The claim that individuals legitimately differ with respect to their values seems to be uncontroversial among bioethicists, yet many bioethicists nevertheless oppose right-to-try laws. This seems to be due in part to a failure to recognize that such laws are intended primarily to be political, not legal, instruments. The right-to-try movement seeks to build political support for increasing access to newly developed drugs outside of clinical trials. Opponents of right-to-try laws claim that increasing access outside of clinical trials would undermine (...) evidence-based medicine. They seek to maximize overall gains to patients by protecting them from adverse drug reactions and ensuring that drugs are more effective on average. In contrast, right-to-try activists have a point that regulatory judgments of drug safety and effectiveness impose one set of trade-offs on all individuals, regardless of their different values. That might be acceptable if determinations of safety and effectiveness were black and white, but that does not seem to be the case. This article argues that judgments of safety and effectiveness are in an important respect normative and reflect the perceived value of those ends relative to others. Such judgments, when universally imposed, harm patients who would readily make do with less knowledge of drug safety and effectiveness in exchange for more time and self-determination. The relevant moral principle is that of respect for individual autonomy. Just as that principle should lead one to substitute collective decisions for individual ones to regulate a natural monopoly, the same principle should lead one to substitute individual decisions for collective ones to avoid a government monopoly on access to newly developed drugs. It is argued that reforms should increase the number of treatment options available to patients outside of clinical trials. The final section of the article discusses ways in which current regulations might be reformed so as to provide more treatment options outside of clinical trials, without undermining evidence-based medicine. (shrink)

Heated debates over healthcare policy in the United States point to the need for a legal framework that can sustain both moral diversity and peaceful cooperation. It is argued that the classical liberal Rule of Law, with its foundation in the ethical principle of permission, is such a framework. The paper shows to what extent the current healthcare policy landscape in the United States diverges from the rule of law and suggests how the current framework could be modified in order (...) to better approximate that ideal. Two objections are then answered. The first is that the rule of law cannot be realized due to the structure of legislatures. The second objection is that government should guarantee both liberty and all of the necessary conditions of autonomy. (shrink)

Santayana may be read as a conservative in behavior, thought, and feeling, if not in creed. A close reading of Scepticism and Animal Faith (SAF), Santayana’s autobiography, Persons and Places (PP), and Santayana’s ontology as articulated in Realms of Being (RB), supports an interpretation of Santayana’s philosophy as one of human imperfection and limits, which includes a conservative vision of human flourishing.

Knowing that we are finite, how can we live to the fullest? Spanish/American philosopher George Santayana described a special kind of transcendence or "spirituality" that enables us to fully enjoy the present moment, regardless of our limited existence. This book clarifies and extends Santayana's account of spirituality, while suggesting how the detachment of spirituality can relieve human suffering, enrich our lives, and make us better human beings.

Most of Santayana’s critics view him as an epiphenomenalist. Angus Kerr-Lawson has written several articles that characterize Santayana’s account of consciousness as epiphenomenalist.1 In “Santayana’s Philosophy of Mind”, John Lachs considers the strengths and weaknesses of Santayana’s epiphenomenalism.2 These views are based on solid evidence. Although he seldom uses the word “epiphenomenalism”, Santayana’s most prominent account of mind-body relations has all the features of that theory. In “Apologia Pro Mente Sua”, Santayana praises an article by Eliseo Vivas that presents him (...) as an epiphenomenalist. He goes on to imply that he has never contradicted his “doctrine of the material inefficacy of.. (shrink)

American transcendentalism is essentially a kind of practice by which the world of facts and the categories of common sense are temporarily exchanged for the world of ideas and the categories of imagination. The point of this exchange is to make life better by lifting us above the conflicts and struggles that weigh on our souls. As these chains fall away, our souls rise to heightened experiences of freedom and union with the good. Emerson and Thoreau are the two most (...) significant nineteenth century proponents of American transcendentalism. (shrink)

Frank Mathias Oppenheim was born in Coldwater, Ohio, on May 18, 1925, and studied at Xavier, Loyola, and Saint Louis Universities. He joined the Chicago Province of the Jesuit Order in 1942 and was ordained on June 15, 1955. He is the author of four books on Josiah Royce’s philosophy: Royce’s Journey Down Under, Royce’s Mature Philosophy of Religion, Royce’s Mature Ethics, and Reverence for the Relations of Life: Re-Imagining Pragmatism via Josiah Royce’s Interactions with Peirce, James, and Dewey, in (...) addition to scores of journal articles devoted to Royce. Oppenheim is also the editor of Josiah Royce’s Late Writings: A Collection of Unpublished and Scattered Works, and was... (shrink)

Essays and poems explore the contemporary relevance of Emerson’s work and thought.

