On behalf of the editors of FPQ, I thank our colleagues for providing us their public addresses at the Celebration of Life of Professor Claudia Falconer Card of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who died on Saturday, September 12, 2015. Claudia Card was the author of over one hundred articles and books, key works of moral and feminist philosophy including Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil, and The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral (...) Luck. She was the president of the Central division of the APA 2010-2011, which she often described as her favorite division of the APA. She earned her BA from UW-Madison, and her PhD in 1969 from Harvard University, as the advisee of John Rawls, whom she spoke of with affection as one of the most sensitive and generous of philosophers. I remain grateful to Claudia for being the sort of philosopher who helped her students, colleagues, and readers to confront our responsibilities, and the responsibilities of others, as she lived her own philosophy of taking responsibility for one’s own identity. K.J. Norlock. (shrink)

This chapter examines the main issues in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The discussions cover his views on happiness, virtues of character, virtues of thought, moral responsibility, moral dilemmas, practical reasoning, choice, akrasia, pleasure, and friendship.

Abstract:Accepting the controversial thesis that Aristotle is an ethical egoist, I argue that Aristotle's brand of ethical egoism is immune to four important objections to such a position. I analyse the causes of the four objections showing (a) that Aristotle does not have a conception of happiness which would give rise to the first three, and (b) that his account of practical reasoning, of which I provide an original interpretation, can deal with the fourth.

This Element is an examination of the philosophical themes presented in Aristotle's Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. Topics include happiness, the voluntary and choice, the doctrine of the mean, particular virtues of character and temperamental means, virtues of thought, akrasia, pleasure, friendship, and luck. Special attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of virtues of character and thought and their relation to happiness, the reason why Aristotle is the quintessential virtue ethicist. The virtues of character have not received the attention they (...) deserve in most discussions of the relationship between the two treatises. (shrink)

Aristotle’s account of happiness aims to show that happiness is both objective and attainable. According to Aristotle, the pursuit of happiness benefits both the agent and other people too. This paper attempts to explain how Aristotle’s account supports these claims. Along the way, I argue that Aristotle’s much-maligned doctrine of the mean has some true and important implications concerning the nature and value of happiness.

(2012). Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 1205-1207. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.730985.

The aim of Becker’s book is to bring stoicism up to date and to defend a contemporary stoic ethical theory against the prejudices of the skeptical modern reader. Becker imagines what would have happened if stoicism had had a continuous history from ancient times to the present. Since the stoics are thoroughgoing naturalists, according to Becker, they would have incorporated the insights of modern biology and psychology into their theory. They would have abandoned their teleological view of the universe and (...) they would have expanded their account of human psychological development using the latest textbooks in psychology. Stoics are often caricatured as leading bleak lives of forbearance and denial. According to Becker, modern stoics, in favorable circumstances, can enjoy life as much as anyone else and, like their ancient counterparts, can hail from all walks of life. Modern stoicism does not require that one always be cool and detached. Instead, one should be so only when the situation demands it. Nor does modern stoicism require that one lower one’s sights in order not to be disappointed. Instead, it merely enjoins one not to attempt the impossible. Modern stoics are determinists, not fatalists. Finally, despite the comments on the book jacket, modern stoics do not believe that virtue is the only good, although they still believe that virtue is a unique, unconditional, and incommensurable good. (shrink)

One might think that inequality of income and wealth are a special cause for concern only nowadays. But, perhaps surprisingly, equality and inequality of resources are issues addressed by Aristotle in his Politics. I first discuss Aristotle’s suggestion that equality of resources is a way of avoiding faction. I then discuss Aristotle’s relatively neglected critique of Phaleas of Chalcedon’s proposal for equal plots of land, arguing that Aristotle actually improves on Phaleas’s ideas in his own proposal for a second-best constitution. (...) In such a constitution, Aristotle avoids the hour-glass distribution of rich and poor that is a modern problem. His proposal also incorporates some aspects of his famous doctrine of the mean. I then briefly discuss the question of resources in Aristotle’s ideal city of the Politics and in his ethical works, speculating on the question why distributive justice in relation to wealth is not addressed in the passages of the Politics I discuss. I conclude with some brief reflections on modern and ancient views. (shrink)

In her new book, Leunissen, author of Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature, turns her expertise in Aristotle's biology to the issue of virtue of character. The book contains some fascinating material from Aristotle's biological works and also material from relatively neglected parts of the Politics, including discussions of ethnography, climate, physiognomy, and "eugenics." Leunissen's thesis is that an examination of this material will provide insight into how people become morally virtuous, and especially why Aristotle excludes women from (...) this group.Leunissen suggests that it is Aristotle's biology that leads to his views about women, but that does not exclude the possibility of the... (shrink)

Aristotle’s practical syllogism is an ethical topic. It is possible to construct an ethical syllogism that explains the actions of the good human being, with the first part of the minor premise referring to the agent’s character. The resulting account coheres with Aristotle’s discussions of the akratic, the enkratic and the learner, and with Aristotle’s view that practical wisdom requires full ethical virtue and conversely. The ethical syllogism is central to Aristotle’s ethic of virtue.

Aristotle’s practical syllogism is an ethical topic. It is possible to construct an ethical syllogism that explains the actions of the good human being, with the first part of the minor premise referring to the agent’s character. The resulting account coheres with Aristotle’s discussions of the akratic, the enkratic and the learner, and with Aristotle’s view that practical wisdom requires full ethical virtue and conversely. The ethical syllogism is central to Aristotle’s ethic of virtue.