Acknowledgements Andrea Scarantino, Nicholas Shea, Mark Sprevak, and three anonymous referees provided incisive and constructive comments, for which I am very grateful. In 2012, earlier versions of this paper were delivered in Edinburgh, at the Joint Session in Stirling, and at a workshop on natural information in Aberdeen. I thank participants for their feedback.

Philosophers have recently paid more attention to the physical aspects of scientific models. The attention is motivated by the prospect that a model’s physical features strongly affect its use and that this suggests re-thinking modelling in terms of extended or distributed cognition. This paper investigates two ways in which physical features of scientific models affect their use and it asks whether modelling is an instance of extended cognition. I approach these topics with a historical case study, in which scientists kept (...) records not only of their findings, but also of some the mental operations that generated the findings. The case study shows how scientists can employ a physical model as an external information store, which allows alternating between mental manipulations, recording the outcome externally, and then feeding the outcome back into subsequent mental manipulations. The case study also demonstrates that a models’ physical nature allows replacing explicit reasoning with visuospatial manipulations. I argue, furthermore, that physical modelling does not need to exemplify a strong kind of extended cognition, the sort for which external features are mereological parts of cognition. It can exemplify a weaker kind, instead. (shrink)

This article reconsiders the theoretical role of the genetic code. By drawing on published and unpublished sources from the 1950s, I analyse how the code metaphor was actually employed by the scientists who first promoted its use. The analysis shows that the term ‘code’ picked out mechanism sketches, consisting of more or less detailed descriptions of ordinary molecular components, processes, and structural properties of the mechanism of protein synthesis. The sketches provided how-possibly explanations for the ordering of amino acids by (...) nucleic acids. I argue that employing the code metaphor was justified in virtue of its descriptive-denotational and explanatory roles, and because it highlighted a similarity with conventional codes that was particularly salient at the time. 1 Introduction2 Coding Schemes in the 1950s2.1 The research problem: Determining amino acid sequences2.2 The solution: Mapping schemes or ‘codes’3 The Code Metaphor Played Descriptive and Explanatory Roles4 Theness of Codes and the Expendability of the Code Metaphor5 The Role of Arbitrariness6 Conclusions. (shrink)

The explanation of animal communication by means of concepts like information, meaning and reference is one of the central foundational issues in animal behaviour studies. This book explores these issues, revolving around questions such as: • What is the nature of information? • What theoretical roles does information play in animal communication studies? • Is it justified to employ these concepts in order to explain animal communication? • What is the relation between animal signals and human language? The book approaches (...) the topic from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including ethology, animal cognition, theoretical biology and evolutionary biology, as well as philosophy of biology and mind. A comprehensive introduction familiarises non-specialists with the field and leads on to chapters ranging from philosophical and theoretical analyses to case studies involving primates, birds and insects. The resulting survey of new and established concepts and methodologies will guide future empirical and theoretical research. (shrink)

Ethological theory standardly attributes representational content to animal signals. In this article I first assess whether Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic theory accounts for the content of animal signals. I conclude that it does not, because many signals do not exhibit the required sort of cooperation between signal‐producing and signal‐consuming devices. It is then argued that Kim Sterelny’s proposal, while not requiring cooperation, sometimes yields the wrong content. Finally, I outline an alternative view, according to which consumers alone are responsible for conferring (...) representational status and determining content. I suggest that consumer‐based teleosemantics reconstruct the content of both cooperative and noncooperative signals and explain how a given trait can mean different things to different consumers. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, U.K.; e‐mail: ulrich.stegmann@kcl.ac.uk. (shrink)

The concept of genetic information is controversial because it attributes semantic properties to what seem to be ordinary biochemical entities. I argue that nucleic acids contain information in a semantic sense, but only about a limited range of effects. In contrast to other recent proposals, however, I analyze genetic information not in terms of a naturalized account of biological functions, but instead in terms of the way in which molecules determine their products during processes known as template-directed syntheses. I argue (...) that determining an outcome in a certain way is constitutive for being an instruction. On this account, the content of genetic information is identified with the template's properties, which determine the product in the way constitutive for instructions. (shrink)

