Explores the basic forms of responsibility that we willingly assume and the collaborative fulfillment that we find in each.

How can we take history seriously as real and relevant? Despite the hazards of politically dangerous or misleading accounts of the past, we live our lives in a great network of cooperation with other actors; past, present, and future. We study and reflect on the past as a way of exercising a responsibility for shared action. In each of the chapters of Full History Smith poses a key question about history as a concern for conscious participants in the sharing (...) of action, starting with “What Is Historical Meaningfulness?” and ending with “How Can History Have an Aim?” Constructing new models of historical meaning while engaging critically with perspectives offered by Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Heidegger, Eliade, Sartre, Foucault, and Arendt, Smith develops a philosophical account of thinking about history that moves beyond postmodernist skepticism. Full History seeks to expand the cast of significant actors, establishing an inclusive version of the historical that recognizes large-scale cumulative actions but also encourages critical revision and expansion of any paradigm of shared action. (shrink)

How can we take history seriously as real and relevant? Despite the hazards of politically dangerous or misleading accounts of the past, we live our lives in a great network of cooperation with other actors; past, present, and future. We study and reflect on the past as a way of exercising a responsibility for shared action. In each of the chapters of Full History Smith poses a key question about history as a concern for conscious participants in the sharing (...) of action, starting with “What Is Historical Meaningfulness?” and ending with “How Can History Have an Aim?” Constructing new models of historical meaning while engaging critically with perspectives offered by Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Heidegger, Eliade, Sartre, Foucault, and Arendt, Smith develops a philosophical account of thinking about history that moves beyond postmodernist skepticism. Full History seeks to expand the cast of significant actors, establishing an inclusive version of the historical that recognizes large-scale cumulative actions but also encourages critical revision and expansion of any paradigm of shared action. (shrink)

To the French critics who originally labelled certain films noir it seemed that a class of Hollywood products had gone darker during the war years – as though a dark filter had been placed over the lens. Films were not designed or marketed as noir, and retrospectively noir's status as a genre is still unsettled. Yet there is widespread interest today in experiencing diverse films as noir, and even in using a Noir Filter in Instagram and video games. Pursuing the (...) filter clue, the noir experience can be thought of as subjection to a dark filtering of narrative. Image filtering styles can help to resolve not only the puzzle of noir's quasi-genre status but also an issue of general interest in aesthetic experience. The use of image filters makes a distinctively powerful contribution to the experience of a work or genre, or to the cultural dominance of an aesthetic regime, due to the unobtrusive formative role it plays in the economy of experience. (shrink)

Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. (...) Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction. (shrink)

A concept of merit is used for spiritual accounting in many religious traditions, seemingly a substantial point of connection between religion and ordinary morality. Teachings of “merit transfer” (as in Buddhism and Roman Catholicism) might make us doubt this connection since they violate the principle that merit must be earned. If we examine the structure of ordinary schemes of desert, however, we find that personal worth is posited for a variety of reasons; the basic requirement in this realm is not (...) earning by individuals but rather a community’s program for cultivating desirable collaboration among its members. There are strong enough parallels between religiously envisioned merit transfer and socially normal conferrals and sharings of worth that we can conclude that the religious posits of transferred merit are indeed comprehensible as merit, whatever other problems of comprehensibility they pose. (shrink)

ABSTRACT To understand the internal structure of moral positions and the nature of moral disagreements, it would be useful to have a “moral sense” model of our different types of moral sensitivity, from our relatively spontaneous friendliness to our appreciation for traditional community norms, ideal ethical norms, and spiritual appeals to ultimate concern. After the first round of modern moral sense theory in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Edwards, most discussions of the moral sense concept have centered on general theses about moral (...) value (objective or subjective, rational or emotional) without attending to this complexity. Even though the familiar positions in these discussions are not reconcilable on the plane of ethical theory, they need not be seen as simply antagonistic. Working with clearly differentiated senses of both “moral” and “sense,” this article refashions “moral sense theory” as a way of placing the insights of the classic moral sense theories, ethical rationalism, and a distinctly spiritual sensibility in a conceptually stable and empirically more discriminating order. The article also suggests strengthening the realist premise of moral sensing by invoking the model of a game player’s operational sense of how things are going in pursuit of a game’s objectives. (shrink)

