The main goal of this study is to develop a conceptual framework meant (a) to present the essential traits of persuasion, (b) to explain resistance to persuasion (mainly when the persuader tries to shape, reinforce, or change an attitudinal response), and (c) to provide a feasible strategy to overcome the coping behaviors associated with resistance to persuasion. Defined as the communication process in which “someone makes other people believe or decide to do something, especially by giving them reasons why they (...) should do it, or asking them many times to do it”, persuasion ensures a noncoercive social control by shaping, reinforcing, or changing target audience’s cognitions, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Persuasion involves volitional behaviors (that are inextricably intertwined with spontaneous, impulsive, mindless, or compulsive behaviors) and a significant cognitive load. Even if persuasion does not elicit negative feelings like various shortcuts to compliance (coercion, bribery, deception, manipulation of the dominant instincts, etc.), it generates ipso facto resistance to persuasion. Public relations specialists and other communication professionals can reduce or cope with resistance to persuasion by creating a low-pressure persuasion context, using evidential reasons, and following evidential rules. (shrink)

The growing importance of Social Networking Sites (SNS) in today's information economy has generated significant interest for understanding and managing shared fake news about brands on social media among academia and industry worldwide. In this context, we consider it is important to discuss the role of flow, also called optimal experience, in sharing fake news about brands on social media. Firstly, we will critically analyze the conceptualizations of the umbrella term „fake news‟ in the so-called „post-truth‟ era and assume a (...) narrow definition from literature. Secondly, we will review different theories from literature (i.e., selective exposure theory, uses and gratifications theory, social comparison theory, rational choice theory and self- determination theory) in order to explain why users share fake news. Furthermore, we will refer to flow theory proposed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975), which could be used as a framework to better the understanding of the user‟s behavior regarding the sharing of fake news about brands on social media. Flow is a hedonistic construct whose importance is widely recognized as having a major impact on the user's behavior in relation to information systems. According to Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1988), flow is a “crucial component of enjoyment” and is “the holistic sensation that people feel when they act with total involvement”. In a flow state, the consumer perceives an effortless action, loss of time and a sense that the experience stands out as being exceptional compared to daily activities (Csikszentmihalyi 1997). Flow is a continuous variable that can occur on different levels, ranging from none to an intense (or complete) state (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi 1988). Flow experience has been studied as an independent variable, as a dependent variable, and lately, as a mediator variable. In this paper we propose a new conceptual model containing 3 variables: (1) fake news spread about brands in SNS, (2) flow state experienced by SNS human users (i.e., optimal experience) and (3) sharing fake news about brands on social media by SNS human users (i.e., social media behavior). We conclude by outlining the need to empirically test the new conceptual model proposed in this paper. (shrink)

The vertiginous rise of right-wing populism, especially in its “nationalist, xenophobic and conservative form”, and some “racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and sexist” drifts associated with this phenomenon – whether real or perceived as such – make the mainstream media play a double role. On the one hand, the mainstream media reflect the struggle for political hegemony between different vested interests; on the other hand, they engage in the fight against right-wing populism blasting both right-wing populist candidates and their voters or supporters. (...) Many mainstream journalists ask citizens to realize a “sanitary cordon”, a “wall” or a “republican front” to block far-right populism and preserve liberal democracy. Moreover, they urge people to be wary of all attempts to “dediabolize” or “normalize” some tokens of right-wing populism. The main idea of this article is that right-wing populism is more harmless than is generally believed and, if excessive, negative media coverage doesn’t baffle but feed it. Populism is essentially a latent side effect of liberal democracy. Populism rises and becomes obtrusive only if a significant part of society perceives a regime of illiberal majoritarianism instead of one of liberal democracy. Right-wing populists are chiefly frustrated “ci-devants” who feel dispossessed of their past, identity, properties, qualities, privileges or titles. Inasmuch as the causes of collective frustration are many and varied (e.g. the real or just perceived corruption of the elites, the “system”, the deep state, the relocation of jobs, immigration, national sovereignty, national identity, communitarianism, radical Islamism, the status of some traditional institutions, some chapters of official history, etc.), there will always be right-wing populists, whether they are self-declared or covert. By adopting David G. Hackett’s thesis that the media are “agents of hegemony”, we applied the critical analysis of discourse to a set of 346 media articles in order to reveal the discursive sources of power, domination, inequality and partiality. The articles appeared in The New York Times and Le Monde during the period 2016-2017, at the time when the presidential elections took place in the United States and France. The articles were selected according to the occurrence of the keywords “Donald Trump” – “populism” and “Marine Le Pen” – “populisme” within the titles. The analysis of these articles reveals a divisive discursive structure that correspond to a real political cleavage in society. It is true that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible. It is also true that mainstream media reinforce this Manichean perspective on society and make populists feel marginalized and politically disempowered. The mainstream media may appease right-wing populism if they treat its followers as legitimate and equal political actors. For this, they have to give up the narrative structures that underscore insurmountable divergences and irreconcilable interests. In a liberal democracy, mass media should chiefly play the role of mediator. They may not aim to defeat or re-educate certain categories of citizens just because they advocate “wrong” political solutions. (shrink)