Prema hjumovskoj teoriji motivacije, motivacijski se proces sastoji od dva međusobno nezavisna mentalna stanja , što znači da subjekt ne može biti u potpunosti motiviran na djelovanje ako mu jedno od tih stanja nedostaje. U prvom dijelu članka prikazujem središnja obilježja ove teorije, a potom pokazujem da prihvaćanje Humeove distinkcije između divljih i tihih strasti može biti vrlo koristan alat za obranu ovog modela od nekih standardnih prigovora.

Contemporary defenses of the doctrine of double effect are mainly focused on avoiding the absurdity charge raised by Judith Thomson (). There are two strategies proposed in the literature for refuting Thomson's argument. In this paper I argue that answering Thomson's challenge comes at a heavy price: while both versions of the DDE that are developed within these two strategies successfully avoid the absurdity charge, they also remain incomplete. Thomson's argument reveals that the proponents of the DDE can at best (...) provide a partial defense of the claim that intentions can be relevant to permissibility. (shrink)

Internalisti razloga smatraju da je prisutnost motiva preduvjet za postojanje razloga. Prema humeovskoj interpretaciji ovog stajališta, razlozi za djelovanje uvijek su relativni budući da njihovo postojanje ovisi o arbitrarnim elementima koji čine nečiji subjektivni motivacijski skup. Jedan od najvećih izazova humeovskom internalizmu predstavlja kantovska interpretacija internalističkog stajališta. Glavna intencija kantovskog pristupa jest dokazati mogućnost racionalne motivacije te tako osporiti humeovski relativizam. U članku kritički prikazujem ovu raspravu te nastojim obraniti humeovski internalizam od jednog suvremenog kantovskog prijedloga.Internalists about reasons argue that (...) the presence of a motive is a precondition for the existence of a reason. According to the Humean interpretation of this view, reasons for action are always relative since their existence depends on the arbitrary elements which form one’s subjective motivational set. One of the greatest challenges to Humean internalism is the Kantian interpretation of the internalist position. The main intention of Kantian approach is to prove the possibility of rational motivation and thus deny Humean internalism. In this article I critically examine this discussion and attempt to defend Humean internalism against one contemporary Kantian proposal. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is probably the most influential version of moral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknown Mackie’s “argument from querness”. In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can (...) ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties. (shrink)

Predmet ovog rada je vjerojatno najutjecajnija verzija moralnog realizma, poznata kao “moralni realizam naturalizam”. Nakon što predložim formulaciju za koju smatram da najpotpunije opisuje poziciju moralnog realizma, raspravljam o tome je li moguće provesti aposteriornu identifikaciju moralnih i prirodnih svojstava. U drugom dijelu nastojim pokazati da moralni realisti naturalisti ne uspijevaju izbjeći poznatom Mackievu “argumentu iz čudnosti” . Na kraju raspravljam o tome mogu li realisti naturalisti moralnim svojstvima pripisati eksplanatornu moć.The subject of this paper is probably the most influential (...) version ofmoral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknownMackie’s “argument from querness” . In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties. (shrink)

Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that strong motivational internalism is false because it cannot accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I argue that the reasons for endorsing (...) weak motivational internalism of any form are not compelling. (shrink)

In his book Moralna spoznaja Baccarini argues that, with respect to the individual reasoning about morality, the method of reflective equilibrium is the appropriate method of moral reasoning. The starting point of my argument is Baccarini’s refutation of Hare’s view. As I see it, one of Baccarini’s central arguments against Hare consists in claiming that Hare’s approach to the amoralist objection weakens the deductive model of moral reasoning. I argue that the amoralist objection also posses a threat to the method (...) of reflective equilibrium. At the end of the paper, I consider another view of moral reasoning which, in my view, is better suited to deal with the amoralist objection. (shrink)

This paper examines a well-known non-identity case of a mother who chooses to conceive a blind child instead of a sighted one. While some people accept the non-identity argument and claim that we should reject the intuition that the mother’s act is morally wrong, others hold onto that intuition and try to find a fault in the non-identity argument. This paper proposes a somewhat middle approach. It is argued that the conclusion of the non-identity argument is not necessarily in conflict (...) with our intuitive response to this case. (shrink)

In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal. Kohar focuses on the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience. The work significantly contributes to two areas of literature: 1) the debate between representationalism and non-representationalism, and 2) the literature on mechanistic explanation. Kohar begins with (...) an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience. (shrink)

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response, which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify the grounds on which the state is justified in acting (...) against them. This article argues that the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria. Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such ‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that they can serve as a useful guide for public policy. (shrink)

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social co...