The genetic code has been regarded as arbitrary in the sense that the codon-amino acid assignments could be different than they actually are. This general idea has been spelled out differently by previous, often rather implicit accounts of arbitrariness. They have drawn on the frozen accident theory, on evolutionary contingency, on alternative causal pathways, and on the absence of direct stereochemical interactions between codons and amino acids. It has also been suggested that the arbitrariness of the genetic code justifies attributing (...) semantic information to macromolecules, notably to DNA. I argue that these accounts of arbitrariness are unsatisfactory. I propose that the code is arbitrary in the sense of Jacques Monod's concept of chemical arbitrariness: the genetic code is arbitrary in that any codon requires certain chemical and structural properties to specify a particular amino acid, but these properties are not required in virtue of a principle of chemistry. This notion of arbitrariness is compatible with several recent hypotheses about code evolution. I maintain that the code's chemical arbitrariness is neither sufficient nor necessary for attributing semantic information to nucleic acids. (shrink)

A central idea of developmental systems theory is ‘parity’ or ‘symmetry’ between genes and non-genetic factors of development. The precise content of this idea remains controversial, with different authors stressing different aspects and little explicit comparisons among the various interpretations. Here I characterise and assess several influential versions of parity.

Diagrams can serve as representational models in scientific research, yet important questions remain about how they do so. I address some of these questions with a historical case study, in which diagrams were modified extensively in order to elaborate an early hypothesis of protein synthesis. The diagrams’ modelling role relied mainly on two features: diagrams were modified according to syntactic rules, which temporarily replaced physico-chemical reasoning, and diagram-to-target inferences were based on semantic interpretations. I then explore the lessons for the (...) relative roles of syntax, semantics, external marks, and mental images, for justifying diagram-to-target inferences, and for the “artefactual approach” to scientific models. (shrink)

One approach to assess the explanatory power of natural selection is to ask what type of facts it can explain. The standard list of explananda includes facts like trait frequencies or the survival of particular organisms. Here, I argue that this list is incomplete: natural selection can also explain a specific kind of individual-level fact that involves traits. The ability of selection to explain this sort of fact vindicates the explanatory commitments of empirical studies on microevolution. Trait facts must be (...) distinguished from a closely related kind of fact, that is, the fact that a particular individual x has one trait rather than another. Whether or not selection can explain the latter type of fact is highly controversial. According to the so-called ‘Negative View’ it cannot be explained by selection. I defend the Negative View against Nanay’s objection. (shrink)

This paper assesses Sarkar's ([2003]) deflationary account of genetic information. On Sarkar's account, genes carry information about proteins because protein synthesis exemplifies what Sarkar calls a ‘formal information system’. Furthermore, genes are informationally privileged over non-genetic factors of development because only genes enter into arbitrary relations to their products (in virtue of the alleged arbitrariness of the genetic code). I argue that the deflationary theory does not capture four essential features of the ordinary concept of genetic information: intentionality, exclusiveness, asymmetry, (...) and causal relevance. It is therefore further removed from what is customarily meant by genetic information than Sarkar admits. Moreover, I argue that it is questionable whether the account succeeds in demonstrating that information is theoretically useful in molecular genetics. Introduction Sarkar's Information System The Pre-theoretic Features of Genetic Information 3.1 Intentionality 3.2 Exclusiveness 3.3 Asymmetry 3.4 Causal relevance Theoretical Usefulness Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Abstract In order to illuminate the role of information in biology, Bergstrom and Rosvall (Biol Philos 26:159–176, 2011a ; Biol Philos 26:195–200, 2011b ) propose a ‘transmission sense of information’ which builds on Shannon’s theory. At the core of the transmission sense is an appeal to the reduction in uncertainty in receivers and to etiological function. I explore several ways of cashing out uncertainty reduction as well as the consequences of appealing to function. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI (...) 10.1007/s10539-012-9310-x Authors Ulrich E. Stegmann, School of Divinity, History and Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High Street, Aberdeen, AB24 3UB UK Journal Biology and Philosophy Online ISSN 1572-8404 Print ISSN 0169-3867. (shrink)

This paper explores John Maynard Smith’s conceptual work on animal signals. Maynard Smith defined animal signals as traits that (1) change another organism’s behaviour while benefiting the sender, that (2) are evolved for this function, and that (3) have their effects through the evolved response of the receiver. Like many ethologists, Maynard Smith assumed that animal signals convey semantic information. Yet his definition of animal signals remains silent on the nature of semantic information and on the conditions determining its content. (...) I therefore compare three ways to specify the semantic content of animal signals. The first suggestion models semantic content on Maynard Smith’s theory of genetic information. On the second proposal, semantic content is equated with a condition identified by conventional content ascriptions. The third suggestion is to explain semantic content in terms of consumer-based teleosemantics. I show how these accounts equate semantic content with distinct kinds of conditions and how they differ with respect to the kinds of traits that qualify as carrying semantic information. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has intensified interest in animals with superior antiviral defences. I argue that the role of such animals in biomedical research contrasts with the role of disease models.

