Endogenous reward (intrinsic reward at will) is a fiat currency that is occasioned by steps toward any goals which are challenging and/or uncommon enough to prevent its debasement by inflation. A “theory of mental computational processes” should propose what properties let goals grow from appetites for endogenous rewards. Endogenous reward may be the universal selective factor in all modifiable mental processes.

In their article, Murayama and Jach contend that a mental computational model demonstrates that high-level motivations are emergent properties from underlying cognitive processes rather than instigators of behaviors. Despite points of agreement with the authors' critiques of the motivation literature, I argue that their claim of dismantling the black box of the human mind has been constructed on shaking grounds.

Murayama and Jach offer valuable suggestions for how to integrate computational processes into motivation theory, but these processes cannot do away with motivation altogether. Rewards are only rewarding because people want and like them – that is, because of motivation. Sexual desire is not primarily a quest for rewarding information. Elucidating the interface between motivation and cognition seems a promising way forward.

Research in community ecology, anthropology, and ethnoprimatology has identified mixed-species animal groups, and we argue that Moffett's definition of society allows these groups to qualify as societies. The existence of mixed-species society has two implications – that societies are structured by social norms, and that it may be more common to belong to multiple societies than Moffett suggests.

Modern humans don't always leave cultural or technological evidence. Yet, Mbuti artifacts, like net-hunting tools and patterns, reveal their modern cognitive capacity. They create geometric and musical structures requiring specific working memory seen in modern Homo sapiens. Evidence from Blombos Cave suggests these skills existed 75,000 years ago, underscoring shared cognitive abilities among all modern human populations.

If human societies are understood as identity groups, then our psychology should include design for the production and detection of credible identity signals. We argue that vocalizations are ideal identity signals because the human auditory system is sensitive to subtle acoustic features; vocal signals are efficient; and speech and song are highly complex, enabling the embedding therein of identity signals.

Moffett's definition of societies could be augmented by recognizing society's organizing systems that coordinate diverse individuals' behavior for collective good. Viewing humans as cultural animals indicates three reasons for ever larger societies: More shared information, bigger and better marketplace for exchange, and military superiority in numbers. Sports teams are societies offering a promising venue for empirical work.

While we are sympathetic with Stibbard-Hawkes’ approach, we disagree with the proposal to switch to a “cognitively modern” null for all Homo species. We argue in favor of a more evidence-driven approach, inspired by recent debates in comparative cognition. Ultimately, parsing the contributions of different genetic and extra-genetic factors in human evolution is more promising than setting a priori nulls.

Innovations, such as symbolic artifacts, are a product of cognitive abilities but also of cultural context. Factors that may determine the emergence and retention of an innovation include the population's pre-existing cultural repertoire, exposure to relevant ways of thinking, and the invention's utility. Thus, we suggest that the production of symbolic artifacts is not guaranteed even in cognitively advanced societies.

Using Neanderthal symbolism, I extend on Stibbard-Hawkes to show that reconsidering the link between cognitive capacity and material culture extends beyond matters of preservation. A reconceptualization of behavioural modernity inclusive of both extant and extinct populations must begin with an honest theoretical separation of biological and behavioural modernity, which requires to critically engage with how we frame the underlying questions.

While ambitious, interesting, and generally corresponding to usage in archaeology history, and anthropology, Moffett's paper seems more philosophy of science (conceptual analysis) than science (their use in explanations). It avoids explanations of how “markers of identity” and “their recognition” are acquired (e.g., by biological evolution, individual learning, social learning, or sociocultural evolution) and what the concept of “a society” explains.

We discuss some of the most central problems and concepts elaborated within the social sciences, especially sociology, which are not or only tangentially exposed by Moffett. Then, we will exemplify of how identity, which is a central constituent of Moffett's definition of society, cannot be opposed to interaction despite his claims. Rather it is to be studied as interactional achievement.

We examine the similarities and differences between Moffett's conceptualization of society and the core configuration model of social groupings. Anonymous societies correspond to the macrodeme level of coordination in the core configuration model, and recognizing that identity-based groups are defined by shared distinctiveness rather than territory encourages a more organic understanding of social groups.

We embrace Moffett's call for more rigorous definitions of social organizations but raise two intersecting critiques: (1) The spaces controlled by societies are not exclusively physical, and (2) cooperation is required to maintain control over spaces, physical or otherwise. We discuss examples of non-physical societal spaces across species and highlight the top-down group cooperation challenge that is maintaining them.