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to (...) be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of Scanlon’s Promises and Practices and What We Owe to Each Other, expectations have become an important topic within discussions on promises. However, confining the role of expectations to promises does not do justice to their importance in creating obligations more generally. This paper argues that expectations are one of the major sources of obligations created within our personal relationships. What we owe to our friends, partners, or siblings very often follows neither from the duties associated (...) with the given role, nor from our explicit promises, commitments, declarations, or consents. The obligations that our close relationships create often arise from a shared understanding of those relationships—and subsequent mutually acknowledged expectations. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning—the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context‐dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can (a) explain a wide range (...) of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures, and (b) explain partial understanding of an utterance. (shrink)

Práce se zabývá filosofickou analýzou vědeckého výzkumu, kterou v polovině minulého století provedla botanička Agnes Arberová. Její koncepce je cenným příspěvkem k otázce kontextu vzniku vědeckého objevu a procesu jeho zdůvodnění v biologických disciplínách. Ve stati se pokusím doložit, že její úvahy mají ráz v zásadě fenomenologický, a proto bude její koncepce interpretována na pozadí úvah Maurice Merleau-Pontyho o tělesné povaze smyslů. Taková interpretace napovídá, že Arberová ve shodě s Merleau-Pontym uvažuje o fenoménech nikoli jako o objektech, které lze zkoumat (...) odděleně, nýbrž nám představuje fenomenální pole, v němž se fenomény vyjevují v souvislosti s předcházející zkušeností. Orientace v předmětu výzkumu lze vnímat jako otázku rovnováhy, jíž badatel výzkumem aktivně vyhledává. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations (...) that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as “widely shared”. In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of (...) Peregrin’s proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin’s response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations – a specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition. (shrink)

Ispitujuci ulogu porodice u procesu intergeneracijskog/transgeneracijskog prenosenja traume i secanja, rad pokusava da odgovori na pitanje na koji nacin suocavanje sa neprozivljenom prosloscu utice na zivote potomaka neposrednih pocinilaca i zrtava holokausta, odnosno, na formiranje identiteta tzv. postgeneracije? Sto je vremenska distanca u odnosu na Drugi svetski rat veca, i sto je broj onih sa neposrednim iskustvom i secanjem manji, termini kao sto su pamcenje i sec?anje poceli su da gube svoje ustaljeno znacenje. Kako je istrazivanje pokazalo, i pored odsustva (...) licnog secanja, pripadnici potomaka onih koji su preziveli masivne traumatske dogadjaje subjektivno su duboko povezani sa secanjem prethodne generacije. U skladu sa cinjenicom da samu traumu i secanje nije moguce fizicki preneti na potomke, rad analizira i poredi termine koje je strucna literatura do sada usvojila, kao sto su sekundarna traumatizacija, tercijarna traumatizacija, zatim, eho traume, ali i postpamcenje. Osnovna teza ovog rada jeste da eho secanja, eho traume, suocavanje s prosloscu, ali i istovremena nemogucnost izmirenja s njom, dovode do tzv. krize identiteta postgeneracije holokausta. (shrink)

Ispitujuci ulogu porodice u procesu intergeneracijskog/transgeneracijskog prenosenja traume i secanja, rad pokusava da odgovori na pitanje na koji nacin suocavanje sa neprozivljenom prosloscu utice na zivote potomaka neposrednih pocinilaca i zrtava holokausta, odnosno, na formiranje identiteta tzv. postgeneracije? Sto je vremenska distanca u odnosu na Drugi svetski rat veca, i sto je broj onih sa neposrednim iskustvom i secanjem manji, termini kao sto su pamcenje i sec?anje poceli su da gube svoje ustaljeno znacenje. Kako je istrazivanje pokazalo, i pored odsustva (...) licnog secanja, pripadnici potomaka onih koji su preziveli masivne traumatske dogadjaje subjektivno su duboko povezani sa secanjem prethodne generacije. U skladu sa cinjenicom da samu traumu i secanje nije moguce fizicki preneti na potomke, rad analizira i poredi termine koje je strucna literatura do sada usvojila, kao sto su sekundarna traumatizacija, tercijarna traumatizacija, zatim, eho traume, ali i postpamcenje. Osnovna teza ovog rada jeste da eho secanja, eho traume, suocavanje s prosloscu, ali i istovremena nemogucnost izmirenja s njom, dovode do tzv. krize identiteta postgeneracije holokausta. (shrink)

