This study focuses on al-Taftāzānī’s discussion of the ontological status of divine attributes in his _Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid_ and aims to demonstrate that al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) reluctantly and ambiguously proposed formula that divine attributes are possible by themselves and necessary by God, which itself is an adaptation of Avicennian formula about the ontological status of the divine intellects, received much more recognition after a more sophisticated and advanced version of it was introduced to Sunnī _kalām_ tradition by al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). His (...) improvements generated a considerable amount of intellectual interest within the subsequent commentary and super-commentary tradition and were then refined by the later commentators, a crucial development which has been almost entirely neglected in the modern scholarship. This study further argues that the orientation of post-classical _kalām_ extends to the point where it embraces a specific formula promoted by the _Falāsifa_ to refine Sunnī theory about the ontological status of the divine attributes. Consequently, Sunnī theology deliberately adapted a previously rejected theory to one of its most exclusive and core subjects, that is the discussion of the divine attributes. This study will also show that dramatic transformations in the approach and the structure indicate that Sunnī _kalām_, especially in _Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid_ commentaries and super-commentaries, was significantly influenced by philosophical theories and was required to adopt both the vocabulary and the framework fashioned in philosophical debates on a greater scale after its first transformation due to al-Rāzī’s influence. Because of the voluminous commentaries and super-commentaries on _Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid_ and their extended coverage of a variety of subjects, the current study limits itself to al-Taftāzānī’s _Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid_ and its super-commentaries by Musa Khayālī (d. 862/1457) and Ramazan Efendi al-Ḥanafī (d. 1025/1616?). (shrink)

This study focuses on al-Taftāzānī’s discussion of the ontological status of divine attributes in his Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid and aims to demonstrate that al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) reluctantly and ambiguously proposed formula that divine attributes are possible by themselves and necessary by God, which itself is an adaptation of Avicennian formula about the ontological status of the divine intellects, received much more recognition after a more sophisticated and advanced version of it was introduced to Sunnī kalām tradition by al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). His (...) improvements generated a considerable amount of intellectual interest within the subsequent commentary and super-commentary tradition and were then refined by the later commentators, a crucial development which has been almost entirely neglected in the modern scholarship. This study further argues that the orientation of post-classical kalām extends to the point where it embraces a specific formula promoted by the Falāsifa to refine Sunnī theory about the ontological status of the divine attributes. Consequently, Sunnī theology deliberately adapted a previously rejected theory to one of its most exclusive and core subjects, that is the discussion of the divine attributes. This study will also show that dramatic transformations in the approach and the structure indicate that Sunnī kalām, especially in Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid commentaries and super-commentaries, was significantly influenced by philosophical theories and was required to adopt both the vocabulary and the framework fashioned in philosophical debates on a greater scale after its first transformation due to al-Rāzī’s influence. Because of the voluminous commentaries and super-commentaries on Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid and their extended coverage of a variety of subjects, the current study limits itself to al-Taftāzānī’s Sharḥ al-ʿAqāid and its super-commentaries by Musa Khayālī (d. 862/1457) and Ramazan Efendi al-Ḥanafī (d. 1025/1616?). (shrink)

The article delves into two closely intertwined notions that have increasingly taken centre stage in Gianni Vattimo’s thought since the mid-eighties: secularisation and kenosis. The significance of these themes in Vattimo’s late work is such that, it is argued, it amounts to an actual Kehre, or turn. However, akin to Heidegger, Vattimo’s Kehre is not a radical break but a shift in research and reflection towards themes that, although already present in his philosophy, have assumed more distinctly religious nuances and (...) have progressively developed up to the point where they have formed an organic perspective. The article traces this development, commencing with the notion of secularisation to then explore its interweaving with themes of emancipation and the violence of metaphysics. It concludes with a reflection on the central role of kenosis and its significance in Vattimo’s thought. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the bodily constitution of violence from a phenomenological perspective, contrasting the directly lived experience of violence with imagistic violence. The analysis involves examining one’s own embodiment from the first-person perspective in two distinct situations: as the agent of violence, anchored in one’s own “I can”, and as a passive victim, marked by vulnerability and helplessness. Each situation reveals specific particularities of the other’s adversity. The final section transitions to the imagistic experience of violence, discussing how (...) bodily markers are modified in this context. Using Kubrick’s iconic film A Clockwork Orange as an example, I illustrate the shift in bodily structures and the implications of imagistic violence. (shrink)

