Después de hacer un breve recuento del origen y de las confusiones del debate acerca del contenido no-conceptual de nuestra experiencia tanto en la tradición analítica como en las interpretaciones de la filosofía teórica de Kant, suscribo y complemento una de las objeciones de Oroño 2017 al no-conceptualismo de Heidemann 2016: que no debemos inferir a partir de la irreductibilidad de las intuiciones a conceptos que las intuiciones puedan representar objetos sin la actividad conceptual.

En este artículo argumento que un escéptico pirrónico puede recurrir a una interpretación condicional o a una interpretación disyuntivista de los enunciados de la forma "me parece que p" para mostrar que puede reportar sus experiencias sin adquirir los compromisos epistémicos normalmente asumidos al..

El objetivo de este artículo es contrastar dos maneras de entender ladiferencia y la colaboración de intuiciones y conceptos para responder ala pregunta de si tienen lugar los contenidos no-conceptuales de estadosmentales en la filosofía teórica de Kant. Estas dos maneras de entenderla relación entre intuiciones y conceptos en Kant son la que Efraín Lazossostiene en el primer capítulo de su libro Disonancias de la Crítica (2014,pp. 19-60) y la que yo he defendido en distintas publicaciones (2000,2008, 2011, 2012). De (...) acuerdo con Lazos, las intuiciones para Kant tienencontenido no-conceptual. De acuerdo conmigo, las intuiciones para Kantsolo pueden representar algo, es decir, tener contenido, si están articuladasconceptualmente y, en este sentido, su contenido es siempre conceptual. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that in order to avoid some of the difficulties to which the contemporary discussion on the transcendental arguments has led we must discriminate different ways of understanding the sceptic’s challenge that Kant faces in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first part, I expound a dilemma into which the Kantian epistemology could fall if we accept the characterization of the transcendental arguments as anti-sceptic arguments. In the second part, I present three ways of understanding (...) the sceptic’s challenge and the different strategies that could be developed to answer it correctly. (shrink)

Antonio Zirión Quijano, coordinador de las Obras completas de José Gaos, ha reunido en El sentido de la filosofía todos los textos que ha publicado sobre este filósofo tan importante para la recepción de la fenomenología en México. En mis comentarios a este libro, contrasto en primer lugar la posición de Fernando Salmerón, el anterior coordinador de esas obras, y la de Zirión ante la concepción de la metafísica de Gaos, un subjetivismo extremo en el cual sobresale la figura del (...) filósofo como un soberbio, empeñado en realizar una tarea imposible. Posteriormente destaco la preocupación que Zirión expresa por esta visión pesimista del quehacer filosófico cada vez con mayor énfasis a lo largo de la serie de ensayos de la primera parte de su libro. (shrink)

P. F. Strawson says, in The Bounds of Sense, that the principalthesis that Immanuel Kant defend in the transcendental deduction of thecategories is that for a series of diverse experiences to belong to a uniqueconscience, it is necessary that they be connected in such way that theyconstitute an tem..

RESUMEN Una vez que el foco de la reflexión pasa de las teorías ideales a la aplicación de la justicia social, centrada en las instituciones de las sociedades democráticas, se requiere prestar especial atención a los estilos de vida. Estos tienen una alta incidencia en cómo la justicia es realizada y afectan tanto a la desigualdad económica como a la disponibilidad de los recursos naturales. En nuestras sociedades es posible establecer restricciones a los estilos de vida, especialmente en aquellos casos (...) en que, por el efecto de algunas dinámicas sociales, aquellos se desacoplan de las concepciones del bien. Se defiende que, en tales casos, la base normativa que permite exigir el respeto a los estilos de vida se disuelve y por ello es posible justificar su restricción. ABSTRACT Now that the focus of reflection has shifted from ideal theories to the application of social justice, centered on the institutions of democratic societies, it is necessary to pay special attention to lifestyles, since they not only influence the realization of justice, but also have an effect on economic inequality and the availability of natural resources. In our societies, it is possible to place restrictions on lifestyles, especially in those cases in which, influenced by certain social dynamics, they disengage from conceptions of the good. The article argues that, in those cases, the normative base grounding the demand that lifestyles be respected is dissolved, thus justifying their restriction. (shrink)

Epistemologists of religion disagree about what evidential value religious experiences have. Some argue that religious experiences have no evidential value while others argue that religious experiences constitute proof of God’s existence. This book argues that religious experiences can contribute to justificatory cases for belief in God in several distinct ways and that several justificatory cases are philosophically viable. This book contends that this joint justificatory viability is best explained by the diversity and development of religious lives: as religious believers grow (...) in a faith tradition, their access to an evidential base can develop and the contributory work religious experiences provide in defense of religious belief can change. This suggests that various epistemologies of religious experience implicitly emphasize different life stages or different prototypical religious believers and that a fully adequate epistemology of religious experience will be expansive, pluralistic, and responsive to the diversity of religious believers and their development in a religious tradition. (shrink)