Word usage and behavior show that most people think of music as a distinct category of valuable experience, yet music lovers are known to have widely different ideas of what music offers. Some love its power to express or arouse emotions; some love the immediate sensuous-kinetic pleasure of tone and beat; some find a compelling sense of individual or communal identity in it; some are caught by the puzzle-solving interest of its compositional designs. Most will agree, nonetheless, that music is (...) wonderful in a musical way—an expresser of emotions not interchangeable with other expressive means, a source of pleasure not interchangeable with other sources, and so on—which seems to indicate that an essential musicality.. (shrink)

An original metaphysical proposal building on classical and contemporary sources. In Centering and Extending, Steven G. Smith retrieves and refashions some of the best ideas of classical and early modern metaphysics to support insight into the natures of mental and material beings and their relations. Avoiding what he critiques as distortive paths of idealism, materialism, repressive monism, and overly permissive pluralism, Smith builds his framework on centering and extending as universal principles of formation. Identifying the basic consistency (...) of being with these principles in symmetrical partnership enables a naturalist process view that, unlike Whitehead’s, does not overbalance toward the subjective and teleological and, unlike Deleuze and Guattari’s, does not overbalance toward the material and chaotic. This view supports useful conceptions of mind and matter, form and energy, reason and cause, and a layered world order without relying on a blind concept of supervenience or emergence. It also respects and reinforces a division of roles between metaphysical sense-making and spiritual determinations of meaningfulness. Steven G. Smith is Jennie Carlisle Golding Professor of Philosophy at Millsaps College. He is the author of several books, including Worth Doing, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Influential moral theories keyed to benevolence (including Mengzi’s and Hutcheson’s) claim a footing for ideal moral benevolence in natural human benevolence. The meaning of this claim depends on how natural and ideal benevolence are conceived and how the two are supposed to be related—as Mengzi suggests, for example, that there is an innate “sprout” of compassionate aversion to suffering that tends to grow into moral humaneness. In any case it is plausible that some sort of spontaneous and consistent human friendliness (...) supports a moral standard of unselfish concern for the well-being of others. The premise of benevolence theory is strengthened when we take account of a largely overlooked form of general good will: benevolent interest in the efforts of others. Here too a form of moral benevolence may grow from a base in natural good will, a point anticipated in Aristotle’s observation that our friendly interest in others is stimulated by the contestants in sports events. The sports spectator act of “pulling for” contestants, though conflicted by competition and exploited for various nonmoral satisfactions, is a vivid specimen of a general pulling for all innocent efforts in an inclusive moral fellowship of triers. (shrink)

This book develops the idea that meaningfulness is specified as a relation between an acknowledged appeal and an adopted attitude. In the Axial Age classics and again in modern refoundings of philosophy and theology, ideals of a fully commanding supreme appeal and a fully adequate orientation to the world in cognizance of that appeal--a sovereign attitude--are intellectually and spiritually central. Some of the most fundamental challenges of pluralism stem from differences in appeal and attitude ideals.

General intelligence is success in comprehensive life- and world-modelling. What counts as intelligent will depend on what an individual or society thinks about life, world, and success. Yet intelligence comparisons have a basis in direct experience of mental encounter; they arise in sensed resemblances among subjects (liable, like other human-kinds perceptions, to stereotyping). Intelligence is assessed differently according to different scenarios of encounter, as for example among workers, traders, lovers, philosophers, or friends. An IQ score could not define a personal (...) intelligence kind, but it could reasonably affect one subject's approach to another in standardized and time-limited situations. (shrink)

This paper presents three theses on the kind of human kinds represented by masculinity and femininity: (1) Genders are taken to be generic realities, (2) complementary kinds of a kind, and (3) normative and valid organizations of intention in community. Analogies are considered between gender and temperament, culture, race, age, and sexual orientation.

