Linear logic, introduced in 1986 by J.-Y. Girard, is based upon a fine grain analysis of the main proof-theoretical notions of logic. The subject develops along the lines of denotational semantics, proof nets and the geometry of interaction. Its basic dynamical nature has attracted computer scientists, and various promising connections have been made in the areas of optimal program execution, interaction nets and knowledge representation. This book is the refereed proceedings of the first international meeting on linear logic held at (...) Cornell University, in June 1993. Survey papers devoted to specific areas of linear logic, as well as an extensive general introduction to the subject by J.-Y. Girard, have been added, so as to make this book a valuable tool both for the beginner and for the advanced researcher. (shrink)

Recently, Lincoln, Scedrov and Shankar showed that the multiplicative fragment of second order intuitionistic linear logic is undecidable, using an encoding of second order intuitionistic logic. Their argument applies to the multiplicative-additive fragment, but it does not work in the classical case, because second order classical logic is decidable. Here we show that the multiplicative-additive fragment of second order classical linear logic is also undecidable, using an encoding of two-counter machines originally due to Kanovich. The faithfulness of this encoding is (...) proved by means of the phase semantics. (shrink)

InA Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that “to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice.” Although it may indeed seem intuitively plausible that a principle based on “threat advantage” cannot count as a principle of justice, it is an altogether different matter to explain why this is so. The question is especially pressing if one bears in mind that such a principle of bargaining in fact underlies many institutionally regulated interactions. Moreover, to the extent that (...) morality is thought of as a mechanism for guaranteeing mutual advantage in the resolution of conflicts, it may indeed seem necessary that it reflect the bargaining power of the parties (in order to make sure that it is indeed advantageous for all of them). In fact, there is a prominent tradition of social-contract theories (from Hobbes to Gauthier) that work under this assumption and claim to provide an answer to what justice requires as much as Rawls's theory does. So seen, the burden of proof seems to fall rather on the shoulders of those committed to claim both that morality is a mechanism that works to the advantage of all and that it nevertheless requires neutralizing all differences in bargaining power. (shrink)

InA Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that “to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice.” Although it may indeed seem intuitively plausible that a principle based on “threat advantage” cannot count as a principle of justice, it is an altogether different matter to explain why this is so. The question is especially pressing if one bears in mind that such a principle of bargaining in fact underlies many institutionally regulated interactions. Moreover, to the extent that (...) morality is thought of as a mechanism for guaranteeing mutual advantage in the resolution of conflicts, it may indeed seem necessary that it reflect the bargaining power of the parties (in order to make sure that it is indeed advantageous for all of them). In fact, there is a prominent tradition of social-contract theories (from Hobbes to Gauthier) that work under this assumption and claim to provide an answer to what justice requires as much as Rawls's theory does. So seen, the burden of proof seems to fall rather on the shoulders of those committed to claim both that morality is a mechanism that works to the advantage of all and that it nevertheless requires neutralizing all differences in bargaining power. (shrink)

In this essay I analyze some conceptual difficulties associated with the demand that global institutions be made more democratically accountable. In the absence of a world state, it may seem inconsistent to insist that global institutions be accountable to all those subject to their decisions while also insisting that the members of these institutions, as representatives of states, simultaneously remain accountable to the citizens of their own countries for the special responsibilities they have towards them. This difficulty seems insurmountable in (...) light of the widespread acceptance of a state-centric conception of human rights, according to which states and only states bear primary responsibility for the protection of their citizens' rights. Against this conception, I argue that in light of the current structures of global governance the monistic ascription of human rights obligations to states is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, states are bound to fail in their ability to protect the human rights of their citizens whenever potential violations either stem from transnational regulations or are perpetrated by non-state actors. In order to show the plausibility of an alternative, pluralist conception of human rights obligations I turn to the current debate among scholars of international law regarding the human rights obligations of non-state actors. I document the various ways in which these obligations could be legally entrenched in global financial institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. These examples indicate feasible methods for strengthening the democratic accountability of these institutions while also respecting the accountability that participating member states owe to their own citizens. I conclude that, once the distinctions between the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights are taken into account, no conceptual difficulty remains in holding states and non-state actors accountable for their respective human rights obligations. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyze the cosmopolitan project for a new international order that Habermas has articulated in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is a very ambitious model for a future international order geared to fulfill the peace and human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the obligation to protect human rights by the international community is circumscribed to the negative duty (...) of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts and those due to regulations of the global economic order. I conclude that the cosmopolitan goals of the Habermasian project can only be achieved if the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community are ambitious enough to cover economic justice. (shrink)

Investigating the possible overlap between depressed and presumably strong Black women, this article maintains that women's experiences of depression are both gendered and raced. A review of clinical and popular literatures examining Black women's experiences of depression as well as findings from an interview study with a nonclinical sample of 44 Black women suggest that the discourse of being strong may normalize a distressinducing level of selflessness and powerlessness among such women. Implications of this study include the need to consider (...) the racially specific ways in which women are placed at risk for and experience depression. (shrink)

