Kripke-Putnam argument for natural kind essentialism can be said to depend on placeholder essentialist intuitions. But some argue that such philosophical intuitions are merely preschooler cognitive biases which are not supported by scientific knowledge of natural kinds. Chemical substances, for instance, whether elements or compounds do not have such privileged set of underlying properties (‘same substance’ relation) which are present in all members of the kind and which provide necessary and sufficient condition for kind membership. In this paper, I argue (...) that placeholder essentialism works for at least some of the scientific natural kinds especially for the basic chemical natural kind, i.e., element. I argue that the dual sense of the element (the basic substance and the simple substance) along with microstructuralism helps explain the essence of an element not only at the abstract level but also at the more concrete level. Based on this essentialist account of element, I conclude that placeholder essentialism is not completely without merit, and it fits nicely with at least some of our scientific natural kinds. (shrink)

Although the concept of biobanking is not new, the open and evolving nature of biobanks has created profound ethical, legal, and social implications, including issues around informed consent, community engagement, secondary uses of materials over time, ownership of materials, data sharing, and privacy. Complexities also emerge because of increasing international collaborations and differing national positions. In addition, the degrees and topics of concern vary as legislative, ethical, and social frameworks differ across developed and developing countries. Implementing national laws in an (...) internationally consistent manner is also problematic. However, these concerns should not cause countries, especially developing countries, to lag behind as this novel wave of research gains momentum, particularly while several biobank initiatives are already underway in the developing world. As the law has always struggled to keep up with the fast-evolving scientific arena, this article seeks to identify the ethico-legal frameworks in place in the United Kingdom, Australia, Uganda, and South Africa, for human biobank research, in an attempt to compare and contextualize the approaches to human biobanking in specific developed and developing countries. (shrink)

A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.

With biobank research on the increase and the history of exploitation in Africa, it has become necessary to manage the transfer of human tissues across national boundaries. There are many accepted templates of Material Transfer Agreements that currently exist internationally. However, these templates do not address the specific concerns of South Africa and even of Africa as a continent. This article will examine three significantly important ethico-legal concepts that were deliberated and carefully adapted by a South African Institution to suit (...) the transfer of Human Biological Materials and associated data for biobank research, namely: informed consent; benefit sharing arrangements; and ownership together with intellectual property rights in human tissues. The discussion includes an analysis of current practice; the ethico-legal challenges in the South African/African context; the decisions made with regard to how the related ethico-legal challenges were addressed in the MTA; and justifications for implementing these decisions. The processes considered could be of benefit to other developing world countries who consider it necessary to manage the transfer of HBMs across national boundaries. (shrink)

Les descendants aux prises avec le passé familial traumatique et exilaire se voient bien souvent tiraillés par des enjeux identitaires paradoxaux, manifestés par des symptômes étranges, sans en posséder les signifiants historiques qui les motivent. Partant d’une étude de cas appréciée sous l’angle de la phénoménologie et de la psychanalyse, les auteurs mènent leurs réflexions sur l’histoire d’une descendante de parents algériens qui ont immigré en France pendant la guerre d’Algérie. Au creux des pages sinistrées du vécu familial, brisé par (...) le traumatisme de guerre et l’exil, seul un « objet métaphoriseur » sera le témoin du désir inconscient ultime de reliaison filiale. (shrink)

Les descendants aux prises avec le passé familial traumatique et exilaire se voient bien souvent tiraillés par des enjeux identitaires paradoxaux, manifestés par des symptômes étranges, sans en posséder les signifiants historiques qui les motivent. Partant d’une étude de cas appréciée sous l’angle de la phénoménologie et de la psychanalyse, les auteurs mènent leurs réflexions sur l’histoire d’une descendante de parents algériens qui ont immigré en France pendant la guerre d’Algérie. Au creux des pages sinistrées du vécu familial, brisé par (...) le traumatisme de guerre et l’exil, seul un « objet métaphoriseur » sera le témoin du désir inconscient ultime de reliaison filiale. (shrink)

