Relational egalitarianism is a prominent theory of justice according to which justice requires equal relations. However, relational egalitarianism faces a central problem, i.e. the problem of intergenerational justice: the view is silent when it comes to relations between non-overlapping generations. In this paper, I want to explore whether relational egalitarians may escape the problem by adopting a different view of what it means to be relevantly related. I discuss four such views and argue that they all face two problems. Ultimately, (...) this means that relational egalitarians end up in a dilemma: Either relational egalitarians adopt their standard lexical view of social relations, but in that case the theory does not speak to relations between non-overlapping generations (the problem of intergenerational justice); or they adopt a non-lexical understanding of (social) relations in which case the theory does speak to relations between non-overlapping generations, but then (a) it is not clear that the relations are thick enough to ground relational, as opposed to distributive, requirements of justice, and (b) even if the relations are thick enough to ground relational requirements, it is hard to see that they can justify egalitarian, as opposed to, say, sufficientarian, relational requirements. (shrink)

Some theorists argue that relational egalitarianism offers no guidance for questions of justice between non-overlapping generations because the relevant kinds of social relations do not exist. To assess this challenge, I distinguish two versions of relational egalitarianism: an interpersonal approach that focuses on particular kinds of dispositions and attitudes, and an institutional approach that focuses on the kind of status people hold under institutions. I argue that the institutional approach meets the challenge. To illustrate this claim, I discuss several cases (...) involving climate change, public debt, and paternalism. Finally, I suggest how the approach I develop bears on the non-identity problem and on the choice of intergenerational distributive principle. (shrink)

Intergenerational justice has in recent decades become an increasingly important subfield of political philosophy. However, due to the absence of coexistence and other aspects of the intergenerational context, it is often unclear whether and how many ideals of justice apply. As such, relational egalitarianism – the view that justice requires equal social relationships – may appear particularly implausible in this domain. In this introduction, we explain this issue, motivating its further examination. Finally, we briefly summarize how the papers in this (...) volume take up this challenge and offer insightful developments on both fronts, advancing our understanding of intergenerational justice and relational egalitarianism. (shrink)

Recent critics of relational equality as an ideal of justice have questioned whether the ideal has any implications for justice between non-overlapping generations. In this paper, I argue that relational equality does have something important to say about what we owe to future generations, which is not captured by an exclusive focus on distributive equality: we owe future generations the capacity to relate to each other as equals. This capacity is undermined not only when resources or savings are significantly depleted (...) by the present generation, but also when the present generation fails to transform the oppressive social categories by which we relate to others. While these categories were not set up by the present generation, I argue that we still have a duty to contribute to changing them, and failing to do so can result in a double wrong: a wrong against our fellow contemporaries, as well as future persons who are ascribed membership in these categories. (shrink)

Social relations play a crucial role in relational egalitarian accounts of justice. Intuitively, however, we can stand in relations of justice to future generations with whom we do not overlap in time and to whom we for that reason are not socially related. This is the background to the Argument from Temporal Non-Overlap and its conclusion that relational egalitarianism offers an incomplete theory of justice. I rebut attempts to resist the argument, or its conclusion, based on Sommers’ distinction between relationships (...) and social relations; Karnein’s Rawlsian account of intergenerational social cooperation; and the distinction between the ground and the content of norms of justice. More generally, I suggest that relational egalitarians face a dilemma in trying to specify what qualifies as social relations from the point of view of justice in such a way that, plausibly, social relations form the content and ground of obligations of justice, but that relations between individuals that do not qualify as social in this sense do not. (shrink)

Relational egalitarianism holds that people should live together as equals. We argue against the received wisdom amongst both friends and foes of relational egalitarianism that it fails to provide a theory of intergenerational justice. Instead, we argue that relational egalitarianism is concerned with social equality amongst future contemporaries, and that this commitment gives rise to duties of justice for current generations that can be grounded in the idea of generational overlap. In doing so, we argue that that the scope of (...) relational egalitarian concerns extends beyond generations amongst whom social relations exist. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the intergenerational problem for relational egalitarianism. It follows Karnein (2023), Nolt (2011), Smith (2013), and others in analysing the issue in terms of intergenerational domination but rejects their claim that the best way to understand the problem is through a group conception of domination involving current generations dominating future generations. My aim in this paper is to replace these existing accounts. I argue that intergenerational domination is better understood structurally via a Role-Based Model, where domination occurs (...) through institutions and social structures. The core idea is that our institutions and social structures created and maintained by earlier generations, enable some future generations to dominate others through and in virtue of their social roles. Because roles are the site where structure meets agency, this Role-Based Model (1) explains how the actions of only some members within a generation – whether from preceding or future generations – contribute to intergenerational domination, and (2) accurately identifies which future individuals or groups are most likely to become victims of intergenerational domination based on their roles and position within these structures. The implication is that social roles are crucial to intergenerational domination. This insight is pertinent to debates on some of the most pressing political and ethical issues of our time such as how to safeguard future generations from the consequences of climate change, antibiotic resistance, and the costs of long-term public debt. Without this Role-Based Model, we risk mischaracterising the problem and implementing ineffective solutions. (shrink)

