Textbooks for social science research suggest that studies are necessarily grounded in foundational philosophies that shape the research process. However, the literature does not provide a consistent picture of how philosophical positions shape research, and few studies have investigated researchers’ own ideas about this process. This study aimed to classify researchers’ descriptions of how philosophical positions connect to aspects of the research process and to investigate metaphors used to describe these connections. From a sample of 1500 journal articles, 73 papers (...) were found that directly mentioned a philosophical position. The analysis found that philosophical positions are most often connected with study design and methodology, or with concepts and theories. The connections include that philosophical positions result in, support, match and result from aspects of the research process, and that philosophical assumptions could be inherent in methodologies and theories. Metaphorically, philosophical positions were a tool, path, location, support, resource, person and seeing. These classification frameworks can be used in future research to understand how researchers conceptualize philosophical positions and how this influences their decision making. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Fricker’s influential account of testimonial injustice (hereafter ‘TI’) should be expanded to include cases of TI from mutually neutralising countervailing prejudices. In this kind of case, the hearer is given due credibility by the speaker. I describe a relevant case, defend it from objections, highlight how it differs from extant cases of due-credibility TI and describe its distinctive features. This case demonstrates how paying attention to the way multiple prejudices operate in concert leads to (...) expanding the repertoire of cases of TI and casts light on the harms of TI. (shrink)

While much has been said on the connection between dominant rationality standards and systemic oppression, the specific role of logic in supporting epistemic injustice has not received much explicit attention. In this paper I highlight several ways in which it is possible for logic – as a discipline, as a particular system and as a gloss for rational common sense – to be implicated in epistemic injustice. Concrete examples are given for testimonial, content-based, hermeneutical and contributory injustices. I conclude by (...) elaborating on how the need to address these injustices affects the attitudes we should carry toward logic. (shrink)

Writings on epistemic injustice have assessed how people can be harmed in their capacity as knowers when they are a racial minority, a woman, disabled and so on. But what about when they belong to the working class? This paper is an initial attempt to understand why class has so far received limited attention within writings on epistemic injustice and to respond to these reasons. It focuses on how testimonial and hermeneutic injustices specifically harm workers in ways distinctive from the (...) harm one might suffer due to other social identities. It does this by drawing attention to the special case of industrial strike action and the play of conceptual resources and credibility assessments that influence the action’s success. Additionally, it provides a first-time exposition for social epistemologists on what I term the ‘class compositional approach’, derived from 1960-70s Italian labour struggles. This approach, I argue, succeeds in evading the criticism of class reductionism while developing recent philosophical work on class-based injustice. (shrink)

Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine (...) the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality. (shrink)

The experimental method is designed to secure the reliable attribution of causal relationships by means of controlled comparison across conditions. Doing so, however, depends upon the reduction of uncertainties and inconsistencies in the process of comparison; and this poses particularly significant challenges for the behavioral and social sciences because they work with human subjects, whose malleability and complexity often interact in unexpected ways with experimental manipulations, thus resulting in unpredictable behavior. Drawing on the Science and Technology Studies perspective and one (...) of our authors’ experiences in experimental work, this paper examines how experimental social scientists manage to establish objectivity and standardization in the face of vagaries arising from working with human subjects. In identifying experimental researchers’ solutions to this challenge, we draw on methodological discussions among applied social scientists as naturally occurring data, through which we show how some seemingly mundane practices play essential roles in extracting patterns out of otherwise unpredictable behaviors in the lab. Closely examining such strategies, we reveal the inherent instabilities in the experimental method when adopted in the social sciences and discuss their methodological implications. In conclusion, we make tentative suggestions for escaping the kinds of methodological impasses which we have identified. (shrink)

1. The current political scene in many countries is populated by polarised groups with sharply contrasting loyalties and beliefs implying that there are fundamental schisms between opposing groups....

This article evaluates an emerging element in popular debate and inquiry: DYOR. (Haven’t heard of the acronym? Then Do Your Own Research.) The slogan is flexible and versatile. It is used frequently on social media platforms about topics from medical science to financial investing to conspiracy theories. Using conceptual and empirical resources drawn from philosophy and psychology, we examine key questions about the slogan’s operation in human cognition and epistemic culture.