Continuously from the 1940s, Michael Polanyi comments on topics that have resonated later since the 1960s in the works of his fellow theorists of science, philosophers of natural sciences, and epistemologists. First part of this article provides a brief reconstruction of Polanyi’s concept of „personal knowledge“ which focuses mainly on the interconnection of the individual level of scientific research with its social dimension. My aim is to evaluate the potential of this concept for the interpretation of research fields where sciences (...) are in close contact with other disciplines. I am convinced that Polanyi’s original approach to the problem of reality should be read as an advocacy of diversity of thought. In my interpretation, Polanyi carries out some form of philosophical therapy of science and its self-concept, which, like the whole of Western society, has undergone dramatic changes over the last century. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce Speedith which is an interactive diagrammatic theorem prover for the well-known language of spider diagrams. Speedith provides a way to input spider diagrams, transform them via the diagrammatic inference rules, and prove diagrammatic theorems. Speedith’s inference rules are sound and complete, extending previous research by including all the classical logic connectives. In addition to being a stand-alone proof system, Speedith is also designed as a program that plugs into existing general purpose theorem provers. This allows (...) for other systems to access diagrammatic reasoning via Speedith, as well as a formal verification of diagrammatic proof steps within standard sentential proof assistants. We describe the general structure of Speedith, the diagrammatic language, the automatic mechanism that draws the diagrams when inference rules are applied on them, and how formal diagrammatic proofs are constructed. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge production is a domain of human excellence, but recently this position became progressively challenged by machine intelligence. Some human tasks will be conquered sooner; others, which include design, may still require human intuition. Would the automated knowledge production truly challenge the human, or is one just an extension – a prosthetic – of the other? What could be the place of art in such environment? Mess and messy scientific models have the potential to provide paradigm shifts in molecular (...) modelling, cancer research and systems biology where not only living humans but also machine learning algorithms craft knowledge. Together with art they have the potential for different reading and re-framing, which are the qualities scientists are looking for when engaging works of art within their molecular modelling process. In my opinion, these are the same qualities scientists are also looking for in the outputs of machine learning and computational chemistry modelling. (shrink)

Prolonged trunk flexion is known to affect passive and active stabilization of the trunk. Previous studies have evaluated changes in spinal range of motion, muscle activity and reflex behavior induced by prolonged trunk flexion, whereas the effect on sitting postural control is vastly underexplored. In this study, we compared the effects of supported and unsupported intermittent trunk flexion on center of pressure motion during sitting on an unstable seat. Participants were exposed to 1-h intermittent trunk flexion and CoP root mean (...) square distance, velocity and frequency before and after the exposure were assessed. Contrary to our hypothesis, there were no main effects of exposure, no main effects of condition, and no interaction between exposure and condition. Our results indicate that prolonged intermittent flexion does not induce any changes in CoP motion during a seated balance task, regardless of the presence of a trunk support during prolonged intermittent flexion. This suggests a successful compensation of decreased passive stiffness by increased reflex activity. (shrink)

For more than a decade now a profound rule-of-law crisis has gripped the European Union, and while the fight for the rule of law has topped not only the academic but also the judicial and political agenda, the results have been disappointingly meagre. This article argues that the main reason for that should be sought in a political strategic move of justifying the assaults on the rule of law by resorting to an “illiberal democracy.” This premeditated political narrative shift has (...) unleashed onto the political sphere and onto public discourse at large comprehensive doctrines which had hitherto been left dormant thanks to an overlapping consensus on the rule of law as a central building block of the political conception of justice à la Rawls. Once this overlapping consensus was broken, the rule of law itself lost its neutral character as a referee on the right among the many conceptions of the good, itself becoming part of the highly politicized power play for dominance among irreconcilable—liberal and illiberal—comprehensive doctrines. The overlapping consensus in the EU is thus broken, but there are no conceptual reasons inherent to the rule of law itself for which it could not be rebuilt in the future. (shrink)