Freedom and security are often portrayed as things that have to be traded off against one another, but this view does not capture the full complexity of the freedom-security relationship. Rather, there seem to be four different ways in which freedom and security connect to each other: freedom can come at the cost of security, security can come at the cost of freedom, freedom can work to the benefit of security, and security can work to the benefit of freedom. This (...) paper analyses each of these connections in turn. It shows that particular understandings of freedom can help us to see particular connections between freedom and security. The practical examples used to illustrate these connections are drawn from the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be suggested that, in the face of challenges such as this one, taking into account all four connections between freedom and security can ultimately help decision-makers in upholding both. (shrink)

Keum’s book makes a significant intervention into the discourse on myth which continues to view myth predominantly as illusory, false, and morally wrong. In introducing an alternative tradition of literary myth, she effectively calls this view into question. The political and normative ramifications of literary myth remain somewhat underexplored, however. In my reflections, I ask how the book defines ‘political myth’. I suggest that a more detailed comparison between the Sorelian and the literary conception of myth would be useful. In (...) particular, it would help to clarify the normative gap between the book’s stronger claims of myth’s significance for reason and its weaker calls for vigilance and pluralism. I close by encouraging an analytic of political myth that goes beyond philosophical pedagogy. (shrink)

The idea of ‘counter-control’ has greatly added to Philip Pettit's theoretical framework of freedom as non-domination, not only helping Pettit to meet prominent analytical criticisms from contemporary liberal theorists, but also helping to better illuminate the possibility of ‘unmoralized’ interference without domination. But while this idea has helped to increase the attractiveness of freedom as non-domination as a philosophical ideal, it has also revealed some disparities between Pettit’s theoretical framework and the practical model of governance to which he ascribes – (...) disparities which call into question the model’s overall ability to guard against imperium and tackle the issue of political legitimacy. In this paper, I review two of these disconnects. First, I discuss how Pettit’s interpretation of ‘individualized’ influence leads him to overlook some of the institutions that would be necessary to satisfy this theoretical constraint. Second, I illustrate how Pettit fails to account for his own axiom of positionality when discussing the institutions that allow citizens to exert ‘unconditioned’ influence, or ‘control’ over legislative direction. In concluding, I draw several inferences from these arguments for neo-republicans continuing to engage in democracy-building. (shrink)

This paper examines the suggestion in Tae-Yeoun Keum’s Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought that myth and reason can be reconciled in a practice of philosophy. If that practice remains centered around critical reasoning, and myth is resistant to such reasoning, then Keum’s argument seems to suggest that resistance to critical reasoning must be somehow necessary to critical reasoning. How to make sense of this apparent contradiction? Exploring the ambiguous relationship between myth and truth, I explore several ways (...) of understanding Keum’s contribution. (shrink)

Do individuals have moral duties to fulfil all the demands of their jobs? In this paper, we discuss how to understand such ‘occupational duties’ and their normative bases, with a specific focus on duties that go beyond contractually agreed upon duties. Against views that reduce occupational duties to contractual duties, we argue that they often have greater moral weight, based on skills, roles, and the duty of social cooperation. We discuss what it would take to make sure that individuals are (...) not unfairly overburdened by such occupational duties, distinguishing between choice conditions (voluntariness, availability of alternatives, full information) and conditions concerning the role and the social structures within which such duties are embedded (feasible role design, existence of support structures, employee voice). These conditions, however, are not fulfilled for many existing jobs, especially for jobs typically occupied by structurally disadvantaged groups such as women or ethnic minorities. This leads to a dilemma between the claims of those who depend on the occupational duties to be fulfilled, and the rights of those who hold these occupations and are unfairly overburdened. We conclude by arguing for the need for structural reform to dissolve this dilemma. (shrink)

This paper questions the argument in Tae-Yeoun Keum’s Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought about the relation between myth and philosophical discourse. In the context of Plato’s Republic in particular, myth remains but one of the several devices that are presented as acceptable only if they are vetted by and consistent with reason. More generally, I ask about the justification or grounding of myth, and how we can know that myth is warranted if it is incommensurable with reason.

