Most approaches to animal ethics ground the moral standing of nonhumans in some appeal to their capacities for intelligent autonomy or mental sentience. _Corporal Compassion _emphasizes the phenomenal and somatic commonality of living beings; a philosophy of body that seeks to displace any notion of anthropomorphic empathy in viewing the moral experiences of nonhuman living beings. Ralph R. Acampora employs phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism and deconstruction to connect and contest analytic treatments of animal rights and liberation theory. In doing (...) so, he focuses on issues of being and value, and posits a felt nexus of bodily being, termed symphysis, to devise an interspecies ethos. Acampora uses this broad-based bioethic to engage in dialogue with other strains of environmental ethics and ecophilosophy. _Corporal Compassion_ examines the practical applications of the somatic ethos in contexts such as laboratory experimentation and zoological exhibition, and challenges practitioners to go beyond recent reforms and look to a future beyond exploitation or total noninterference--a posthumanist culture that advocates caring in a participatory approach. (shrink)

Most approaches to animal ethics ground the moral standing of nonhumans in some appeal to their capacities for intelligent autonomy or mental sentience. _Corporal Compassion _emphasizes the phenomenal and somatic commonality of living beings; a philosophy of body that seeks to displace any notion of anthropomorphic empathy in viewing the moral experiences of nonhuman living beings. Ralph R. Acampora employs phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism and deconstruction to connect and contest analytic treatments of animal rights and liberation theory. In doing (...) so, he focuses on issues of being and value, and posits a felt nexus of bodily being, termed symphysis, to devise an interspecies ethos. Acampora uses this broad-based bioethic to engage in dialogue with other strains of environmental ethics and ecophilosophy. _Corporal Compassion_ examines the practical applications of the somatic ethos in contexts such as laboratory experimentation and zoological exhibition, and challenges practitioners to go beyond recent reforms and look to a future beyond exploitation or total noninterference--a posthumanist culture that advocates caring in a participatory approach. (shrink)

Ralph R. Acampora - Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.3 480-481 Gary Steiner. Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 332. Cloth, $37.50. In this text Steiner surveys the history of doctrines, attitudes, and beliefs about the ethical (...) standing of animals. Unsurprisingly, he finds that the mainstream of thought in this area manifests "an underlying logic: that all and only human beings are worthy of moral consideration, because all and only human beings are rational and endowed with language" . This neatly expresses the anthropocentrism identified in the.. (shrink)

Max Hallman has put forward an interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy according to which Nietzsche is a prototypical deep ecologist. In reply, I dispute Hallman’s main interpretive claim as well as its ethical and exegetical corollaries. I hold that Nietzsche is not a “biospheric egalitarian,” but rather an aristocratically individualistic “high humanist.” A consistently naturalistic transcendentalist, Nietzsche does submit a critique of modernity’s Christian-inflected anthropocentrism (pace Hallman), and yet—in his later work—he endorses exploitation in the quest for nobility (contra Hallman). I (...) conclude thatecophilosophers need to exercise hermeneutical caution in any attempt to appropriate Nietzsche for environmentally ethical designs, lest they illegitimately ventriloquize their own moral voices into an authoritative but alien mouthpiece. (shrink)

This paper compares the phenomenological structure of zoological exhibition to the pattern prevalent in pornography. It examines several disanalogies between the two, finds them lacking or irrelevant, and concludes that the proposed analogy is strong enough to serve as a critical lens through which to view the institution of zoos. The central idea uncovered in this process of interpretation is paradoxical: Zoos are pornographic in that they make the nature of their subjects disappear precisely by overexposing them. The paper asserts (...) that the keep are thus degraded or marginalized through the marketing and consumption of their very visibility and criticizes the pretense of preservation. Furthermore, the paper subjects the related framework of captivity to Foucauldian analysis and critique—we see that the "zoöpticon" deserves designation as an island of power in the carceral archipelago of hegemonic social institutions mapped by Foucault. Hence, this paper suggests that the zoo as we know it be phased out in favor of richer and less oppressive modes of encountering other forms of life; toward this end, the paper explores and assesses alternative approaches to, and practices of, nonhuman animal spectatorship and cross-species conviviality. (shrink)

'A Nietzschean Bestiary' gathers essays treating the most vivid & lively animal images in Nietzsche's work, such as the howling beast of prey, Zarathustra's laughing lions, & the notorious blond beast.