Individuals who possess the virtue of epistemic autonomy rely upon themselves in their reasoning, judgment and decision making in virtuous ways. Philosophers working on intellectual virtue agree that if the pursuit of epistemic autonomy is not tempered by other virtues such as intellectual humility, it can lead to vices such as extreme intellectual individualism. Virtue theorists have made a number of empirical claims about the consequences of possessing this vice – e.g. that it will lead to significantly fewer epistemic goods (...) and a greater number of faulty beliefs. This paper reports the results of two pilot studies and initial results from a larger series of studies that attempt to shed light on some of the intellectual pitfalls of pursuing unrestricted epistemic autonomy. The studies provide empirical support for the philosophical claim that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility are mutually supporting virtues by showing that epistemic autonomy without intellectual humility leads to increased belief in misinformation, conspiracy theories and pseudoscience and decreased trust in scientific experts. They also reveal important contours of the complex and often delicate relationship between the virtue of epistemic autonomy and its more vicious cousin, strong intellectual individualism. (shrink)

Gatekeeping, or determining membership of your group, is crucial to science: the moniker ‘scientific’ is a stamp of epistemic quality or even authority. But gatekeeping in science is fraught with dangers. Gatekeepers must exclude bad science, science fraud and pseudoscience, while including the disagreeing viewpoints on which science thrives. This is a difficult tightrope, not least because gatekeeping is a human matter and can be influenced by biases such as groupthink. After spelling out these general tensions around gatekeeping in science, (...) we shed light on them with a case study from psychology. This concerns whether academic psychologists rightly or wrongly classify the applied-psychology framework of NLP (‘neuro-linguistic programming’) as unscientific and even pseudoscientific. This example of gatekeeping is particularly instructive because both the NLP community and the psychology community, we argue, make legitimate but also illegitimate moves. This case gives rise to several general insights about gatekeeping in science more generally. (shrink)

In Why It's OK to Speak Your Mind, Hrishikesh Joshi argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise intellectual (...) independence, both of which are essential for living a good life. In this paper, I consider the implications of Joshi’s argument and raise several objections to his view. (shrink)

I present an account of epistemic autonomy as a distinctively wide-ranging epistemic virtue, one that helps us to understand a range of phenomena that might otherwise seem quite disparate – from the appropriate selection of epistemic methods, stances and topics of inquiry, to the harms of epistemic oppression, gaslighting and related phenomena. The account draws on four elements commonly incorporated into accounts of personal autonomy: (i) self-governance, (ii) authenticity, (iii) self-creation and (iv) independence. I further argue that for a distinctively (...) epistemic virtue of autonomy; the above elements must ultimately reliably lead to valuable epistemic goods (for the agent herself and others). I then turn to the domains or ways in which epistemic autonomy so understood, can be made manifest. I suggest that epistemic autonomy is a virtue that allows us to appropriately choose (i) subject matters and areas of inquiry, (ii) methods, sources, and processes of belief formation, (iii) epistemic goals and (iv) epistemic stances or frameworks. So understood, epistemic autonomy has a role to play in shaping most every aspect of our epistemic lives. (shrink)

We are constantly called upon to evaluate the evidential weight of testimony, and to balance its deliverances against our own independent thinking. ‘Intellectual autonomy’ is the virtue that is supposed to be displayed by those who engage in cognition in this domain well. I argue that this is at best a misleading label for the virtue, because virtuous cognition in this domain consists in thinking with others, and intelligently responding to testimony. I argue that the existing label supports an excessively (...) individualistic conception of good thinking, both within and outside philosophy. I propose replacing ‘intellectual autonomy’ with ‘intellectual interdependence’, which properly emphasises the depth of our reliance on one another, without suggesting we ought ever to be epistemically servile. (shrink)

Recently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance, and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility. I will argue that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility bear an interesting (...) relationship to one another in that they are interconnected and mutually supporting intellectual virtues. In sections 2 and 3 I will provide a brief overview of the predominant accounts of intellectual humility (section 2) and epistemic autonomy (section 3) in the literature. With an understanding of these intellectual virtues in hand, we will examine their relationship of mutual support in section 4. Section 5 will explore a challenge to this relationship coming from the epistemology of disagreement, and section 6 concludes. (shrink)

This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on the philosophy of epistemic autonomy. In addition to giving some background on various conceptions of epistemic autonomy it provides brief summaries of the articles in the special issue.