In his Democracy across borders, Bohman articulates an ambitious political proposal for a future international order. Perhaps its most salient feature is the promise of global democracy without a world government. Global democracy is usually associated with the ideal of a world community unified under a set of global democratic institutions. Fear of the totalitarian consequences that such a concentration of power would generate often leads even the staunchest cosmopolitans to limit their democratic aspirations to the national level and merely (...) hope for the progressive implementation of the rule of law at the global level. In his book, Bohman tries to break with the widespread assumption that an increase in democratization across national borders must be purchased at the price of a concentration of power that dangerously increases the potential for political domination. According to Bohman, this assumption is rooted in a narrow understanding of the democratic ideal - an understanding that needs to be replaced by a more complex one. (Published: 5 February 2010) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 13-19. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i1.4850. (shrink)

This article questions the societal and cultural image of Black women as strong and suggests that this seemingly affirming portrayal is derived from a discourse of enslaved women’s deviance. In highlighting connections between perceived strength and physical size among Black women, the analysis extends current feminist theory by considering the ways in which the weight many strong African American women carry is reflective of the deviant and devalued womanhood that they are expected to embody both within and outside their culture.

Présenter un aperçu de la « mystique chrétienne médiévale » n’est possible qu’en la situant brièvement dans l’histoire de la « mystique » en Occident. Le terme n’est pas dénué d’ambiguïté. Apparaissant dans le contexte des religions à mystères, la mystique évolue vers une expérience silencieuse que les mots ne peuvent capter, avant de désigner des phénomènes anormaux décrits dans une rhétorique de l’étrange. Par rapport à la littérature moderne, les textes médiévaux sont très sobres. Faisant à écho à la (...) théologie mystique de Denys l’Aréopagite (ve-vie s.), ils présentent une voie d’union à l’Un en deçà des mots et des concepts. Il ne suffit pas de connaître (mathein) Dieu par un savoir notionnel, il faut en faire l’expérience, « en pâtir » (pathein). Ce « pâtir Dieu » sera repris par Maître Eckhart (1260-1328), le chef de file de la mystique rhénane. (shrink)

Why does something please us? Is there right and wrong in aesthetics? What is the value of art? What do philosophical and aesthetic problems have in common? Wittgenstein worked intensively on these and other questions and wrote of the strange resemblance between aesthetics and philosophy. This study shows how Wittgenstein s arguments have substantially contributed to explaining systematic questions in aesthetics.".

Le constat est maintenant partout: la puissance du fondamentalisme religieux, la montee des populismes de droite comme de gauche, le discredit de la classe politique, le rejet de la construction europeenne, rendent caducs les schemas anciens. En particulier l'idee que la democratie, a force de bienveillance, peut tolerer toutes les differences, toutes les croyances. Oui! Il y a des croyances insupportables et intolerables. Non! Le populisme n'est pas une illusion qui se dissipera d'elle-meme avec un peu de pedagogie et de (...) bonne volonte. Non! La politique internationale n'obeit pas aux chartes du droit international. Il faut denoncer la tyrannie des bons sentiments, la politique de l'emotion et de la compassion. Non que la bienveillance soit un sentiment indigne, mais nous devons cesser de croire qu'on peut batir sur elle une communaute politique. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most influential philosophers of our time. The Habermas Handbook offers a comprehensive overview and an in-depth analysis of Habermas's work. Habermas scholars elucidate his thought, providing essential insight into his key concepts and his influence across politics, law, the social sciences, and public life.

« Déconstruire l’idée que l’animal serait sans intelligence, sans conscience, sans langage, etc., n’est qu’une étape vers une entreprise plus essentielle : la reconnaissance de la richesse des mondes animaux, dans leur diversité, sans céder à la tentation de les hiérarchiser. Tel est l’esprit qui m’anime dans cet ouvrage. Parce que les animaux, humains ou non humains, ne sont pas les jouets passifs du monde qui les entoure et qu’ils en sont au contraire les créateurs actifs, parce qu’ils sont porteurs (...) d’une vision du monde, je les considère comme des philosophes. Ils ne se contentent pas de percevoir passivement leur environnement, ils l’élaborent, ils l’anticipent. Ils donnent du sens aux choses. » Y. C. Biologiste et journaliste scientifique, Yves Christen préside la Fondation Ipsen. Il a notamment publié Le Peuple léopard, Les Surdoués du monde animal et L’animal est-il une personne?. (shrink)

Que peut nous apporter aujourd’hui la lecture des Idéologues, ces penseurs qui ont reconfiguré le champ des savoirs au début du XIXe siècle? La mise au jour d’un moment idéologique. Ce moment est celui qui voit une radicalité des Lumières se scinder entre divers branchements disciplinaires, entre diverses conceptions de la subjectivité et de l’émancipation. Le moment idéologique est un moment de passage, mais surtout de décantation. On y voit émerger, quoiqu’encore entremêlés et solidaires, ce que nous sommes habitués à (...) distinguer : Lumières et romantisme, rationalisme et sentiment, radicalité et conservatisme, nécessité et volontarisme, colonialisme et soif d’altérité, science et littérature. Les dix chapitres de cet ouvrage ont en commun de visiter ce moment idéologique à partir de questions concrètes, analysées sur des objets textuels précisément circonscrits : une fausse polémique, un cours d’histoire, une analogie hydraulique, des théories de l’imagination, des épisodes de réminiscence involontaire, un voyage à Alexandrie, un projet d’alphabet universel, une explication de l’amitié, une réécriture romanesque de la folle « science des idées ». C’est à partir de ces cas particuliers que prend forme une image d’ensemble du moment idéologique, où se révèlent à la fois la reconfiguration des champs du savoir et ce que cette reconfiguration a occulté : l’inséparabilité de ce qui devient alors, d’un côté, « la littérature » et, de l’autre, « les sciences » (de l’homme) – le moment idéologique nous faisant voir que ce sont les deux faces d’une même pièce. (shrink)