Semi-urban ecotones exist on the periphery and in the midst of many human population centers. This article addresses the need for and nature of an ethos appropriate to inter-species contact in such zones. It first examines the historical and contemporary intellectual resources available for developing this kind of ethic, then surveys the range of possible relationships between humans and other animals, and finally investigates the morality of multi-species neighborhoods as a promising model. Discussion of these themes has the effect, in (...) conclusion, of dismantling notorious dualisms traditionally associated with the geographic imagination (city/wild, human/animal, nature/culture). (shrink)

This dissertation is an attempt to show that, and how, an inter-species morality of compassion may be grounded reasonably in a phenomenology of body. It provides a literature survey of relevant works and authors, largely drawn from the modern European traditions of philosophic existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics . The ontology and axiology presupposed by a somatically based bioethic are outlined in advance of the latter's presentation . Relevance of the embodied bioethic to actual affairs is demonstrated through exercises in practical (...) philosophy . An extended summary, as well as comparisons with other positions or outlooks and suggestions for further reflection or research, are also supplied . Appropriate propaedeutics, furnishing preliminary context for the project, can be found in the introduction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western PhilosophyRalph AcamporaGary Steiner. Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 332. Cloth, $37.50.In this text Steiner surveys the (Eurocentric) history of doctrines, attitudes, and beliefs about the ethical standing of (nonhuman) animals. Unsurprisingly, he finds that the (...) mainstream of thought in this area manifests "an underlying logic: that all and only human beings are worthy of moral consideration, because all and only human beings are rational and endowed with language" (2). This neatly expresses the anthropocentrism identified in the book's title, the "discontents" of which are obviously a gloss on Freud's reading of civilization—that is to say, Steiner sees a great deal of dissatisfaction (largely misgivings of conscience) mixed in with our sense of superiority over other animals. Subliminal unease with, and even explicit dissent from, the mainstream orthodoxy is not absent from the [End Page 480] historical account—indeed, as the author rightly indicates, there has been a parallel (if comparatively minor) stream of more animal-friendly philosophy throughout the ages of thinking on this subject. Moreover, this latter current of thought has been gathering strength lately as "an increasing number of ethologists and philosophers have marshaled insights concerning the evolutionary continuity and physiological similarity between animals and human beings to argue that many animals are conscious, sentient beings that [or better, who] deserve substantial moral consideration" (3).From the outset, then, Steiner situates his historical project within the context of contemporary debates in animal ethics. "By focusing on the historical development of thinking about animals," he proposes, "one can understand the sources of our own anthropocentric prejudices and use that history as the basis for a radical rethinking of the moral status of animals" (37). Early on, in the first chapter in fact, Steiner identifies two problems in the current development of the heterodox, animal-friendly tradition: animal ethicists, he claims, tend to overestimate the mental faculties of nonhumans and do not question the longstanding assumption that intellect (rational or linguistic) is what ultimately imparts moral significance. In effect, Steiner's charge is that these moralists anthropomorphize animals psychologically because they are still tied (critical protestations notwithstanding) to ethical anthropocentrism.Even aside from his ambition to further contemporary animal ethics, Steiner has provided a needed and lucid account of the history he targets. The historical surveys of animal ethics already on the record are limited either because they are merely brief preludes to anthologies or monographs whose main interest is to theorize anew or because they are subsidiary to histories of broader fields such as environmental or ecological thinking. Though Steiner harbors no pretense to exhaustive coverage, the figures he does treat are representative of a fairly comprehensive range from antiquity to postmodernity. Not only are famous vegetarians of the classical Greco-Roman periods covered (viz. Pythagoras, Plutarch, and Porphyry), but arch-anthropocentrists such as Aristotle and the Stoics are examined as well (though in the chapter dedicated to them, one would have liked to see more attention given to the animal-friendly Theophrastus). Notable here is that Steiner treats an assortment of Presocratic philosophers, extending back even to epic thinkers such as Hesiod and Homer. A number of medieval Christians are covered (including Augustine, Francis of Assisi, and Thomas Aquinas), and then it is on to a full chapter about Cartesian thought, before another on empiricism, utilitarianism, and Kant. Last in the survey come a trio of late moderns (Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Schweitzer), followed by a postmodern triumvirate (Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida). Unfortunately absent from this later coverage are the vitalist Henri Bergson and his post-structuralist heirs, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.In his final chapter Steiner aims to harness the history he has related for the purpose of reconceiving the moral status of animals so as to avoid the twin problems of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism which he sees as our inheritance in the Western tradition. The route he takes is to synthesize biocentrically two rival approaches of species linkage, one that stresses common competence and another... (shrink)

Strangers to Nature brings together many of the leading scholars who are working to redefine and expand the discourse on animal ethics. This volume will engage both scholars and lay-people by revealing the breadth of theorizing about the human/non-human animal relationship that is currently taking place.