To place epistemic trust in someone is to take their word for something. Much of the existing literature on epistemic trust concerns epistemic authorities. But as important as authority is to epistemic trust, it pales in comparison to the epistemic importance of conflicts of interests. In economics, we say that buyers shouldn’t take the word of sellers. Caveat emptor: let the buyer beware. I argue for a similar principle in epistemology. Caveat auditor: let the hearer beware. Others often have incentives (...) to testify in ways that are odds with our epistemic goals. Given this, our epistemic trust in others should be calibrated to reflect the epistemically virtuous and perverse incentives of ourselves and others. This basic principle explains the need for epistemic caution in a wide range of applied topics from politics to product reviews to fake news. (shrink)

Catherine Elgin has recently offered compatibility with autonomy as a plausible criterion for the epistemic virtues. This approach mixes elements of Kantianism with virtue theory. Sasha Mudd has criticized this combination on the grounds that it weakens the structure of Kantian autonomy and undermines its resources for responding to cultural relativism. Elgin’s more recent defense of the role of autonomy has taken a more Kantian turn. Here, I defend Elgin’s original claim, grounding it in a distinctively virtue theoretic account of (...) the development of virtues. Exploring how individuals develop their epistemic virtues within a social context, I show how these virtues can be grounded in both developmental and constitutive relational autonomy. I further argue that a virtue theoretic conception of autonomy should be substantive, not just procedural, and this limits concerns about relativism. (shrink)

There’s something paradoxical with a person saying ‘I am humble’; it doesn’t seem so humble to self-attribute humility in general, and intellectual humility in particular. In light of the recent interest in educating for intellectual virtues, this paradox has interesting implications to educating for intellectual humility. In particular, one might wonder how a teacher can be a model of intellectual humility to her students. If a teacher says something like ‘Here’s me being an exemplar of intellectual humility’, the paradox above (...) takes on a pedagogical angle. In this paper, I analyze the paradoxes in self-attributing and learning intellectual humility using three different accounts of this virtue, before proceeding to untangle what could be called the ‘Modeling Paradox’ of teaching intellectual humility and figure out whether this virtue can be non-problematically demonstrated to one’s students. (shrink)

This paper has two objectives. The first objective is a decoupling of the African body from ‘blackness’—a discursive formation—that was attached to the body by the slave and the colonial regimes. The second aim is a critique of modern epistemic and epistemological regimes that give ‘blackness’ its modern currency. To achieve these goals, I use phenomenology, a philosophy of self-responsible beginning according to Edmund Husserl, to return to the African body before colonialism and slavery. Through phenomenology I can ‘bracket’ what (...) the above regimes and their legacies have been conditioning the African to see and know about the body. The paper is therefore an attempt at a liberatory epistemology aimed at overcoming what Achille Mbembe has referred to as a ‘dungeon of appearance’. Since ‘blackness’ is continental and diaspora Africans (CADA) seen through discursive colonial eyes, phenomenology provides an epistemological freedom to observe the body in-time. (shrink)