Biobanks are repositories that store human biological materials and their associated data. They are rapidly becoming part of national and international networks and give rise to unique ethico-regulatory issues. Whether consent is informed and whether this term should be used when specimens are collected for biobank research is questionable. Where risks occur, they are usually social and relate to identifiability. Public trust and confidence are important for the success of this type of research. Consensus is growing that governance of biobanks (...) should be harmonised. Controlled specimen and data access agreements are essential. The South African National Health Act and its Regulations, that provide the foundation for the legal framework with regard to human tissue and research in South Africa, are silent on the issue of biobanks and the law lags behind while science and technology advance rapidly. The use of biobank assets will lead to significant benefits in human health and should be encouraged while taking account of the associated ethical, legal and social issues and working towards a balance between these two positions. (shrink)

Private medical aids are essentially non-profit organisations that aim to deliver speedy treatment and should prevent members from unexpected, out of pocket expenses for medical care. However, although the latest statistics show that 16.2% of individuals in South Africa were members of medical aid schemes, making the promise of private healthcare accessible to a small percentage of the population, they are not without their own unique set of challenges. The restrictions that exist within the private sector have a direct bearing (...) on the types of healthcare services patients can access, which in turn impacts on the fundamental right to access healthcare. Using a recent High Court Case decision, this article seeks to explore whether there is justice in the provision of healthcare services, specifically within the private sector in South Africa. (shrink)

Ask a philosopher what a proof is, and you’re likely to get an answer hii empaszng one or another regimentationl of that notion in terms of a finite sequence of formalized statements, each of which is either an axiom or is derived from an axiom by certain inference rules. (Wecan call this the formal conception of proof) Ask a mathematician what a proof is, and you will rbbl poay get a different-looking answer. Instead of stressing a partic- l uar regimented (...) notion of proof, the answer the mathematician will give ilikl.. (shrink)

If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract eternal invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoid a militant Realism which forces our commitment (...) to anything that our theories quantify. Escaping metaphysical straitjackets, while retaining the insight that some truths are about objects that do exist, Azzouni says that we can sort scientifically-given objects into two categories: ones which exist, and to which we forge instrumental access in order to learn their properties, and ones which do not, that is, which are made up in exactly the same sense that fictional objects are. He offers as a case study a small portion of Newtonian physics, and one result of his classification of its ontological commitments, is that it does not commit us to absolute space and time. (shrink)

Numbers -- Hallucinations -- Fictions -- Scientific languages, ontology, and truth -- Truth conditions and semantics.

What in our theoretical pronouncements commits us to objects? The Quinean standard for ontological commitment involves (nearly enough) commitments when we utter “there is” or “there are” statements without hope of eliminating these by paraphrase. Coupled with the indispensability of the truth of applied mathematical doctrine, the result is that the ontologically hard-nosed scientist is a Platonist—haplessly commited to abstracta. In this book Azzouni offers a way around the Quinean straitjacket: ontological commitment turns on how theories are (nearly enough) (...) nailed to the world. The specifics of how theories are applied indicates which among the posits of a theory are mere mathematical garb and which are genuine connections to items out there. In the first part of the book Azzouni undercuts the arguments, both actual and possible, in support of Quine’s criterion. An alternative criterion for what exists—ontological independence—is offered, one in sturdy accord with ordinary folk views on the matter. In the second part of the book, a beginning is made of bringing this alternative to bear upon scientific theories with a rich mathematical component. Along the way, old philosophical issues about absolute space and time versus relative space and time, the status of mathematical posits, such as spatial and temporal points, and so on, are illuminated. (shrink)

Our experience of objects is very rich. We perceive objects as possessing individuation conditions. This, however, is a projection of our senses and thinking. Azzouni shows the resulting austere metaphysics tames many ancient philosophical problems about constitution, as well as contemporary puzzles about reductionism.

Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way, what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized but nonexistent objects that our scientific theories are often couched in terms of. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items-especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences-are indispensable. We cannot avoid talking about such things. Scientific and ordinary languages thus enable us to say things about Pegasus (...) or about hallucinated objects that are true, such as "Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse," or "That elf I'm now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes." Standard contemporary metaphysical views and semantic analyses of singular idioms on offer in contemporary philosophy of language have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all. That is, philosophers often feel driven to claim that such objects do exist, or they claim that all our talk isn't genuine truth-apt talk, but only pretence. This book reconfigures metaphysics in radical ways that allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial presupposition that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them. (shrink)

Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things as well. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a special kind of knowledge with its own special means of gathering evidence. He analyses the (...) linguistic pitfalls and misperceptions philosophers in this field are often prone to, and explores the misapplications of epistemic principles from the empirical sciences to the exact sciences. What emerges is a picture of mathematics both sensitive to mathematical practice, and to the ontological and epistemological issues that concern philosophers. (shrink)

When ordinary people - mathematicians among them - take something to follow from something else, they are exposing the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. Jody Azzouni investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues invented by logicians. One claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of consequence, we do not introspect rules by which we reason, nor do we grasp the scope and range of the domain, as it (...) were, of our reasoning. This point is illustrated with a close analysis of a paradigmatic case of ordinary reasoning: mathematical proof. (shrink)

Human values and core principles of societies like self-respect, dignity, fairness, equality, dignity, non-discrimination and sharing have long been discussed and valued all over different societies and communities around the globe. These universal core principles are a reflection of the human rights; so the common skeleton of framework, philosophy and concept of human rights should be worldwide or universal. This implies that the recognition of human rights is supposed to be the goal of every state. Other than this central point, (...) can we actually know the concept and dimensions of human rights? This basic question brings out the subject of education of human rights & human rights in education. Keeping in view this context the main objective of author is to study the perception/concept & practices of Teacher Educators about Human Right Education & Human Right in Education. The population in this study comprised of Teacher Educators of Department of Education & teacher education of public universities of Sindh, where target population was Department of Education / teacher education of three randomly selected public universities. The target sample was sixty percent Teacher Educators from each department which were selected by random sampling. The research was descriptive in nature & qualitative & quantitative by method. A questionnaire with open and close ended questions was used to collect data and the data was analyzed with the help of percentages& theme analysis to inquire the concept & practices. Visualized findings sum-up the concept and practices about the theme with a few recommendations for practitioners and policy makers. (shrink)

The form of nominalism known as 'mathematical fictionalism' is examined and found wanting, mainly on grounds that go back to an early antinominalist work of Rudolf Carnap that has unfortunately not been paid sufficient attention by more recent writers.

Jody Azzouni argues that we involuntarily experience certain physical items, certain products of human actions, and certain human actions themselves as having meaning-properties. We understand these items as possessing meaning or as having truth values. For example, a sign on a door reading "Drinks Inside" strikes native English speakers as referring to liquids in the room behind the door. The sign has a truth value--if no drinks are found in the room, the sign is misleading. Someone pointing in a (...) direction has the same effect: we experience her gesture as significant. Azzouni does not suggest that we don't recognize the expectations or intentions of speakers ; we do recognize that the person pointing in a certain direction intends for us to understand her gesture's significance. Nevertheless, Azzouni asserts that we experience that gesture as having significance independent of her intentions. The gesture is meaningful on its own. The same is true of language, both spoken and written. We experience the meanings of language artifacts as independent of their makers' intentions in the same way that we experience an object's shape as a property independent of the object's color. There is a distinctive phenomenology to the experience of understanding language, and Semantic Perception shows how this phenomenology can be brought to bear as evidence for and against competing theories of language. (shrink)

All sides in the recent debates over the Quine‐Putnam Indispensability thesis presuppose Quine's criterion for determining what a discourse is ontologically committed to. I subject the criterion to scrutiny, especially in regard to the available competitor‐criteria, asking what means of evaluation there are for comparing alternative criteria against each other. Finding none, the paper concludes that ontological questions, in a certain sense, are philosophically indeterminate.

Mistaken reasons for thinking diagrammatic proofs aren't rigorous are explored. The main result is that a confusion between the contents of a proof procedure (what's expressed by the referential elements in a proof procedure) and the unarticulated mathematical aspects of a proof procedure (how that proof procedure is enabled) gives the impression that diagrammatic proofs are less rigorous than language proofs. An additional (and independent) factor is treating the impossibility of naturally generalizing a diagrammatic proof procedure as an indication of (...) lack of rigor. (shrink)

Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...) why these proofs—written in the vernacular to this very day—succeed in conforming to those norms. (shrink)

The existing ethico-legal regulation of adolescent children's participation in health research in South Africa is currently unclear. The article interrogates the existing framework governing children's consent to research participation, with specific emphasis on discrepancies in consent norms in law and ethical guidelines. Against the backdrop of the constitutional directive that requires that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child, the article assesses whether sufficient consideration is given to children's evolving maturity and capacities when (...) consent to their participation in health research is sought. The article provides specific recommendations and proposes a legislative change to consent provisions in the National Health Act 61 of 2003 in order to address the existing lacunae and to align the framework with constitutional imperatives and international fundamental rights considerations. (shrink)