Murayama and Jach point out that we do not sufficiently understand the constructs and mental computations underlying higher-order motivated behaviors. Although this may be generally true, we would like to add and contribute to the discussion by outlining how interdisciplinary research on novelty-evoked exploration has advanced the study of learning and curiosity.

Moffett's interdisciplinary definition of society seeks to distinguish itself from the prevalent, political understanding of the term. Through engagement with international relations literature, we outline how Moffett's proposed “society” results in a recapitulation of the definition of a nation-state. We suggest that this tension could be addressed by adopting a functional, rather than identity-based, approach.

Moffett's definition of society is broadly applicable to all group-living animals from insects to nation states. Presenting examples from primates, I illustrate difficulties in defining boundaries between societies and even what societies defend to demonstrate the complexity of using an understanding of the processes effecting primate societies to understand those effecting human societies. However, finding similarities and differences in processes shaping societies is intriguing and Moffett's definition provides an excellent starting point.

Murayama and Jach argue that it is not clearly specified how motivation constructs produce behavior and that this black box should be unpacked. We argue that the authors overlook important classic theory and highlight recent research programs that already started unboxing. We feel that without relying on the mechanisms that such programs uncover, the proposed computational approach will be fruitless.

Our commentary suggests that different materialities (fragile, enduring, and mixed) may influence cognitive evolution. Building on Stibbard-Hawkes, we propose that predictive brains minimise errors and seek information, actively structuring environments for epistemic benefits. This perspective complements Stibbard-Hawkes' view.

Moffett's paper is an important contribution to the multidisciplinary discussion of the notion of “society.” This comment aims to clarify and nuance some points considered important from an anthropological perspective. In particular, it stresses the importance of controlled social interaction and historical dynamics.

Murayama and Jach raise a key problem in behavioral sciences, to which we suggest evolutionary science can provide a solution. We emphasize the role of adaptive mechanisms in shaping behavior and argue for the integration of hierarchical theories of goal-directed cognition and behavioral flexibility, in order to unravel the motivations behind actions that, in themselves, seem disconnected from adaptive goals.

Stibbard-Hawkes' taphonomic findings are valuable, and his call for caution warranted, but the hazards he raises are being mitigated by a multi-pronged approach; current research on behavioural/cognitive modernity is not based solely on material chronology. Theories synthesize data from archaeology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience, and genetics, and predictions arising from these theories are tested with mathematical and agent-based models.

The definition of society as identity group is most likely to be useful when combined with the instrumental functions of identity groupings. These take two key forms, with important differences. First, identity groupings are useful for individual decision making. Second, societies can be units of collective behavior and information processing. Disentanglement of these forms is needed.

The target article explores material culture datasets from three African forager groups. After demonstrating that these modern, contemporary human populations would leave scant evidence of symbolic behaviour or material complexity, it cautioned against using material culture as a barometer for human cognition in the deep past. Twenty-one commentaries broadly support or expand these conclusions. A minority offer targeted demurrals, highlighting (1) the soundness of reasoning from absence; and questioning (2) the “cognitively modern” null; (3) the role of hunter-gatherer ethnography; and (...) (4) the pertinence of the inferential issues identified in the target article. In synthesising these discussions, this reply addresses all four points of demurral in turn, and concludes that there is much to be gained from shifting our null assumptions and reconsidering the probabilistic inferential links between past material culture and cognition. (shrink)

Although in basic agreement with Murayama and Jach's call for greater attention to the black boxes underlying motivated behavior, we provide examples of our published suggestions regarding how subjective task value (and ability self-concepts) “gets into people's knowledge structures.” We suggest additional mental computational processes to investigate and call for a developmental and situated individual differences approach to this work.

Murayama and Jach offer a thoughtful and timely critique of motivation constructs. We largely concur with their basic premises, but offer additional input and clarification regarding the importance of carefully considering the energization and direction components of motivation, and fully attending to the hierarchical aspect of motivation rather than prioritizing particular levels of analysis.

The target article rightly questions whether the archaeological record is useful for identifying sea changes in hominin cognitive abilities. This commentary suggests an alternative approach of synthesizing findings from primatology, evolutionary developmental biology, and paleoanthropology to formulate hypotheses about cognitive evolution in hominins that lived during the three million years that preceded the record of material culture (the Botanic Age).