Tattoos are widely regarded as morally neutral, and the decision to have them as carrying no ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to question this assumption. I argue that decisions to have tattoos involve risks that are not merely prudential—they are normative. The argument starts with a thesis that the power we presently have over our lives is constrained by the need to respect our future selves. If we make a discretionary choice that disregards our future interests and (...) preferences, then, under certain circumstances, we can be morally to blame. I argue that certain decisions to get tattoos fit this description. Therefore, getting some tattoos makes us blameworthy. (shrink)

After a brief discussion of the terms determinism and free will, the paper sets out to compare some recent philosophical approaches to the problem of free will with a theological anthropology account of the notion. It aims to defend the claim, that even though different kind of questions are asked on both sides, they tackle similar issues and a complementary approach is needed. Recent philosophy considers the problem mostly from the standpoint of logic, naturalist evolutionary ontology and cognitive science. In (...) the Christian theological tradition, the idea of free will has been discussed mostly from the perspective of the problem of sin and grace, thus on the grounds of soteriology, hamartiology and theological ethics. The paper shows similarities between the approaches, mainly between the problem of physical determinism and theological determinism and also divine foreknowledge. (shrink)

The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “off-loading computation from the brain to the body”, where the body is said to perform “morphological computation”. Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the ‘off-loading’ perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus distinguish (1) morphology that (...) facilitates control, (2) morphology that facilitates perception and the rare cases of (3) morphological computation proper, such as ‘reservoir computing.’ where the body is actually used for computation. This result contributes to the understanding of the relation between embodiment and computation: The question for robot design and cognitive science is not whether computation is offloaded to the body, but to what extent the body facilitates cognition and control – how it contributes to the overall ‘orchestration’ of intelligent behaviour. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the process of European integration. It is argued that the nature of this relationship has been both mutually informative and transformative. As a particular understanding of sovereignty has influenced and determined the perception of European integration, i.e., its conceptualization, so the process of European integration has reflected back on sovereignty and entailed its rethinking. This poses a particular challenge for legal theorists: how to pin down the meaning of sovereignty (...) and European integration so as to put both in the best conceptual and normative light. The article begins by looking at the traditional perspective on sovereignty and how this has been challenged by European integration. The focus then shifts from sovereignty to European integration in order to examine how different perspectives on sovereignty, when used as an epistemic lens for understanding the process of European integration, have produced uneven conceptions of this integration. Finally, the article concludes by making a choice between the various conceptions of sovereignty and European integration. It is argued that the best conception of European integration is offered by the constitutional form of a union founded on pluralist sovereignty. (shrink)

Though historically important, the notion of tacit consent plays little role in contemporary discussions of political legitimacy. The idea, in fact, is often dismissed as obviously implausible. The ambition of this paper is to challenge this assumption and show that tacit consent can become a key ingredient in a theory of legitimacy. Instead of defining tacit consent through residence (where, according to John Locke or Plato's Socrates, staying in the country amounts to tacitly consenting to its system of rule), the (...) paper explores a different strategy, delimiting tacit consent as an absence of active dissent. The basic idea starts from the fact that widespread anti-government protests and demonstrations always carry a potent delegitimating force. Political legitimacy is therefore never permanent and unchangeable, regardless of the nature of the regime, and can be undermined at all times by active dissent from the population. Having established the relationship between dissent and delegitimation of political power, even the inverted, stronger claim is defended: the absence of active dissent (i.e., tacit consent) can, under certain circumstances, serve to legitimize political power. The paper sets up and defends several conditions that need to be met for the right normative mandate to be created by the population tacitly accepting the existing power arrangements. If those are fulfilled (especially when full freedom of expression and information is granted), tacit consent can become a vital element of political legitimacy. (shrink)

Engineers fine-tune the design of robot bodies for control purposes, however, a methodology or set of tools is largely absent, and optimization of morphology (shape, material properties of robot bodies, etc.) is lagging behind the development of controllers. This has become even more prominent with the advent of compliant, deformable or ”soft” bodies. These carry substantial potential regarding their exploitation for control—sometimes referred to as ”morphological computation”. In this article, we briefly review different notions of computation by physical systems and (...) propose the dynamical systems framework as the most useful in the context of describing and eventually designing the interactions of controllers and bodies. Then, we look at the pros and cons of simple vs. complex bodies, critically reviewing the attractive notion of ”soft” bodies automatically taking over control tasks. We address another key dimension of the design space—whether model-based control should be used and to what extent it is feasible to develop faithful models for different morphologies. (shrink)

