Jan-Werner Müller’s analysis of ‘authoritarian populism’ represents a highly limited approach to the issue that is typical of many mainstream approaches within populism studies and liberal-democratic constitutional theory. Through a critique of Müller, the article develops an account of the historical emergence of authoritarian populism as a ‘long counter-revolution of the radical right’ against the values and institutions of the social-democratic welfare state. Focussing on the USA and UK, the article shows how, rather than being a novel phenomenon emerging from (...) the fringes in the 1980s and 1990s, authoritarian populism emerges from the middle of the twentieth century as a highly successful form of hegemonic struggle over the Republican and Conservative parties and over American and British societies. The political success of a highly contradictory ideological framework of the radical right has helped to largely normalise a language, rhetoric and imaginary of authoritarian populism and place it at the centre of contemporary politics and culture. By largely ignoring such a development, and the highly contingent nature of North Atlantic ‘democracy’, theorists and commentators like Müller fail to grasp the depth of the current authoritarian populist threat and offer only liberal-democratic mythology in response to the ranting and chanting of ‘fake news’. (shrink)

The Other's War is an intervention into a set of contemporary moral, political and legal debates over the legitimacy of war and terrorism within the context of the so-called global War on Terror. Tarik Kochi considers how, despite the variety of its approaches âe" just war theory, classical realist, post-Kantian, poststructuralist âe" contemporary ethical, political and legal philosophy still struggles to produce a convincing account of war. Focusing on the philosophical problem of the rightness of war, The Other's (...) War responds to this lack. Through a discussion of a number of key Western intellectual traditions, Kochi demonstrates how often conflicting and contradictory conceptions of warâe(tm)s rightness have developed in modernity. He shows how a process of ordering violence around different notions of right has constantly redrawn the boundaries of what constitutes âe~legitimateâe(tm) violence. Such a process has consequences for anyone who claims to be fighting a âe~just warâe(tm). Building upon this account and drawing upon the philosophical heritage of G.W.F. Hegel and Ernst Bloch, The Otherâe(tm)s War proposes a new understanding of war, not just as a social condition characterised by violent conflict and struggles for power, but as the attempt of individuals and groups to realise their normative claims through violence. Kochi argues that both of these aspects of war are an expression of the metaphysics of human subjectivity. War begins with, and is the radical exaggeration of, a fundamental activity of human subjectivity, in which the subject constitutes its normative and material identity; realising and positing itself through acts that involve negation and violence. By drawing consideration of the problem of war back to the level of a philosophical examination of the metaphysics of human subjectivity, The Other's War develops a novel theory of war that helps us to better understand the nature of contemporary conflict as a process of recognition. From this perspective, judgment, it is concluded, needs to be constantly guided by the effort to recognise the ethics of the other's war. (shrink)

This essay presents an interpretation of the juridical thought of Cicero, Hugo Grotius and Adam Smith. Focussing upon questions of property, capital accumulation and violence, the essay traces a tension within their writings between a social ethic of human fellowship and compassion, and, a theory of the utility of ‘unsocial’ commercial self-interest. This tension forms a key problem for the tradition of liberal international law. For Grotius and Smith one response to this tension is to attempt to reign in capitalist (...) markets by asserting a range of moral duties to individuals and to the nation-state. The importance of stressing such an interpretation is to reject the flattening-out of the liberal political and juridical tradition by contemporary neoliberal thought, and to reclaim a number of ways of thinking about the global economy and international law in which moral action and political intervention are understood as playing a necessary and essential role. (shrink)