Brian Cutter objected to the consequence argument due to its dependence on the principle that miracle workers are metaphysically impossible. A miracle worker is someone who has the ability to act in a way such that the laws of nature would be violated. While there is something to the thought that agents like us do not have this ability, Cutter claims that there is no compelling reason to regard miracle workers as metaphysically impossible. However, the paper contends that miracle workers (...) are indeed impossible according to well-known theories concerning the laws of nature. This result highlights the reliance of the consequence argument on a plausible premise, which is widely accepted by proponents of non-Humean views of laws. The paper also provides a way to explain away the intuition that miracle workers are possible, but this has the upshot that a recent, two-dimensional formulation of the consequence argument is unsound. (shrink)

We prove that every weakly square compact cardinal is a strong limit cardinal, and therefore weakly compact. We also study Aronszajn trees with no uncountable finitely splitting subtrees, characterizing them in terms of being Lindelöf with respect to a particular topology. We prove that the class of such trees is consistently non-empty and lies between the classes of Suslin and Aronszajn trees.

I argue that the opening line of the _Phaedrus_ proleptically encapsulates the major themes of the dialogue and that paying attention to the opening line enables us to strengthen the identification of psychagogy as the key unifying thread of the whole dialogue. In particular, I argue that the opening line foreshadows the quarrel between Lysias and Socrates over the practical guidance of Phaedrus’ soul; the prominence of friendship in the philosophical form of life; the pertinence of Socrates’ one-on-one, custom-built speeches, (...) vis-à-vis the later conceptualization of rhetoric; the definition of the soul as a source of never-ending movement; as well as the origin (_arché_) and destiny (_télos_) of human souls, following the lines of the Palinode. (shrink)

v. 1. Estética, fenomenología y hermenéutica -- v. 2. Filosofía de la ciencia, filosofía del lenguaje y filosofía de la psiquiatría -- v. 3. Ética y filosofía política, filosofía de la religión e historia de la filosofía.

We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the RPCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly (...) review the most entrenched or classical positions, including Salmon’s ‘interactive forks’, van Fraassen’s scepticism, and Cartwright’s generalisation of the fork criterion. We then go on to review the results of the ‘Budapest school’ on the existence of formally defined screening­ off events for any correlation —by means of the ideas of probability space extensibility and (Reichenbachian common cause) completability. We distinguish the Budapest doctrine clearly from any of the classical conceptions, and thus present an overall framework for discussions of causal inference in quantum mechanics. We argue that this review is preliminary essential work for a thorough assessment of the conditions under which RCCP may be a reliable tool for causal inference in a genuinely probabilistic (indeterministic) context. (shrink)

Sprache, Einstellung und Rationalität stellen zentrale Begriffe eines komplexen Zusammenhangs dar, der in seiner philosophischen Tragweite noch viel zu wenig verstanden wird. In zweierlei Hinsicht trägt die vorliegende Arbeit dazu bei, dieses Desiderat zu beseitigen: Im ersten Teil wird dafür argumentiert, daß Ansätze, die glaubhaft machen wollen, daß bei der Erklärung von Intentionalität auf Rationalitätsannahmen zu verzichten sei, schon deshalb fehlerhaft sind, weil es bei Einstellungs-Zuschreibungen nicht auf die Individuierung geistiger Zustände ankommt. Vielmehr besagt die zentrale Überlegung des zweiten Teils, (...) daß dasjenige, was gemeinhin als die kognitive Signifikanz von Einstellungs-Äußerungen bezeichnet wird, am einfachsten durch eine ergänzende Theorie der pragmatischen Kontext-Bedingungen zu erfassen ist. Hier ist dann auch der Ort, an dem der im Titel gestiftete Zusammenhang am deutlichsten zutage tritt. (shrink)

This collection explores the controversial and perhaps even abject idea that evils, large and small, human and natural, may have a central positive function to play in our lives. For centuries a concern of religious thinkers from the Christian tradition, very little systematic work has been done to explore this idea from the secular point of view.

This is the first book to offer a systematic comparison of the philosophies of Albert Camus and Frantz Fanon. It shows how the ethical, political, and psychological outlooks of these two influential thinkers can further our understandings of how to bring about justice in the face of deep power imbalances. The author foregrounds the bloody Algerian War of Independence in his analysis of the philosophies of Camus and Fanon. Although neither supported French colonial occupation of Algeria, they held radically different (...) views of the conflict. Fanon supported emancipation through violence, which the author argues has been uncritically romanticized. Camus, on the other hand, supported an ethics of moderation that shunned indiscriminate violence. The author argues that Camus has been unfairly accused of being an apologist for colonialism. Finally, the author draws out the common endorsement of humanist values that drive both Camus' and Fanon's thought. Camus and Fanon on the Algerian Question will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in twentieth-century Continental philosophy, postcolonialism, existentialism, and African philosophy. (shrink)