Background and Aims The study of intraspecific trait variation (ITV) in plants has a long history, dating back to the fourth century BC. Its existence was widely acknowledged by the end of the 18th century, although systematic and experimental studies commenced only a century later. However, the historiography of ITV has many gaps, especially with regard to early observations and visual documents. This note identifies an early depiction of plant ITV. -/- Methods The botanical works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (...) (1749–1832), a German writer and naturalist, were subjected to close reading. This included all publications and unpublished sources related to botany between 1785 and 1832 (e.g. notes, drafts, diaries, letters, drawings). This material is accessible in the multi-volume historical-critical edition of Goethe’s studies in natural science (Leopoldina-Ausgabe). -/- Key Results A diary entry from 9 September 1786 described changes in leaf morphology along an elevation gradient in the Bavarian Alps. The leaves of an unidentified species of willow (Spix sp.) and gentian (Gentiana sp.) were said to become narrower with increasing elevation; leaves also stood further apart on twigs, and the latter became thinner. A crude drawing of two willow twigs illustrated the differences. Goethe conjectured that the differences were due to environmental conditions. -/- Conclusions Goethe’s notes were anecdotal, and it is unclear whether the observed plant individuals actually belonged to the same species. Nevertheless, the notes represent an early and clear articulation of the hypothesis that changes in environmental conditions can cause ITV in a natural plant population. The drawing may be the earliest visual record of environmentally caused plant ITV in the wild. (shrink)

Altruism and Groups Many animals display altruistic behaviour (=df behaviour that benefits conspecifics more that the agent). Until the 1950s this was explained as good for the group if not the individual. (Ardrey, Wynne-Edwards, lemmings.) BUT won’t groups of altruists always be invaded by selfish animals?

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Ulrich Meyer defends a novel theory about the nature of time, and argues against the consensus view that time and space are fundamentally alike. He presents the first comprehensive defense of a 'modal' account, which emphasizes the similarities between times and possible worlds in modal logic, and is easily reconciled with the theory of relativity.

The discourse on climate politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected. So, in order to turn climate change politics from its head onto its feet you have to take sociology into account. There is an important background assumption which shares in the general ignorance concerning environmental issues and, paradoxically, this is in corporated in the specialism of environmental sociology itself — this (...) is the category of ‘the environment’. If ‘the environment’ only includes everything which is not human, not social, then the concept is sociologically empty. If the concept includes human action and society, then it is scientifically mistaken and politically suicidal. (shrink)

Relative overlap measures of coherence have recently been shown to have two devastating properties: according to the plain relative overlap measure, the degree of coherence of any set of propositions cannot be increased by adding further propositions, and according to the refined relative overlap measure, no set can be more coherent than its most coherent two-element subset. This result has been taken to rule out relative overlap as a foundation for a probabilistic explication of coherence. The present paper shows that (...) this view is premature: we propose a relative overlap measure that does not fall victim to the two properties. The guiding idea is to employ a well-established recipe for the construction of coherence measures and to adapt it to the idea of relative overlap. We show that this new measure keeps up with, or even outperforms, former overlap measures in a set of desiderata for coherence measures and a collection of popular test cases. This result re-establishes relative overlap as a candidate for a proper formalization of coherence. (shrink)