Od tri velika ideala modernog demokratskog doba, bratstvo je vrlo brzo zasjenjeno drugim dvjema vrijednostima, slobodom i jednakošću. Suvremena politička teorija je skoro jednoglasno zamijenila i sam pojam bratstva pojmom solidarnosti ili društvene pravednosti: u svojoj Teoriji pravednosti, John Rawls izričito izjednačuje bratstvo s »načelom razlike« koje legitimira mehanizme distributivne pravednosti. Ipak, pogrešno prevodeći francusko fraternité kao community, neke angloamerički autori uvode treći republikanski ideal u okoštalu debatu liberala i komunitarijanaca: tamo gdje fraternité shvaćena kao solidarnost omogućuje suopstojnost slobode i (...) jednakosti, fraternité shvaćena kao zajednica postavlja granice izgradnji dobro uređenog demokratskog društva.De trois grands idéaux de l’âge démocratique moderne, la fraternité a été très tôt éclipsée par les deux autres valeurs que sont la liberté et l’égalité. La théorie politique contemporaine a quasi unanimement supplanté la notion même de fraternité par celle de solidarité ou de justice sociale : dans sa Théorie de la justice, John Rawls assimile explicitement la fraternité au « principe de différence » légitimant les dispositifs de justice distributive. Toutefois, par une traduction abusive, certains courants de la pensée politique anglo-saxonne interprètent fraternité comme communauté, en l’introduisant de la sorte dans le débat sclérosé entre libéraux et communautariens : là où la fraternité/solidarité rend compossibles liberté et égalité, fraternité/ communauté pose des limites à la construction d’une société démocratique bien ordonnée. (shrink)

BackgroundIn Morocco, medical research ethics training was integrated into the medical curriculum during the 2015 reform. In the same year, a law on medical research ethics was enacted to protect individuals participating in medical research. These improvements, whether in the reform or in the enactment of the law, could positively impact the knowledge of these researchers and, consequently, their attitudes and practices regarding medical research ethics. The main objective of this work is to assess Moroccan physicians’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices (...) at the beginning of their careers (interns and residents) in medical research ethics.Patients and methodsThis is a multicenter cross-sectional study conducted in 2021 among Moroccan physicians. Three scores were created and validated to assess physicians’ level of knowledge, attitudes, and practices regarding research ethics. A descriptive analysis was carried out, followed by a univariate analysis and a multivariate analysis using multivariate binary logistic regression to study the factors associated with the different calculated scores.ResultsA total of 924 physicians were included in the study, with an average age of 27.8 ± 2.2 years. 40.7% had a high medical research ethics knowledge score, and 68.8% had good attitudes. These two scores were positively associated with age and were statistically higher in residents and in physicians who had received training in medical research ethics during their medical curriculum. Only 29,9% of physicians who had participated in research studies had adequate practices with medical research ethics. This score was statistically higher in residents and in physicians who had heard about research ethics.ConclusionA genuine introduction to ethics in the medical curriculum is essential to enhance researchers’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices. This, in turn, can lead to an increase in both the quantity and quality of research conducted in Morocco. (shrink)

A tese defendida no presente artigo é que a autoconsciência, na visão de Searle é uma caraterística do campo unificado de consciência. Após uma discussão de três distinções a respeito da consciência propostas por Rosenthal, é discutido o conceito de consciência de Searle – como um fenômeno qualitativo, subjetivo e unificado – e o caráter holístico desse conceito. A discussão que Searle faz dos conceitos de autoconsciência e de introspecção mostra que ele acredita que uma autoconsciência implícita é uma característica (...) constitutiva do campo unificado de consciência. (shrink)

O artigo investiga a frequente alegação na literatura filosófica de que a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência é incoerente. Após um exame das teses básicas de sua teoria da mente , é discutida sua posição a respeito da identidade entre a consciência e a atividade cerebral . Da adesão de Searle a uma tese da identidade de ocorrências deve-se concluir que não há contradição entre esta tese e a irredutibilidade ontológica que ele defende. Porém, é possível deduzir (...) de sua teoria asserções que contradizem esta mesma teoria , uma vez que essa irredutibilidade resulta em um dualismo de propriedades. (shrink)