Veiling is one of the sources of seclusion of women from and within society. _Ghūnghat_ (_avagunṭhana, purdāh_) or veiling is primarily associated with covering one’s face which performs various functions. The rationale for veiling could be that it becomes a source of refuge to women from the gaze of others, sometimes providing them with a place of their own, without any interference from others, maintains their respectability and _mān_ or _izzat_ (honour), and becomes a sign of their modesty in society. (...) On the other hand, on analysis, it turns out to be a source of concealment of one’s identity, suppression of one’s sexuality, and a life without any agency. This paper, in the context of the dominant caste of the North Indian Hindu community, will bring out the cultural, social, and gendered aspects of the practice of veiling to show how the acceptance and deference to this practice is the byproduct of women’s conditioning in a patriarchal society. By bringing in the physical and symbolic aspects of veiling, this paper attempts to show how this discussion is significant for the attainment of a ‘good quality of life’ as mentioned by Martha Nussbaum and to come out of the state of an internalised sense of oppression. (shrink)

Veiling is one of the sources of seclusion of women from and within society. Ghūnghat (avagunṭhana, purdāh) or veiling is primarily associated with covering one’s face which performs various functions. The rationale for veiling could be that it becomes a source of refuge to women from the gaze of others, sometimes providing them with a place of their own, without any interference from others, maintains their respectability and mān or izzat (honour), and becomes a sign of their modesty in society. (...) On the other hand, on analysis, it turns out to be a source of concealment of one’s identity, suppression of one’s sexuality, and a life without any agency. This paper, in the context of the dominant caste of the North Indian Hindu community, will bring out the cultural, social, and gendered aspects of the practice of veiling to show how the acceptance and deference to this practice is the byproduct of women’s conditioning in a patriarchal society. By bringing in the physical and symbolic aspects of veiling, this paper attempts to show how this discussion is significant for the attainment of a ‘good quality of life’ as mentioned by Martha Nussbaum and to come out of the state of an internalised sense of oppression. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy has been influenced by Michel Foucault’s thoughts in various aspects. This influence can be seen especially in methodology and political philosophy to a certain extent. Agamben’s political project, Homo Sacer, culminates in the publication of The Use of Bodies, where he proposes ‘form-of-life’ as a way to overcome the contemporary biopolitics. While the concept of form-of-life has often been considered in connection with the issue of sovereignty and law, this article argues that it (and Agamben’s coming politics) (...) can also be understood as a response to Foucault’s biopower. This is possible by considering several conceptual oppositions raised by Agamben against Foucault’s ideas, concepts such as “intimacy”, “community”, and “zoe/bios”. And this is, finally, an effort to re-appropriate human freedom. (shrink)

The essay offers an interpretation of psychedelic peak experiences. It criticizes the quasi-scientific naturalistic attempts to explain such experiences and offers an alternative ontology underlying a more complex sense of naturalism, thus defending an entheogenic view irreducible to mere psychological effects. First, the mainstream ontology in the paradigm of natural sciences is exposed as being a version of the ontology of presence. This fact is shown as the reason for the phenomenological gap and the impotence of the natural sciences to (...) address human experience. Next, existential anxiety is interpreted in terms of Heidegger’s ontology and is suggested as the core dimension of possible spiritual transformation. Finally, the phenomenology of mystical psychedelic experiences (MPE) is interpreted in terms of overcoming existential anxiety– a well-documented effect of MPE – and explicated in ontological terms. The psychedelic experience is shown to be mystical in a sense of transcending the everyday mode of existential denial of the enigmatic nature of the universe by facing the nothingness in a way that transforms one’s stand within it into a stand of original belongingness to the field of emptiness (Nishitani). Different aspects of psychedelic experience are explained and co-related in terms of such a transformation. (shrink)