This essay examines the logic of greatness attributions in general and the implications of aesthetic positions taken by Hume, Shelley, and T. M. Greene in order to show how the attitude of faith, i.e. a disposition for unbounded personal growth, can constitute greatness in experiences or in objects or occasions of experience. On this basis the role of great experiences in education is elucidated. It is argued that faith takes a distinctively free aesthetic form in the educational frame of reference (...) so that great experiences may abound. (shrink)

Hooks are the particular elements in works of art that are in fact specially compelling for individual subjects. Hooks have their own kind of aesthetic meaningfulness that is obscured by the calculations of cultural manipulators, on the one hand, and by leading aesthetic theories’ insistence upon subordinating parts of a work to the whole, on the other. Hook appreciation inspires desirable adjustments in those theories.

For perspicuous comparison and evaluation of moral positions on life-and-death issues, it is necessary to take into account the different meanings that killing and getting killed can bear in the two dimensions of dealing with persons (intention meeting intention) and handling them. A homicidal scenario in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows the possibility of courteous dealing coinciding with lethal handling. The extreme possibility of lovingly affirming persons while killing them, suggested by the Augustinian “kindly severity” ideal for state-sponsored (...) punitive killing, requires the killers’ affirmation of a fleshliness and fallibility shared with their victims; but love can accept killing only provisionally, since it postulates freedom from the constraints that are felt to require killing. (shrink)

This paper uses the humor of Road Runner cartoons as a test of our intuitions about causality as these intuitions are appealed to by the rival theories of Hume and Kant. I argue that Road Runner cartoons are funnier to Kantians, with their stronger presumption of necessary causal regularity, and therefore supportive of Kantianism to the degree that we find this humor compelling.

Why should past occurrences matter to us as such? Are they in fact meaningful in a specifically historical way, or do they only become meaningful in being connected to other sorts of meaning—political or speculative, for example—as many notable theorists imply? Ranke and Oakeshott affirmed a purely historical meaningfulness but left its nature unclear. The purpose of this essay is to confirm historical meaningfulness by arguing that our commanding practical interest in how we share action with other actors is distinctively (...) engaged by presumed information about past occurrences. We recognize that past occurrences have determined the conditions of action sharing, constraining our practice with regard to which actors we share practical reality with and which compounding actions we may or must join in progress. (shrink)

Based on a bold equation of cinema with history, Jean-Luc Godard’s essay-film Histoire du Cinéma provokes new thoughts about what historical understanding involves and how cinematic revelation can happen. This paper discusses how Histoire engages conventional standards of historical understanding while also taking us into uncharted depths of historical realization, examining the undeniable historical evidence presented in the film, undismissable insights into relations among historical data, and possibly valid judgments of historical truth. Reaching for non-obvious connections, Godard risks misleading decontextualization (...) of his materials. But by stocking our minds with pertinent film selections, new treatments of those images, and various writers’ musings he draws us into his quest for a practically decisive realization of the significance of the recent history of our civilization. (shrink)

What is the relation between the thought of exteriority (that is, of an intellectually unencompassable Other taken to be a supreme source or condition of meaning) and the idealism, subjective or objective, that it reacts against? Eberhard Grisebach makes a good case study because his exteriority statement (Gegenwart, 1928) is unsurpassably extreme yet evolves in discernible stages from an idealist starting-point. After considering parallels with Buber and Levinas and criticisms from several sources, I argue that the exteriority strategy for thinking (...) about community is indispensable even if its dedication to negating comprehension renders it sterile for many philosophical purposes. (shrink)

“Intrinsic value” is a perplexing notion in that it purports to establish a relationship with a thing that cannot in fact be established by the valuing subject butcan only be welcomed. An important sense of “good” expresses the non-axiological side of shared flourishing. We do need the concept of intrinsic value to put our different kinds of value in order, but we can also recognize that the positing of intrinsic value is grounded on events of appeal wherein perceived beings promise (...) distinctive forms of benign partnership with their perceivers. The ideal of appeal maximalism can displace the problematic ideal of unrestricted intrinsic value as a basis for expanding the circle of moral consideration. (shrink)