Moffett's article asserts that human societies are distinct from other social groups because they must maintain control over specific territories. In our commentary, we challenge this argument, aiming to enrich it by highlighting the pivotal role of history and collective memories and their underestimated significance in shaping societies across time and beyond territorial ownership and resource control.

Sports, team games, and physical skill competitions appear to be a human universal and may have been prevalent throughout the hominin lineage. These activities are cognitively complex and can be associated with a distinctive and symbolic material culture. Yet, many of the artifacts used by foraging groups for sports, team games, and athletic competitions often have a low preservation probability.

Murayama and Jach rightfully aim to conceptualize motivation as an emergent property of a dynamic system of interacting elements. However, they do not embrace the ontological and paradigmatic constraints of the dynamic systems approach. They therefore miss the very process of emergence and how it can be formally modeled and tested by specific types of computer simulation.

Many motivational constructs are opaque “black boxes,” and should be replaced by an explicit account of the underlying psychological mechanisms. The theory of motivational systems has begun to provide such an account. I recently contributed to this tradition with a general architecture of motivation, which connects “energization” and “direction” through the goal-setting activity of emotions, and serves as an evolutionary grounded map of motivational processes.

We expand on Moffett's discussion of societies in the context of multilevel social systems, for which Moffett proposes the core unit to constitute a society. Moffett's definition of a society, however, suggests that it is more parsimonious to assign this label to the upper (band) level. An understanding of multilevel systems is critical for informing discussions about what a society is.

Stibbard-Hawkes presents a much-needed case for distinguishing between different types of evidence for cognition in past cultures. However, he does not outline an applicable approach for moving forward in making claims about the cognition of past cultures. We present an initial model for calibrating both absolute and comparative claims about past cultures' cognition and other traits.

Murayama and Jach claim that current motivational constructs do not specify causal processes (black-box problem) and that mental computational processes solve this problem. We argue, process-focused research requires theoretical frameworks addressing situational variations, individual differences, and their interaction. Classic achievement motivation theory provides comprehensive models with empirically measurable process-related constructs and predictions. Recent developments build on this, addressing motivation, action, and their socio-cultural and lifespan context. Theory-free mental computational processes cannot do any of that.

The article provides an important warning but its general conclusions should be nuanced: (i) When there is no evidence for it, we should depart from the hypothesis that a species lacks a particular cognitive capacity, and (ii) inferences from absence of evidence can be epistemically sound and scientifically strategic in cognitive and linguistic archaeology.

Stibbard-Hawkes's detailed demonstration that in the case of hunter-gatherer artifacts, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence must never be forgotten. The belief that there is a single coherent “human cognitive capacity” difference between modern humans and some unspecified earlier form should be rigorously re-examined.

I argue that Murayama and Jach's claim that higher-order motivational constructs face the “black-box” problem is misconceived because it doesn't clearly distinguish between personal and subpersonal explanations. To solve it they propose interpreting motivations as causal effects of mental computational processes. I suggest that their solution might be more compellingly presented as providing a fictionalist perspective on some personal-level constructs.

Moffett contends that societies should be considered the “primary” group with respect to their social ramifications. Although intriguing, this claim suffers from insufficient clarity and evidence. Rather, if any group is to be crowned supreme it should surely be the family, with its unique capacity to encourage pro-group behavior, shape other groups, and provide meaning.

To understand the nature and evolution of different kinds of societies, we must characterize the psychological mechanisms members use to identify who belongs. Across both individual recognition- and anonymous-societies, these range from physiological responses to individuals up to powerful conceptual representations of the group that license generalization and novel predictions. Sketching these mechanisms helps us understand the transition from the individual recognition societies of our ape ancestors to uniquely human forms of anonymous society.

We comment on the consequences of the target article for language evolution research. We propose that the default assumption should be that of language-readiness in extinct hominins, and the integration of different types of available evidence from multiple disciplines should be used to assess the likely extent of the realization of this readiness. The role of archaeological evidence should be reconsidered.

A clear definition of society helps prevent conceptual misunderstanding. When making practical measurement of societies, it is worth noting that social complexity is actually a jagged concept that encompasses multiple weakly correlated dimensions. Understanding such jaggedness assists interpretation of the divergence between anonymous societies and the social brain hypothesis.