In this article, the nature of Ethiopian modernity will be explored through the usage of concepts like coloniality, entangled modernities and uneven histories that are borrowed from decolonial and postcolonial perspectives. Through such an analysis, the Ethiopian discourse on modernity will be presented as a conception of social progress that developed in a dialectical relationship with liberal, Marxist, indigenous and religiously inspired conceptions of modernity. It will be argued that resisting the attempts to romanticize the past as a foundation of (...) cultural revival and also the attempt to confine the discussion of Ethiopian modernity to the introduction of western modernization, Ethiopian modernity should be alternatively conceptualized as a discourse that is co-constituted in an active confrontation with alternative visions of progress. The article argues that the diagnosis of the multiple and interconnected discourses that shaped the Ethiopian discourse on modernity serves as a foundation of an Ethiopian critical theory. Such a theory creatively synthesizes cultural values, hosts an inclusive political culture that furnishes the culture of public criticism and introduces a world of knowledge production that overcomes Eurocentrism. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary research has been a topic of interest for many decades – perhaps longer. And yet, even now, there is still much we do not understand about how to stimulate collaboration across research disciplines. This article reports the results of a systematic review of the academic literature on strategies for promoting new interdisciplinary research collaborations, which returned only a very small number of empirical studies. A broader review of the scholarship in this area reveals a literature that is highly theorized, (...) but not adequately operationalized for empirical investigation of how to enable new collaborations. A shift toward a better formulation of research questions, with a view toward generating more empirical data on practical strategies for connecting researchers and encouraging them to work together across disciplinary boundaries, will be required to further the research agenda on interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconsider the notion of epistemic trespassing and attempt to explore possible scenarios in which it could lead to positive outcomes in scientific research and information dissemination. As we will point out, some of the significant discoveries in the history of science would not have been possible were it not for the epistemic trespassers, whose shift in paradigm changed the approach to specific issues for the better. Furthermore, we will present instances where individuals, often labeled as ‘trespassers’ (...) – those who venture into fields outside their expertise – can be considered trustworthy and reliable sources of testimony. Consequently, epistemic trespassing turned out to be essential for the advancement of science. Epistemic trespassing in our age is virtually inevitable – whether it be from a political perspective (to preserve democratic values) or due to purely practical reasons (i.e. searching for information online). There are interdisciplinary fields where a strictly negative characterization of epistemic trespassing would question their methodology since these disciplines rely on experts from various fields. For these reasons, we advocate for a more charitable approach to epistemic trespassing and greater public education to help them distinguish between correct and false information. (shrink)

Prominent research programs dealing with the nature and mechanisms of interpersonal social coordination have emerged in cognitive science, developmental psychology and evolutionary anthropology. I argue that the mechanistic approach to explanation in contemporary philosophy of science can facilitate interdisciplinary integration and division of labor between these different disciplinary research programs. By distinguishing phenomenal models from mechanistic models and structural decomposition from functional decomposition in the process of mechanism discovery, I argue that behavioral and cognitive scientists can make interlocking contributions to (...) families of mechanism models representing a) what central forms of interpersonal social coordination consist in, b) what types of agents engage in such forms of coordination, c) what types of cognitive mechanisms give rise to such forms of coordination, d) how the operation of such mechanisms is modulated by the natural and social environments that the agents populate. Thus mechanistic philosophy of science can play a heuristic role in guiding the research strategies of scientists in different scientific disciplines in a manner that is complementary to the research strategies of scientists in other disciplines and thereby efficient from the point of view of the division of epistemic labor. (shrink)

There is wide agreement among scholars in research policy that the position of the social sciences and humanities (SSH) in interdisciplinary research is not as good as it should be. Academics give many reasons why SSH fields should become more active collaborators in interdisciplinarity, including the capacity within these disciplines to introduce new research questions and to make interdisciplinary research more ethically and societally grounded. This article assesses the conditions attached to 127 recent funding programmes for interdisciplinary and crossdisciplinary research. (...) The findings indicate that the exclusion of SSH from interdisciplinary fields is an ongoing problem in research funding. Furthermore, when given funding, SSH disciplines are less likely to be given the opportunity to connect their research questions and targets solely to the advancement of knowledge. These priorities increase the likelihood of SSH disciplines contributing to multidisciplinary research rather than focusing on interdisciplinarity with knowledge integration. (shrink)

Human culture is built upon nature to help humans adapt to their environment – first natural, but later natural-cultural. Cultural practices are aimed at aiding survival in changing environments, and in different settings they meet different environmental pressures, causing later changes in trajectories. According to cultural evolutionism, behaviours, ideas and artefacts are subject to inheritance, competition, accumulation of modifications, adaptation, geographical distribution, convergence and changes of function – these are mechanisms present also in biological evolution. In the following paper, we (...) examine women’s dance and physical exercise practices, which contain similar postures performed in comparable circumstances, as found in initiation ritual dances in chosen East African communities and in Slavic gymnastics for women in the Belarusian tradition. In times of globalization and the mixing of cultures, the position on knees and elbows is recontextualized in a visually attractive form of contemporary dances like Kangamoko and Baikoko, or more widely different variants of ‘twerking’ and reconstructed physical exercises. Approaching ‘twerking’ positions, especially on knees and elbows as a cross-genre performance, we find common roots in the communal support for women’s good wife and mother status teachings in various cultures, showing the importance of women’s circles, women’s health and well-being for the community. (shrink)