This article presents an ontological reading of Sufism in the style of Heidegger’s ontological examination of ancient philosophy. In this regard, it is a novel approach to the study of Sufism as a metaphysical conundrum within the Islamic context. The article explores what we mean by the nature of Sufism and the question of “being Sufi.” It does this for two reasons: to show the frontiers of metaphysical reasoning in Islamic intellectual history and to demonstrate that Sufism is the “setting-into-work” (...) of the mystical within the Islamic. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of the death of God in Hegel's philosophy and its implications for his political thought. It argues that Hegel's notion of the death of God involves a Christological kenotic sense of self-emptying, which extends beyond his philosophy of religion to impact his entire philosophical system, including politics, given that Hegel considers that the state consists in the march of God. The paper aims to interpret Hegel’s stance on the death of God as kenotic and its (...) integration into his system, with the purpose of addressing how this kenotic structure manifests in concrete conceptions of the state. Specifically, it examines the enigmatic figure of the Hegelian monarch as a kenotic-political figure. Finally, it concludes that Hegel's political thought consists of a political theology of kenosis, which is more concerned with the divestment of power rather than a plenipotentiary paradigm. (shrink)

In this paper, I will be discussing, through the lens of this paradox, the experiences of a Hindu devotee of God, the 16th-century poet Mirabai. I will map out some contours of this interaction that seems to be conceptually impossible and yet animates the devotional life. I will explore how Mirabai seeks to transgress, through her poetic expressions alternating with joy and sorrow, the finite realm and somehow contain the divine non-finite reality, namely, Krishna. As we will see, her attempts (...) to engage with Krishna, her non-finite beloved, and generate a loving interaction between herself and Krishna often leads to the disappearance of Krishna which encases her in a spiral of deep suffering and lament. However, it is precisely this agony that enables her to gradually withdraw herself from the finite world and, in turn, immerse herself devotionally in Krishna. I will explore, in the final section, the nature of Mirabai’s devotional victory, and how these moments of suffering, in the experience of separation from Krishna (viraha-bhakti), are yet charged with a liberating power. This spiritual telos allows for a deep devotional connection to be established between her finite self and Krishna, a connection that cannot be articulated straightforwardly on the logical plane. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been a number of philosophical publications focusing on spirituality. But even in pertinent philosophical texts it is rare to find attempts at shaping a workable definition of spirituality, despite the obvious need for a clear definition for the philosophical debate on spirituality. This paper addresses the major issues in shaping a satisfactory definition of spirituality: an understanding of spirituality as transcendence of critical reasoning, the broadness of the concept, the implications of various scholarly backgrounds and (...) the challenge of avoiding a circular definition. It suggests a rough clustering of common approaches into ontological, ethical, and functional definitions and discusses their weaknesses. It is argued that an inclusive, metaphysically parsimonious, and stipulative definition is the best way to address typical difficulties and avoid weaknesses of common definitions. Finally, it proposes a definition based on meaning, a term that often appears in the discussion of spirituality. It is suggested that understanding meaning in the ordinary sense of the word might be a good starting point to arrive at a satisfactory definition of spirituality. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been a number of philosophical publications focusing on spirituality. But even in pertinent philosophical texts it is rare to find attempts at shaping a workable definition of spirituality, despite the obvious need for a clear definition for the philosophical debate on spirituality. This paper addresses the major issues in shaping a satisfactory definition of spirituality: an understanding of spirituality as transcendence of critical reasoning, the broadness of the concept, the implications of various scholarly backgrounds and (...) the challenge of avoiding a circular definition. It suggests a rough clustering of common approaches into ontological, ethical, and functional definitions and discusses their weaknesses. It is argued that an inclusive, metaphysically parsimonious, and stipulative definition is the best way to address typical difficulties and avoid weaknesses of common definitions. Finally, it proposes a definition based on meaning, a term that often appears in the discussion of spirituality. It is suggested that understanding meaning in the ordinary sense of the word might be a good starting point to arrive at a satisfactory definition of spirituality. (shrink)