We welcome Stibbard-Hawkes's empirical contributions and discussion of interpretive challenges for archaeology, but question some of his characterizations and conclusions. Moving beyond critique, it is time to develop new research methods that eschew simplistic modern/premodern binaries. We advocate an inductive, probabilistic approach using multiple lines of evidence to infer the causes and consequences of behavioral variability across time and space.

I expand Stibbard-Hawkes' exploration of symbolism and cognition to suggest that we also ought to reconsider the strength of connections between cognition and technological complexity. Using early weaponry as a case study I suggest that complexity may be “hidden” in early tools, and further highlight that assessments of technologies as linear and progressive have roots in Western colonial thought.

Moffett presents a robust proposal for a comparative study of societies as the basis for studying the human condition and behavior. This theoretical framework has implications for the study of deceptive behavior. I discuss how this framework might describe the adaptation of deceptive behavior within human societies and shed light on the dynamics of collaborative deceptive behavior through interpersonal commitment.

I have attempted to provide a concept of societies that will foster productive cross-disciplinary discussions, namely one incorporating these three elements: (1) A mechanism for group identification, by which members distinguish those who belong from those who do not; (2) the potential for this membership to last for generations; and (3) control over a shared physical space. Herein, I respond to thoughtful commentaries from academics across the social and biological sciences, addressing their insights on the importance of identity in determining (...) society boundaries, how institutions and nations relate to identity, the complications of territoriality as a definition component, how societies fragment, the workings of multitier sociality, and the significance of cooperation. (shrink)

In their proposal for unpacking the black box of motivation, Murayama and Jach (M&J) propose three types of reductions: From high-level to low-level motivational constructs, from motivation to cognition, and from contentful to contentless explanations. Although these reductions come with the promise of parsimony, they carry the risk of losing vital explanatory power.

The target article argued that motivation constructs are treated as black boxes and called for work that specifies the mental computational processes underlying motivated behavior. In response to critical commentaries, we clarify our philosophical standpoint, elaborate on the meaning of mental computational processes and why past work was not sufficient, and discuss the opportunities to expand the scope of the framework.

The proposed “black-box” problem and its solution are drawn from the same substance-oriented framework. This framework's assumptions have consequences that re-create the black-box problem at a foundational level. Specifically, Murayama and Jach's solution fails to explain novel behavior that emerges through an organism's development. A process-oriented theoretical shift provides an ontological explanation for emergent behavior and eliminates the black-box problem altogether.

Using modern hunter-gatherers to infer about early Homo sapiens only works if at least (a) modern hunter-gatherers represent an unbiased sample of humanity, and (b) modern hunter-gatherers act in ways similar to the behavior of early Homo sapiens. Both of these are false, leading to the problem of whether we can draw conclusions about early Homo sapiens from modern hunter-gatherers.

Identity formation and maintenance is a complex process operating at many levels, with identity markers and affiliations often contested, negotiated, rejected, revised, and replaced, both within and between groups, by parties with competing interests. This needs to be considered if identity is to serve as a useful criterion for defining society.

We present several arguments for the preeminence of social interactions in determining and giving shape to societies. In our view, a society can emerge from social interaction and relationship patterns without the need for establishing an a priori limit on who actually belongs to it. Markers of group identity are one element among many that allow societies to persist.

Whole Trait Theory (and other dynamic theories of personality) can illuminate the process by which motivational states become traits. Mental computational processes constitute part of the explanatory mechanisms that drive trait manifestations. Empirical work on Whole Trait Theory may inform future research directions on mental computational processes.

Metacognitive feelings are an integral part of mental computational processes and influence the outcome of computations. We review supporting evidence on affect inherent in perceptual processes, fluency in study decisions, metacognitive feelings in aha-experiences and intuition, and affect in early phases of interest development. These findings connect to recent theories that combine metacognitive feelings with computational models.

Some constructs in motivation science are certainly underdeveloped and some motivation researchers may work with underspecified constructs, as suggested by Murayama and Jach (M&J). However, this is not indicative of a general problem in motivation science. Many motivation theories focus on specific mechanisms underlying motivated behavior and thus have already adopted the computational process perspective that M&J call for.

Moffett's outstanding paper offers a thought-provoking definition of a human society as an identity group. This commentary reflects on the centrality of shared group identification in societies, and discusses two important phenomena related to group identity, that is (i) the perceived temporal persistence of the group, and (ii) the processes leading to group fragmentation and schism.