Advocates of gentrification regard it as a strategy of urban rehabilitation. Critics see in it the displacement of people from old neighborhoods, the polarizing of communities and both the expression and exacerbation of existing inequalities. Within political theory, assessments of gentrification have engaged primarily in evaluating gentrification’s benefits (rehabilitation) and burdens (displacements). In this paper, I argue gentrification is best understood as a relationship of domination between, on the one hand, the producers and consumers of gentrification, connected to one another (...) by a state-administered legislative apparatus that both commodifies land and makes it available as a consumable product, and on the other, all those individuals who are outside of that relationship, but who must nevertheless live in the shadows it casts. Focusing on how the boons of rehabilitated urban space can be weighed against the burdens assumed by displaced people is thus beside the point: domination is baked into gentrification as a strategy of capitalist urban development and should therefore be rejected. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to critics of Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought. First, I defend my choice to carve up the concept of myth into deep myths and literary myths. I address concerns that the effective focus of my book on literary myths risks jettisoning the political stakes of myth, and that it may not solve the definitional problems the move seeks to mitigate. Second, I answer my critics’ invitation to elaborate on the relationship between myth (...) and critical reason. In particular, I attempt to resolve the tension they perceive between my definition of myth, as a medium that is distinctively opaque to criticism, and my argument that it can complement critical thought. (shrink)

This introduction presents an overview of Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought and its central arguments. I situate the contributions of the book within theoretical work on political myth, both traditional and more recent, and also within scholarship on the philosophical function of Plato’s myths. Whereas political theorists have long conceived of myth in pathological terms, Plato and the Mythic Tradition joins a growing body of work envisioning a more constructive role for myth in politics and philosophy. This (...) was a task that preoccupied Plato and some of his most significant modern readers. Recovering their common project, moreover, helps us tell a different story about Plato’s philosophical myths and their reception in modern political thought. (shrink)

Prior to the democratic breakthrough in most Western countries, the right to vote was premised on a person’s economic contribution. No country today reserves voting rights exclusively to contributors, but economic contribution matters once again. It matters for immigrants’ access to citizenship and its associated political rights, and it matters for emigrants’ attempts to keep the right to vote in their ‘home country’. Economic contribution has attracted very little attention in the literature on democratic inclusion. The few scholars who have (...) discussed it have rejected it based on its expected implications, without going into detail about its different instantiations and normative underpinnings. This paper lays the foundation for a more thorough critique. Informed by historical practices, we distinguish between two main types of economic contributivist regulations: those that condition the right to vote on the size of the contribution, and those that condition it on compliance with legally required contributions. We suggest that contributivism can be based either on property rights or on reciprocity. We conclude the paper by contrasting contributivism with established principles of democratic inclusion (such as the all-affected principle), and by arguing that, unlike these other principles, contributivism is incompatible with the democratic ideal of self-rule. (shrink)

This essay raises three questions: What has myth been? What can myth do? And does recognising the centrality of mythmaking and imaginative narration to political theory across time have implications for how we approach political theory's modern history? First, I suggest that discussions of myth in early modern England were embedded within broader debates about the nature and power of poetry. This raises questions about how we delineate the criteria for myth as opposed to other forms of imaginative narration. Then (...) I ask whether myths are not simply obfuscating, as often assumed, but also potentially truth-making? Finally, if a constitutive aspect of political theory across time has been a preoccupation with myth, this gives us further ground (if such further ground is needed) to attend to feminist theorists in the 1960s and 70s, for whom a central task was to expose and debunk prevailing myths. (shrink)

Democracy is assumed to require the equal political inclusion of denizens, as sustained political inequalities between members of society seemingly undermine the democratic ideal of equal freedom. This assumption is prominently expressed by Walzer’s Principle of Political Justice, according to which democratic institutions must attribute equal political rights to denizens in order to sustain their equal protection from domination and the recognition required for free agency. This paper rejects this influential assumption. We argue that denizenship constitutes a social position in (...) which equal freedom can be enjoyed without political inclusion on equal terms to citizens. Many denizens are citizens somewhere else, and enjoy status, rights, and protections in virtue of their external citizenship, which can protect them from domination and provide them with the recognitional basis of self-respect. The cross-border relationships between denizens and their home country, as well as between the host country and the home country, must therefore be considered when evaluating claims to political inclusion. Accepting the democratic legitimacy of the partial political inclusion of denizens allows us to focus on the most pressing political claims, such as those of refugees and stateless persons. Partial inclusion schemes can also make less restrictive immigration policies more rational and desirable for citizens. (shrink)