This article explores Schelling's critique of Fichte's idealism in light of his evolving metaphysical framework, emphasizing his affirmation of the primacy of nature. By challenging Fichte's concept of being, Schelling underscores the importance of a realist position that asserts the unity of ideal and real, drawing on Hölderlin’s idea of Being as trans-reflexive. The first major theme examined is Schelling’s critique of the distinction between consciousness and its real content, which Fichte's system inadvertently promotes. Schelling counters this by advocating for (...) an identity of the ideal and the real, thus reframing the metaphysical debate. The second theme explores the theory of the bond, a pivotal shift in Schelling’s thought, which disrupts the notion of a systematic unity grounded in reason. Schelling’s realization that no being can wholly be itself, and the resulting impossibility of establishing a strict identity, challenges the traditional modern philosophical systems that uphold the identity of principle and development. This article argues that Schelling’s work anticipates a more dynamic, interconnected understanding of Being, ultimately undermining the conventional idea of reason as a static, substantial principle, as upheld by earlier idealist thinkers. (shrink)

This article explores Schelling's critique of Fichte's idealism in light of his evolving metaphysical framework, emphasizing his affirmation of the primacy of nature. By challenging Fichte's concept of being, Schelling underscores the importance of a realist position that asserts the unity of ideal and real, drawing on Hölderlin’s idea of Being as trans-reflexive. The first major theme examined is Schelling’s critique of the distinction between consciousness and its real content, which Fichte's system inadvertently promotes. Schelling counters this by advocating for (...) an identity of the ideal and the real, thus reframing the metaphysical debate. The second theme explores the theory of the bond, a pivotal shift in Schelling’s thought, which disrupts the notion of a systematic unity grounded in reason. Schelling’s realization that no being can wholly be itself, and the resulting impossibility of establishing a strict identity, challenges the traditional modern philosophical systems that uphold the identity of principle and development. This article argues that Schelling’s work anticipates a more dynamic, interconnected understanding of Being, ultimately undermining the conventional idea of reason as a static, substantial principle, as upheld by earlier idealist thinkers. (shrink)

When looked at under the perspective of hope, existential philosophers Albert Camus and Søren Kierkegaard are typically seen as inverted images of one another: Kierkegaard embraces hope, which for him is a religious sentiment that he describes at length in _Fear and Trembling_ through the character of Abraham. Camus – on the other hand – rejects hope, seeing both Kierkegaard and Abraham as individuals who had committed what Camus terms a ‘philosophical suicide.’ Camus’ _The Myth of Sisyphus_ can thus be (...) understood as an answer to Kierkegaard’s Abraham: Sisyphus – unlike Abraham – is an individual who had accepted the absurd nature of the world, rejected hope, and thus achieved happiness. In my paper, I will argue that Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard and of Abraham is not final – I will argue that Camus, in fact, sees hope as an existentially important phenomenon. I will show that Camus does not reject hope in _The Myth of Sisyphus_ but that he merely _temporarily suspends_ it, only to return to it in his later writings. _The Myth of Sisyphus_ is therefore only one of the many ‘stages on life’s way,’ and I will argue that hope is an important aspect of human existence not only for Kierkegaard but also for Camus. That said, Camus’ understanding of hope will not be the same as Kierkegaard’s; hope will exist not in relation to God, but in a relationship with other human beings. (shrink)

When looked at under the perspective of hope, existential philosophers Albert Camus and Søren Kierkegaard are typically seen as inverted images of one another: Kierkegaard embraces hope, which for him is a religious sentiment that he describes at length in Fear and Trembling through the character of Abraham. Camus – on the other hand – rejects hope, seeing both Kierkegaard and Abraham as individuals who had committed what Camus terms a ‘philosophical suicide.’ Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus can thus be (...) understood as an answer to Kierkegaard’s Abraham: Sisyphus – unlike Abraham – is an individual who had accepted the absurd nature of the world, rejected hope, and thus achieved happiness. In my paper, I will argue that Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard and of Abraham is not final – I will argue that Camus, in fact, sees hope as an existentially important phenomenon. I will show that Camus does not reject hope in The Myth of Sisyphus but that he merely temporarily suspends it, only to return to it in his later writings. The Myth of Sisyphus is therefore only one of the many ‘stages on life’s way,’ and I will argue that hope is an important aspect of human existence not only for Kierkegaard but also for Camus. That said, Camus’ understanding of hope will not be the same as Kierkegaard’s; hope will exist not in relation to God, but in a relationship with other human beings. (shrink)