Discussable issues lurk amidst the sprawling variety of "heaven" conceptions in different traditions. To advance reflection on heaven thinking, this paper concentrates on the question of what makes for a best world and orders possible heavens according to alternative resolutions of space, time and causality. Some apparent strengths and weaknesses of each type are examined. It is suggested that the proposed heavens of most durable interest will be those representing the most amazing combinations of possibilities, while the most productive discussions (...) of heaven-related issues will be those best able to refer to conditions of goodness in the actual world. (shrink)

Kant’s central notion of a “causality of freedom” seems inconsistent with his theoretical analysis of causation. Because of its detachment from any reference to time, it is also seriously in tension with ordinary moral ideals of individuality, efficacy, responsiveness, and personal growth in the exercise of freedom. I suggest a way of conceiving moral freedom that avoids the absurdity of practical timelessness while preserving the main strengths of Kant’s theories of theoretical and practical meaning, including his refusal to specify the (...) content of human fulfillment. Much as Kant’s ideal of the highest good combines the supreme good of moral virtue with its necessarily desired complement of worthy happiness, a Kantian ideal of the fullest freedom can combine the transcendental freedom of the moral disposition with individual exercises of freedom in the dramatic interaction of actual moral community. (shrink)

This study examines developments in Karl Barth's early theology (to 1932) and Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy (as far as Otherwise than Being) to show how the concept of the Totally Other addresses the most radical problem of justification for theological and philosophical thought.

In this book, Steven G. Smith focuses on the guidance function in language and scripture and evaluates the assumptions and ideals of scriptural religion in global perspective. He brings to language studies a new pragmatic emphasis on the shared modeling of life-in-the-world by communicators constantly depending on each other's guidance. Using concepts of axiality and axialization derived from Jaspers' description of the 'Axial Age', he shows the essential role of scripture in the historical progress of communicative action. This (...) volume clarifies the formative power of scriptures in religions of the 'world religion' type and brings scripture into philosophy of religion as a major cross-cultural category of study, thereby helping philosophy of religion find a needed cross-cultural footing. (shrink)

Some of kant's rationales for conceiving the highest good of morality as virtue rewarded with happiness rest on the subject's "necessary" natural desire for happiness, While others appeal to a still-Obscure principle of moral desert. The principle, I argue, Is that the moral agent qua moral necessarily hopes for the "approval" of fellow moral legislators and god, Who "would" (did they exist, And if they could) signify their approval by bestowing the means of happiness.

Elucidation of the epistemic fulfillment of "realizing" in imaginative, intellectual, and spiritual modes.

Our moral valuation of nonhuman and human beings alike may arise in sympathy, the realization in feeling of a significant commonality between self and others; in scrupulous observance of policy, the affirmation in practical consistency of a system of relations with others; and in piety, the attitude of boundless appreciation and absolute scruple with respect to objects as sacred - that is, as valued for the sake of adequate valuation of the holy. Differences between the moral status of humans and (...) that of nonhumans are to be explained not by any single criterion such as the capacity to suffer or to make contracts, but rather by finding the relative positions of humans and nonhumans on continua of feelable commonality, policy considerateness, and sacredness. Investigation of these differences must take into account the way basic religious apprehensions (or the absence thereof) organize these frames of reference. (shrink)

Buber's assertions about the relation between the self (I) and God (the Eternal You) amount to an "argument" which means reasonably to bring its audience to awareness of God. This reasoning is better understood and evaluated if it is presented in a more conventionally argumentative form than Buber gave it. The key premises are: 1) Buber's account of I-You saying as a general theory of meaning and criterion of reality, and 2) Buber's claim that You-saying in encounters with finite beings (...) does not exhaust the I's capacity to say You. Thus 1) whenever I say You, I meet reality; and 2) I can say You infinitely. Both in its premises and in its non-coercive way of soliciting assent, this Buberian argument exhibits the actual valid appeal of all the best-known arguments to God. (shrink)

Trying, a central human concern, is actualized and beheld in rather pure form in athletic endeavor, where successful trying interests us as a revelation of a waxing kind of human being, full of promise. In the moral life trying is not so openly displayed, yet one’s standing in the moral system of evaluation is determined by it. The honor attaching to athletic success models the moral community’s confirmation of individuals’ commitment to it.