Substance use disorders (SUDs) constitute a growing global health crisis, yet many limitations and challenges exist in SUD treatment research, including the lack of objective brain-based markers for tracking treatment outcomes. Electroencephalography (EEG) is a neurophysiological technique for measuring brain activity, and although much is known about EEG activity in acute and chronic substance use, knowledge regarding EEG in relation to abstinence and treatment outcomes is sparse. We performed a scoping review of longitudinal and pre-post treatment EEG studies that explored (...) putative changes in brain function associated with abstinence and/or treatment in individuals with SUD. Following PRISMA guidelines, we identified studies published between January 2000 and March 2022 from online databases. Search keywords included EEG, addictive substances (e.g., alcohol, cocaine, methamphetamine), and treatment related terms (e.g., abstinence, relapse). Selected studies used EEG at least at one time point as a predictor of abstinence or other treatment-related outcomes; or examined pre- vs. post-SUD intervention (brain stimulation, pharmacological, behavioral) EEG effects. Studies were also rated on the risk of bias and quality using validated instruments. Forty-four studies met the inclusion criteria. More consistent findings included lower oddball P3 and higher resting beta at baseline predicting negative outcomes, and abstinence-mediated longitudinal decrease in cue-elicited P3 amplitude and resting beta power. Other findings included abstinence or treatment-related changes in late positive potential (LPP) and N2 amplitudes, as well as in delta and theta power. Existing studies were heterogeneous and limited in terms of specific substances of interest, brief times for follow-ups, and inconsistent or sparse results. Encouragingly, in this limited but maturing literature, many studies demonstrated partial associations of EEG markers with abstinence, treatment outcomes, or pre-post treatment-effects. Studies were generally of good quality in terms of risk of bias. More EEG studies are warranted to better understand abstinence- or treatment-mediated neural changes or to predict SUD treatment outcomes. Future research can benefit from prospective large-sample cohorts and the use of standardized methods such as task batteries. EEG markers elucidating the temporal dynamics of changes in brain function related to abstinence and/or treatment may enable evidence-based planning for more effective and targeted treatments, potentially pre-empting relapse or minimizing negative lifespan effects of SUD. (shrink)

O artigo examina a teoria de David Armstrong sobre a consciência e sua concepção do inconsciente. Após uma discussão do caráter anti-cartesiano dessa teoria, são discutidas as noções de consciência mínima e consciência perceptiva, bem como o conceito de consciência introspectiva, que é o mais importante para Armstrong. A conclusão é que, apesar do valor explicativo dos seus conceitos de consciência, Armstrong defende uma perspectiva insatisfatória a respeito do inconsciente, pois essa perspectiva não dá conta da real influência do inconsciente (...) em nossa vida mental. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 O artigo investiga se o naturalismo biológico (a solução de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo) pode ser considerado uma concepção fisicalista acerca da mente. Apesar de defender um fisicalismo a respeito dos particulares (seção 2), Searle adere ao argumento básico dos dualistas para a irredutibilidade das propriedades mentais (seção 3), e não consegue fundamentar sua alegação de que tal irredutibilidade é compatível com o fisicalismo (seção 4). Desse modo, sua teoria da mente se revela como um dualismo de (...) propriedades. (shrink)

Resumo: John R. Searle articulou uma filosofia da mente de acordo com a qual a consciência é o mais importante dos fenômenos mentais, sendo essencialmente caracterizada por uma subjetividade de seu modo de existência. O problema é que a existência de fenômenos mentais inconscientes coloca essa concepção em dificuldades, pois fenômenos inconscientes existem sem serem vivenciados, ou seja, existem de forma objetiva. Para escapar desse problema, Searle propõe uma teoria disposicional do inconsciente, mas a tese do presente trabalho é que, (...) ao aceitar a possibilidade de causação mental inconsciente, Searle está comprometido com a existência de propriedades mentais genuínas, mas independentes da consciência, de modo que sua tese da subjetividade ontológica da mente desmorona. (shrink)

Searle defende a perspectiva – historicamente associada a Descartes – segundo a qual a consciência é a essência da mente. Isso gera complicações para que ele possa explicar a existência de fenômenos mentais inconscientes – existência que o próprio Searle aceita. Sua estratégia para conciliar a essencialidade da consciência com a existência de fenômenos mentais inconscientes é recorrer a uma teoria disposicional: estados inconscientes existem na forma de disposições para a causação de estados conscientes. O presente artigo se concentra em (...) uma dificuldade enfrentada por essa teoria, dificuldade decorrente da eficácia causal que o próprio Searle atribui aos fenômenos mentais inconscientes. Se um fenômeno inconsciente causa uma determinada ação, então ele o faz em virtude de suas propriedades mentais aspecto qualitativo de sensações, ou o conteúdo representativo de desejos), mas se estas propriedades mentais desempenham um papel essencial na causação, então elas existem efetivamente, o que significa que o fenômeno inconsciente possui uma existência mental independente da consciência, o que contradiz a visão cartesiana da consciência como a essência do mental. (shrink)

The paper aims at giving a general exposition of John Searle’s solution of the mind-body problem – biological naturalism – and examines its fundamental theses, and some of its consequences. The exam of such theses – which delineates the characteristics of Searle's theory – shows that the theory has three main difficulties, since it holds some assertions which at first sight seem to be incompatible.