Should immigrants have fewer cultural and language rights than citizens and long-settled groups, and if so, on what moral ground? In the first part of the paper, we develop a novel critique of Kymlicka’s account of voluntary cultural rights alienation, arguing that it is only plausible in the context of emigration, not immigration. We argue that the choice to immigrate cannot be considered voluntary without it being sufficiently clear to the migrant what her rights and duties will be in the (...) new society. If so, then voluntariness cannot morally ground a particular rights regime in the destination country. Any such rights regime must be justified on independent moral grounds. Secondly, we argue that voluntariness can play a different role in a normative argument for cultural rights-differentiation between citizens and denizens. It can i) mitigate the overall injustice of differential treatment; and it can ii) instantiate the justice of how rules apply to the immigrant in a reasonably just society. Thirdly, we sketch an alternative moral grounding of cultural and language rights differentiation that rests, not on voluntariness, but on a contextual analysis of the relevant interests involved. While the protection of these relevant interests gives us reasons to prioritize the language(s) of long-settled groups in many cases, there is no general case for restricting the full recognition of language and culture to long-settled groups. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that there are good reasons to permit states to engage in their own forms of prioritization of refugees for admission, if doing so enables more refugees overall to find safety. I identify three distinct clusters of programs that states operate, those that emphasize contribution-based reciprocity, those that emphasize anticipated benefit, and those that elevate cultural considerations. I assess the legitimacy of these programs separately, and then consider them together, to defend the view that – overall, (...) considering the profound need for resettlement spots – they warrant our normative support. At least at first glance, the reason that these programs are legitimate is that they are all underpinned by principles in moral philosophy that in general command widespread support. In the final section, I examine the discomfort they generate, and suggest that the discomfort has three related sources: (i) that there is something wrong with considering the benefits refugees may bring when at issue is simply whether states are carrying out their moral duties towards them; (ii) that the result of permitting such prioritization is that those who are most vulnerable are left behind; and (iii) that cultural considerations can easily slide into racist considerations. While I agree that we must be attentive to how these programs operate in practice, and whether they generate harm (in particular, more harm than good), I believe that in the current context, these objections can be adequately countered so that we should in general offer these programs our cautious, and conditional, support. (shrink)

This paper examines the normative justification for special rights for Indigenous peoples whose traditional territories straddle contemporary international borders. Examining the Mohawks of Akwesasne (Quebec, Ontario, and New York state) and the Tohono O’odham (Arizona and Sonora, Mexico) as cases, I demonstrate how state claims to territorial jurisdiction and border regulation often interfere with the lives of Indigenous people whose social, cultural, economic, spiritual and political practices and relationships cluster across contemporary international boundaries. Through the concept of group occupancy interests, (...) I argue that members of Indigenous nations whose territories straddle borders possess special rights to access and use lands presently claimed by states of which they are not recognized citizens. Moreover, I demonstrate how border-straddling Indigenous nations challenge the unlimited sovereignty of contemporary states with respect to border policy: the occupancy and self-determination interests of Indigenous peoples may ground the moral rights of their communities to co-manage international border crossings with states. Finally, I argue that collective interests in cross-border political identities and self-determination can ground the rights of Indigenous peoples to form unified cross-border jurisdictional units that demand recognition by states, alongside the rights of Indigenous peoples to regulate group membership. (shrink)

This paper argues against the claim that liberal democratic societies’ commitment to political equality requires them to offer a path to citizenship to temporary migrant workers (i.e. the democratic justice argument). I advance two arguments against this claim: (i) that access to citizenship is neither sufficient nor necessary to reduce temporary migrant workers’ exploitation and (ii) the democratic justice argument hinges on an untenable conception of status inequality. The paper fleshes out these two reasons in detail to then present an (...) adequate analysis of the status difference that temporary labor migration programs (TLMPs) give rise to. I conclude that TLMPs’ restriction of their participants’ rights and access to citizenship can be compatible with democratic principles and, particularly, with political equality. (shrink)

