The author argues for a Collingwoodian claim: if an emotion is expressed in art, it is not a content which exists prior to, and independent of, its expression. Artistic emotion expressions rather clarify and complete emotions. The autor backs up this claim by Musil’s Lewinian theory of emotion which displays significant parallels to recent Enactivist Theories of Emotion: it states that embodiment in action is necessary in any case in order for nonspecific dispositions to emotions to shape and consolidate into (...) specific fully fledged, genuine emotions. Two ways of shaping and consolidating are distinguished. One way is to categorise emotions in terms of their so-called “formal objects” by associating nonspecific dispositions to emotions via action with specific paradigm scenarios. Another way is to put these categories to the test by expressing exemplary individual experiences which go beyond the existing repertoire of paradigm scenarios. Art, when it expresses emotions, shapes and consolidates in the second way. Art challenges the existing system of emotion types which is at the same time to challenge the corresponding system of evaluations and values. The presented argument draws upon the notions of expressing developed by Dorit Bar-On and Philipp J. Koch. (shrink)

In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality. One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from (...) this stronger claim. (shrink)

I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence. Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, (...) it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement. (shrink)

In this comment we take up two points made by Douglas Hollan in his article “Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy,” and discuss their possible philosophical implications. Hollan‘s concept of complex empathy may give rise to the idea that we can learn about other people’s beliefs via empathy, which is something we do not believe is possible. Furthermore, Hollan’s description of possible negative effects of empathy, such as manipulations of a person on the basis of knowledge about their (...) emotions, might pose a problem for proponents of care ethics, who generally start from the assumption that empathy fosters altruistic behavior. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.

Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by (...) difference in content between emotion and judgment, or by a difference in the respective attitude towards content. I argue that conflict without contradiction is due to both differences, where difference in content is prior to difference in attitude. (shrink)

Wenn es in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts so etwas wie die "arme Verwandtschaft" unter den philosophischen Themen gab, so waren das die Gefühle. Zwar hatten sich Klassiker wie Platon, Aristoteles, Spinoza, Descartes und Hume eingehend mit ihnen befaßt, aber seit Kant, der sie als "Gegner der Vernunft" abtat, wurde den Gefühlen in der Philosophie nur noch wenig Beachtung geschenkt. Erst seit den 1960er Jahren rückten sie wieder in den Fokus des Interesses, und zwar aufgrund der Einsicht, daß Gefühle (...) kognitive mentale Zustände sind, die dazu dienen können, andere Zustände und Handlungen rational zu machen. Strittig ist indes, von welcher Art emotionale Kognitionen sind. Der Band versammelt in historisch-systematischen Einzelstudien die wichtigsten Positionen in der Philosophie der Gefühle und eignet sich gleichermaßen als umfassende Einführung in die Thematik wie auch als Seminarvorlage. (shrink)

Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. (shrink)

I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...) can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non-inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

Können unsere Gefühle uns Gründe dafür liefern, etwas für wahr zu halten und zu tun? Verfügen wir über bestimmte Werte und moralische Überzeugungen vielleicht sogar nur kraft unserer Gefühle? Entgegen der philosophischen Tradition, in der die Gefühle überwiegend als irrational und subjektiv abgetan wurden, zielt der vorliegende Sammelband auf den Nachweis, dass die Gefühle einen integralen und unverzichtbaren Bestandteil rationalen Urteilens und Handelns bilden. Neben der Darstellung verschiedener Facetten moderner kognitivistischer Gefühlsphilosophie kommt dabei auch die Psychologie zu Wort.