Murayama and Jach criticize the use of high-level motivational constructs in psychology, urging psychologists to “unpack” the black box. These constructs are alleged to be “psychological constructions” with no causal powers of their own. I argue that this view is mistaken, and that high-level motivational constructs are causal even when unpacked in terms of underlying computational, algorithmic, and implementational processes.

Though we see the potential for benefits from the development of process-oriented approaches, we argue that it falls prey to many of the same critiques raised about the existing construct level of analysis. The construct-level approach will likely dominate motivation research until we develop computational models that are not only accurate, but also broadly usable.

We argue that the target article's computational/reductionistic approach to motivation is insufficient to explain the energization of human behavior, because such explanation requires broad consideration of “what people are trying to do.” We illustrate what is gained by retaining (rather than jettisoning) higher-order motivation constructs and show that the authors’ approach assumes, but fails to name, such constructs.

There are indeed questionable motivation constructs in psychology. The diagnosis and proposed remedies in the target article both neglect the crucial consideration that all tendencies to behaviour compete for the same finite set of degrees of freedom. Action selection also has irreducibly economic aspects which should constrain motivation constructs and already inform healthy research programmes.

Stibbard-Hawkes shows that cultures using material symbols might well not leave traces of that practice in the archaeological record. The paper thus poses an important challenge: When is absence of evidence evidence of absence? This commentary uses behavioural ecology to make modest progress on this problem.

One of the key features of society is a sense of belonging to the same thing. But what should “what is the same” be? The article points out that categories, social roles, and place in power structures are primary to the sense of belonging, not secondary. And the criterion for belonging in society should be shared moral values.

Stibbard-Hawkes forcefully alerts us to the pitfall of false-negative reasoning in symbolic archaeology. We highlight the twin problem of false-positive reasoning in what we call the “false-symbol problem.” False symbols are intuitively special entities that, owing to their non-utilitarian nature, invite symbolic interpretation. But they are not symbolic. We link the false-symbol problem to work in comparative primate cognition, taking “primate art” as our main example.

Moffett points to humans' use of physical markers to signal group identity as crucial to human society. We characterize the developmental and cognitive bases of this capacity, arguing that it is part of an early-emerging, intuitive socio-physical interface which allows the inanimate world to encode rich social meaning about individuals' identities, and the values of the society as a whole.

The absence of symbolic material cultural objects in the archaeological record does not prove absence of symbolic cognition. Sometimes perishable materials are selected for symbolic roles, for practical concerns or to indicate a temporary condition. Also some symbolic functions may predate the use of durable materials. Finally, child play and artisan experimentations usually involve cheap and perishable materials. These are symbolic and representational activities that do not leave a material trace.

Integrating the predictive processing framework into our understanding of motivation offers promising avenues for theoretical development, while shedding light on the computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Here we decompose expected free energy into intrinsic value (i.e., epistemic affordance) and extrinsic value (i.e., instrumental affordance) to provide insights into how individuals adapt to and interact with their environment.

Shared intentionality is the derived hominin motivation and skills to align mental states. Research on the role of interdependence in the phylogeny of shared intentionality has only considered the archeological record of Homo heidelbergensis. But ethnographic and fossil data must be considered, too. Doing so suggests that shared intentionality may have been favored in Homo erectus to support persistence hunting.

Understanding the psychological computations underlying motivation can shed light onto motivational constructs as emergent phenomena. According to Murayama and Jach, reward-learning is a key candidate mechanism. However, there's no such thing as a free lunch: Not only benefits (like reward), but also costs inherent to motivated behaviors (like effort, or uncertainty) are an essential part of the picture.

Stibbard-Hawkes challenges the link between symbolic material evidence and behavioural modernity. Extending this to non-human species, we find that personal adornment, decoration, figurative art, and musical instruments may not uniquely distinguish human cognition. These common criteria may ineffectively distinguish symbolic from non-symbolic cognition or symbolic cognition is not uniquely human. It highlights the need for broader comparative perspectives.

Shared group identifications can significantly subdivide populations. However, groups with mutual recognition may not be territorial. In the deep ocean, territoriality is absent but some species have important groups based upon shared identification. Control over access to physical space should be dropped from the definition of “society,” although “territorial society” could be retained as an important subcategory.

Moffett's definition of societies and fascinating comparisons will help us understand some aspects of societies that apply across species, however, both definitions and the dynamics of deeply rooted cultural institutions that so transformed human communities will be critical to understanding “societies.”.