Many argue that, given the all-subjected principle, non-temporary immigrants should have access to citizenship, challenging differences in rights between denizens and citizens. This article reassesses this conclusion by examining the case for a pathway to citizenship for denizens and asking whether former denizens, now citizens, can be denied some rights existing citizens have. It reconstructs Hart’s distinction between general and special rights, demonstrating with reference to Kant how the special right to political citizenship stems from general rights. This elucidates why (...) denizens are entitled to a path to political citizenship. The article further explores how the exercise of citizenship can lead to additional special rights, scrutinizing whether these must also accrue to new citizens. It discusses conditions under which these further special rights might justify a distinction between citizens. The conclusion argues that reserving certain rights for some citizens is interesting for rethinking democratic theory in light of increasing mobility, less for justifying different rights for citizens and former denizens. (shrink)

Under which conditions, if any, is it morally permissible for states to grant non-citizen residents (‘denizens’) different political, socio-economic, and cultural rights than citizens? What, if anything, could justify legal rights-differentiations along the lines of citizenship? This special issue scrutinizes these politically increasingly salient questions from a wide range of perspectives, drawing on recent literature in the ethics of migration, citizenship, multiculturalism, and refuge, as well as on normative theories of law, territory, and settler colonialism. In this introduction to the (...) volume, I sketch a conceptual map of the emerging debate on justice for denizens, making explicit some underlying theoretical assumptions common to each of the three key domains of legal rights-differentiations (political, socio-economic, and cultural rights). I distinguish the question of what is owed to denizens as a matter of justice, from that of what justice permits and requires in respect to denizens generally. And I outline four models, implicit in the literature, for theorizing the moral rights different types of denizens have and lack – to help determine which forms of unequal treatment wrong them. I conclude by providing brief summaries of the seven contributing articles, pinpointing them on my conceptual map. (shrink)

Can awarding migrants fewer legal rights than citizens ever be just? This paper explores this issue. I first outline an abstract argument in favor of rights differentiation. According to this argument, people’s rights ought to track their independent claims; since these claims may vary, some rights differentiation is permissible. I then suggest that this argument threatens to undermine the institution of citizenship because citizens’ claims on the state can differ in just the way migrants’ claims can, and the rights of (...) citizenship can be unbundled and awarded piecemeal. To resolve this tension, I offer a novel account of the normative functions of citizenship, which turns on the assertion that citizenship’s public conferral of equal rights promotes status equality and confers equal recognition. This account sets firm bounds on rights differentiation without ruling it out entirely. (shrink)

Relational egalitarians sometimes argue that a degree of distributive equality is necessary for social equality to obtain among members of society. In this paper, we consider how such arguments fare when extended to the intergenerational case. In particular, we examine whether relational reasons for distributive equality apply between non-overlapping generations. We claim that they do not. We begin by arguing that the most common reasons relational egalitarians offer in favour of distributive equality between contemporaries do not give us reasons to (...) object to distributive inequality between non-overlapping generations. This argument by itself however will not fully suffice to show that there are no relational reasons to care about intergenerational distributive equality, given the nature of relational equality and its requirements in the intergenerational case are likely to be qualitatively different than in the contemporary case. Therefore, we also make the positive argument that for the intergenerational case to satisfy the requirements demanded by the ideal of relational equality it suffices that future persons’ interests are meaningfully incorporated and protected in the decision-making of preceding generations, and there is no basis for a concern with distributive equality. While some have argued that the one-way and asymmetrical causal influence between non-overlapping generations means concerns of social equality are inapplicable in the intergenerational case, we argue that the ongoing nature of this influence makes concerns of social equality appropriate. If successful, the upshot of the argument is that it can be coherent to maintain a commitment to relational equality between non-overlapping generations, all while remaining agnostic about distributive equality between them. (shrink)

This paper argues that if the critics of the currently dominant notice-and-consent model of governing digital data transactions are correct, then they should oppose political reforms of the model. The crux of the argument is as follows: the reasons the critics give for doubting the effectiveness of notice-and-consent in protecting user privacy (namely, ordinary users’ various cognitive deficiencies and the inherent inscrutability of the subject matter) are also reasons for doubting the effectiveness of protecting user privacy through democratic or regulatory (...) means. Furthermore, insofar as attempts to improve the notice-and-consent model through more legislation or regulation would also involve more coercion than the status quo, they should be resisted on normative grounds. So, out of the bad options we have when it comes to protecting digital privacy, it seems – contrary to the majority position advanced in the literature – that we should stick with notice-and-consent. (shrink)