In Metaphysics Λ, Aristotle appeals to the prime mover: an unmoved mover that is the first moving cause of the world. Elsewhere, he calls the science concerned with the prime mover ‘theology’ (Meta. E.1, 1026a19). But what is the point of this science? On a common view, its purpose is to give an account of the prime mover itself, and especially to prove its existence. By contrast, I argue that Aristotle’s theology in Metaphysics Λ is ‘nature-bound’: it ultimately aims at (...) explaining facts about the perceptible world, in particular the motion of heavenly bodies and the cycle of generation of perishable substances. (shrink)

Socrates has an implicit argument for his afterlife story that concludes the Gorgias, with two key premises. One is at 527a–c, where he summarizes the ethical position he has been arguing for through most of the dialogue, regarding the intrinsic goodness of justice, the intrinsic badness of injustice, and the desirability of rehabilitative punishments. The second occurs at 507e–508a, where Socrates asserts that the universe is held together by justice. This argument explains why Socrates regards his story as a logos, (...) not merely a muthos. It also helps us understand the nature of the rewards and punishments in his story. (shrink)

Doctors heal people, and architects build houses. Their expertise guides them in their performance. Aristotle calls this expertise a technē. He often tells us that technē comes with a productive form of knowledge (poiētikē epistēmē). But what kind of knowledge does he associate with technē? We argue that for Aristotle technical knowledge is scientific knowledge—knowledge that can be modeled in terms of demonstrations. The view we develop enjoys several explanatory advantages over alternative interpretations and shows how Aristotle’s conception of technical (...) knowledge is consistent throughout his metaphysics, philosophy of science, and ethics. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotle in Eudemian Ethics (EE) 8.2 invalidates the question of whether good luck, understood as irrational but continuous success in performing virtuous actions, can produce happiness. The ‘lucky’ people in EE 8.2 possess what Aristotle elsewhere calls ‘natural virtue’. By attributing their success to nature and god instead of luck, he denies they have genuine good luck. This denial reveals that the question of whether such ‘good luck’ can lead to happiness is inherently misconceived. On this (...) interpretation, the examination of good luck in the EE takes a significantly different approach than its counterpart in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE). (shrink)