This paper revives the idea of final cause as a way of considering how the meaning of occurrences--what they have permitted in our lives, as opposed to what produced them or how they fit into a prior plan--is essential to our understanding them.

Beginning with Anaximenes, philosophers have adopted spirit-words to identify that which is of commanding significance for understanding and living human life. So again here. To be a spiritual being is to be one for whom the first and final determiner of meaning is the question of how best to live in relationship with other beings, preeminently other intenders. Since parties to relationship transcend comprehension, the spirit-as-mind (nous) tradition rests on a fundamental mistake. Validity structures like rationality and culture function as (...) provisional answers to the essentially open question of relationship and are misunderstood if abstracted from it. (shrink)

God’s revelation is not uncommonly represented as a past speaking---“God has spoken,” “We have heard.” In order to study how the possibilities of reasoning are affected when the crucial evidence to which reasoning may appeal is a remembered speaking, a parableis offered in which three young brothers dispute whether their mother has called them home. Their arguments necessarily take an ad hominem tum. It is found that the claims of the brother who remembers hearing are provisionally, partially, and prescriptively reasonable. (...) This brother’s position resembles that of St. Paul at Romans 1 :18-32 (“So they are without excuse” ). (shrink)

The development of a metaphysics of actuality is reconstructed from Plato through Bergson to capitalize on Bergson's suggestion that mind and matter can be understood as inversions of each other, or as respectively a centering and an extending of forms. This view avoids the pitfalls of reductive monism and disjunctive dualism: it is dyadic (cognizant at once of mind-matter difference and of the unity of reality), symmetrical (not apt to close off prematurely our reckoning with complexity and change, on either (...) side), and correlational (able to track relations of form, energy, and sequence between mental and material items). (shrink)

The sense of a religious life ideal typically depends on an ordinary practical understanding of selfhood and success (worthiness) that it both departs from (toward a higher excellence) and trades on. Serenity and passion are examined as ways of transmuting ordinary trying and worth.

Attitude is an important criterion and cause of religiousness, though it is commonly mishandled in religious reflection by (1) skewing the anthropologically central variable of attitude toward “feeling,” on the side of affect, or toward “disposition,” on the side of will, and (2) obscuring different basic forms and validities of religious attitude by insisting on one overly narrow or misleadingly rounded-out conception of devoutness (most often, “faith”). This paper develops a more adequate conception of attitude in general and of the (...) generic religious attitude of devoutness as branching into three principal, sometimes divergent religious attitudes: faith, oriented to the realizable; piety, oriented to the realized; and submission, oriented to realizing. (shrink)

Some of the most significant religious appeals can be taken as reasons of a distinctively religious kind. But many popular ways of interpreting religious reasoning pose obstacles to appreciating religious reasons as such. To avoid binding the concept of religious reason to an intellectual programme that requires a disjunction between the religious and the rational or that dissolves all tension between religious claims and general rational standards of validity and normativity, religious reasons can be defined for purposes of liberal study (...) by their challenging yet rationally appreciable transvalid claims and transnormative implications. Examples from the book of Amos and the Chandogya Upanishad are discussed. (shrink)

This book illuminates the aesthetically underrated meaningfulness of particular elements in works of art and aesthetic experiences generally. Beginning from the idea of "hooks" in popular song, the book identifies experiences of special liveliness that are of enduring interest, supporting contemplation and probing discussion. When hooks are placed in the foreground of aesthetic experience, so is an enthusiastic “grabbing back” by the experiencer who forms a quasi-personal bond with the beloved singular moment and is probably inclined to share this still-evolving (...) realization of value with others. This book presents numerous models of enthusiastic “grabbing back” that are art-critically motivated to explain how hooks achieve their effects and philosophically motivated to discover how hooks and hook appreciation contribute to a more ideally desirable life. Framing hook appreciation with a defensible general model of aesthetic experience, this book gives an unprecedented demonstration of the substantial aesthetic and philosophical interest of hook-centered inquiry. (shrink)