Toen Ulrich Libbrecht vanaf de jaren 1970 Vlaanderen en Nederland inspireerde met ‘oosterse wijsheid voor de westerse mens’ was dit pionierswerk. Ondertussen heeft de globalisering zich verder voltrokken, is boeddhisme en meditatie geen exotisme meer en is China dichterbij gekomen. Hoe kijkt de filosoof nu tegen deze ontwikkelingen aan? Dit boek is ontstaan uit gesprekken waarin Libbrecht op een meesterlijke wijze oosterse en westerse inzichten integreert tot een nieuw antwoord op actuele vragen en universele thema’s. Hierin benadrukt hij de (...) waarde van natuur, wetenschap en religieus bewustzijn in de betekenis van re-ligare: herverbinden. In dit boek zet hij geen theorie uiteen, maar neemt de lezer mee op de boeiende weg van het denken, doortrokken van ontroering en een rijke levenservaring. (shrink)

In Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768): Classicist, Hebraist, Enlightenment Radical in Disguise, Ulrich Groetsch offers a vivid portrayal of the Enlightenment radical Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) and his debt to earlier traditions of scholarship.

Angesichts anhaltender Diskussionen um die notwendige oder wünschenswerte Förderung von Forschung und Wissenschaft unternimmt das Buch den Versuch, akademische Forschung als ein für demokratische Gesellschaften unverzichtbares Element öffentlicher Debatten und damit der öffentlichen Entscheidungsfindung zu verteidigen. Da Wissenschaft wie Demokratie beide verfahrensorientiert sind, ist ihre historische Verbindung kein Zufall. Vielmehr sind Demokratie und Wissenschaft wechselseitig aufeinander angewiesen. Ökonomisch betrachtet, lässt sich Wissenschaft als ein öffentliches Gut verstehen, das insbesondere für das Funktionieren einer Zivilgesellschaft unverzichtbar ist.

Im Hörsaal zeigt sich das europäische Philosophieren jederzeit mündlich und beweglich. Viele pilgerten zwischen 1970 und 1984 nach Paris, wo Michel Foucault dreizehn umfangreiche Vorlesungen hielt. Sein Publikum erstaunte vor dem Wechsel an Themen, Texten und Bildern. Foucault sprach über Machtverhältnisse, Strafregime und diskursive Ordnungen, er thematisierte die Sexualität, das Wahrsagen und wie gut zu leben sei. Seine Anekdoten und Geschichten faszinieren noch in den gedruckten Transkriptionen aller 150 Vorlesungsstunden. Der Essay »Foucault im Hörsaal« versucht den Nachvollzug des mündlichen Foucault (...) und testet den Zusammenhang der mündlich vorgetragenen Gedankenentwicklung. Warum taucht dort - und nur dort - die Figur des Ödipus auf? Es gibt viele rote Fäden im Vortrag Foucaults, der explizit experimentierend ist und sich vom Charakter seiner Bücher deutlich absetzt. Foucault hat Vorlesungen eher wie politische Interventionen als lebhafte Ansprachen gestaltet; er adressiert seine Zuhörer als Zeitgenossen mit offenem Erwartungshorizont. -- Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book answers questions about secularization: Does it dissolve religion, or transform it into faith in a universally valid value? Is it restricted to the west or can it occur everywhere? Using ideas of Max Weber, the book conceives secularization as a process comparable to the rational development of science and production. What is the value secularization propagates? Sifting historical texts, Steinvorth argues the value is authenticity, to be understood as being true to one's talents developed in activities that are (...) done for their own sake and provide life with meaning, and as unconditionally commanded. How can a value be unconditionally demanded? This question leads to an investigation of the self that combines Kant's ideas on the conditions of the possibility of experience with modern brain science, and to the metaphysical deliberation whether to prefer a world with creatures able to do both good and evil to one without them. It is not enough, however, to point to facts. We rather need to understand what secularization, religion and their possible rationality consist inches Max Weber's sociology of religion has provided us with the conceptual means to do so, which this book develops. Secularization is rediscovered as the same progress of rationality in the sphere of religion that we find in the development of the spheres of science, art, the economy and politics or public affairs. It proves to be the perfection rather than the dissolution of religion - a perfection that consists in recognizing authenticity as the successor of the absolute of religion. (shrink)

Does the modern age have a specific attitude to the world, a way to make sense of the myriad stimuli that impinge on human organisms or, as I call it, a metaphysics? This book claims it has. It shows that what crucially changed Europe from the 16th century on was the spreading idea that things are best done for their own sake, for goals inherent in an activity, such as the goal of telling a good story or having a lively (...) chat, inheres in the telling or chatting itself. (shrink)