Metamorphoses of the Zoo marshals a unique compendium of critical interventions that envision novel modes of authentic encounter that cultivate humanity's biophilic tendencies without abusing or degrading other animals. These take the form of radical restructurings of what were formerly zoos or map out entirely new, post-zoo sites or experiences. The result is a volume that contributes to moral progress on the inter-species front and eco-psychological health for a humankind whose habitats are now mostly citified or urbanizing.

means of defense, squirts its spittle and half-digested fodder at its opponent.”1 Thus we see Nietzsche, as he does frequently in his writings, drawing on the semantic resources made available by the investigation of animal nature and using them to illuminate human character. The editors of . Nietzschean Bestiary had the superlative idea to advance the progression from zoology to anthropology one step further: starting from Nietzsche’s myriad trope of animality, to construct a philosophical bestiary that illuminates not only the (...) status of human animality but also that of our metaphorical resources in general. The result comprises twenty-five essays from twenty-three contributors, most of which are organized around a single creature (albeit no llama). These essays’ execution of the original idea is, on the whole, excellent. I do not think that they establish the two main conceits of the volume. But the volume nevertheless provides a vivid and diverse display of Nietzsche’s animal tropes that engages with broader philosophical concerns. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Nietzsche's (Artful) Naturalism The Subject Naturalized Nietzsche's Artful Naturalism Toward an Ethos of the Agonized Subject.

Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it turns out in (...) the end that this problem is not really a special problem about moral disagreement at all: it is a general problem about disagreement as such. For this reason, in the later sections of this essay, I shall turn to some general questions in epistemology, about the epistemic significance of disagreement. (shrink)

This book gives a general theory of rational belief. Although it can be read by itself, is a sequel to the author's previous book The Value of Rationality (Oxford, 2017). It takes the general conception of rationality that was defended in that earlier book, and combines it with an account of the varieties of belief, and of what it is for these beliefs to count as "correct", to develop an account of what it is for beliefs to count as rational. (...) According to this account, rationality comes in degrees: the degree to which one's beliefs counts as rational is determined by their distance from a corresponding probability function - where this distance is measured by those beliefs' "expected degree of incorrectness" according to the probability function; the account also involves an explanation of what determines exactly which probability function plays this role in each case, and of why this probability function should play this role. In developing and defending this account, new light is shed on several central epistemological issues. These issues include: the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification; the debates between internalism and externalism, and between foundationalism and coherentism; the significance - or lack of it - of the notion of 'evidence'; the relationship between credences, full belief, inference, and suspension of judgment; the nature of the kind of possibility that is presupposed by the relevant sort of probability; and whether rationality is "diachronic" - so that the beliefs that it is rational for us to have now depend, in part, on the beliefs that we held in the past. Finally, some suggestions are made about how this theory bears on a range of further topics, including the defeasibility of inference, scepticism, and the analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

In this astonishingly rich volume, experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship on what is arguably Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. A lengthy introduction, annotated (...) bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research. (shrink)

What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an action or attitude—in terms of which all other normative concepts can be defined. (...) It is argued here that this proposal faces grave difficulties. According to a better proposal, what these normative concepts have in common is that they have a distinctive sort of conceptual role—a reasoning-guiding conceptual role. This proposal is illustrated by a number of examples: different normative concepts differ from each other in virtue of their having different conceptual roles of this reasoning-guiding kind. (shrink)

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars discuss when is deliberate ignorance a virtue, and what type of environment does it require.