An unrestricted conception of actors and their interdependence in action has now been deployed effectively in various fields of study, but the question remains how we can discriminate reasonably in our action sharing if there is more to consider than simply putting persons ahead of things. By what general practical realizations can a universal action sharer be guided? I identify four primary levels of action sharing—-coexistence, cooperation, collaboration, and communion—-showing a distinctive complex of factual and directive considerations in each. I (...) further show how three orientations in which we approach fellow actors—-need, desire, and delight—-sustain different, partly divergent and partly complementary understandings of action sharing. This analysis helps us to anticipate the character of the strongest appeal that can be made for consideration of a fellow actor. (shrink)

Considering the profoundly collaborative nature of human communication, the notion of guidance needs more careful consideration and foregrounding in the philosophy of language. The practically cruc...

A Lens Problem arises when a movie viewer is dissatisfied with the physical information provided by shots taken with non-normal lenses. Experiences will vary, but the real possibility of the Lens Problem points to an important dimension of movie experience that is neglected by theories oriented to realistic seeing or imaginative seeing-as. Before we construe a presentation as documentary or fictional, we are in the first place watchers: our more or less constant watchful interest in gleaning useful information about position (...) and movement in a world is a basis for the immediate and constant engagement of our attention by a movie and for an experience of progress or disappointment in learning from it. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel Levinas later expressed regret that he sided with Martin Heidegger rather than the more “ideal”-minded Ernst Cassirer in their 1929 Davos encounter, Cassirer’s philosophy of culture would never have been an apt framework for Levinas’s own project, which was always directed more to fundamental orientation than to formative activities or achievements. In “Meaning and Sense” (1964), Levinas conceived a totalizing cultural “meaning” as a foil to transcendent ethical “sense.” In a 1983 paper, however, he proposed an ethical conception (...) of culture. He could have developed this further using another element from “Meaning and Sense,” an ethical conception of work as service of the Other. The work-in-progress of culture combines pure ethics and implemented morality, pure command and consistent style, infinite vulnerability and actual power. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel Levinas later expressed regret that he sided with Martin Heidegger rather than the more “ideal”-minded Ernst Cassirer in their 1929 Davos encounter, Cassirer’s philosophy of culture would never have been an apt framework for Levinas’s own project, which was always directed more to fundamental orientation than to formative activities or achievements. In “Meaning and Sense” (1964), Levinas conceived a totalizing cultural “meaning” as a foil to transcendent ethical “sense.” In a 1983 paper, however, he proposed an ethical conception (...) of culture. He could have developed this further using another element from “Meaning and Sense,” an ethical conception of work as service of the Other. The work-in-progress of culture combines pure ethics and implemented morality, pure command and consistent style, infinite vulnerability and actual power. (shrink)

Argues against a consumption-oriented vision of agents' relation with material things that there are worthy, morally happy kinds of owner-partnership with things and that expansion of access to owner worth should be among the goals of moral, political, and economic policy.

Concrete worthy actions have not been aterminus of discernment for moral theory in theway that they often are for the deliberatingmoral agent. Some ordinary hallmarks of worthyactions challenge the unworldly and impersonalways of envisioning life that dominatephilosophical ethics. I discuss six: a worthyaction (1) improves the world in moralperspective, (2) discloses the agent''s power,(3) is personally rewarding, (4) unites virtue,justice, and happiness, (5) is a prime objectof moral choice, and (6) belongs to a practicalgenre (such as work or love). Appreciatingworthy (...) actions leads to a less abstract andconformist view of ethical standards and moreattention to individual portfolio-buildingaccording to diverse practical opportunities. (shrink)

A comprehensive look at how we rely on ideals of worthy action in the pursuit of moral happiness.