Cette étude se place à la croisée de trois auteurs qui laissent entrevoir, à l'horizon du nucléaire, la persistance d'un même questionnement autour du concept inattendu de "déception". Le nucléaire, qui semble accompagné par une multiplication sans retour des discours sur la fin, emporte jusqu'à l'idée même de fondement, exposant la raison à l'effondrement de son "principe" et entraînant le "désappointement" du programme rationnel de la modernité. La raison semble alors incapable de se soustraire au règne du simulacre qui "instrumentalise (...) les idées mais ne les pense plus" (Levinas). Face à la recrudescence des discours catastrophistes, il s'agira alors de "démystifier l'apocalypse" et "l'alternative du tout ou rien qui transforme en un pouvoir quasi mystique l'arme de l'atome" (Blanchot). Derrida, Blanchot et Levinas, proposeront trois analyses qui semblent nous "dissuader" de penser le phénomène nucléaire selon le critère d'une vérité conventionnelle car il se présente sous les traits d'une "apocalypse sans apocalypse, sans révélation de sa propre vérité, sans savoir absolu" (Derrida). Trois apologies paradoxales qui élèvent le désastre nucléaire au rang de principe "d'époque", tout en suspendant ce geste dans l'insignifiance d'une absence de révélation et l'effondrement du sens, exposant la pensée à une "déception", un "dessaisissement", qui s'avèrent essentiels à son renouveau. Il semblait d'autant plus important, à l'heure de la post-vérité, d'analyser cette éthique de la déception qui reconduit la raison hégémonique à sa "fission" inhérente."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Partir vers Dieu est une chose. Se reposer en Dieu et par là en soi-même en est une autre, une expérience plus pleine encore. En toute technique d'homme, en toute activité de création, une initiation s'avère nécessaire et bienheureuse; c'est le temps des fiançailles où l'initié progresse de découvertes en illuminations. Tels étaient les Chemins de la Contemplation. Mais dans La profondeur de Dieu, nous apprenons à nous reposer dans l'extraordinaire intimité à nous-mêmes de notre SOURCE la plus profonde, plus (...) profonde que le fond de nous-mêmes : la SOURCE personnelle qui nous produit, nous cherche et nous aime. Il n'est pas demandé dans ces pages de se perdre dans des formules, dans des idées, dans des systèmes. Nous avons trop souffert de ces catéchismes-là! Seulement : ne pas s'arrêter de creuser jusqu'à ce qu'on ait trouvé le fond. Les grands Sages de l'Orient, ceux du taoïsme, du confucianisme et du bouddhisme peuvent être nos maîtres en la matière. car ils ne sont jamais lassés de creuser. Et le Christ ne veut pas détruire le fruit de leur intense réflexion; mais l'accomplir. (shrink)

Niccolò Machiavelli is the most prominent and notorious theorist of violence in the history of European political thought - prominent, because he is the first to candidly discuss the role of violence in politics; and notorious, because he treats violence as virtue rather than as vice. In this original interpretation, Yves Winter reconstructs Machiavelli's theory of violence and shows how it challenges moral and metaphysical ideas. Winter attributes two central theses to Machiavelli: first, violence is not a generic technology (...) of government but a strategy that tends to correlate with inequality and class conflict; and second, violence is best understood not in terms of conventional notions of law enforcement, coercion, or the proverbial 'last resort', but as performance. Most political violence is effective not because it physically compels another agent who is thus coerced; rather, it produces political effects by appealing to an audience. As such, this book shows how in Machiavelli's world, violence is designed to be perceived, experienced, remembered, and narrated. (shrink)

For many years, M. Jean d'Ormesson has been doing me the honor of asking me to write for Diogenes. More recently, he suggested that I should coordinate an issue of this review that would be devoted to my extended discipline, History, but history in the way in which I understand it. It was certainly not for lack of interest that I did not reply to the first request but, no doubt, because of the sense of a chronic lack of time (...) - almost a pleonasm - from which I, like everyone else, suffer. It was not because I was cured that I accepted the second invitation but probably because I allowed myself, with full knowledge of the facts, to entertain the idea that editing an issue would take up less time than simply contributing. … In fact, as everyone knows, the opposite is true, especially when the occasional editor also volunteers to be one of the contributors. This issue is now completed and I sincerely thank M. Jean d'Ormesson for having wished to entrust me with this task that I have enjoyed very much. (shrink)