This is a theological adventure based on the thought of Charles Hartshorne. Its appearance at this time represents an attempt to begin anew in theology on the assumption that the abstract God of classical thinking is dead. Hartshorne's philosophy advances a God of concrete and changing reality, as opposed to the abstract, immutable and "dead" God image of the radical theologians. The author argues that the "Death of God" theology is no more than a recognition that Christian incarnation is impossible (...) given classical presuppositions; argues for disallowance of the traditional image and positing of a neo-classic, dipolar concept of God which surpasses the abstract and makes acceptable the belief in a Supreme Being. (shrink)

Kant held the moral law to be an objective imperative, an entity in its own right. It carries with it prescriptive force, in parallel to other principles of pure reason, like those of logic and mathematics. Objective imperatives therefore do not derive their authority from any other source,such as common consensus or the will of God. In Objective Imperatives, Ralph C. S. Walker seeks to show that this is a highly defensible view: Kant's Categorical Imperative, properly understood, is broadly (...) right. The key to it is rationality, and not universality, which functions only as anapproximate test. Often, Kant sets the matter out badly, and most of the common objections to him can be shown to be due to misunderstandings. A morality that gives us an objective imperative does appear incompatible with the determinism to which Kant commits himself, but Walker argues that thisappearance is misleading. (shrink)

Der Band prasentiert zwei bislang unedierte Dialoge des normannischen Abts Ralph von Battle (1040-1124), eines Schulers von Lanfrank und Anselm von Canterbury. In Der Fragende und der Antwortende legt ein Christ einem anderen Christ seine Glaubenszweifel vor. Sie betreffen Themen einer philosophischen Theologie des Christentums wie das Problem des Bosen oder die Rede von 'der Schopfung aus dem Nichts'. Beide Gesprachspartner zeigen sich dem Denken des Augustinus verpflichtet. Der Wissende und der Nichtwissende ist das Gesprach eines Christen mit einem (...) Atheisten, das den Entwurf einer naturlichen Theologie einschliesslich ihrer Grenzbestimmung enthalt. (shrink)

This work is Emerson's set of essays published in 1860 just before the start of the Civil War: 'Fate,' 'Power,' 'Wealth,' 'Culture,' 'Behavior,' 'Worship,' 'Considerations by the Way,' 'Beauty,' 'Illusions.'.

It is widely assumed that our “evidence” is at least one source of the “justification” that we have for believing things—where this notion of “justification” seems to be a normative notion. More precisely, it seems to be an agential normative notion, evaluating the different possible attitudes that are available to an agent at a time, on the basis of facts that are just “given”—that is, facts that it is not available to the agent to change through the way in which (...) she exercises her reasoning capacities at that time. However, given the meaning that the term “evidence” has in everyday English, what is in this sense “given” to you cannot be identified with your current “evidence”. First, some propositions count as part of the “evidence” that you now have precisely in virtue of the fact that you now believe those propositions; but these beliefs are not part of what is now “given” to you—they are themselves among the attitudes whose justification is in question. Secondly, what is now “given” to you arguably includes facts about what you believed in the past—but such facts cannot naturally be called part of your current “evidence” unless you now know or believe these facts. In fact, it seems, the concept “evidence” does not really belong to individualistic epistemology, but to social epistemology: the function of “evidence” is that it is what we can use to show that something is true to the contextually relevant audience. (shrink)

This essay defends a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) – the doctrine that there is normally a stronger reason against an act that has a bad state of affairs as one of its intended effects than against an otherwise similar act that has that bad state of affairs as an unintended effect. First, a precise account of this version of the DDE is given. Secondly, some suggestions are made about why we should believe the DDE, and about (...) why it is true. Finally, a solution is developed to the so-called ‘closeness problem’ that any version of the DDE must face. (shrink)

Reading Certainty offers incisive historical analysis of the foundational questions of the Christian tradition: how are we to read scripture, and how can we know we are saved? This collection of essays honors the work and thought Susan E. Schreiner by exploring the import of these questions across a wide range of time periods. With contributions from renowned scholars and from Schreiner's students from her more than three decades of teaching, each of the contributions highlights the nexus of certainty, perception, (...) authority, and exegesis that has defined her scholarly work. Intellectual historians, early modernists, and scholars of Christianity will all appreciate this testament to Schreiner's influence. Contributors include: Vincent Evener, Bruce Gordon, Ralph Keen, Mark Lambert, Kevin J. Madigan, Richard A. Muller, Willemien Otten, Daniel Owings, Elizabeth Palmer, Karen Park, Barbara Pitkin, Ronald K. Rittgers, William Schweiker, Jonathan Strom, and Matthew Vanderpoel. (shrink)