According to epistemic structural realism scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an (...) interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman. (shrink)

In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. Second, I (...) argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given. (shrink)

Review of 'Manuel Vargas. 2013. Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility'.

The use of unrealistic assumptions in Economics is usually defended not only for pragmatic reasons, but also because of the intrinsic difficulties in determining the degree of realism of assumptions. Additionally, the criterion used for evaluating economic models is associated with their ability to provide accurate predictions. This mode of thought involves –at least implicitly– a commitment to the existence of unvarying invariant factors or regularities. Contrary to this, the present paper presents a critique to the use of invariant knowledge (...) in economics. One reason for this analysis lies in the fact that economic phenomena are not compatible with the logic of invariance, but with the logic of "possibility trees" or "open-ended results". The other reason is that the use of invariant knowledge may entail both external validity problems and negative exposures to a "black swan". Alternatively, an approach where models are understood as possible scenarios is proposed. It is argued that the realism of assumptions is crucial here, since it helps to ascertain the degree of resemblance between the different models and the target system. (shrink)

Names are referring expressions and interact with the determiner system only exceptionally, in stark contrast with count nouns. The-predicativists like Sloat, Matushansky, and Fara claim otherwise, maintaining that syntactic data offers indicates that names belong to a special syntactic category which differs from common count nouns only in how they interact with ‘the’. I argue that the-predicativists have incorrectly discerned the syntactic facts. They have bypassed a large range of important syntactic data and misconstrued a critical data point on which (...) they ground the-predicativism. The right data offers new compelling syntactic grounds for referentialism. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a hypothetical model of mental causation that I call semantic pruning and which could be defined as the causal influence of contents and meanings on the spatial configuration of the network of synapses of an individual. I will be guided by two central principles: 1) the causal influence of the mental occurs by virtue of external semantic constraints and consists in the selective activation of certain physical powers, 2) when the selective activation is continual, it (...) triggers a process of synaptic pruning in the neural and neuromuscular network. (shrink)

This is a discussion of Delia Fara’s theory of vagueness, and of its solution to the Sorites paradox, criticizing some of the details of the account, but agreeing that its central insight will be a part of any solution to the problem. I also consider a wider range of philosophical puzzles that involve arguments that are structurally similar to the argument of the Sorites paradox, and argue that the main ideas of her account of vagueness helps to respond to some (...) of those puzzles. (shrink)

The clock hypothesis is taken to be an assumption independent of special relativity necessary to describe accelerated clocks. This enables to equate the time read off by a clock to the proper time. Here, it is considered a physical system–the light clock–proposed by Marzke and Wheeler. Recently, Fletcher proved a theorem that shows that a sufficiently small light clock has a time reading that approximates to an arbitrary degree the proper time. The clock hypothesis is not necessary to arrive at (...) this result. Here, one explores the consequences of this regarding the status of the clock hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper is a tribute to Delia Graff Fara. It extends her work on failures of meta-rules for validity as truth-preservation under a supervaluationist identification of truth with supertruth. She showed that such failures occur even in languages without special vagueness-related operators, for standards of deductive reasoning as materially rather than purely logically good, depending on a context-dependent background. This paper extends her argument to: quantifier meta-rules like existential elimination; ambiguity; deliberately vague standard mathematical notation. Supervaluationist attempts to qualify the (...) meta-rules impose unreasonable cognitive demands on reasoning and underestimate her challenge. (shrink)

I discuss Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine’s homonymous book. Next, Putnam’s changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working (...) mathematician. (shrink)

We discuss critically some recent theses about geometric cognition, namely claims of universality made by Dehaene et al., and the idea of a “natural geometry” employed by Spelke et al. We offer arguments for the need to distinguish visuo-spatial cognition from basic geometric knowledge, furthermore we claim that the latter cannot be identified with Euclidean geometry. The main aim of the paper is to advance toward a characterization of basic, practical geometry – which in our view requires a combination of (...) experiments on visuo-spatial cognition with studies in cognitive archaeology and comparative history. Examples from these fields are given, with special emphasis on the comparison of ancient Chinese and ancient Greek geometric ideas and procedures. (shrink)

This paper discusses Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument for mathematical realism on the basis of the indispensable role mathematics plays in scientific explanations of physical facts, along with various responses to it. I argue that there is an analogue of causal explanation for mathematics which, of several basic types of explanation, holds the most promise for use in the EIA. I consider a plausible case where mathematics plays an explanatory role in this sense, but argue that such use still does not (...) support realism about mathematical objects. (shrink)

This paper considers two models of embodied mathematical cognition, and analyses the image of mathematics that they support.

En ciencia cognitiva se han propuesto teorías de doble proceso para explicar competencias como razonamiento y toma de decisiones. Machery distingue entre arquitectura cognitiva unificada, según la cual a una competencia le subyace solamente un tipo de proceso y arquitectura de múltiples procesos, según la cual a una competencia le subyacen al menos dos tipos de procesos. Basándonos en esta distinción, intentaremos mostrar que si se explicitan y se analizan los criterios de coordinación entre procesos, las teorías de doble proceso (...) articuladas para el razonamiento y la toma de decisiones parecerían ofrecer más bien una arquitectura unificada y no de múltiples procesos. (shrink)

At first glance, every metaphysics of laws can be combined with every ontology of time. In contrast, the paper intends to show that Humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical view of temporal existence, i.e. growing block or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-productive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.

Aquí profundizamos la tesis de que un modelo de simulación permite crear conocimiento en forma de explicaciones causales sostenida por Paul Weirich. Sostenemos la validez de exportar resultados del modelo al mundo modelizado en virtud de la similaridad entre modelo y mundo, analizable en términos de identidad parcial de estructura para eliminar la similaridad superficial que repita los resultados empíricos al ajustar datos por calibración. La estructura de relaciones rescatadas del mundo resulta crítica al estudiar la mencionada similaridad, como así (...) también ciertas propiedades que condicionan el tipo de relaciones entre los elementos del modelo que representan entidades del mundo. (shrink)

Según Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemología de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemológica negativa y su principal tesis epistemológica positiva están en peligro si su teoría metafísica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aquí un problema para dicha teoría: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones lingüísticas. Describiré algunas opciones que tendría Williamson para evitar el (...) problema; pero sostendré que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad. (shrink)

Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay : 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success (...) of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn’s. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizamos críticamente el enfoque mecanicista de explicación científica centrándonos principalmente en la forma en la que este da cuenta de los fenómenos biológicos. Nos proponemos complementar esta perspectiva con una concepción de nivel como intervalo de cuasi-descomponibilidad que nos permite fundamentar metafísicamente las propuestas mecanicistas clásicas en las propiedades sistémicas características de las entidades biológicas. A través del análisis de ejemplos concretos, demostraremos cómo nuestra propuesta permite superar algunas de las limitaciones de los enfoques predominantes de explicación (...) mecanística. (shrink)