One of the merits of Royce’s writings is that Royce has set his sights high. The expanded edition of Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems, edited by Scott L. Pratt and Shannon Sullivan, is no exception to this rule. In pointing the way to “social salvation,” the shorter “Provincialism”—one of the essays added to the originals to form the expanded edition—captures the overarching purpose of the book and of much of Royce’s philosophy. The essays address different moral problems, but (...) they share the common goal of promoting what is arguably the highest ideal of civilized human life. Yet the republication of a philosophy book after an extended period of neglect raises the concern that .. (shrink)

Michael Brodrick’s book, The Ethics of Detachment in Santayana’s Philosophy, constitutes a much-needed contribution to the field of American philosophy. Although it is common for contemporary authors to claim that their preferred philosopher has been misunderstood, few can do so with as much conviction as Broderick has done for George Santayana, “a great and unjustly neglected philosopher”.The overarching goal of Brodrick’s investigation is the presentation of a conceptual framework for an “ethics of detachment” fundamentally mediated by human (...) finitude. Setting his work in opposition to the contemporary ethical conceit of an “attachment” to life, progress, and perfection, Brodrick seeks to demonstrate “how... (shrink)

This timely anthology contains five pieces of republished poetry (and one original poem) and eleven essays of varying length taking mostly contemporary stances on—and thus hoping to spur the on-going reception into the twenty-first century of—the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson. The assortment of the texts is heterogeneous, yet showing a slight philosophical emphasis: among the eleven essays, half a dozen are by authors trained in philosophy, a couple by literary scholars, and another couple by poets. The prose pieces are (...) previously unpublished, excluding the classical essays by Robert C. Pollock (published originally in 1958) and John J. McDermott (1980), as well as John Lysaker's thought-provoking meditation "Taking.. (shrink)

Positive Psychology has been instrumental in promoting wellbeing science in the modern era. However, there are still ways in which positive psychology interventions and positive education programmes can be improved to achieve more robust and sustained effects. One suggested method is to make wellbeing more salient and tangible through the use of objective tools that assess the relationship between psychological and physiological wellbeing, and enable wellbeing status and change to be seen. With the addition of an interdisciplinary team, as well (...) as technology-enabled and pedagogically sound learning tools and approaches, the potential for positive outcomes and impact increases exponentially. Monitoring wellbeing progress in this way can provide evidence, motivation and belief in positive psychology and wellbeing interventions. This can lead to engaged learning, sustained benefits and systemic impact. Positive psychology needs to strategically extend on the emerging work in this field to help everyone, including policy makers, notice and value wellbeing. (shrink)

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...) on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. (shrink)

At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, (...) and Stereotype Threat,” and “Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.” The first part contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and “dual process” models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second part contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. (shrink)

Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.

In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.

Causation: A Realist Approach Traditional empiricist accounts of causation and laws of nature have been reductionist in the sense of entailing that given a complete specification of the non-causal properties of and relations among particulars, it is therefore logically determined both what laws there are and what events are causally related. It is argued here, however, that reductionist accounts of causation and of laws of nature are exposed to decisive objections, and thus that the time has come for empiricists to (...) break with that tradition. -/- The basic goal of this book, therefore, is to set out and defend realistic accounts of those concepts. In the case of causal relations, for example, Tooley maintains that causation is basically a matter of theoretical relations between states of affairs that underlie and explain relative frequencies. He also argues that such an approach avoids the objections that tell against reductionist accounts and that it does so without making causal relations epistemologically inaccessible. (shrink)

Dignity plays a central role in current thinking about law and human rights, but there is sharp disagreement about its meaning. Combining conceptual precision with a broad historical background, Michael Rosen puts these controversies in context and offers a novel, constructive proposal. “Penetrating and sprightly...Rosen rightly emphasizes the centrality of Catholicism in the modern history of human dignity. His command of the history is impressive...Rosen is a wonderful guide to the recent German constitutional thinking about human dignity...[Rosen] is in (...) general an urbane and witty companion, achieving his aim of accessibly written philosophy.” —Samuel Moyn, The Nation “[An] elegant, interesting and lucid exploration of the concept of dignity...Drawing on classical, liberal and Catholic traditions, Rosen hopes to rehabilitate dignity to its rightful place near the centre of moral thought...Rosen's admirable book deserves wide attention from political theorists, jurisprudes and political philosophers.” —Simon Blackburn, Times Higher Education “Dignity deserves to be widely read, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also as a corrective to the habit of discussing such topics in abstraction from their social context. Whether or not one agrees with Rosen's arguments, there can be no doubt he has widened our horizons.” —Rae Langton, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)