When ordinary people--mathematicians among them--take something to follow from something else, they are exposing the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. Jody Azzouni investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues invented by logicians. One claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of consequence, we do not introspect rules by which we reason, nor do we grasp the scope and range of the domain, as it were, of our reasoning. (...) This point is illustrated with a close analysis of a paradigmatic case of ordinary reasoning: mathematical proof. (shrink)

Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain within (...) the province of classical logic. But one of these strategies is rather controversial, and the other requires substantially more work than is often supposed. Being a non-factualist is no easy business, and it may not be the most philosophically perspicuous way to go. (shrink)

Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science is a fascinating study of the bounds between science and language: In what sense does science provide knowledge? Is it to be taken literally? Is science an instrument only distantly related to what's real? Does the language of science adequately describe the truth? Jody Azzouni approaches these questions through an analysis of the "reference" of kind terms. He investigates the technology of science--the actual forging and exploiting of causal links--and shows how this technology (...) allows for knowledge-gathering, why scientific lore must be regarded as true, and in what ways our access to the universe is anchored in observation. The book then explores the language of science and shows how this flexible tool enables us to transform our fragmented investigations of the world into a unitary and seamless discourse. (shrink)

This monograph presents Azzouni’s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual’s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops Kripke’s original version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following (...) paradox to make salient the linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni reveals how compelling Kripke’s earlier work on the paradox was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all shown to fail. No straight solution can be made to work. Azzouni illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams, “reference magnetism,” fail as well. And yet an overlooked sceptical solution is still available in logical space. Azzouni describes a series of “disposition-meaning” private languages that he shows can be successfully used by a population of speakers to communicate with one another despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of languages enable solitary “Robinson Crusoes” to survive and flourish in their island habitats. These languages—sufficiently refined—have the same properties normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the individual’s authority over her self-imposed rules or her ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance between the rule-following paradox and Hume’s problem of induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a corollary of Hume’s problem that arises when the problem of induction is applied to an individual’s own abilities to follow rules. (shrink)

Tim Crane (2011) characterizes the cognitive role of singular thought via singular mental files: the application of such files to more than one object is senseless. As many do, he thus stresses the contrast between ‘singular’ and ‘general’. I give a counterexample, plurally-directed singular thought, and I offer alternative characterizations of singular thought—better described as ‘objects-directed thought’—initially in terms of the defeasibility of the descriptions associated with one's thinking of an object, and then more broadly in terms of whether descriptions (...) of the object or description-independent epistemic routes to the object are primarily operative in an agent's thinking. (shrink)

Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science is a fascinating study of the bounds between science and language: in what sense, and of what, does science provide knowledge? Is science an instrument only distantly related to what's real? Can the language of science be used to adequately describe the truth? In this book, Jody Azzouni investigates the technology of science - the actual forging and exploiting of causal links, between ourselves and what we endeavor to know and understand. Here can (...) be found one of the earliest severely careful analyses of Putnam's notorious permutation argument, as well as the responses to it by David Lewis and Michael Devitt, among others. The ways in which the references of noun phrases transcend our capacities to fix reference by human means (e.g. causation) are shown and the consequences of this are drawn clearly. (shrink)

I defend my nominalist account of mathematics from objections that have been raised to it by Mark Colyvan.

I revisit my earlier arguments for the (trivial) inconsistency of natural languages, and take up the objection that no such argument can be established on the basis of surface usage. I respond with the evidential centrality of surface usage: the ways it can and can't be undercut by linguistic science. Then some important ramifications of having an inconsistent natural language are explored: (1) the temptation to engage in illegitimate reductio reasoning, (2) the breakdown of the knowledge idiom (because its facticity (...) isn't comfortable with every sentence being true and false). Restoring the utility of the knowledge idiom motivates regimentation - the consistentist reinterpretation of natural language inferences (as they occur in real time). It's then sketched how to give the semantics of a natural language despite its inconsistency: Necessary and sufficient truth conditions are dropped in favor of necessary truth conditions and sufficient truth conditions. (shrink)