O artigo investiga a concepçáo de reduçáo de Searle no que se refere à compatibilidade entre redutibilidade causal e simultânea irredutibilidade ontológica da consciência à atividade cerebral. A reduçáo causal da consciência – a explanabilidade causal de suas características por processos cerebrais e a identidade de suas capacidades causais (seçáo 2) – é incompatível com a irredutibilidade ontológica (seçáo 3), porque a diferença ontológica entre características subjetivas e objetivas torna a identidade das capacidades causais incompreensível (seçáo 4). O principal problema (...) é que a teoria de Searle afirma e nega simultaneamente a identidade entre consciência e processos cerebrais (seçáo 5). (shrink)

O artigo defende a tese de que a irredutibilidade ontológica que Searle atribui à consciência envolve o naturalismo biológico (proposto por ele como uma solução para a parte conceitual do problema mente-corpo) em diversas incoerências, especialmente no que diz respeito ao tema da causação mental. Após uma apresentação das teses básicas da teoria (seção 2), são discutidos os problemas que a tese da irredutibilidade ontológica gera para a visão de Searle sobre a causação mental (seção 3), e as incoerências decorrentes (...) dessa tese (seção 4). A conclusão é que o modo como Searle concebe a irredutibilidade ontológica da consciência é uma fonte de problemas para o naturalismo biológico. (shrink)

O artigo examina a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência (em especial a sua teoria acerca de seus poderes causais), que se mostra obscura e incoerente. Porém, essa incoerência não é inevitável, pois o naturalismo biológico possui elementos que permitiriam a articulação de uma teoria mais clara a respeito das capacidades causais. O exame da teoria de Pereboom e Kornblith possibilita entender por que a afirmação de identidade das capacidades causais leva a um reducionismo. Essa teoria aponta um (...) caminho promissor para que se possa aprimorar o naturalismo biológico. (shrink)

This paper contains an analysis of a famous criticism from John Searle on materialist tradition. This tradition uses to ignore or even refuse the subjectivity of mental phenomena. This paper examines Searle’s strategy to defend this subjectivity, refusing the essential character of behavior to the mental aspect (section II), distinguishing subjective and objective in epistemic and ontological senses (section III) and showing his solution to the problem of other minds (section IV). However, his attempt to obtain an indirect access to (...) subjective mental phenomena through causal explanations (section V) of these phenomena by brain processes is not enough to integrate the ontological subjectivity in our scientific worldview, once that this supposed ontological irreducibility from subjective to objective phenomena seems to result in the conclusion that mental phenomena are something beyond natural reality. (shrink)

John Searle claims that consciousness is ontologically subjective, since conscious mental phenomena only exist as long as they are experienced. Therefore, mental phenomena are essentially conscious, insofar as their mental character depends on their connection with consciousness. However, to align the acceptance of unconscious mental phenomena with his Cartesian view of consciousness, Searle defends adispositional account of the unconscious. The problem is that some cases of unconscious mental causation require that certain decisive mental properties exist in an occurrent way, and (...) not merely as dispositions. By accepting unconscious mental causation, Searle commits himself to a mental existence that isindependent from consciousness. Such unconscious existence implies that certain mental phenomena are ontologically objective, and not subjective as he claims, because they exist without being experienced.Keywords: Ontological subjectivity, unconscious, disposition, mental causation, objectivity. (shrink)