Some persons who believe provably false claims – such as that there were significant voter irregularities in the 2020 election – may nevertheless be evidentially rational for holding their false beliefs. I consider a person I call our average believer. In her daily life, she incidentally gathers evidence favoring the hypothesis that there were significant voter irregularities, but she does not investigate the matter. Her information environment, moreover, is such that it accidentally (through no fault of her own) excludes counterevidence (...) to the thesis that there were such irregularities and intensifies the flow of information that there were irregularities. As a consequence, she becomes convinced that there were significant voting irregularities in the 2020 U.S. election. I argue that while she is not zetetically rational, for she does not investigate the matter, she is evidentially rational in that she apportions her belief to the evidence. While she has no right to the Cliffordian, or assertoric, belief that there were such irregularities, she is not epistemically blameworthy for having the wagered belief it is true. (shrink)

Rather than ask if expertise is under threat, this paper uses case studies to show how expertise is enabled. Its appearance can be traced to how the already known evokes sensibility, judging, thinking and languaging. As defined below, it draws on epistemic cycles. Using Secchi and Cowley’s (2021) 3M model, this posits a second cut between the micro and the macro. In the mesosphere, people create temporary domains or what William James (1991) calls ‘little worlds’. Within these corpora popularia, the (...) new is made possible – expertise sets off unimagined outcomes. Thus, many concerns cannot be solved by scientific correlates of a natural ontological attitude: indeed, the truism clarifies many social challenges. We lack social institutions that dedicate expertise to goals like ecosocial justice and life-sustaining relations. Once the necessary expertise is traced to epistemic cycles, we can demand of institutions that they create bodies that seek to bring a rich future to evolution. (shrink)

This paper takes a step back from considering expertise as a social phenomenon. One should investigate how people become knowers before assigning expertise to a person’s actions. Using a temporal-sensitive systemic ethnography, a case study shows how undergraduate students form a social system out of necessity as they fabricate knowledge around an empty wording like ‘conscious living’. Tracing the engagement with students and tutor to recursive moments of coaction, I argue that, through the subtleties of bodily movements, people incorporate the (...) actions of others as they become knowers. Knowing for a person solidifies as they imbue concepts, terms, facts, etc. with their own understanding. While coaction refers to the interlocking of actions in a specific moment, the fabrication of knowledge resides in temporally distributed moments of coaction where students deliberately incorporate and build on past occurrences in a present moment. In so doing, people cannot be separated from their systemic embedding. Linking coaction with systemic cognition, people fabricate knowledge within wider systemic structures. Within these boundaries, knowers come to fabricate knowledge for themselves and a wider system. Thus, knowing must be seen as an active, embodied, dialogical and multiscalar activity. (shrink)

The paper thematizes basic content-free cognition in human social practices. It explores the enlanguaged dimension of skilled practical doings and expertise by taking the minimal case of concept-based perception as its starting point. Having made a case for considering such activity as free of mental content, I argue in favor of the abolishment of the distinction between truth-telling and social consensus, thus questioning the assumption held by proponents of Radical Enactivism, namely that truth and accuracy conditions are restricted to content-involving (...) activity. Instead, I claim, even content-free practical activity can be evaluated on the basis of accuracy conditions which ultimately tie with agents’ practical understandings and the normative aspects of the practice. With this as my backdrop, I explore how expertise arises in the interplay of enlanguaged affordances, concept-involving perception and the normative accuracy conditions that constrain a particular practice. (shrink)

While literature is often used as a source of examples and illustrations across disciplines, literary studies tends to be underrepresented in interdisciplinary exchanges. Perhaps the reason lies in a lack of understanding what actually is the expertise of literary studies and how this can be useful in interdisciplinary settings. In this article, I propose to outline the expertise of literary scholars through concepts of 4E cognition and to devise a proposal for how such expertise could successfully shape the epistemic common (...) ground of social cognition of experts in interdisciplinary dialogue. Literature involves metacognition centrally through its language style, the design of the narrative and its links to other texts, and literary scholars have the expertise in formulating exactly how this works – in a non-mimetic way – through the analysis and interpretation of literary texts. This very particular expertise and practice of literary scholars enables literary texts to be proposed as a boundary object in interdisciplinary dialogues through a shared epistemic common ground. For this argument, I build on earlier theoretical work in 4E cognition and predictive processing and my experience running interdisciplinary workshops on that model. (shrink)