Our species' behavioral and cognitive evolution constitute a key research topic across many scientific disciplines. Based on ethnographic hunter-gatherer data, Stibbard-Hawkes challenges the common link made between past material culture and cognitive capacities. Despite this adequate criticism, archaeology must retain a central role for studying these issues due to its unique access to relevant empirical evidence in deep time.

Murayama and Jach critically evaluate the idea that motivation is a dynamic that determines behavior and propose alternatively that it might be an emergent property that people construe through perceived regularities in experience and action. The critique has value but fails to appreciate the progress that has been made in moving beyond the idea of which the authors are critical.

Although higher-level constructs often fail to explain the mechanisms underlying motivation, we argue that purely mechanistic approaches have limitations. Lower-level neural data help us identify “biologically plausible” mechanisms, while higher-level constructs are critical to formulate measurable behavioral outcomes when constructing computational models. Therefore, we propose that a multi-level, multi-measure approach is required to fully unpack the black box of motivated behavior.

Many have interpreted symbolic material culture in the deep past as evidencing the origins sophisticated, modern cognition. Scholars from across the behavioural and cognitive sciences, including linguists, psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists, primatologists, archaeologists, and palaeoanthropologists have used such artefacts to assess the capacities of extinct human species, and to set benchmarks, milestones, or otherwise chart the course of human cognitive evolution. To better calibrate our expectations, the present paper instead explores the material culture of three contemporary African forager groups. Results show (...) that, although these groups are unequivocally behaviourally modern, they would leave scant long-lasting evidence of symbolic behaviour. Artefact sets are typically small, perhaps as a consequence of residential mobility. When traded materials are excluded, few artefacts have components with moderate–to–strong taphonomic signatures. The present analyses show that artefact function influences preservation probability, such that utilitarian tools for the processing of materials and the preparation of food are disproportionately likely to contain archaeologically traceable components. There are substantial differences in material use among populations, which create important population-level variation in preservation probability, independent of cognitive differences. I discuss the factors – cultural, ecological, and practical – that influence material choice. In so doing, I highlight the difficulties of using past material culture as an evolutionary or cognitive yardstick. (shrink)

I propose the need to establish a comparative study of societies, conceived of specificially here as bounded groups beyond a simple, immediate family that have the potential to endure for generations, whose constituent individuals recognize one another as members, and that maintain control over a physical space. This definition, with refinements and ramifications I explore, serves for cross-disciplinary research because it applies not just to nations but to diverse hunter–gatherer and tribal groups with a pedigree that likely traces back to (...) the societies of our common ancestor with the chimpanzees. It also applies to groups among other species for which comparison to humans can be instructive. Notably, it describes societies in terms of shared group identification rather than social interactions. An expansive treatment of the topic is overdue given that the concept of a society (even the use of such synonyms as primate “troop”) has fallen out of favor among biologists, resulting in a semantic mess; whereas sociologists rarely consider societies beyond nations, and social psychologists predominantly focus on ethnicities and other component groups of societies. I examine the relevance of societies across realms of inquiry, discussing the ways member recognition is achieved; how societies compare to other organizational tiers; and their permeability, territoriality (allowing for mobile territories), relation to social networks and kinship, and impermanence. We have diverged from our ancestors in generating numerous affiliations within and between societies while straining the expectation of society memberships by assimilating diverse populations. Nevertheless, if, as I propose, societies were the first, and thereafter the primary, ingroups of prehistory, how we came to register society boundaries may be foundational to all human “groupiness.” A discipline-spanning approach to societies should further our understanding of what keeps societies together and what tears them apart. (shrink)

The constructs of motivation (or needs, motives, etc.) to explain higher-order behavior have burgeoned in psychology. In this article, we critically evaluate such high-level motivation constructs that many researchers define as causal determinants of behavior. We identify a fundamental issue with this predominant view of motivation, which we call the black-box problem. Specifically, high-level motivation constructs have been considered as causally instigating a wide range of higher-order behavior, but this does not explain what they actually are or how behavioral tendencies (...) are generated. The black-box problem inevitably makes the construct ill-defined and jeopardizes its theoretical status. To address the problem, we discuss the importance of mental computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Critically, from this perspective, motivation is not a unitary construct that causes a wide range of higher-order behavior – it is an emergent property that people construe through the regularities of subjective experiences and behavior. The proposed perspective opens new avenues for future theoretical development, that is, the examination of how motivated behavior is realized through mental computational processes. (shrink)