Thinking and Reasoning

ISSNs: 1354-6783, 1464-0708

15 found

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  1.  10
    Examining the role of deliberation in de-bias training.Esther Boissin, Serge Caparos & Wim De Neys - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (2):327-355.
    Does avoiding biased responding to reasoning problems and grasping the ­correct solution require engaging in effortful deliberation or can such solution insight be acquired more intuitively? In this study we set out to test the impact of deliberation on the efficiency of a de-bias training in which the problem logic was explained to participants. We focused on the infamous bat-and-ball problem and varied the degree of possible deliberation during the training session by manipulating time constraints and cognitive load. The results (...)
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  2.  35
    Testing the underlying structure of unfounded beliefs about COVID-19 around the world.Paweł Brzóska, Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Jarosław Piotrowski, Bartłomiej Nowak, Peter K. Jonason, Constantine Sedikides, Mladen Adamovic, Kokou A. Atitsogbe, Oli Ahmed, Uzma Azam, Sergiu Bălțătescu, Konstantin Bochaver, Aidos Bolatov, Mario Bonato, Victor Counted, Trawin Chaleeraktrakoon, Jano Ramos-Diaz, Sonya Dragova-Koleva, Walaa Labib M. Eldesoki, Carla Sofia Esteves, Valdiney V. Gouveia, Pablo Perez de Leon, Dzintra Iliško, Jesus Alfonso D. Datu, Fanli Jia, Veljko Jovanović, Tomislav Jukić, Narine Khachatryan, Monika Kovacs, Uri Lifshin, Aitor Larzabal Fernandez, Kadi Liik, Sadia Malik, Chanki Moon, Stephan Muehlbacher, Reza Najafi, Emre Oruç, Joonha Park, Iva Poláčková Šolcová, Rahkman Ardi, Ognjen Ridic, Goran Ridic, Yadgar Ismail Said, Andrej Starc, Delia Stefenel, Kiều Thị Thanh Trà, Habib Tiliouine, Robert Tomšik, Jorge Torres-Marin, Charles S. Umeh, Eduardo Wills-Herrera, Anna Wlodarczyk, Zahir Vally & Illia Yahiiaiev - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (2):301-326.
    Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...)
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  3.  9
    Elementary probabilistic operations: a framework for probabilistic reasoning.Siegfried Macho & Thomas Ledermann - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (2):259-300.
    The framework of elementary probabilistic operations (EPO) explains the structure of elementary probabilistic reasoning tasks as well as people’s performance on these tasks. The framework comprises three components: (a) Three types of probabilities: joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities; (b) three elementary probabilistic operations: combination, marginalization, and conditioning, and (c) quantitative inference schemas implementing the EPO. The formal part of the EPO framework is a computational level theory that provides a problem space representation and a classification of elementary probabilistic problems based (...)
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  4.  17
    The implicit perception of harm following moral violations in autism.Gabriele Osler, Laura Franchin, Giulia Guglielmetti, Stefano Calzolari, Rocco Micciolo & Luca Surian - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (2):379-393.
    Previous studies showed that when reading a scenario depicting a harmless moral violation in the domain of purity, people nevertheless implicitly infer that harm was involved. In this study, we assessed whether this “implicit completion” process found in the perception of immoral actions is also present in people with autism spectrum disorder. In two experiments, we found an implicit activation of harm representations in response to all kinds of moral violations in neurotypical adults as well as in adults with autism. (...)
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  5.  1
    Gain-loss domain and social value orientation as determinants of risk allocation decisions.Ming-Hong Tsai & Verlin B. Hinsz - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (2):356-378.
    People often make less risky decisions for themselves than others. We examined how people allocated risks (i.e., determining the ratio of uncertain outcomes to certain outcomes) between themselves and others. We also investigated gain (vs. loss) domain and social value orientation as predictors of risk allocations. The results of three experiments demonstrated that participants were more likely to share their risks equally between themselves and others than distribute risk unequally. In the gain (vs. loss) domain, participants allocated fewer risks to (...)
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  6.  10
    Verbal and numeric probabilities differentially shape decisions.Robert N. Collins, David R. Mandel & Brooke A. MacLeod - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):235-257.
    Experts often communicate probabilities verbally (e.g., unlikely) rather than numerically (e.g., 25% chance). Although criticism has focused on the vagueness of verbal probabilities, less attention has been given to the potential unintended, biasing effects of verbal probabilities in communicating probabilities to decision-makers. In four experiments (Ns = 201, 439, 435, 696), we showed that probability format (i.e., verbal vs. numeric) influenced participants’ inferences and decisions following a hypothetical financial expert’s forecast. We observed a format effect for low probability forecasts: verbal (...)
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  7.  9
    Law and order: the timing of mitigating evidence affects punishment decisions.Emily B. Conder, Christopher Brett Jaeger & Jonathan D. Lane - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):1-23.
    When we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator’s individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable. Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of punishment that is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally. But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator’s transgression. We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence. Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a (...)
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  8.  7