A naturalistic approach to expert-identification begins by asking, ‘how do novices pick out putative experts?’ Alvin Goldman and Elizabeth Anderson, representing a fairly common approach, consider agents’ psychological biases as well as social situatedness. As good as this is, culture’s role in shaping cognitive mechanisms is neglected. An explanatory framework that works well to accommodate culturally-sensitive mechanisms is Peircean semiotics. His triadic approach holds that signs signify objects to interpreters. Applying the triadic model to expert-identification: novices interpret signs of expertise (...) as pointing to particular experts. The main advantage of the framework is that it is significantly more nuanced than the Goldman-Anderson model in describing how agents identify experts. It explicitly accommodates cultural and agential differences in expert-identification. It also explicitly admits the possibility of rational disagreement in assessment of evidence for expertise. But these advantages come at a cost. Namely, it’s difficult in theory – as well as practice – to make one’s way into the semiotic system of someone from another culture to help guide them away from fraudulent experts. Even so, it’s a trade-off worth making since it organizes relevant details for expert-identification, which is a first step in sketching a better normative theory. (shrink)

In this article, we offer an overview of the philosophical and psychological literatures on expertise. Work so far has failed to engage with recent work in embodied and encultured cognition--in particular the notions of interactivity and semiosis. We suggest how bringing these concepts on board reveals new areas of research concerning the philosophy and psychology of expertise. We conclude with a brief synopsis of each paper.

This article arises out of critical contemplation of ‘skills’ in relation to Higher Education pedagogy as it relates to the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. As the emphasis on skills dominates more and more of the discourse about pedagogy in Higher Education, the article aims to make some critical comments about the reductionist approach to education that easily becomes part of skills discourse. In addition to criticising instrumentalist deployment of ‘skills’ in Higher Education policy, the article also considers the supposedly (...) most ‘radical’ perspective on the idea of skill which is implicit in enactivists’ accounts of the embedding of sensorimotor action in cognition. It is argued that such a perspective is undermined by its insistence on a model of direct human-environment interaction which brackets creativity, anticipation and the future. The article suggests that such a perspective would be illumined by dialogue with Ernst Bloch’s concept of the ‘not-yet’. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss expertise by considering the activity of reading. Cognitive scientists have traditionally conceptualised reading as a single, well-defined task, namely the decoding of letter sequences into meaningful sequences of speech sounds. This definition captures a core feature of the reading activity at the computational level, but it is an overly narrow model of how reading behaviour occurs in the real world. We propose a more expansive model of expertise. In our view, expertise in general is best (...) conceptualised as a distributed process that takes place within a cultural-cognitive ecosystem. Our model allows for a more inclusive view of expertise in reading. We argue that reading is better understood as a manifold task domain that admits multiple reasonable criteria for evaluating performance. We draw on ethnographic data to show how our model allows for a wider appreciation of what expertise in reading amounts to in educational contexts. (shrink)

We ask whether it is reasonable to delay or refuse to take COVID-19 vaccines that have been shown in clinical trials to be safe and effective against infectious diseases. We consider two kinds of vaccine hesitancy. The first is geared to scientifically informed open questions about vaccines. We argue that in cases where the data is not representative of relevant groups, such as pregnant women and ethnic minorities, hesitancy can be reasonable on epistemic grounds. However, we argue that hesitancy is (...) not reasonable if a vaccine has passed well-conducted clinical trials. The second kind of hesitancy is to do with beliefs about the institutions offering a successfully trialled vaccine and the justifiability of cooperating with those institutions. For example, in the UK, distrust of the UK Government or the National Health Service is identified as a factor in the vaccine hesitancy of minority ethnic populations. We ask whether this sort of hesitation is reasonable given normative requirements of fair co-operation, both with those institutions and the wider population. We suggest that the answer is not straightforward. Sometimes the hesitation is unreasonable but understandable. -/- . (shrink)