18 found

Year:

  1.  9
    Thick Concepts and Moral Revisionism in Plato’s Gorgias: Arguing About Something There Can Be No Argument About.Philipp Brüllmann - 2019 - Phronesis 65 (2):153-178.
    David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles’ immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato’s Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles, is precisely addressing the thickness of the concept of justice: it reveals that this concept is both descriptive and evaluative and that formulating a revisionist position about justice is therefore extremely difficult. Callicles’ strategy (...)
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  2.  97
    The Guise of the Beautiful: Symposium 204d Ff.Jonathan Fine - 2019 - Phronesis 65 (2):129-152.
    A crux of Plato’s Symposium is how beauty relates to the good. Diotima distinguishes beauty from the good, I show, to explain how erotic pursuits are characteristically ambivalent and opaque. Human beings pursue beauty without knowing why or thinking it good; yet they are rational, if aiming at happiness. Central to this reconstruction is a passage widely taken to show that beauty either coincides with the good or demands disinterested admiration. It shows rather that what one loves as beautiful does (...)
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  3.  7
    Mixing Body and Soul: Galen on the Substance of Soul in QAM and De Propriis Placitis.Robert Vinkesteijn - 2019 - Phronesis 65 (2):224-246.
    In a late treatise, That the Capacities of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body, Galen of Pergamum infamously offered the view that the substance of the soul is identical with a bodily mixture. This thesis has been found radical and extreme in modern scholarship and is generally considered to be at odds with Galen’s ‘agnosticism’ on the substance of soul. In this paper I propose a close reading of QAM that allows us to make sense of it in (...)
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  4.  22
    Is Plato an Innatist in the Meno?David Bronstein & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):392-430.
    Plato in the Meno is standardly interpreted as committed to condition innatism: human beings are born with latent innate states of knowledge. Against this view, Gail Fine has argued for prenatalism: human souls possess knowledge in a disembodied state but lose it upon being embodied. We argue against both views and in favor of content innatism: human beings are born with innate cognitive contents that can be, but do not exist innately in the soul as, the contents of states of (...)
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  5.  27
    Self-Knowledge in the Eye-Soul Analogy of the Alcibiades.Daniel Ferguson - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):369-391.
    The kind of self-knowledge at issue in the eye-soul analogy of the Alcibiades is knowledge of one’s epistemic state, i.e. what one knows and does not know, rather than knowledge of what one is. My evidence for this is the connection between knowledge of one’s epistemic state and self-improvement, the equivalence of self-knowledge to moderation, and the fact that ‘looking’ into the soul of another is a metaphor for elenctic discussion. The final lines of the analogy clarify that the part (...)
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  6.  14
    Geometrical Objects as Properties of Sensibles: Aristotle’s Philosophy of Geometry.Emily Katz - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):465-513.
    There is little agreement about Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry, partly due to the textual evidence and partly part to disagreement over what constitutes a plausible view. I keep separate the questions ‘What is Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry?’ and ‘Is Aristotle right?’, and consider the textual evidence in the context of Greek geometrical practice, and show that, for Aristotle, plane geometry is about properties of certain sensible objects—specifically, dimensional continuity—and certain properties possessed by actual and potential compass-and-straightedge drawings qua quantitative and (...)
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  7.  32
    Aristotle’s Empiricist Theory of Doxastic Knowledge.Hendrik Lorenz & Benjamin Morison - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):431-464.
    Aristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among (...)
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  8.  10
    Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy.James Warren - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):515-525.
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  9.  28
    Aristotle.Paolo Crivelli - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (3):349-368.
  10.  36
    Imitating Virtue.Margaret Hampson - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (3):292-320.
    Moral virtue is, for Aristotle, famously acquired through the practice of virtuous actions. But how should we understand the activity of Aristotle’s moral learner, and how does her activity result in the acquisition of virtue? I argue that by understanding Aristotle’s learner as engaged in the emulative imitation of a virtuous agent, we can best account for her development. Such activity crucially involves the adoption of the virtuous agent’s perspective, from which I argue the learner is positioned so as to (...)
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  11.  52
    How Things Happen for the Sake of Something: The Dialectical Strategy of Aristotle, Physics 2.8.Emily Nancy Kress - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (3):321-347.
    I offer a fresh interpretation of the dialectical strategy of Physics 2.8’s arguments that things in nature happen for the sake of something. Whereas many recent interpreters have concluded that these arguments inevitably beg the question against Aristotle’s opponents, I argue that they constitute a careful attempt to build common ground with an opponent who rejects Aristotle’s basic worldview. This common ground, first articulated in the famous Winter Rain Argument, takes the form of an intriguing pattern of reasoning: that natural (...)
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  12.  11
    The Jellyfish’s Pleasures: Philebus 20b-21d.Katharine R. O’Reilly - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (3):277-291.
    Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is deprived, (...)
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  13.  16
    Attitudinal Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus.Brooks A. Sommerville - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (3):247-276.
    This paper addresses two interpretive puzzles in Plato’s Philebus. The first concerns the claim, endorsed by both interlocutors, that the most godlike of lives is a pleasureless life of pure thinking. This appears to run afoul of the verdict of the earlier so-called ‘Choice of Lives’ argument that a mixed life is superior to either of its ‘pure’ rivals. A second concerns Socrates’ discussion of false pleasure, in which he appears to be guilty of rank equivocation. I argue that we (...)
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  14.  23
    Aristotle on Musical Catharsis and the Pleasure of a Good Story.G. R. F. Ferrari - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (2):117-171.
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  15.  9
    The Aristotelian Psychology of Tragic Mimesis.José M. González - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (2):172-245.
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  16.  32
    On the So-Called Common Books of the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics.Dorothea Frede - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (1):84-116.
  17.  36
    Aristotle Contra Plato on the Voluntariness of Vice: The Arguments of Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.Rachana Kamtekar - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (1):57-83.
  18. Intrinsic Valuing and the Limits of Justice: Why the Ring of Gyges Matters.Tyler Paytas & Nicholas R. Baima - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (1):1-9.
    Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, (...)
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