    Argument evaluation and production in the correction of political innumeracy.Martin Dockendorff & Hugo Mercier - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):195-217.
    The public is largely innumerate, making systematic mistakes in estimating some politically relevant facts, such as the share of foreign-born citizens. In two-step or multistep flow models, such mistakes could be corrected if better-informed citizens were able to convince their peers, in particular by using good arguments citing reliable sources. In six experiments, we find two issues that dampen the potential power of this two-step flow process. First, even though participants were more convinced by good than by poor arguments, many (...)
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  9.  17
    The effect of cardinality in the pigeonhole principle.Baptiste Jacquet & Jean Baratgin - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):218-234.
    The pigeonhole principle is a well-known mathematical principle and is quite simple to understand. It goes as follows: If n items are placed into m containers, and if m (...)
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  10.  7
    Political ideology and environmentalism impair logical reasoning.Lucas Keller, Felix Hazelaar, Peter M. Gollwitzer & Gabriele Oettingen - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):79-108.
    People are more likely to think statements are valid when they agree with them than when they do not. We conducted four studies analyzing the interference of self-reported ideologies with performance in a syllogistic reasoning task. Study 1 established the task paradigm and demonstrated that participants’ political ideology affects syllogistic reasoning for syllogisms with political content but not politically irrelevant syllogisms. The preregistered Study 2 replicated the effect and showed that incentivizing accuracy did not alleviate these differences. Study 3 revealed (...)
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  11.  14
    Initial judgment of solvability: integrating prior expectations with experience-based heuristic cues.Tirza Lauterman & Rakefet Ackerman - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):135-168.
    Initial Judgment of Solvability (iJOS) is a metacognitive judgment that reflects solvers’ first impression as to whether a problem is solvable. We hypothesized that iJOS is inferred by combining prior expectations about the entire task with heuristic cues derived from each problem’s elements. In two experiments participants first provided quick iJOSs for all problems, then attempted to solve them. We manipulated expectations by changing the proportion of solvable problems conveyed to participants, 33%, 50%, or 66%, while the true proportion was (...)
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  12.  10
    Bullshit blind spots: the roles of miscalibration and information processing in bullshit detection.Shane Littrell & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):49-78.
    The growing prevalence of misleading information (i.e., bullshit) in society carries with it an increased need to understand the processes underlying many people’s susceptibility to falling for it. Here we report two studies (N = 412) examining the associations between one’s ability to detect pseudo-profound bullshit, confidence in one’s bullshit detection abilities, and the metacognitive experience of evaluating potentially misleading information. We find that people with the lowest (highest) bullshit detection performance overestimate (underestimate) their detection abilities and overplace (underplace) those (...)
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  13.  10
    Expertise overcomes impasse to yield far transfer and insight in problem-solving.Thomas C. Ormerod & Harriet Gross - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):24-48.
    Sources of difficulty in insight problem-solving have been identified, but current theories are less successful at explaining discovery of solution ideas. Here, we explore the role of expertise in promoting insight. In Experiment 1, experienced designers and financiers solved visual and verbal problems. Expertise did not influence solution rates for verbal problems, but designers solved more visual problems than financiers, despite similar incorrect initial attempts. In Experiment 2, experienced and novice designers attempted problems either unconstrained, prevented from drawing, or sitting (...)
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  14.  14
    The temporal dynamics of third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions: answers from a 2-response paradigm.Flora Schwartz, Anastasia Passemar, Hakim Djeriouat & Bastien Trémolière - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):109-134.
    Recent work supports the role of reasoning in third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions. The dynamics of the underlying cognitive processes supporting moral judgment is however poorly understood. In two preregistered experiments, we addressed this issue using a two-response paradigm. Participants were presented with moral scenarios twice: they had to provide their first judgment about an agent under both time pressure and interfering load, and were then asked to respond a second time at their own pace. In Experiment 1, participants (...)
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  15.  11
    Robust intuition? Exploring the difference in the strength of intuitions from perspective of attentional bias.Yunhong Wang, Wei Bao, Edward J. N. Stupple & Junlong Luo - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):169-194.
    The logical intuition hypothesis proposes a difference in the strength between logical and heuristic intuitions. The labels of logical and heuristic intuitions are exclusive to conventional reasoning research. This paper reports the result of testing intuition strength using the dot-probe methodology in a novel multiplication paradigm. Here, “logical intuition” and “heuristic intuition” were relabeled as “weaker intuition” (-1 × 5 = 5) and “stronger intuition” (1 × 5 = 5), respectively, to assess the assumptions about the difference in the strength (...)
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