The conflict between perfectionism and the neutrality of a liberal state is one of the burning issues of contemporary liberalism and political philosophy as a whole. The paper examines the roots of the perfectionist as well as neutralistic thinking, which are found in the philosophies of Immaneul Kant and John Rawls respectively. Through the reconsideration of the latter the character of the conflict can also be redefined. The aim of the paper is to show the basic difference between the above (...) mentioned conceptions, which in the long run appears to be an anthropological one. (shrink)

The article aims to provide a general framework for assessing and categorizing the cognitive systems of human and non-human animals. Our approach stems from biosemiotic, ethological, and phenomenological investigations into the relations of organisms to one another and to their environment. Building on the analyses of Merleau-Ponty and Portmann, organismal bodies and surfaces are distinguished as the base for sign production and interpretation. Following the concept of modelling systems by Sebeok, we develop a concentric model of human and non-human animal (...) cognition that posits three intertwined spheres: corporeity, social communication, and culture. The model explicitly works with the pluralistic perspective that views the communication and cognition of humans as distinct, but not superior to those of non-human animals. Our position is substantiated by two case studies: the first one focuses on the acquisition and spread of nut-cracking technique among the chimpanzees in the Täi forest, the second one on the communication and cognition of deafblind persons. From an epistemological perspective, our paper is a contribution to contemporary attempts to link biosemiotics and ethology with phenomenological concepts of agency, living bodies, and lifeworld. (shrink)

Business ethics’ theories have come under a lot of criticism lately. The problem has been the lack of a philosophical base or the inadequate implementation of it. We are trying to solve this problem by examining the roots of ethics and then applying it to the business environment. The root that has been undeservedly overlooked has been the concept of free will, the oldest philosophical problem on which every ethics theory lies. We have chosen two theories that we think would (...) be the best base for business ethics. We will shortly present the others. Since free will presents the core of business ethics, business ethicists must first agree on which theory to implement. Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ theory of free will best amplify the core of economic theory, because it gives reason a central and most important role in the theory. The concept of free will is mainly philosophical as is business ethics so the article follows this tradition, but we tried to give business examples where possible. We do not give a final conclusion because it should be reached by debate and mutual agreement between business ethicists. (shrink)

The relativistic quantum mechanics with Lorentz-invariant evolution parameter and indefinite mass is a very elegant theory. But it cannot be derived by quantizing the usual classical relativity in which there is the mass-shell constraint. In this paper the classical theory is modified so that it remains Lorentz invariant, but the constraint disappears; mass is no longer fixed—it is an arbitrary constant of motion. The quantization of this unconstrained theory gives the relativistic quantum mechanics in which wave functions are localized and (...) normalized in spacetime. Though many authors have published good works in support for such a localization in time, the latter has been generally considered as problematic. Here I show that wave packets restricted to a finite region of spacetime are not a nuisance, but just the contrary. They have the physical interpretation in the fact that an observer perceives a world line event by event, as his experience of “now” proceeds in spacetime. Quantum mechanically this means that at a certain value of the evolution parameter τ the event is most probably to occur within the spacetime region around {ie1005-1} occupied by the wave packet; at later value of τ the position {ie1005-2}—and hence the time coordinate t—of the wave packet is changed. This is closely related to the interpretation of quantum mechanics in general. (shrink)

A new theory is considered according to which extended objects in n-dimensional space are described in terms of multivector coordinates which are interpreted as generalizing the concept of center of mass coordinates. While the usual center of mass is a point, by generalizing the latter concept, we associate with every extended object a set of r-loops, r=0,1,...,n−1, enclosing oriented (r+1)-dimensional surfaces represented by Clifford numbers called (r+1)-vectors or multivectors. Superpositions of multivectors are called polyvectors or Clifford aggregates and they are (...) elements of Clifford algebra. The set of all possible polyvectors forms a manifold, called C-space. We assume that the arena in which physics takes place is in fact not Minkowski space, but C-space. This has many far reaching physical implications, some of which are discussed in this paper. The most notable is the finding that although we start from the constrained relativity in C-space we arrive at the unconstrained Stueckelberg relativistic dynamics in Minkowski space which is a subspace of C-space. (shrink)