Seit Beginn der frühen Neuzeit ist das naturwissenschaftliche Verfahren maßgeblich durch ein neues Konzept geprägt: das Konzept des experimentellen, gestalterischen Eingriffs in die Natur. Es geht nun nicht mehr darum, eine Geschichte der "freien und ungebundenen Natur" (Bacon) zu erzählen, die in ihrem eigenen Lauf belassen und als vollkommene Bildung betrachtet wird. Es geht vielmehr darum, der "gebundenen und bezwungenen Natur" (Bacon) vermittels der experimentellen Tätigkeit des Menschen die Geheimnisse zu entreißen. Diese technisch-praktische Konzeption grenzt sich explizit von den klassischen (...) kontemplativen Wissenschaftsvorstellungen der Antike ab. Wie es Kant paradigmatisch in Bezug auf Bacon formuliert hat, ist diese "Revolution der Denkart" maßgeblich durch ein gewandeltes Verständnis des Verhältnisses des Menschen zur Natur geprägt. Der Mensch als Experimentator hat für Kant nicht mehr die "Qualität eines Schülers", der sich passiv von der Natur belehren läßt und an ihrem "Leitbande" (Kant) gegängelt wird. Seine neu gewonnene Autorität verleiht ihm vielmehr den Status eines Richters, der nun die Natur nötigen kann, auf gestellte Fragen zu antworten. Die Laborforschung der modernen Naturwissenschaft ist von den Formen der alten Naturwissenschaft so weit entfernt, daß sie den Vorwurf auf sich zog, sie untersuche Artekakte, aber nicht Natur. Die grundlegenden Theorien über Natur können in der Regel nur unter den künstlichen Bedingungen des Labors aufgestellt werden. Daraus darf aber nicht geschlossen werden, die anhand von Laborphänomenen aufgestellten und getesteten Theorien handelten nicht von der Natur außerhalb der Labore. Aber ihrer exakten und detaillierten Anwendung auf Prozesse außerhalb der Labore stehen eine Fülle von Schwierigkeiten entgegen. Insofern markiert das Labor sehr wohl eine Grenze exakter Naturforschung, die für den Umgang der wissenschaftlich-technischen Zivilisation mit der Natur wichtige Konsequenzen hat. Inhalt: Kristian Köchy / Gregor Schiemann: Natur im Labor Lothar Schäfer: Die Erscheinung der Natur unter Laborbedingungen Holm Tetens: Das Labor als Grenze der exakten Naturforschung Christoph Rehmann-Sutter: Genes in Labs - Concepts of Development and the Standard Environment Kristian Köchy: Lebewesen im Labor. Das Experiment in der Biologie Jutta Weber: Mannigfaltige Techno-Naturen. Von epistemischen Modellsystemen und situierten Maschinen Thomas Sören Hoffmann: Gezeigte versus sich zeigende Natur. Eine Skizze im Blick auf das Verhältnis von Labor und Natur Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich: Laborforschung im Erkenntnishandeln der Experimentiergesellschaft. Eine holistisch-pragmatische Perspektive für die Wissenschaftstheorie. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 18 Heft: 1 Seiten: 133-172.

This study of biological laboratory is focussed on the biological experiment. By confronting the real conditions of life science experiments with an ideal canon of experimental principles - which is constituted by the six preconceptions of separation, manipulation, control, distance, reproduction and homogeneity - the differences and specialities of biological experimentation are examined. This special constitution of biological experiments in the laboratory is a reaction of the special conditions of biological phenomena too. In a co-evolutionary process of trial-and-error improvement of (...) laboratory actions not only technical points but also natural conditions are impressed on the methodical executions. This special relation between ,,nature" and ,,art" can be described in the terms of Merleau-Pontys ,,chiasm". German Im Fokus dieser Untersuchung zum biologischen Labor steht die Analyse des Experiments. Durch konfrontative Gegenüberstellung der realen Forschungs-bedingungen in den Lebenswissenschaften mit dem Idealkonzept vom Experiment - gekennzeichnet durch die sechs Vorannahmen der Separation, Manipulation, Kontrolle, Distanz, Wiederholbarkeit und Homogenität - wird die spezifische Ausgestaltung des biologischen Methodenarsenals deutlich. Diese ist auch als eine Reaktion auf die besonderen Forschungsbedingungen der Biologie zu interpretieren. In einem koevolutiven ,,trial and error-Verfahren der Optimierung biologischer Laborhandlungen prägt sich bei aller Künstlichkeit auch eine ,,natürliche Vorgabe in den methodischen Vollzug ein. Dieses spezielle Verhältnis von ,,Natur und ,,Kunst kann in Analogie zu Merleau-Pontys Konzept des ,,Chiasmus interpretiert werden. (shrink)

