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  1.  17
    Consider the Agent in the Arthropod.Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer & Heidi Harley - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (32).
    —Commentary on Mikhalevich and Powell on invertebrate minds.— Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.
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  2.  43
    Does Sentience Come in Degrees?Andrew Y. Lee - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (20).
    I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.
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  3.  61
    Problems with Basing Insect Ethics on Individuals’ Welfare.Susana Monsó & Antonio José Osuna Mascaró - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (8).
    In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, (...)
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  4.  30
    Improving Invertebrate Welfare.Heather Browning & Walter Veit - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (4).
    Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates. They do not offer any examples, however, of how their welfare should be considered or improved. We draw on animal welfare science to suggest some ways that would not be excessively demanding.
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  5.  30
    Relationship Between Cognition and Moral Status Needs Overhaul.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (3):1-2.
    I commend Mikhalevich & Powell for extending the discussion of cognition and its relation to moral status with their well researched and argued target article on invertebrate cognition. I have two small criticisms: that the scala naturae still retains its appeal to some in biology as well as psychology, and that drawing the line at invertebrates requires a bit more defense given the larger comparative cognitive-scientific context.
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  6.  4
    Disentangling Different Forms of Justice : Commentary on Treves Et Al. On "Just Preservation".Anna Wienhues - 2020 - Animal Sentience 27 (21).
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  7.  63
    Drawing the Boundaries of Animal Sentience.Walter Veit & Bryce Huebner - 2020 - Animal Sentience 13 (29).
    We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not.
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  8.  20
    Avoiding Anthropocentrism in Evolutionarily Inclusive Ethics.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2020 - Animal Sentience 5 (29).
    Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates are unworthy of ethical concern. However, developing an evolutionarily inclusive ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical scala naturae and human-centered conceptions of the biological world. In particular, we need to question the anthropocentric assumptions that still linger in discussions like these.
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