Utilitas

ISSN: 0953-8208

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  1.  18
    A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem.Jonas H. Aaron - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):35-49.
    This paper offers a unified explanation for the procreation asymmetry and the non-identity thesis – two of the most intractable puzzles in population ethics. According to the procreation asymmetry, there are moral reasons not to create lives that are not worth living but no moral reasons to create lives that are worth living. I explain the procreation asymmetry by arguing that there are moral reasons to prevent the bad, but no moral reasons to promote the good. Various explanations for the (...)
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  2.  37
    Fit and Well-Being.Teresa Bruno-Niño - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):16-34.
    In this paper, I argue for Fit, a prudential version of the claim that attitudes must fit their objects, the claim that there is an extra benefit when one's reactions fit their objects. I argue that Fit has surprising and powerful consequences for theories of well-being. Classic versions of the objective list theory, hedonism, desire views, and loving-the-good theories do not accommodate Fit. Suitable modifications change some of the views substantially. Modified views give reactions a robust role as sources of (...)
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  3.  28
    Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth?Jeffrey Carroll - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):102-110.
    Must we always pursue economic growth? Kogelmann answers yes. Not only should poor countries pursue growth, but rich countries should as well. Kogelmann aims to provide a wealth-insensitive argument – one demonstrating all countries should pursue growth regardless of their wealth. His central argument – the no halting growth (NHG) argument – says no country experiencing growth should stop it, because doing so requires undermining the conditions causing it and those conditions are independently morally desirable, so they should not be (...)
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  4.  20
    Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues.Romy Eskens - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):64-82.
    Forced choices between rescuing imperilled persons are subject to a presumption of equality. Unless we can point to a morally relevant difference between these persons' imperilments, each should get an equal chance of rescue. Sometimes, this presumption is overturned. For example, when one imperilled person has wrongfully caused the forced choice, most think that this person (rather than an innocent person) should bear the harm. The converse scenario, in which a forced choice resulted from the supererogatory action of one of (...)
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  5.  58
    Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable.Bob Fischer & Jeff Sebo - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):50-63.
    In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, (...)
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  6.  12
    Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023), pp. vi + 218.Workineh Kelbessa - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):111-113.
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  7. For the Greater Individual and Social Good: Justifying Age-Differentiated Paternalism.Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):1-15.
    What justifies differences in the acceptance of paternalism towards competent minors and older people? I propose two arguments. The first argument draws on the widely accepted view that paternalism is easier to justify the more good it promotes for the paternalizee. It argues that paternalism targeting young people generally promotes more good for the people interfered with than similar paternalism targeting older people. While promoting people's interests or well-being is essential to the justification of paternalism, the first argument has certain (...)
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  8.  18
    The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming.Kartik Upadhyaya - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):83-101.
    Provided we blame others accurately, is blaming them morally right even if we are guilty of similar wrongdoing ourselves? On the one hand, hypocrisy seems to render blame morally wrong, and unjustified; but on the other, even hypocritical blaming seems better than silence. I develop an account of the wrongness of hypocritical blaming which resolves this apparent dilemma. When holding others accountable for their moral failings, we ought to be willing to reason, together with them, about our own, similar failings. (...)
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