Seit Beginn der frühen Neuzeit ist das naturwissenschaftliche Verfahren maßgeblich durch ein neues Konzept geprägt: das Konzept des experimentellen, gestalterischen Eingriffs in die Natur. Es geht nun nicht mehr darum, eine Geschichte der "freien und ungebundenen Natur" (Bacon) zu erzählen, die in ihrem eigenen Lauf belassen und als vollkommene Bildung betrachtet wird. Es geht vielmehr darum, der "gebundenen und bezwungenen Natur" (Bacon) vermittels der experimentellen Tätigkeit des Menschen die Geheimnisse zu entreißen. Diese technisch-praktische Konzeption grenzt sich explizit von den klassischen (...) kontemplativen Wissenschaftsvorstellungen der Antike ab. Wie es Kant paradigmatisch in Bezug auf Bacon formuliert hat, ist diese "Revolution der Denkart" maßgeblich durch ein gewandeltes Verständnis des Verhältnisses des Menschen zur Natur geprägt. Der Mensch als Experimentator hat für Kant nicht mehr die "Qualität eines Schülers", der sich passiv von der Natur belehren läßt und an ihrem "Leitbande" (Kant) gegängelt wird. Seine neu gewonnene Autorität verleiht ihm vielmehr den Status eines Richters, der nun die Natur nötigen kann, auf gestellte Fragen zu antworten. Die Laborforschung der modernen Naturwissenschaft ist von den Formen der alten Naturwissenschaft so weit entfernt, daß sie den Vorwurf auf sich zog, sie untersuche Artefkakte, aber nicht Natur. Die grundlegenden Theorien über Natur können in der Regel nur unter den künstlichen Bedingungen des Labors aufgestellt werden. Daraus darf aber nicht geschlossen werden, die anhand von Laborphänomenen aufgestellten und getesteten Theorien handelten nicht von der Natur außerhalb der Labore. Aber ihrer exakten und detaillierten Anwendung auf Prozesse außerhalb der Labore stehen eine Fülle von Schwierigkeiten entgegen. Insofern markiert das Labor sehr wohl eine Grenze exakter Naturforschung, die für den Umgang der wissenschaftlich-technischen Zivilisation mit der Natur wichtige Konsequenzen hat. (shrink)

O artigo examina as concepções de consciência, bem como as concepções de fenômenos mentais inconscientes, de David Armstrong e John Searle. Enquanto Armstrong entende a consciência como decorrente de uma percepção de segunda ordem, de modo que um fenômeno inconsciente é apenas um fenômeno mental que não é percebido, Searle entende a consciência como um estado global, o que torna sua visão do inconsciente mais complicada. Estados mentais inconscientes não passam de padrões de atividade neuronal, padrões que são capazes de (...) causar estados mentais conscientes nas circunstâncias adequadas. Porém, enquanto a teoria de Armstrong é perfeitamente coerente, a visão de Searle se mostra inconsistente, pois a eficácia causal que ele atribui aos fenômenos inconscientes é incompatível com o papel fundamental que ele atribui à consciência no domínio dos fenômenos mentais. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the question as to whether biological naturalism (John Searle’s solution for the mind-body problem) can be construed as a physicalist account of the mind. Despite defending physicalism in connection with particulars (section 2), Searle accepts the dualists’ basic argument for the irreducibility of mental properties (section 3). However, Searle is unable to substantiate his claim that such irreducibility is compatible with physicalism (section 4). This being the case, his theory about the mind is shown to (...) be a variety of property dualism. (shrink)

O artigo tem como objetivo geral determinar se o naturalismo biológico é uma forma de fisicalismo ou de dualismo. Após uma exposição das semelhanças da teoria com o fisicalismo reducionista, é examinada a visão de Searle sobre a redução causal, e discutida uma maneira como sua concepção acerca das capacidades causais da consciência e do cérebro pode ser reformulada para não comprometê-lo com o reducionismo.